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ABSTRACT
Ever since its creation, Jordan has depended on foreign aid for 
her survival. Throughout its history (from the 1920's till the present 
day), the geopolitical position of the country has ensured it a continual 
flow of foreign aid by the Western World whom the Middle East has been 
both of political and economic interest. The aid received during the 
period 1924-1972 was not for economic development. In fact, it was given 
for political motives.
Although J.D. 681.5 million spread over two decades may seem small, 
the amount constitutes a large proportion of Jordan's budget revenues, 
imports and G.D.P. This study is intended to analyse the magnitude, 
composition and effects of foreign aid which Jordan received over the 
period 1924-1972.
Chapter I provides a background to this study by describing the 
developments in the principal sectors of the Jordanian economy. Chapter 
II on the other hand specifies the magnitude, kind and distribution of 
foreign aid received by Jordan. As far as the kind of foreign aid is 
concerned, the country has received most of the aid in the form of 
grants. The grants received by Jordan were mainly in the form of 
budgetary aid. Most of the Government expenditure, to a large extent 
financed by aid was devoted to defence and the maintenance of 
administrative machinery, and relatively little was spent on economic 
development. Chapter III is an extension of Chapter II. It traces the 
sources of foreign aid and the motives, economic and political, behind it.
The total volume of debt, the debt service payments, the burden of 
debt on the economy and the sectoral distribution of foreign loans are the 
issues discussed in Chapter IV. Besides these there is also
(ii)
a discussion of the financial terms on which loans were given. It was 
found that debt service payments have posed no problem to Jordan. An 
analysis of the distribution of loans showed that the distribution was 
heavily biased in the favour of the services-producing and against the 
goods-producing sectors. This pattern of distribution, however, did 
not improve the debt service capacity of the economy and was not in 
accordance with the priorities of the Jordanian economy.. Further, in 
"financial terms" most of the borrowing by Jordan has been worthwhile.
Most loans received with the exception of commercial loans involved a 
significant degree of concession. Chapter V discusses the non-financial 
terms of loans and their possible effects. The analysis shows that loans 
given to Jordan were tied to projects and to projects and procurements 
in the donors' home markets (double-tied loans). The principal effect 
of project^tied loans was on the allocation of resources. On the other 
hand, double-tied loans, coupled with the incompetence of the economic 
apparatus in Jordan, has enabled donors to substitute Jordan's investment 
preferences for their own. Furthermore, double-tied loans raised the 
cost of projects undertaken and consequently reduced the real value of the 
tied aid.
Chapter VI discusses the performances of hcome, savings, investment 
and consumption and the possible effect of foreign aid on these macro-economic 
variables. Finally, Chapter VII attempts to bring together the analyses 
and conclusions of previous chapters on the composition and effect of 
foreign aid to Jordan.
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1DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRINCIPAL SECTORS OF THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY. 
1924-1925/1972-1973" —
PART ONE: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND A SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS 
PRIOR TO THE 1950'iT “
A— THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND:
Before the First World War, Transjordan was a part of the Turkish 
Empire. From 1894 until the First World War, it formed a part of the 
Ottoman province of Syria. The break-up of the Ottoman Empire resulted 
in the British assuming the political control of the region. During 
the course of the'First World War, the British government made con­
flicting promises to the Jews and the Arab inhabitants of the area.
On the one hand, Arabs were promised the political control of Palestine.
On the other hand, Jews were granted the right, in the form of Balfour 
Declaration, to establish their home in Palestine,1
As a separate political entity, Transjordan dates back to 1920 when 
on the collapse of Feisal's short-lived Syrian Kingdom, the High 
Commissioner of Palestine made a declaration to an assembly of Skeiks 
(notables) at El-Salt that Great Britain favours a system of local self- 
government under British tutelage. Amir Abdullah ibn Hussain, elder 
brother of King Feisal, arrived in Transj’ordan accompanied by a tiny force 
from Hijaz looking forward to raising tribes and heading for Syria against 
the French authorities who deposed King Feisal on July 15,1920: "In 1921, 
at a meeting in Jerusalem, Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for 
Colonies, Col. Lawrence, Amir Abdullah, and Sir Herbert Samuel, High 
Commissioner of Palestine, the Amir agreed to abandon the contemplated
CHAPTER I
1 Congress of the United States, Committee on Foreign Affairs, background 
information on Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya,-Morocco, Palestine, 
Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Lebanon, Transjordan, Tunisia, Turkey. Yemen, 
(Washington: no. pub., September 2,1947),p.73. ‘
2Syrian Campaign and to take over administration of Transjordan under 
the Palestine mandate which had been entrusted to Great Britain by the 
San Remo Conference on April 25,1920."
It is worth noting, at this stage, that the. creation of Jordan was 
a by-product of international politics. The new entity was based on 
political considerations and it could be argued that it was not self 
sustaining. Politically as well as economically it lacked the basic 
conditions of independent survival. It had meagre national resources 
and historically it always formed a part of the economics of Syria 
and Palestine.
To ensure the survival of the new state, Britain offered financial 
support as well as administrative backing. The financial support took 
the form of an annual subsidy to the government budget and the 
maintenance of the army. So, foreign aid to Jordan is not a new 
phenomenon. Ever since its creation, Jordan has depended on foreign 
aid for its survival. Throughout its history (from the 1920’s till the 
present day), the geo-political position of the country ensured it a 
continual flow of foreign aid by the Western World whom the Middle East 
has been both of political and economic interest. Later on in Chapter III 
we will examine the motives for aid to Jordan. It will be argued then 
that the motives were mainly political. 1
1 A. Konikoff, Transj*ordan - An Economic Survey. (Jerusalem:
Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 
1946), p.ll.
3B - A SUMMARY OF THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY 
PRIOR TO THE 1950's:
Our object here is to describe the main features of the Jordanian 
economy with a view to providing the necessary background to the 
analysis of the magnitude, composition and economic effects of foreign 
aid to Jordan. For the purpose, the period 1924-1972 is divided into 
two parts: 1924-1950 and 1950-1972. This division is based on the 
fact that 1950 witnessed the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan - an entity composed of the Eastern province (Transjordan) and 
the segment of Palestine left over after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
The economy of Transj*ordan at the time of the foundation of the 
country was almost entirely agricultural; most of the national income 
was drawn from and most of the population employed in this sector.
Barley and wheat were the main winter crops. Grapes, olives and 
tobacco were the other principal agricultural crops. The agricultural 
sector was more or less self-subsistent. Production techniques were 
primitive and agricultural production varied from year to year with 
changes in the weather. The government intervention in the sector 
was minimal and the agricultural extension services practically non­
existent. The Agricultural Bank was the only specialised credit 
institution which extended credit to this sector.
For most part, whatever industry existed was restricted to the 
processing of agricultural produce, e.g: the production of olive oil, 
flour millingf manufacture of drinks and food etc. Apart from these, 
cement, pottery, tanning and two tobacco manufacturing enterprises were 
examples of other industries. Further, a fair part of manufacturing took 
the form of handicraft production. Of the limited mineral resources 
available in the country, i.e., phosphate, clay, sand and marble, a few 
were exploited.
The pattern of foreign trade was that of an underdeveloped country 
and it was characterised by a persistent balance of trade deficit.
Exports consisted of agricultural commodities while imports of finished 
and semi-finished consumer goods. The volume of exports, and given 
their composition, depended heavily on weather conditions. As for the 
geographical distribution of trade, Japan and the neighbouring Arab 
countries were the main sources of imports, and most of the exports 
went to the neighbouring Arab countries (Palestine, Syria, Iraq and 
Saudi-Arabia).
Indirect taxes and foreign aid in the form of budget subsidies were 
the main source of government revenues. The tax base was limited, it 
consisted of few taxes and their incidence was restricted to the main 
urban areas. Of the indirect taxes, customs duties were the largest 
domestic source of revenues. As for government expenditures, a large 
proportion of them went to the maintenance of the army and the police.
Though Jordan had unique and outstanding archaeological sites and 
holy places, the government paid no special attention to the development 
of tourism. The development was,completely left to private initiative. 
As compared to the neighbouring Palestine, tourism remained under­
developed in Transjordan due to the lack of accommodation, communication 
and other infra-structural facilities.
PART TWO: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRINCIPAL SECTORS OVER THE 1950*s.
After the Palestine War of 1948, on April 24 1950, Transj’ordan and 
the Eastern part of Palestine were united in a single state - a 
constitutional monarchy called later "the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan".^
1 U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Data Book, 
Near East and Independent Africa, (Washington, D.C.; 1952), O.I.R., 
No. 5531, (Revised), p.67.
5As a result of the War the area of Jordan increased from 34,750 sq. k.m.
to 37,150 sq. k.m., of which the total cultivable area was estimated to
be only 1,765,000 acres. * In other words, the unification of the
two banks of the River Jordan resulted in an increase in the arable land.
2(+ %). On the other hand, the population of Jordan tripled as
a result of the incorporation of Eastern Palestine in Jordan. The 
population swelled even more as a result of the influx of 350,000 
Palestinian refugees from Israel.
The 1948 War had serious economic consequences for the country. 
Firstly, it led to the influx of a large number of refugees and secondly, 
it cut the country off from its traditional markets and the principal 
outlet to the sea (Haifa Port).
Since its creation, Jordan's political existence and its economic
viability have been in doubt. In a survey of the Transjordanian economy
in 1946, A. Konikoff argued for close and complementary relations between
the Jordanian and Palestinian economies on the grounds that the two were
3complementary and that they are not self-sustaining on their own. After 
the 1948 War, a team from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (I.B.R.D.) visited Jordan and in its report emphasised the 
fragile condition of the Jordanian economy and the necessity of foreign 
aid as the condition of survival of the economy. ^
1 Paul Grounds Phillips, The Hash»mite Kingdom of Jordan: Prolegomena to 
a Technical Assistance Program, Ph.D. Dissertation, (Chicago; Illinois, 
March,1954), Research Paper no. 34, p.102.
2 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic 
Development of Jordan, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1961), p.41.
3 A. Konikoff, op.cit., p.94.
4 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, op.cit., p.4.
6Starting with the national incomes, now we go on to review the 
developments in the principal sectors of the economy.
A - THE NATIONAL INCOME:
Prior to the period under review (.1924-1951), the national income 
was not calculated. The first estimates of the national income, made 
in 1952, were based on the value added in different sectors. It is 
these estimates of the value added which enabled us to describe the 
structure of the economy. ^
As can be seen from the following table, the national income
fluctuated from year to year. The main reason for these fluctuations
was that a substantial proportion of the national income originated from 
2agriculture. Over the period G.D.P. grew at an average yearly rate of 
about 9% at current prices. This increase in gross income was spread 
over most sectors prominent among which were construction (+ 22.0%), 
transport (+ 15.0%), services (+15.0%), mining and manufacturing (+12.0%), 
ownership of dwellings (+ 10.4%), public administration and defence (+ 10.5%) 
and finally the trade and banking sector (10.1%). 12
1 A.Y. Badre and associates estimated Jordan’s income of 1952-1954 
according to the product approach, whereas the I.B.R.D. Mission 
followed the sectoral value added approach. See A.Y. Badre and 
associates, The National Income of Jordan, 1952-1954, (Beirut: 
Economic Research Institute, A.U.B., n.d.).
2 1955 was a bad agricultural year whereas 1956 was good.
TABLE I
PERCENTAGES OF GROWTH IN THE VALUE ADDED OF SECTORS
1954-1959
Period Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
at Factor 
Cost
Agriculture
&
Forestry
Mining, 
Manuf ac— 
turing & 
Electricity
Const­
ruction
Trans­
port
Banking
&
Trade
Owner­
ship
of
Dwellings
Public
Adminis­
tration
&
Defence
Services
1954 - *"■ - - - -
1955 -10,0 -56.3 24,0 25,0 25.0 7.0 10,0
1956 43,0 206.5 21.2 13.3 24.0 13.0 26,0 19.0 -18.2
1957 1.0 -33.0 8.0 12.0 22.1 14.3 7.0 16.0 37.0
1958 12.0 1.0 12.0 26.3 8.4 20.0 6.5 17.3 5.4
1959 6.1 -19.0 4.0 54.2 8.0 13.0 27.3 3.2 54.0
Average 
of 1954- 
1959 9.Q *6.5 12,0 22.0 15.0 10.* *1.1 *0.4 *5,0
Source: Based on Table 1, Appendix I
8The influx of refugees, the rapid increase in population and the 
loss of traditional outlets made it necessary for the government and 
the private sector to undertake infra-structural projects, Data in 
Table l.A reflects the structural changes in the economy whereby sectors 
such as construction, transport, trade and banking emerged as large 
contributors to the national income.
If we compare the average contribution of sectors to G.D,P. in
1958-1959 with that of 1954-1955, it emerges that the importance of 
agriculture - the largest sector of the economy, declined relative to 
other sectors of the economy. Total available resources in 1959 as a 
percentage of those in 1954 rose by about 200.4%. The G.D.P. contribution 
to this total could be regarded as a rough indicator of the capacity of 
the Jordanian economy to produce more output.^ To put the structural 
change of the economy's income in a more concise form one could say that 
the sectoral distribution of income changed in such a way as to make the
contribution of the services sectors rise from 58.9% in 1954 to 70% in
. . . 21959, while the contribution of the sectors producing tangibles declined.
(See Table l.B.)
■ M  M  1 '^  < I M  II > M  > K  ^  H  T -  n  I I 1 ■! n  M  1 M  | >| I  I  ^1 .  « '■ -  « ■ h » ■ i i , in ,  ,  .  ,
1 Total available resources as defined in the Jordanian national 
accounts are equal to gross domestic product plus imports of 
goods and services; see Table 2, Appendix I.
2 In Chapter v  ] an examination will be undertaken of the factors 
and the mechanisms by which foreign aid changed the structural 
development of the Jordanian economy.
TABLE l.A
CONTRIBUTIONS OP SECTORS TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
1954-1959
IN PERCENTAGES
‘ Period Agriculture&
Forestry
Manuf ac turing 
&
Mining & 
Electricity
Construction Transport Trade & 
Banking
Ownership
of
Dwellings
Public
Administration 
& Defence
Services
1954 29.8 8.8 2.5 9.2 19.5 4.8 19.0 6.3
1955 14.4 12.1 3.5 12.8 21.6 5.3 22.6 7.7
1956 31.0 10.3 3.0 11.1 17.1 4.7 18.7 4.4
1957 20.7 11.0 3.1 13.4 19.4 5.0 21.5 6.0
1958 18.7 11.0 3.5 13.0 20.8 4.8 22.6 5.6
1959 14.3 11.0 5.0 13.2 22.1 5.7 22.0 8.2
Average
Contri­
bution
1954-59. 21.5 11.0 3.4 12.1 20.1 5.1 21.0 6.4
Average Value Added 
in 1958-59 as Z of 
Average Value Added 
in 1954-55. 114.7 164.9 226.0 189.0 164.5 163.0 168.6 157.1
Ranks of Sectors 
According to Average 
Value Added in 1958- 
1959 as Z of Average 
Value Added in 1954- 
1955. 8 4 1 2 5 6 3 7
Source: Based on Table 1, Appendix I.
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RATIOS OF MATERIAL AND SERVICES PRODUCING SECTORS TO G.D.P.
TABLE l.B.
Period Ratio of Material 
Producing Sectors 
to G.D.P.
Ratio of Services 
Producing Sectors 
to G.D.P.
1954 41.1 58.9
1955 30.0 70.0
1956 44.0 56.0
1957 35.0 65.0
1958 33.1 66.9
1959 30.0 70.0
Average
1954-59 35.5 64.5
Source: Table 1, Appendix I.
The growth performance of the economy in the post-1948 period far 
exceeded the expectations of observers and economic analyists.^ However, 
it should be noted that the rates of growth in income refer to income at 
current and not constant prices, so changes in income represent both 
changes in quantities and changes in prices. Unfortunately, the data on 
price changes are not available. Nevertheless, the available price index 
of wholesale prices in Amman during the first half ofJhe 1950's indicates 
that price changes were negligible.
1 (a) I.B.R.D., op.cit., p.4, p.10 and pp.66-68;
(b) J. Baster, "The Economic Problems of Jordan", International Affairs, 
Voi. 31, January 1955, pp.26-35;
(c) R.J. Ward, "Self Help Criteria in the Development of Jordan," 
Economic Internazionale, Voi. XVIII, 1965.
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WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX IN AMMAN (1950 - 100)
TABLE l.C
Period Cereals & 
Wheat Flour
Other Foodstuffs Construction
Materials
Fuel
•
General
1954 75.2 92.8 94.3 95.5 80.6
1955 91.3 90.5 99.9 96.0 91.9
1956 83.5 89.7 105.7 98.0 86.7
1957 80.3 97.4 106.1 92.2 85.4
1958 94.1 83.2 89.7 84.2 91.3
1959 98.4 . 74.7 92.3 88.3 93.3
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, Annual Statistical Yearbook, 
(Amman: Department of Statistics Press, 1960).
Increases in prices of cereals and wheat flour (see Table l.C.) in 
the later part of the 1950's were due to crop failures (see Graph no. 1). 
Apart from the price index, there were other factors which further suggest 
that prices during the period were negligible, namely: (a) the labour 
force in Jordan was not unionised and the elasticity of the supply of 
labour, over a wide band was, it could be argued, infinite, (b) Low 
tariffs and the liberal trade policy followed by the government coupled 
with smuggling implied a high price elasticity of supply of goods.
(c) Though demand for housing, as a result of the influx of refugees, 
increased, legal restrictions on increases in rent made them insensitive 
to demand. (d) On average, the harvests over the period were good.
B - THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
The economy in general as in previous periods relied heavily on 
this sector. It provided livelihood to three-quarters of the non­
refugee population. As before, wheat and barley remained the main crops 
and they were almost entirely produced on non-irrigated lands. That 
in turn meant that yields of the main crops were crucially dependent on
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the rainfall. This sector, as shown by Table l.D, grew at an average 
yearly rate of about 16.5%. Though the relative importance of agriculture 
declined over time, it contributed about 21.5% of G.D.P. over the period 
1954-1959.
TABLE l.D.
THE VALUE ADDED IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
1954-1959 ___________
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Value Absolute Change % Change Share in G.D.P. %
1954 14.2 29.8
1955 6.2 -8.0 -56.3 14.4
1956 19.0 12.8 206.5 31.0
1957 12.8 -6.2 -33.0 20.7
1958 12.9 0.1 1.0 18.7
1959 10.5 -2.4 -19.0 14.3
Average
1954-59 13.0 -0.6 16.5 21.5
I
Source: Based on Table 1, Appendix I.
1 Table 3, Appendix I gives the principal agricultural crops and 
fluctuations in their output. It is necessary to point out that 
agricultural data in Jordan is deficient in a number of respects:
(a) It is difficult to acquire and if available one has to 
scrutinize it with great care.
(b) Data is collected by incompetent officials from semi-illiterate 
farmers where questions and answers are often misunderstood by 
both parties.
(c) Data is often accumulated by different sources, including 
foreign sources. However, reconciliation of figures is 
difficult to accomplish.
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A number of projects were undertaken with a view to extending the 
irrigated land area, the important among which were the East Ghour Canal 
and soil and water conservation schemes,'*'
Over the period, the methods of production in agriculture did change 
but this change was not spread evenly. By and large, the methods 
remained primitive and labour intensive. Labour intensity of the methods 
of production and the wasteful use of labour in the form of low 
productivity of labour was encouraged by the abundance of labour. It could 
be argued that the abundance of labour was one of the principal barriers 
to the introduction of more efficient methods of production. Apart from these 
the other barriers to the improvement of agricultural techniques were;
(a) the geographical features of the country, i.e., mountainous and rugged;
(b) lack of technical know-how; (c) high costs of energy and, (d) scarcity
of government extension services. It is worth noting that productivity in
this sector was low. The average yield of wheat per hectar was 850 k.g. or
one bushel per acre, in 1953. Later, it went down to 400 k.g., in 1954.
The average yield of barley was 11.5 bushels per acre but dropped to 5.7
2during the same period. The main reason for the decrease in productivity 
per acre was an increase in the extensive margin of cultivation which 
brought into use the less productive land.
1 According to 1954 Census of Agriculture, the total cultivated area in 
Jordan was 1,930,000 acres; land use was classified as follows in 
thousands of acres, in 1952:
No. %
Cultivated Area 1931 100
Fallow 589 30.5
Irrigated 120 6.21
Fruit Trees 188 9.74
Rainfed Crops 1035 53.6
2 Raphael Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan, (Princeton; Newjersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1958), pp.96-135.
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C - THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR;
The industrial sector grew during this period but its growth was
restricted by the following factors: (a) poor raw material and mineral
endowment (aside from phosphate, cement and potash) of the country;
(b) shortage of skilled labour; (c) scarcity of capital inspite of an
increase in it due to the capital brought by Palestinian refugees; (d) the
high cost of electricity and other sources of energy and transport.* On
the other hand, there were a number of factors which permitted the growth
of the industry, namely: the abundant supply of cheap labour, inflow of
skilled Palestinian labour and businessmen and the inflow of capital
2brought in by Palestinian businessmen.
Despite the large volume of public investment, the. industrial sector 
dominantly remained in private hands. Over the period, the value added 
in industry, on average, increased by 12% and it ranked fifth among other 
sectors in terms of the rates of growth. As to the share in G.D.P., its 
average contribution was 10.5% over the period 1954-1959. The 1959 share 
of industry in G.D.P. was 125% higher than that of 1954.
So far as the composition of industry is concerned, cement industry 
was the largest. The principal reason for the fast growth of the 
industry was the h°using and construction boom which followed the 1948 War 
and the influx of Palestinian refugees. 12
1 The cost of one ton of fuel delivered in Amman was U.S. $73 compared 
with U.S. $20 at Beirut or Haifa in Palestine, ibid., p .117; see also 
Table 4, Appendix I for figures on percapita income over the period 
1954-1972.
2 The United Nations' Review of Conditions in the Middle East put a 
figure of *P* 10 million on the inflow of private capital from Palestine. 
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Review of Economic 
Conditions in the Middle East, 1951-1952, Supplement to World Economic 
Report, (New York: U.N., March, 1953), p.113.
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Apart from the cement, other industries which grew over the period were 
cigarettes, alcoholic drinks and phosphate. Other industries, e.g. : 
village-made soap, handicraft industries producing tourist souvenirs, 
glass and pottery, remained small in scale and principally oriented 
towards the local market. The following table describes the output of 
principal industries over 1954-1959.
TABLE l.E.
PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES 
1954-1959
Products Units 1954 1955 1956
i
1957 1958 1959
Phosphate 000 tons 75.0 164.0 208.4 261.9 293.9 337.6
Cement 000 tons 86.0 95.0 79.3 107.2 114.2 110.3
Soap - 000 tons - 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 ■ 1.9
Cigarettes 000 tons - - 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9
Alcohol 000 liters - - 317 345 404 359
Beer 000 liters - - - - 74 381
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 
(Amman: Department of Statistics Press, various issues).
D - DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FISCAL SECTOR
To start with, it is necessary to describe the composition of 
government expenditure and revenue.
(a) The Expenditure Side of the Budget:
Over the 1950's, government expenditure rose steadily. It rose from 
J.D. 9.14 million in 1950 to J.D. 30.8 million in 1959 - an increase of 
over 300 per cent. Recurring expenditures in particular, took up a large 
proportion of total expenditures. On average, over the period 1950-1959, 
they constituted 83.3% of government expenditure. Security and defence
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expenditures were high if measured in relation to both government
expenditures and revenues. (They constituted about 53.5% and 52.2%
respectively).1 The following table (Table I.F., p.17) shows the
average share of defence expenditures in the total government expenditures.
As compared to the pre-Second World War period, the government
channelled more of its expenditure to economic projects. During the period
under review, the development expenditure rose from a level of J.D. 1.72
million in 1952 (12.8% of total expenditures) to a level of J.D. 4.80 million
in 1959 (15.2% of the total). By and large, as the following table shows,
the government budget remained in surplus, this was due to the continual
2inflow of foreign aid.
TABLE l.G.
GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
AND THE BUDGETARY BALANCE 
1950-1959
IN MILLIONS OP JORDANIAN DINARS
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Total Govern­
ment Revenues 9.29 12.66 13.46 15.94 17.67 18.86 21.20 25.52 30.60 31.67
Total Govern­
ment Expen­
ditures 9.14 13.79 13.43 15.46 16.56 17.63 21.32 23.86 29.34 30.82
Balance 0.15 -1.13 0.03 0.48 1.11 1.23 -0.12 1.66 1.26 0.94
Source : Based on Table 7 in Appendix I.
1
2
See Appendix I, Table 5.
In the forthcoming chapters, 
Jordan will be undertaken. thorough examinations of foreign aid to
TABLE l.F
RATIOS OF PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES TO TOTAL EXPENDITURES 
AM) INDEX OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES
1950-1959
CINDEX: 1950 = 100)
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Average % 
1950-1959
Ratio of , Defence 
Components ' Expenditures 47.0 42.5 67.0 58.3 57.5 55.0 50.0 57.0 46.0 54.3 53.5
to Total . Recurring 
Government ' Expenditures 87.2 82.0 80.5 84.3 85.7 82.0 80.2 84.8 83.3
Expenditures, Development 
' Expenditures - - 12.8 18.0 19.5 15.7 14.3 18.0 19.8 15.2 16.7
Defence Expenditures as % 
of Total Government Revenues 46.2 46.3 67.0 57.0 54.0 51.3 50.1 53.1 44.0 53.0 52.2
Defence Expenditures
1950 - 100 100 137.0 209.3 210.0 222.0 226.0 248.0 316.0 313.0 390.0
Source: Based on Table 6 and Table 5 in Appendix I.
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(b) The Revenue Side of the Budget;
On the revenue side, the outstanding feature was the persistent 
reliance on indirect taxes as the main source of domestic revenues. 
Foreign aid remained one of the main sources of the government revenues. 
The following table shows that indirect taxes provided 78.4% of total 
tax revenues over 1952-1953 (averaged 83.2% over 1952-1959), whereas 
direct taxes provided only 21.6% of the total (averaged 17.0% over 1952— 
1959). Actually, the share of indirect taxes increased over the period 
and the share of direct taxes decreased. (The share of indirect taxes 
reached 87.1% in 1959 whereas the share of direct taxes shrank to 12.9% 
at the end of the same year.)
TABLE l.H.
TAX REVENUES - COMPONENTS AND RATIOS 
1952-1959
VALUES ARE IN MILLIC)NS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Items 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 Average of 
1952-1959
1-Tax Revenues 3.42 3.71 4.78 5.64 5,69 6.98 7.73 9.64 6.0
2-Direct Taxes 0.74 0.68 0.84 0.86 1.09 1.16 1.04 1.24 1.0
3-Indirect
Taxes 2.68 3.03 3.94 4.78 4.60 5.82 6.69 8.40 5.0
4-Ratio of
2 to 1 21.6 18.3 17.6 15.2 19.2 16.6 13.4 12.9 17.0
5-Ratio of
3 to 1 78.4 81.7 82.4 84.8 80.8 83.4 86.6 87.1 83.2
Source: Based on Table 6 in Appendix I.
In other words, the tax system remained regressive and inequitable, in the 
sense that the main burden of taxes was on wage earners in rural and urban 
areas and the income from property by and large escaped taxation.
1 In the forthcoming chapters and particularly Chapter VJ,we shall 
examine the effect of foreign aid on the prevailing Jordanian 
tax system.
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The following table, based on income assessments for the fiscal year 
1958-1959, shows that 85.7% of tax payers had taxable income of less 
than J.D. 400, whereas 0.7% had had income over J.D. 2800. Unfortunately, 
the data on the distribution of income is not available to enable us to 
draw precise conclusions about the inequity of the tax system.
TABLE 1.1
INCOME ASSESSMENTS FOR THE PERIOD 1958-1959
Income Group No. %
Less than J.D. 400 25,558 85.7
J.D. 400 - 800 2,631 8.7
800 - 1200 751 2.4
1200 - 1600 392 1.2
1600 - 2000 225 0.8
2000 - 2400 130 0.5
2400 - 2800 85 0.3
Over 2800 141 0.7
Source: The Jordanian Income Tax Department, unpublished 
data (in Arabic).
The government revenue in 1959 was 304% higher than that of 1950. 
This tremendous increase in the first place, can be ascribed to the 
high marginal propensity to import, and tariffs on imported goods.
Data presenfiadin Table l.J. demonstrate the fact that the average rate of 
growth in domestic revenues over 1950-1959 was higher than that of total 
revenues (domestic revenues and foreign aid). This suggests a relative 
decrease in the dependence on foreign aid.
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RATES OF GROWTH IN DOMESTIC AND TOTAL REVENUES
1950-1959
TABLE l.J.
Annual 
Rate of 
Growth 
in
Domes tic 
Revenues
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
1950-1959
31.8 24.4 -2.0 7.3 30.5 6.5 8.8 121.2 -43.3 22.7 20.8
Annual 
Rate of 
Growth 
in
Total
Revenues 36.0 36.3 6.3 18.4 10.9 6.7 12.4 20.4 20.0 3.8 17.1
Source: Based on Table 6, in Appendix I.
Turning to other major characteristics of the Jordanian fiscal system, 
the following table shows some important features: (a) the share of 
domestic revenues in the gross national income (G.N.P.) remained low.*
2(b) The share of tax revenues in the gross national product was also low. 
The agricultural sector was lightly taxed and on top of it tax exemptions 
were granted in drought years. (d) In order to encourage the formation of 
co-operative, exemptions from income tax were offered. Further, exports 
and industry were encouraged in the sense that machinery and industrial
3inputs were admitted duty free m  the country.
1 See also Appendix I, Table 8.
2 See also Appendix I, Table 8.
3 By issuing the Encouragement and Guidance of Industry Law No. 27 of 1955, 
and the Encouragement of Foreign Capital Law No. 28 of 1955, the govern­
ment, however, for the first time, used fiscal measures to attain 
economic objectives.
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TABLE l.K.
RATIOS OF INDIRECT TAXES TO DOMESTIC REVENUES AND THE SHARE OF 
TAX REVENUES IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
1952-1959
Ratio of 
Indirect 
Tax
Revenue 
to Total 
Domestic 
Revenue
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 Average
Ratios
1952-59
50.1 53.0 53.0 60.0 53.0 30.3 61.5 63.0 53.0
Domestic 
Revenue 
as % of 
G.N.P. 14.3 16.0 12.7 27.4 14.0 13.5 16.3
Tax
Revenue 
as % of 
G.N.P. 9.1 11.3 8.3 10.0 10.0 9.7 6.0
Source: Based on Table 8 and Table 9 in Appendix I.
E - THE FOREIGN TRADE SECTOR:
The foreign trade balance over the period was permanently in 
deficit, as shown by the following table:
TABLE l.L
IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE AND OTHER INDICATORS
1950-1959
VALUES ARE IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 Average
1950-1959
Imports of Goods (M) 13.48 16.18 17.15 18.21 18.59 25.26 24.61 29.76 33.92 39.26 23.6
Annual Rate of Change in Imports 2.7 20.02 6.0 6.2 2.1 35.9 -2.6 20.9 14.0 15.7 12.1
Imports Index 1950 = 100 100 120 127 135 138 187 183 221 252 291
Balance of Merchandise -11.53 -14.18 -15.04 -15.55 -15.54 -21.72 -19.50 -24.28 -30.49 -35.91 -20.4
% Change in Balance of Merchandise 19 23 6 3 - 40 10 25 26 18 17.0
Imports as % of G.N.P. n.a n.a n.a n.a 35.5 50.7 36.0 42.5 44.0 40.0 41.4
Ratio of Food Imports to Total 
Imports n.a n.a 34 35 28 25 29 33 32 30 31.0
Ratio of Wheat and Flour Imports to 
Total Imports of Food n.a n. a 40 38 24 41 21 17 31 32 31.7
Ratio of Imports to Exports 691.3 809.0 812.8 684.6 609.5 713.6 481.6 543.1 989.0 L172.0 750.6
Imports as Z  of Total Available 
Resources * n.a n.a n.a n.a 27.8 36.2 28.2 32.5 32.7 31.7 31.5
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 4, 10, 11 and Table 12.
* Total available resources = gross domestic product + total imports of goods and services
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An examination of the composition of imports shows even though the 
economy was predominantly agricultural, food and food products con­
stituted by far the largest item in the economy's import bill. They 
averaged 31.0% of imports over 1952-1959. On the other hand, inter­
mediate and manufactured goods accounted, on average, for 68,5% of the 
import bill over the last four years of the 1950's. The growth of the 
economy had two main consequences, namely; an increase in the size of 
the balance of payments deficit and an increase in the share of inter­
mediate goods in imports.
Exports were mainly agricultural eonmiodities, and export earnings 
were, therefore, affected by changes in the weather conditions. The 
following data show that exports increased at an average yearly rate 
of 3.4. Taking the 1950 as a base year 0-950 - 100), exports in 1959 
were 172. The ratio of exports to imports fluctuated from year to year. 
On average, over the period 1950-1959, exports covered 14.2% of total 
imports* (See Table l.M., p.24).
Comparing the rates of growth of imports and that of exports, it is 
obvious that the former grew a lot faster than the latter. The growing 
deficit on the visible account was financed partly by an increase in the 
incomes earned by Jordanians working abroad and, to a great measure, by 
foreign aid. (See Table I.N., p25).
TABLE l.M
EXPORTS OF MERCHANDISE AND OTHER INDICATORS 
1950-1959
VALUES ARE IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 Average 1950-1959
Exports of Goods 1.95 2.00 2.11 2.66 3.05 3.54 5.11 5.48 3.43 3.35 3.3
Annual Rate of Change in Total 
Exports co•CM1 2.6 5.5 26.1 14.7 16.1 44.4 7.2 -37.4 -2.3 3.4
Exports Index 1950 = 100 100 103 108 136 156 181 262 281 176 172
Exports as % of G.N.P, n. a n.a n.a n.a 6.0 7.1 7.5 8.0 4.4 3.4 6.1
Exports of Goods and Services 
as % of Total Resources n.a n. a n.a n.a 8,6 8.1 10.1 10.7 8.8 8.6 9.2
Ratio of Phosphate Exports 
to Exports of Goods n.a n.a 1.4 1.9 1.6 17.0 13.5 17.0 28.6 30.4 14.0
Ratio of Fruits and Vege­
table Exports to Total 
Exported Goods 5.6 13.0 25.1 29.7 32.1 30.5 38.3 41.4 44.9 42.4 30.3
Ratio of Exported Goods to 
to Imported Goods 14.3 12.4 12.3 14,6 16,4 14.0 20.8 18.4 10.1 8.5 14.2
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 2, 4, 10, 11, 13 and Table 31.
NJ4>
TABLE l.N
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MERCHANDISE AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
VALUES ARE IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Time Exports Imports Balance of Services % Change % Change % Change Deficit on Visible
of
Goods
of
Goods Goods Services
Goods
&
Services
Balance
to
Balance 
of Goods
in Balance 
of Goods
in Services 
Balance
in Deficit 
on Balance 
of Goods & 
Services
Trade as % of G.N.P
1950 1.95 13.48 -11.53 0.83 -10.70 7 19 - - -
1951 2.00 16.18 -14.18 0.83 -13.35 6 23 - 25 -
1952 2.11 17.15 -15.04 1.23 -13.81 8 6 48 3 -
1953 2.66 18.21 -15.55 1.56 -13.99 10 3 27 1 -
1954 3.05 18.59 -15.54 2.66 -12.88 17 - 71 -8 30.0
1955 3.54 25.26 -21.72 3.17 -18.55 15 40 19 44 43.6
1956 5.11 24.61 *■19.50 3.05 -16.45 16 10 -4 - 28.5
1957 5.48 29.76 -24.28 1.06 -23.22 4 25 -65 41 34.6
1958 3.43 33.92 -30.49 5.68 -24.81 19 26 436 7 39.5
1959 3.35 39.26 -35.91 2.66 -33.25 7 18 153 34 36.2
Average
1950-59 3.3 23.6 -20.4 2.3 -18.1 10.9 17.0 48.0 13.6 35.4
Source: Based on Table 10 and Table 11 in Appendix I.
hoLn
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F - THE TOURISM SECTOR
Over the fifties, the government paid more attention than before 
to the development of this sector. With its holy and historical places, 
Jordan can be appropriately called "an open museum". The political 
conditions since the 1948 War made it, however, difficult to exploit 
the full potential for the development of the tourist industry. Apart 
from a few years, 1956-1958, the travel account of the balance of 
payments was in surplus. (See Table 1.0.) Revenues from tourism rose 
from J.D. 0.9 million in 1950, to J.D. 2.85 million in 1959, at an 
average yearly rate of 19.0%.
The importance of this sector in the Jordanian economy, appears 
more clearly if we look at its rate of growth and its bearing on key 
economic variables: exports of goods and the deficit on visible trade. 
The following figures bring out the contribution of revenues from 
tourism to the above-mentioned economic variables, over 1950-1959:
53.6% of total exports; and 
8.6% of deficit on visible trade.
However, despite this remarkable growth, the growth of the tourist 
industry did not match those in the neighbouring countries. Table 1.0. 
(p.27) points this out.
TABLE 1.0
TRAVEL ACCOUNT, TOURISM RECEIPTS AND OTHER RELATIONSHIPS
1950-1959
VALUES ARE IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 Average
1950-1959
Tourism Receipts 0.88 1.08 1.29 1.68 2.21 2.45 1.49 1.22 1.22 2.85 2.0
Travel Account Balance 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.36 0.88 1.32 0.59 -0.46 -0.39 0.92 0.35
Ratio of -Exports of Goods 
Tourism on Visible
45 54 61 63 72 69 29 22 36 85 53.6
to I 8 8 9 11 14 11 8 5 4 8 8.6
Rate of Change in Tourism
Receipts * 22.7 19.4 30.3 31.5 10.9 -39.2 -18.1 133.6 19.1
Source: Based on Table 14 in Appendix I
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PART THREE: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRINCIPAL SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY 
OVER THE PERIOD 1960-1972.
Earlier in our analysis we examined the structural changes that took 
place in the Jordanian economy during the periods 1924-1949 and 1950-1959, 
which are crucial to an appraisal of the economy's performance in the 
second phase of our study viz., 1960-1972. What we have done is to 
examine the basic features of the economy and changes in them during the 
1950's. The question which arises at this juncture is how did the basic 
sectors of the economy perform during the period 1960-1972? Therefore, 
in the following part of this chapter we will be concerned with the main 
sectors of the economy, i.e., agriculture, industry, the fiscal develop­
ments and finally, the economy's international trade balances.
A - GROSS NATIONAL INCOME
Over the period under review, the gross national income of Jordan
increased at an average rate of 9.2% per annum.^ Though income increased
steadily over this period, its rate of growth fluctuated from year to year
mainly due to fluctuations in agricultural output. Taking into account a
3% average rate of growth in population, income percapita increased at the
2rate of 6.2% per year. Table l.P. shows that the service sector
remained the dominant sector of the economy as compared with the goods 
producing sector, (see also Graph no. 2). 12
1 After the 1967 War, the contributions, of economic sectors in the West 
Bank of Jordan (now occupied by Israel) were estimated by the Jordan 
Department of Statistics. The addition of these estimates to the 
estimated national income figure of the East Bank will add.up to a 
total figure that includes a certain degree of error.
2 G.N.P. percapita increased from a level of J.D. 62.5 in 1960 to 
J.D. 102 in 1972. Taking percapita income of 1954 as a base, G.N.P. 
percapita was 166 and 271 in 1960 and 1972, respectively. (See Appendix 
I, Table 4.)
TABLE l.P.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF SECTORS TO GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME
1960-1972
PERCENTAGES AND AVERAGE PERCENTAGES
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average
1960-69
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Rate of Growth in GNP 7.0 20.3 3.0 5.2 17.0 12.4 3.0 11.0 -4.2 18.5 9.3 -5.0 6.3 7.0 2.77
Rate of Growth in GDP 
Share of Sectors in 
G.D.P. :
5.0 24.0 -2.0 8.3 15.2 11.4 -0.8 18.3 -5.0 18.0 9.2 -4.4 7.0 7.1 3.23
Agriculture 16.3 22.8 19.2 18.8 25.2 22.6 18.5 21.9 16.3 18.3 20.0 15.1 18.7 18.0 17.3
Mining & Manufacturing 7.7 8.0 7.4 9.0 9.2 10.7 11.5 9.9 11.9 11.6 9.7 10.4 10.1 11.1 10.5
Construction 5.0 4.1 5.7 5.2 4.0 5.2 6.2 4.9 5.8 5.5 5.2 4.1 3.7 5.3 4.5
Transport 12.4 11.4 11.5 10.8 8.9 8.4 9.6 8.4 8.6 8.1 9.8 8.4 8.0 7.8 8.1
Trade
Electricity & Water
21.9 21.9 21.8 22.5 20.7 20.8 19.3 22.1 17.3 19.3 20.8 20.0 19.3 18.7 19.3
Supply 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4
Banking and Finance 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.5 2.2 1.7 2.1 2.0
Ownership of Dwellings 
Public Administration
8.0 7.2 7.9 8.0 7.3 7.1 7.5 6.7 7.3 6.5 7.4 7.2 7.1 6.8 7.0
& Defence 17.7 15.1 15.7 15.0 14.5 14.2 14.7 14.7 19.7 18.3 16.0 20.0 19.3 18.2 19.2
Services
Ratios Material Pro-
9.2 7.8 8.8 8.8 8.3 8.5 9.3 8.5 9.9 9.2 8.8 11.1 10.8 10.7 10.9
to educing Sectors 
G.D.P Service Pro-
29.9 35.4 33.0 33.8 39.2 39.7 37.7 37.7 35.4 36.5 35.8 31.1 33.8 35.7 33.5
of: ducing Sectors 70.1 64.6 67.2 66.2 60.8 60.3 62.3 62.3 64.6 63.5 64.2 68.9 66.2 64.3 66.5
Total Percentages 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Based on Table 15 and Table 16 in Appendix I.
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The second striking feature is the very high level of consumption.1 
Aggregate consumption doubled over the period and, on average, con­
stituted 76.1%, 102.2% and 102.9% of total resources, G.N.P. and G.D.P. 
respectively. These ratios were even higher during the period 1970- 
1972. The high level of consumption could not have been sustained but 
for the continuous inflow of foreign aid. (See Table I.Q., p31)
Gross investment registered a very high rate of growth during the 
period. It averaged 11.5% over the period 1960-1972. Table l.R. below 
demonstrates the fact that gross investment as a ratio of G.N.P., G.D.P. 
and total available resources was farly high. This could be considered, 
partly, as an explanation of the high rate of growth attained by the 
economy over this period. (See Graph no. 3) (See Table l.R., p32).
In order to put the economic development of Jordan in its right 
context, one should not overlook a major political turn in the history of 
the kingdom that has had far reaching socio-economic repercussions viz., 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of 
Jordan. (See Table I.S., p33).
i .The Iraeli occupation of the West Bank of Jordan had economic 
effects very similar to those of the 1948 War. It resulted in the influx 
of 300,000 refugees to the East Bank of Jordan. The resulting increase 
in the population of the East Bank exerted further pressures on the 
region's relatively meagre infra-structural facilities. Furthermore, 
the influx made the problem of unemployment worse. To ameliorate this 
situation, the government increased its current expenditure at the expense 
of development expenditure.
1 The relationship between foreign aid and the level of consumption in 
the economy is discussed in Chapter VI.
TABLE l.Q»
CONSUMPTION PERCAPITA AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF 
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES 
1960-1972
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average1960-69 1970 L971 1972 Average1970-72
Annual Rate of Change 
in Consumption 2.5 13.3 0.4 14.0 4.0 12.3 7.0 9.6 3.4 9.2 7.6 -2.0 8.3 6.5 4.3
Consumption Percapita* * 66.96 74.67 73.49 80.54 80.52 86.7 89.05 99.0 99.4 102.9 85.3 96.8 102.5 104.9 101.4
Percentage Change in
Consumption Percapita — 11.5 -1.6 9.6 -0.02 7.6 2.8 11.2 0.4 3.6 5.0 -6.0 5.9 2.4 1.0
Consumption ( G.N.P. 109.2 102.9 100.4 108.8 97.0 96.8 100.6 99.5 107.4 99.1 102.2 102.0 103.9 103.8 103.2
as % ( G.D.P. 129.1 118.0 120.9 127.2 114.9 115.8 124.8 115.7 125.9 116.7 120.9 119.7 121.3 120.7 120.6
of ( Total
..Available
'"Resources 79.5 78.5 77.0 78.8 75.8 75.6 75.7 79.3 76.3 70.5 76.1 75.8 77.7 77.0 76.8**
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 2, 4 and 15.
* Values are in Jordanian Dinars;
** Total available resources = gross domestic product + imports of goods and services.
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TABLE l.R
GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION AND ITS RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
1960-1972
VALUES IN J.D . MILLIONS
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average
1960-69
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Gross Domestic 
Capital Formation 17.1 19.0 20.2 20.0 25.3 27.8 28.1 25.6 37.5 64.4 28.5 40.1 49.8 44.1 44.7
Annual Rate of 
Growth in Invest­
ment 35.7 11.1 6.3 -1.0 26.5 10.0 1.1 -8.9 46.5 71.7 20.0 -37.7 0.2 -11.4 -16.3
Investment as 
Percentage of:
G.N.P. 16.1 14.9 15.4 14.5 15.7 15.4 15.1 12.4 19.0 27.5 16.6 18.0 21.0 17.4 18.8
G.D.P. 19.1 17.1 18.6 16.9 18.6 18.4 18.7 14.4 22.2 32.7 19.6 21.1 24.5 20.3 22.0
Total
Available
Resources 11.8 11.4 11.8 10.5 12.3 12.0 11.4 10.0 13.5 19.6 12.7 13.4 15.7 13.0 14.1
Source: Based on Table 2 and Table 15 in Appendix I.
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TABLE l.S.
THE COMPOSITION OF GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME AND THE RELATIVE
SHARE OF THE WEST BANK
East
Bank
West
Bank
Entire
Jordan
West Bank 
Figures as 
% of Tota1
2Area (k.m ) 91,100 5,900 97,000 6.0
of which Cultivated 3,500 2,500 6,000 41.6
Irrigated 230 70 300 23.3
Population: Hay 1967 1,130,000 990,000 2,120,000 46.6of which refugees 289,000 434,000 723,000 60.0
Composition of GDP (%) 
in 1966 (J.D. Million):
Agriculture 12.9 7.6 20.5 37.0
Industry & Mining 7.9 2.1 10.0 21.0
Construction ' 3.4 1.7 5.1 33.3
Transport 5.5 4.9 10.4 47.1
Trade 12.0 9.1 21.1 43.1
Ownership of 
Dwellings 4.4 3.1 7.5 41.3
Public Admini­
stration & 
Defence 12.7 2.6 15.3 16.9
Services 4.8 5.3 10.1 52.4
All Sectors 63.6 36.4 100.0 36.4
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, unpublished report, 1967, 
(in Arabic).
Apart from the influx of refugees, the War had other economic 
consequences: (a) The Israeli bombardment in the Valley of Jordan put a
stop to work on ongoing irrigation projects and it destroyed a large 
section of the East Ghour Canal - the principal source of irrigation in 
the country, (b) The closure of the Suez Canal made Jordanian exports and, 
particularly phosphate, to the West of Suez more expensive. The re-routing 
of exports to Beirut from Agaba increased transport costs. Similarly,
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imports from the countries west of Suez became more expensive as a result 
of increase in transport cost, (c) The West Bank of Jordan was economically 
complementary to the East Bank of Jordan. It constituted the main market 
for the industries on the East Bank. The loss of the West Bank, as a 
result, meant a shrinkage in the market for domestically produced manu­
factures. (d) The government budget was strained as a result of allocating 
more funds to West Bank civil servants and citizens in order to tide them 
over the adverse situation under occupation. In the meantime, this 
increase in government expenditures was accompanied by loss of government 
taxes levied on the West Bank, (e) The loss of West Bank was a blow to 
the tourist industry because most of the archaeological and holy sites 
are on the West Bank and not on the East Bank of Jordan, (f) The 1967 war 
led to a shift in the government expenditures from development projects 
to the projects concerned with the rehabilitation of refugees. For example, 
the Potash project, El-Safai-Agaba road, electrification of rural areas 
and damming of the Yarmouth River, were either shelved or delayed. Further, 
development expenditure was reduced as a result of the increased allocation 
of resources to defence, (g) The political uncertainty and tensions, 
created as a result of the war, discouraged investment both by local and 
foreign investors, (h) As Jordan has been a net exporter of manpower to 
the neighbouring Arab countries, the remittances of Jordanians working 
abroad, mostly drawn from the West Bank, dropped which meant the loss of 
a vital source of foreign exchange to the country.
In contrast to these, there.were a number of positive factors! (a)
The Arab Summit Conference committed itself to providing economic aid 
to Jordan to enable the Jordanian economy to recover from the economic 
effects of the war. Moreover, some Arab countries, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, 
undertook to station troops in Jordan; these troops boosted the demand
for local products, (b) The unstable political situation created as a 
result of the war, affected the level of consumption and in particular
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the consumption of luxury goods. The effect took the form of lower 
demand for imported luxury goods. In turn, the cut in the consumption of 
importables contributed to a decrease in the trade deficit (visible 
account).
B - DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR;
We have already pointed out that the increase in agricultural 
production was hampered by its heavy reliance oh the rainfall. In fact, 
the weather, especially the rainfall, has been the main determinant of 
yield per acre in Jordan. Fluctuations in agricultural production and 
consequent changes in agricultural incomes have an important effect on 
the economy where 35.3% of the population directly depends on agriculture/ 
To this, in order to take into account the secondary effects, one must add 
the urban population indirectly dependent on agriculture through the sale 
and purchase of commodities from and to agriculture. The balance of 
payments also suffered due to fluctuations in agricultural production.
(On average, food imports accounted for 26.7% of aggregate imports, over 
1960-1972.)1 23 (See Table l.T., P36)
Table l.T. shows a decrease in the share of agriculture in the G.D.P. 
To recall, the share was 21.5% in 1954-59, later it decreased to 19.8% in 
1960—69 and then to 17.3% in 1970-72. However, this decline in the 
relative importance of agriculture did not mean a decrease in its absolute 
importance. On the contrary, bearing in mind the rises in international 
prices of food products and raw materials, and in view of its importance 
as the largest source of employment, this sector remains vital to the 
development of Jordan.
1 During the period 1960-1969, five out of ten seasons were bad.
2 For data on the share of agriculture in the total manpower in Jordan, 
see Appendix I, Table 18.
3 For data on the classification of imported commodities, see Table 12 
and Table 17 in Appendix I.
TABLE l.T
GROWTH IN THE AGRICULTURAL VALUE ADDED AND RELATIVE 
IMPORTANCE OF COMPONENTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
1960-1972
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average 1970 1971 1972 Average
1960-69 1970-72
Rate of Change in
Agricultural Value Added -3.1 73.1 -17.4 5.6 54.6 -0.1 -19.0 40.1 29.0 32.0 19.48 -21.11 32.0 3.1 4.67
Share of Agricultural Value
Added in G.D.P. 16.3 22.8 19.2 18.8 25.2 22.6 18.5 21.9 16.3 18.3 19.8 15.1 18.7 18.0 17.27
Ratio of Food Imports to
Total Imports 26.0 26.0 21.4 25.3 28.0 27.0 27.0 26.0 28.0 26.7 27.1 28.7 28.1 29.0 28.6
Relative
Importance ) Field Crops 11.5 21.6 20.8 13.6 33.9 35.2 18.5 42.3 33.2 39.1 27.0 18.8 42.4 41.4 34.2
to Total . „ > Agricul.- > Vegetables 70.2 52.7 59.3 50.0 34.2 34.0 51.0 44.0 45.3 36.8 47.8 54.2 41.9 36.2 44.1
tural ) Fruits 
yalue 
Added
18.3 25.7 19.9 36.4 31.9 30.8 30.5 13.7 21.5 24.1 25.3 27.0 20.8 22.5 23.4
Relative . tn_  ^T ) Wheat Importance 66.8 62.3 64.5 67.1 65.7 63.5 67.7 66.3 73.1 68.3 66.5 77.0 73.1 75.0 75.0
to Field x _ ,
Crop > BarUy 
Output ) Other Field
20.4 27.8 20.6 20.4 21.7 21.7 15.3 18.3 15.4 18.3 20.0 7.2 11.4 12.1 10.2
12.8 9.9 14.9 12.5 12.6 14.8 17.0 15.3 11.3 13.4 13.5 15.8 15.5 12.9 14.7
Crops
Relative Importance of the 
Tomato to Total Vegetable 
Output 39.0 40.1 34.2 51.4 50.3 44.6 43.5 64.1 71.7 68.4 50.7 66.2 60.4 62.0 62.9
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 12, 15, 17 and 19.
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The g o v e r n m e n t  i n  i t s  p o l i c i e s  and the allocation o f  investment has, 
during this period and the previous periods, tended to overlook the 
importance of this sector.*
The main features of the agricultural sector, over this period, 
was its inability to meet domestic demand for food. (Over one third of 
food requirements was imported.) Agriculture, as in the previous 
periods, remained highly specialised. From Table l.T. we can infer the 
following about the composition of agricultural output: (a) Vegetables 
replaced field crops as the largest item. .Over half of vegetable output 
consisted of tomatoes. (b) Field crops ranked second in importance and 
among them wheat was the most important* (It accounted for 65.5% of total 
field crops.) Though they ranked second in importance, they occupied more 
than two thirds of the cultivable land in the East Bank in both 1967 and 
1968. It is important to note, however, that land in Jordan is still 
undercultivated, it is possible, therefore, to increase the extensive 
margin of cultivation. The following table shows that only 5.8% of cultivable 
area was irrigated and of that one half was either left fallow or unused 
due to lack of water. 12
1 This analysis will be dealt with in detail when the distribution of 
foreign aid as well as its impact on the pattern of investment is 
discussed in the forthcoming chapters.
2 See the results of the 1966, 1967 and 1968 agricultural sample surveys 
depicted on Table 20 in Appendix I. (Classification of land according 
to the type of products.)
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AREA AND CLASSIFICATION OF CULTIVATED LAND IN JORDAN
TABLE l.U.
\ 2Dunums (1000 m ) %
Area of the Kingdom 94.7 million Dunums 100
of which:
The East Bank 89.1 million Dunums 94.1
The West Bank 5.0 million Dunums 5.9
Cultivable Land 13.0 million Dunums 13.7
of which:
Fores t Land 2.0 million Dunums 11.5 .
Uncultivated Land 2*5 million Dunums 2.7
Total Cultivable Land 100
of which:
Rainfed Land 43.2
Irrigated or could be
Irrigated 5.8
Fallow Land 30.1
Unused Land due to Lack
of Water 20.9
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, Agricultural Sample, 
(Amman: Department of StatisticsPress, 1966).
The development of agriculture was held back due to the inadequate 
provision of credit and the high rates of interest charged on loans to 
agriculture. Commercial banks did not, for the most part, extend 
agricultural credit, by and large they restricted themselves to commercial 
credit. The Agricultural Credit Corporation was the only institution that 
provided agricultural credit. The following table shows that out of total 
credit extended by commercial banks over 1964-1972, only 1.9% was extended 
to agriculture whereas commerce got.an average of 44.4% of the total.1 
(See Graph no. 4) *I,
1 For details on the distribution of commercial banks' credit, see Appendix
I, Table 21; Table 22 in Appendix I gives the cost of credit in Jordan.
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It can be said that the commercial banks' lack o f  interest in the 
development of this sector, the maintenance of high liquidity ratio by 
banks and inability of the Central Bank to draw up a development-oriented 
credit policy, were among the main constraints on the development of this 
sector. The neglect of agriculture not only led to a lop-sided develop­
ment, but also, it can be argued that, a slow down in the pace of overall 
development.^" (See Table I.V., p40)
C - THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR;
The industrial sector showed a fairly high rate of growth (14.7%)
over the period despite the setbacks which the economy suffered as a
result of the loss of the West Bank, the civil strife of 1970 and the
closure of the Syrian and the Iraqi borders following that. The average
contribution of this sector to G.D.F. and to total employment was still
2low, (9.6% and 9.9% respectively). (See Table I.W., p41)
It. is the non-economic factors, mainly international and domestic 
political events, which constrained the development of industry. The 
effect of these political events varied from one to another and their
Aeffect on different branches of industry varied and depended on the 
compensatory policies followed by the government.
1 offers^an^insight^into** ““ 1‘q“idity.ratios °f coranercial banks,
banking^ystenpin JoÎdaÎ C8r' e ° £ PaSS1Vlty and ° f  the
2 See Appendix I, Table 18.
3 sS::£o % dh“ ïv)? °£ £0rei8” aid "lth *  «■» 1-*- trial
TABLE l.V
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
1960-1972
VALUES IN J.D. MILLIONS
1960 - 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average1960-69
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Total Commercial Banks'
Credit 16.8 18.7 21.3 25.8 29.27 33.3 38.99 38.89 40.99 45.39 30.9 45.55 46.93 50.59 47.7
Commercial Banks' Credit
to Agriculture - - - - 0.86 0.68 0.61 0.77 0.65 0.72 0.72 0.58 0.80 0.80 0.73
Commercial Banks' Credit 
to the Trade Sector - - - - 14.41 17.08 20.34 17.35 17.08 19.06 17.55 16.89 18.96 21.46 19.10
Ratio of ( Banks' Credit
the ( to
Following( Agriculture
to Total ( _ , , _ ... _ , . v Banks Credit Banks ,
‘ Trade
-■ - - - 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.5
- - - - 49.0 51.0 52.0 45.0 42.0 42.0 46.8 37.0 40.0 42.0 40.0
Ratio of Banks' Credit
to
Agriculture as % of 
Banks' Credit to - - - - 6.0 4.0 3.0 4.4 4.0 3.8 4.2 3.4 4.2 3.7 3.8
Trade
Credit Extended by the 
Agricultural Credit 
Corporation (ACC) 0.452 0.467 0.693 0.804 0.527 1.173 1.537 5.976 6.400 5.951 2.4 5.922 5.912 6.408 6.1
Source: (a) Central Bank of Jordan, The Third Annual Report, (Amman: National Press, 1967); and Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, Vol. 7, no. 12, December 1969; and Vol. 9, no. 8, August 1973.
(b) Appendix I, Table 21.
TABLE l.W
GROWTH IN THE INDUSTRIAL VALUE ADDED AND RELEVANT INDICATORS
1960-1972
VALUES IN J.D. MILLIONS
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average1960-69
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Rate of Change in the 
Industrial Value Added 11.0 28.2 -8.7 31.8 18.0 29.5 6.5 1.3 14.6 15.3 14.73 -14.5 4.0 16.7 2.08
The Industrial Value 
Added 1959 - 100 110.6 141.7 129.4 170.5 201.1 260.4 277.2 280.8 321.8 371.1 317.3 330.0 385.2
Industrial Output as 
% of G•D•P• 7.7 8.0 7.4 9.0 9.2 10.7 11.5 9.9 11.9 11.6 9.7 10.4 10.1 11.1 10.53
Ratio of Banks' 
Credit to Industry 
to Total Credit . —m 11.3 13.0 12.1 11.0 10.0 9.0 10.9 9.0 8.3 8.5 8.5
Ratio of Banks' 
Credit to Trade to 
Total Credit - - - - 49.0 51.0 52.0 45.0 42.0 42.0 46.8 37.0 40.0 42.0 40.0
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 16, 24, 25 and 26.
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As before, the industrial establishments remained in private 
hands. This feature distinguishes Jordan from some of the Arab 
countries, e.g.: Syria, Iraq and Egypt, where industrialisation meant 
the extension of public control of industry.
Investment in industry was low during this period. The main 
reason for relatively low investment in industry was the attraction of 
commerce as the profitable venue of investment.2 Investment could be 
higher had certain profitable industrial projects been undertaken.
Jordan possesses some natural resources sufficient to make the following 
industries profitable, the ceramics, glass ware, potash and phosphate 
fertilizers, coloured stones, souvenirs and handicraft, and leather 
products.
Though output of the industrial sector consisted of a large number
of products, it is only a few products, e.g.: phosphate (Jordan's main
mineral resource), cement, oil refining and electricity, which accounted
for most of the value added in the sector. Apart from these, other
industrial establishments mainly confined themselves to producing import 
3substitutes. These industries relied heavily on imported inputs which 
contributed to the worsening position of the balance of payments. Moreover, 
these industries utilised, apart from labour, a few domestically produced 
inputs; and, as a result, they had little effect on further industrialisation 
by way of linkages. 1
1 In addition, the majority of industrial establishments were small and 
they employed less than 10 persons, see Jordan Department of Statistics, 
National Accounts and Input-Output Analysis. 1959-1967, (Amman: 
Department of Statistics Press, n.d.), pp.67-84.
2 See Table 21 in Appendix I for a detailed account of the share of trade 
in the total credit extended by commercial banks.
3 For an account of the production and the index number of principal 
industries in Jordan, see Appendix I, Table 26.
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i.e.: inefficient utilization of resources. The quality of domestically
produced goods was inferior to that of foreign goods and their prices
were high compared to international prices.1 Though the imported
finished goods were subject to high tariffs, unfinished and intermediate
goods were let in duty free. This, as is well known, implies a dis-
, 2crimination against capital and intermediate goods industries.
D - DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FISCAL SECTOR:
Overall, during the period 1960-72 the government budget was in 
deficit, and the size of deficit increased over time. The deficit in 
1963 was 2.98 J.D., and in 1972 11.8 million J.D. The table below 
shows the pattern of government expenditure and revenue over the period.
It can be seen from the table that in the first half of the 1960s the 
budget was occasionally in surplus but from 1965 onwards it was 
constantly in deficit. (See Table l.X., p44.)
Government expenditures rose at higher rates than government revenues. 
The former at an average annual rate of 12.7% while the latter 10.9% over 
the period 1960-1972. There was a sharp jump in the government expenditure 
after the 1967 war and later on in 1972 following the civil war in 1970.
So far as the composition of the government expenditure is concerned, 
the following table shows that most of it was devoted to current 
expenditure. The main reason for this was high expenditure on defence - 
a part of current expenditure. The expenditure on defence rose sharply 
after the 1967 war and the 1970 civil war. Moreover, the government 12
1 By offering long-term concessions (40 years in some cases) and by 
using prohibitive tariffs, the government, in fact, contributed to 
the above results.
2 For an account of the tax concessions as well as the other measures 
which favoured such an industrial development, see The Encouragement 
of Investment Law, no.53 of 1972, which superseded Law no. 1 of 1967 
and previous similar laws. The Ministry of National Economy, The 
Encouragement of Investment Law, no, 53 of 1972, (Amman: no pub.,
n.d.).
The import substituting industrialisation has well-known weakness,
TABLE l.X
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, REVENUE AND 
COMPONENTS OF EXPENDITURE 
1960-1972
IN MILLIONS OF J. DINARS
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average 1970 1971 1972 Average
1960-69 1970-72
Total
Government
Expenditures 32.84 33.09 37.62 39.34 43.63 46.99 38.61 68.15 80.52 88.41 50.92 80.71 81.54 99.63 87.29
Total Govern­
ment Revenues 31.90 35.58 38.85 36.36 46.21 44.59 35.36 70.42 71.91 76.38 48.56 68.38 78.57 87.96 78.30
Budget 
Balance (i) 0.94 0.49 1.23 -2.98 2.58 -2.40 -3.25 2.27 -8.61 -12.03 -2.18 -12.33 -2.97 -11.67 -9.0
Rate of C h a n g e  
in Government 
Expenditure 7.0 1.0 14.0 5.0 11.0 8.0 -18.0 77.0 18.2 10.0 13.32 9.0 1.0 22.2 4.73
Rate of Change 
in Government 
Revenues 0.4 5.3 15.7 -6.4 27.1 -3.5 -20.7 99.2 2.1 6.2 12.5 -10.5 15.0 12.0 5.5
Components of 
Government 
Expenditures :
a) Recurring 
Expenditures 26.86 28.15 30.02 33.19 34.46 35.81 28.31 44.59 57.19 65.23 38.38 59.03 60.71 70.47 63.4
b) Develop­
ment Expen­
ditures 5.98 4.94 7.60 6.15 9.17 11.18 10.30 23.56 23.33 23.18 12.54 21.68 20.83 29.16 23.89
c) Defence 
Expenditures 18.06 18.43 18.72 19.11 21.61 22.21 17.12 28.56 39.46 46.17 24.95 38.21 39.12 45.07 40.8
Sources Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 5, 7 and 8.
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budget as it was set out underestimated expenditure on defence. At 
times the expenditure was recorded under a different category and at 
times it was simply not recorded. (See Table l.Y., p46.)
The budgetary deficit was financed from the following sources: 
foreign aid, borrowing from banks and the floatation of government 
bonds.^  The former has been a usual source of the government receipts 
in Jordan, while the latter two are more recent. The government 
resorted t o borrowing from the banks due to either its inability or 
the lack of willingness to increase taxes. A further reason for 
resort to borrowing was the economic disruption caused by the 1967 
war and the 1970 civil war. During these periods taxes were not 
collected and Libya and Kuwait stopped their annual grant to Jordan 
during the 1970 civil war.
The government tried to extend its borrowing power by floating 
the so called development bonds in 1971 and 1972,
Nominal Value Date of Issue Interest Rate Maturity Date
First Issue J.D. 3.0 m. June 1971 7 % 1976
Second Issue J.D. 3.0 m. Jan. 1972 6% 1977
Third Issue J.D. 2.0 m. Nov. 1972 6% 1978
The main subscribers to these bonds were commercial banks and a few 
large commercial firms. The range of subscribers to the bond was 
limited by the following factors: Small saver could not subscribe because 
bonds were issued in large denominations. Private firms and businessmen 
were not interested because they could earn a rate of return higher than 
that offered by the bond elsewhere. Finally, the subscription was limited 
due to the fact they were first floated in a period of political 
uncertainty following the 1970 civil war.
1 Under the Kartoum Agreement - the end result of the Arab Presidents' 
and Kings' Conference of 1967 - Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Libya agreed 
to provide J.D. 37.7 m. per annum to Jordan.
TABLE l.T,
INDICES OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ASP SHARES
OF EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS IN TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
1960-1972
IN MILLIONS OF J. DINARS
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average
1960-^9
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Percentage of 
the following 
to Government 
Expenditures:
a) Recurring 
Expenditures 81.8 85.1 79.8 84.4 79.0 76.2 73.3 65.4 71.0 73.8 77.0 73.1 74.5 70.7 72.8
b) Develop­
ment Expen­
ditures 18.2 14.9 20.2 15.6 21.0 23.8 26.7 34.6 29.0 26.2 23.0 26.9 25.5 29.3 27.2
c) Defence 
Expenditures 55.0 56.0 50.0 49.0 50.0 47.3 44.3 42.0 49.0 52.2 49.5 47.3 48.0 45.0 46.8
Percentage 
Change in:
a) Recurring 
Expenditures 3.32 4.80 6.64 10.56 3.83 3.92 -20.94 57.51 28.26 14.06 11.19 -9 .5 0 2.85 16.08 3.14
b) Develop­
ment Expen­
ditures 24.6 -17.4 53.8 -19.1 49.1 22.0 -7.9 128.7 -0.9 ■0,6 23.2 -6.5 -3.9 40.0 10.0
c) Defence 
Expenditures 8.0 2.0 1.6 2.1 13.1 2.8 -23.0 66.0 38.2 17.0 12.8 -17.2 2.4 15.2 0.11
Recurring 
Expenditures 
1959 - 100 103 108 115 128 132 138 109 171 220 251 227 233 271
Development 
Expenditures 
1959 - 100 125 103 158 128 191 233 215 491 486 483 452 434 608
Defence 
Expenditures 
1959 - 100 421 430 436 446 504 518 399 666 920 1076 891 912 1051
Defence 
Expenditure 
as Z of Total 
Government 
j Revenues 57.0 55.0 48.2 53.0 j  47.0 50.0 48.4 41.0 55.0 60.4 51.5 56.0 50.0 51.2 52.4
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 5, 6, 7 and 8.
47
The government revenues increased at an average yearly rate of 
10.9% over the period 1960-1972, but the actual yearly rate of increase 
fluctuated widely. With regard to domestic revenues, the following 
table shows that they increased as a ratio of total government 
expenditures. (See Table I.Z., p48.)
In general, it can be argued that the potential for taxation in 
Jordan was underutilized. The ratio of tax revenues to G.D.P. averaged 
only 11.7% over 1960-1972. Domestic revenues were only 49.3% of total 
government receipts over the period. Moreover, domestic revenue only 
covered, on average, 53% of government expenditure. A slight increase 
in the ratio of taxes to G.D.P. would have implied a substantial 
increase in government revenue. For example, an increase in the ratio 
from 11.7% to 16.7% would have meant a doubling of development 
expenditure. In fact, the government did not try to increase the share 
of taxes in G.D.P., instead it relied, as in previous periods, on 
foreign aid to finance the excess of expenditure over revenue.
Table I.Z., Table l.AA., and Graph 6, show the continued 
dependence on indirect taxes as the source of domestic revenue. They 
represented, on average, 87.9% of tax revenues over 1960-1972, Customs 
duties, however, were the principal form of indirect taxes. They 
constituted, on average, 48.0% of domestic revenues over 1964-1972, while 
income taxes were only 7.4% over the same period. There was a measure of 
tax reform in 1969 when the government introduced a mildly progressive 
income tax schedule, i.e«, 5% on first 500 Dinars and 50% on the income 
in excess of 8000 J.D. (Law No. 29 of 1969). Over the period, the yield 
from the taxes levied were low due to the wide-spread tax evasion, and 
inefficiency of the system of collection of taxes. In fact, it can be 
argued that the easy availability of foreign aid made it possible for the
TABLE l . Z
TOTAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES ASP THE RELATIVE 
IMPORTANCE OP COMPONENTS
IN MILLIONS OF J. DINARS
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average
1960-69
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Total Government 
Revenues 31.9 33.58 38.85 36.36 46.21 44.59 35.36 70.42 71.92 76.38 48.56 68.38 78.57 87.96 78.30
Percentage Change 
in:
Government Revenues 0.4 5.3 15.7 -6.4 27.1 -3.5 -20.7 99.2 2.1 6.2 12.5 -10.5 15.0 12.0 5.5
^Domestic Revenues 4.0 6.1 44.0 -8.2 23.0 12.2 12.2 -15.0 3.0 24.0 10.53 -7.0 19.3 7.0 6.2
Tax Revenues 10.58 11.48 12.73 14.23 15.89 20.52 17.93 18.27 19.09 22.99 16.37 21.46 23.59 28.31 24.45
Direct Taxes 
Indirect Taxes 
Ratio of the 
Following to GNP:
1.30
9.28
1.52
9.96
1.79
10.94
2.01
12.22
2.02
13.87
2.51
18.01
2.59
15.9
2.16
16.12
1.80
17.27
2.28
20.72
2.0
14.43
2.49
18.97
2.93
20.76
3.43
24.39
3.0
21.33
Domestic Revenues 13.1 11.5 16.1 14.1 15.0 15.0 13.0 12.4 13.3 14.0 13.75 14.0 15.3 15.3 14.87
^Tax Revenues 10.0 9.0 9.7 10.3 10.0 11.4 10.0 8.9 9.7 10.0 10.0 9.6 10.0 11.2 10.3
Ratio of the 
Following to GDP:
Domes tic Revenues 15.5 13.2 19.4 16.5 17.6 17.7 20.0 14.4 15.6 16.4 16.7 16.0 17.8 17.7 17.2
^Tax Revenues 11.8 10.4 11.7 12.1 11.7 13.6 12.0 10.3 11.3 11.6 11.7 11.3 11.6 13.0 12.0
Ratio of Domestic 
Revenues to Total 
Revenues 43,4 43,7 54.3 53.3 51.6 60.0 84.8 36,2 36,5 42,6 50.5 44.3 45.9 43.8 44.7
Ratio of Domestic 
Revenues to Total 
Expenditures 42.1 44.4 56.1 49.3 54.6 57.0 77.7 37.4 32.6 36.8 48.8 37.5 44.3 38.6 40.1
.Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 6, 8, 9 and 5.
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government to avoid the reform of the tax system. (See Table l.AA., p50.)
Briefly, the budgetary policy of the government can be described in 
the following terms: by and large the government expenditure exceeded 
the government revenue. The government financed its deficit either 
through foreign aid or through borrowing. Indirect taxes were the main 
component of total domestic revenues. The government resorted to 
borrowing whenever foreign aid was not forthcoming to bridge the gap 
between expenditure and revenue.
E _ DEVELOPMENTS in the international trade
As in the previous periods, the balance of visible trade over the 
period (1960-1972) was in deficit. The size of the deficit grew over 
the period, it was, on average, 7.1% of G.N.P. over the period. Exports 
grew at the average yearly rate of 14.6% - a rate higher than that of 
imports. However, the size of the deficit grew as a result of an increase 
in the volume of trade. The following table shows the balance on visible 
trade over the period 1960-1972. (See Table l.AB., p51.)
To some extent the deficit on the visible account was covered by 
the surplus on the invisible account. The important items on the 
invisible account, as we pointed out earlier, were: earnings from 
tourism, repatriated earnings of Jordanians working abroad and investment 
income particularly the rate of interest earned by the Central Bank on 
its deposits abroad.^- The following table shows the relative importance 
of tourism earnings and remittances from Jordanians working abroad.
(See Table l.AC., p52. See also Graph 8.)
1 The country's foreign exchange reserves are given in Appendix I,
Table 28; for a detailed account of the balance on invisibles, 
see Appendix I, Table 27.
DOMESTIC REVENUES AND COMPONENTS OF TAX REVENUES
1960-1972
TABLE- 1,AA
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average
1960-69
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Domestic
Revenues 13,83 14.68 21.11 19.38 23.83 26.74 29,99 25.50 26.27 32.52 23.39 30.26 36.10 38.50 34.95
Tax Revenues 10,58 11.48 12.73 14.23 15.89 20.52 17,93 18.27 19.09 22.99 16.37 21.46 23.59 28.31 24.45
Percentage of 
the Following 
to Domestic 
Revenues :
a) Customs 
Duties — - - 36.0 47.0 49.2 52,0 55.0 51.5 48.5 47.0 40.0 45.0 44.0
b) Direct 
Taxes 9.4 10.4 8.5 10.4 8.5 9.4 9.0 8,5 7.0 7.0 8.81 8.2 8.1 9.0 8.4
c) Income 
Taxes mm 5.5 7.0 7.2 8.1 7.0 7.0 7.0 8.2 8.0 8.2 8.13
Percentage of 
the Following 
to Tax Revenues i
a) Indirect 
Taxes 87.7 86.8 85.9 85.9 87.3 87.8 89.1 88.2 90.5 90.1 87.93 88.4 87.6 87.9 87.96
b) Direct 
Taxes 12.3 13.2 14.1 14.1 12.7 12.2 10.9 11.8 9.5 9.9 12.07 11.6 12.4 12.1 12.03
Percentage of 
Income Tax to 
GNP - - *■* - 0.81 1.0 1.2 1.02 1.0 1.0 1.03 1.12 1.2 1.24 1.19/
Source? Based on the following tables in Appendix I; 6, 8, 9 and 15 o
TABLE 1.AB
VISIBLE TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE IMBALANCES
1960-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Exports
of
Goods
Imports
of
Goods
Balance of Services
Balance
to
Balance 
of Goods 
%
% Change 
in Trade 
Deficit
% Change 
in Services 
Balance
% Change 
in Deficit 
on Goods 
and
Services
Balance on Visible 
Trade as % of GNP
Goods Services Goods
and
Services
1960 3.95 41.43 -37.48 8.66 -28.8 23 4 226 -13 35.5
1961 5.27 40.93 -35.66 10.13 -25.5 28 -5 17 -11 28.0
1962 5.92 43.51 -37.59 10.73 -26.9 29 5 6 5 28.7
1963 6.56 53.63 -47.07 10.89 -36.1 23 -25 1 35 34.2
1964 8.73 49.40 -40.60 16.20 -24.4 40 -14 49 -33 25.3
1965 9.91 55.80 -45.90 19.00 -26.9 41 13 17 10 25.4
1966 10.40 67.30 -56.90 21.40 -35.5 38 24 13 32 30.6
1967 11.33 54.20 -42.90 15.10 -27.8 35 -25 -29 -22 20.8
1968 14.26 57.30 -43,00 -1.40 • -44.4 -3 -0.2 -109.0 60.0 21.8
1969 14.75 67,54 -52.79 -10.28 -63.07 -19.5 22.8 -634.0 42.0 22.6
Average
1960-69 9.10 33.10 -44.0 10.04 -34.0 23.5 5 -44.32 10.6 27.29
1970 12.17 65.53 -53.36 6.78 -46.58 12.7 1.2 166.0 -26.1 24.0
1971 11.44 76,19 -64.75 6.58 -58.17 10.2 21.3 -3.0 24.9 27.4
1972 17.01 94.88 -77.87 8.88 -68.99 11.4 20.3 35.0 18.6 30.9
Average
1970-72 13,53 78,87 <-65.3 7.41 -58.0 11.43 14.27 6.6 5.8 27.4
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 10 and 11 Ui
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TABLE 1.AC
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OP TOURISM RECEIPTS 
AND REMITTANCES FROM JORDANIANS WORKING ABROAD
1960-1972
IN DINARSniLUlUlNb U* J,
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average
1960-69
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Ratio of Tourism 
Receipts to:
a) Exports of 
Goods 82 82 85 91 91 99 109 60 32 31 76.2 35 27 20 27.3
b) Deficit on 
Visible 
Trade 9 12 13 13 20 21 20 16 11 9 14.4 8 5 4 5.7
Rate of Change 
in Tourism 
Receipts 13.3 34.4 16.4 18.8 33.3 22.5 15.3 -40.0 -32.4 -1.5 8.0 -6.8 -26.5 9.4 -8.0
Remittances of 
Jordanians 
Abroad 1960=100 100 84 99 99 128 149 169 105 66 111 89 80 119
Receipts from 
Jordanians 
Working Abroad 
to:
a) Exports of 
Goods 158.0 100.0 105,0 94,0 92,0 94,0 102,0 58,0 29,0 47,0 88,0 45,5 43,4 43,6 44,2
b) Balance on 
Visible 
Trade 17.0 15.0 16.5 13.1 20.0 20.2 18.6 15.3 9.5 13.1 15.8 10.4
________
7.7 9.5 9.2
Source; Based on Table 14 and Table 29 in Appendix I.
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Though the balance on visible trade and the balance of goods and 
services of the balance of payments were in deficit, the picture changes 
if we add to the above balances the unrequited transfers and the balance 
on capital transactions in the non-financial sector* The balance of
payments on the extended definition was in surplus over 1960-1969 with 
the exception of the years 1960, 1963 and 1969. In fact, foreign aid 
not only offset the deficit on the current account but it also added to 
the country's foreign exchange reserve. The increase in reserves, in 
turn, meant an increase in the investment income. However, from 1969 
onward, the balance of payments was in deficit with the exception of 
1972. The following table shows the balance of payments on the extended 
definition (1960-1972). (See Table l.AD., p54.)
From Table l.AD., one could see that the balance of payments was
in deficit over the period 1969-1971. The main reasons for that were:
the substantial increase in government expenditure and imports of 
2military hardware. The increase in government expenditure had an 
additional effect on imports. It revived the economy which in turn led 
to the return of confidence, as a result commercial banks were more
1 The Central Bank of Jordan defines the balance on the current account 
of the balance of payments as the balance on economic transactions in 
goods and services together with unrequited transfers; the balance on 
rapital transactions in the non-financial sector is defined as the net 
flow of foreign capital (particularly loans) into the economy. If one 
adds up the balance on current account to the balance on capital trans- 
actions in the non-financial sector, the result will be the balance on 
basic transactions. For an analysis of the balance of payments and 
methodology see Na'man Issa Fakoury, An Analytical Study of Jordan's 
Balance of Payments, 1950-1968. M.A. Thesis, (Amman: Central Bank of 
Jordan, October 1974).
2 Table l.X. above shows the change in government expenditures on defence.
TABLE 1,AD
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION - BALANCE 
OF BASIC TRANSACTIONS 
1960-1972
■ IN MILLIONS OF J. DINARS
Ave- Ave- Aye^ Ave-
rage
1950
rage
1955 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
rage
1960 1970 1971 1972
rage
1970
1954 1959 1969 1972
Balance on:
Goods and 
Services 1 -12.9 -23.3 -28.8 -25.5 -26.9 -36.2 -24.5 -26.8 -35.6 -27.8 -44.4 -63.1 -33.9 -46.6 -58.2 -69.0 -57.9
Un-requited 
Transfers 2 11.30 19.31 26.88 26.28 25.21 24.14 28.50 29.5 34.1 53.9 54.5 47.34 35.04 40.65 36.6 68.3 48.52
Capital Trans­
actions in Non •
Monetary 
Sector 3 1.43 2.0 0.9 1.25 6.93 1.36 6.23 2.6 5.21 2.0 4.9É 5.34 3.68 0.26 6.74 8.32 5.11
Balance of Basic 
Transactions 
4 = 2+3+1 -0.22 -1.95 -1.02 2,03 5.24 -10.7 10,23 5,3 3.71 28.1 15,1 -10.4 4.76 -5.7 -14.8 7.62 -4.29
Source: (a) International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., n.d.), vols. 12, 16 and 18.
This source covers the period till 1963.
(b) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 5, No, 12, Dec. 1969; and Vol, 6, No. 12, Dec. 1970; and 
Vol. 9, No. 10, Oct. 1973.
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willing to extend credit to finance imports. Table 21 in Appendix I shows 
that the trade sector got, on average, 30.8% of total commercial banks' credit 
over 1964-1972. 1 Finally, aid from Arab Countries dropped when Libya and 
Kuwait stopped their contributions to Jordan.
With regard to the surplus of 1972 (J.D. 7.6.m.>, the main reaaons for 
that w e r e :  the end of the civil w e r  and assumption of the complete political 
control by the government. The end of the political uncertainty led to an 
increase in production and an increase in the repatriated earnings and 
requited transfers. Apart from these, the other main contributing factor 
was the dramatic rise in the volume of exports.
As in the previous periods, Jordan followed a liberal trade policy.
Over the period 1960-1970 imports grew at an average yearly rate of 6.44%, 
the rate of increase over the period 1970-1972 was double that figure. As a 
proportion of the national income (G.N.P.) imports were 32.8% of the total.
An analysis of the structure of imports helps us to analyse the role of imports 
in the functioning of the eonomy. From the following table it can be seen 
that over half of the imports consisted of consumer goods. In fact, items of
food accounted for more than a quarter of t h p  . ,4 1 r tie total imports during the period
1960-1972. (See Table l.AE., p56.)
In comparison to the previous periods, the export performance of the 
economy was better. The average annual rate of growth of exports was 
higher than that of both imports and the national income (G.N.P.). It 
averaged 14.6% over 1960-1972. However, it is necessary to point out that 
the rates of growth in isolation could be misleading. Exports were small in 
comparison to other macro-economic magnitudes, e.g. the ratio of exports to 
imports was only 16.8% while the ratio of exports to G.N.P. was 5.5*. Exports, 
as in the previous periods, mainly consisted of a few agricultural products 
and minerals. Fresh vegetables and fruits constituted an average of 48.5% 
of total exports over 1960-1972.
1 For an account of th. performance o£ both aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply in the Jordanian economy, see Appendix I, Table 30. a8gregate
TABLE 1 .AE
GROWTH IN IMPORTS AND THEIR FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION 
1960-1972
IN MILLIONS OF J. EINARS
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average 1970 1971 1972 Average
1960-69 1970-72
Annual Rate of 
Change in 
Imports 5.53 -1.2C 6.30 23.30 -8.0 13.0 21.0 -19.5 6.0 18.0 6.44 -3.0 16.3 25.0 12.77
Import Index; 
1959 - 100 106 104 Lll 137 126 142 171 138 146 172 167 194 242
Balance of 
Goods
1950 - 100 352 309 326 408 353 398 493 372 373 458 463 562 675
The Following 
as Z of Total 
Imported Goods
Food Imports * 26.0 26.0 21.4 25.3 28.0 27.0 27.0 26.0 28.0 26.7 26.1 28.7 28.1 29.0 28.6
Consumption
Goods 69.0 67.4 63.5 61.3 50.0 49.0 46.0 43.0 48.0 50.0 44.72 50.1 43.6 48.6 47.4
Capital Goods 8.4 10.8 11.5 5.8 25.0 22.0 22.0 27.0 24.0 22.4 17.9 20.3 23.0 19.5 21.0
Raw Materials 26.1 24.2 29.2 27.8 19.0 21.0 22.0 25.0 21.0 21.5 23.7 23.0 17.8 19.7 20.2
Imports as Z 
of the 
Following:
GNP 39.2 32.2 33.2 39.0 31.0 31.0 36.2 26.3 29.0 29.0 32.6 29.5 32.2 38.0 33.23
Exports 1049 777 735 818 566 563 647 478 402 458 649 539 666 558 588
\
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 10, 11, 15, 17 and 30.
* Data on food imports for the period 1960-63 are from D.N. Year Book of International Trade Statistics, (New York: D.N., 1962); 
1963 and 1965.
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Among minerals, unprocessed rocks bearing phosphate were the most 
important. They accounted for on average 25.9% of total exports proceeds. 
Most of the exports went to the neighbouring Arab Countries. The 
following table shows the performance of exports and the relative 
importance of different export items. (See Table l.AF., p58.)
i
f  _ CONCLUSION
(i) Jordan is a creation of international politics in the Middle 
East; and since its creation, international politics have had a profound 
effect on the functioning of the economy. In the first place the 
boundaries of the country were delineated on the basis of political 
considerations and not economic viability. Over the course of its 
history, the boundaries of the country have changed twice, first after 
the 1948 war and then after the 1967 war. In short, the history of Jordan 
is punctuated by international and civil wars, and each of them created 
problems for the economy in the form of the influx of refugees and 
economic and political disruptions.
(ii) Jordan is not well endowed in natural resources. Apart from 
the things normally found in most places, phosphate is the only mineral 
resource of importance found in Jordan. So, unlike some Arab countries, 
Jordan cannot get by on the rent from its mineral resources. By inter­
national standards the population density of the country is not high, 
but the cultivable area as a proportion of total land area is small, and 
a large portion of best agricultural land is to the west of the river of 
Jordan - a region which has been under Israeli occupation since 1967. 
Jordan is an arid country, the main barrier to an increase in the margin 
of extensive cultivation is the shortage of water, The extensive margin 
can be increased at the cost of heavy investment in irrigation works.
TABLE 1,AF
GROWTH‘iN EXPORTS AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
OR THEIR COMPONENTS 
1960-1972
IN MILLIONS OF J. DINARS
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Average
1960-69
1970 1971 1972 Average
1970-72
Annual Rate 
of Change 
in Exports 18.0 33.4 12.3 10.8 33.1 13.5 5.0 9.0 25.9 3.4 16.4 -17.5 -6.0 48.7 8.4
Export Index; 
Exports of 
1959 - 100 118 157 177 196 261 296 310 338 426 440 363 341 508
Exports of 
Goods as Z  
of:
GNP 4.0 4.1 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.5 6.0 6.0 7.2 6.3 5.45 5.5 5.0 7,0 5.83
Imports of 
Goods 9.5 12.9 13.6 12.2 17.7 17.8 15.5 21.0 24.9 21.8 15.7 18,7 15.0 18.0 17.2
Ratio of 
the Following 
to Exports of 
Goods:
Phosphate
Exports 33.2 29.4 25.0 22.3 27.0 25.0 30.1 31.0 30.0 24.2 27.72 18,4 20,0 21,0 19.8
Fruits and
Vegetable
Exports 36.8 30.4 35.3 36.5 51.0 50.6 62.5 61.4 61.2 58.7 48.4 61.1 46.9 38.1 48.7
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 2, 10, 11, 13, 17 and 26. 00
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(iii) There was an upward trend in the growth of national income 
which, on the average, attained a rate of 10% over the whole period.
The value added in all the economic sectors was seen to grow. However, 
a significant structural development appeared in the fifties whereby 
the economy's aggregate value added was derived from services sectors 
than from goods producing sectors. The services sectors do not produce 
saleable commodities which would finance future growth. So the 
development occuring in the economy with this service sector base had
a shaky foundation.
(iv) As is usual in underdeveloped countries, most of the population 
derives its livelihood from agriculture, and the sector is the largest 
single contributor to the national income. Productivity in agriculture
is low and the techniques of production primitive. The prevalent method 
of cultivation is dry farming - a method which makes yields heavily 
dependent on the rainfall and weather. Most of the agricultural production 
consists of a few products. Despite the fact that the majority of 
population is employed in the sector, Jordan is a food deficit country.
Over the period 1960-1972 something like a quarter of imports consist 
of food. In its economic policies the government did not, despite its 
importance, pay special attention to the development of the sector.
(v) The industrial sector prior to 1950 was rudimentary. The 
development of industry in Jordan is, therefore, a post 1950 phenomenon. 
Over the period, 1950-1972, the share of the industry in the national 
income increased. The pattern of industrialisation in Jordan has been 
very similar to that in other underdeveloped countries in that most of 
the industries were established to produce import substitutes. The 
factors which constrained the development of industry were: (a) the 
lack of managerial expertise and technical know-how; Cb) the limited
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size of the domestic market; (c) the liberal import policy of the 
government; and (d) absence of the domestic sources of energy and 
paucity of domestically produced raw materials. The development of 
industry was also constrained by the shortage of credit to the sector.
(vi) As for the fiscal system and the budgetary policy of the 
government. Most of the tax revenueswece derived from indirect taxes 
and of them the duty on imports was the most important. On the other 
hand, direct taxes accounted for a small portion of the tax revenue.
The incidence of direct taxes was limited due to wide-spread tax 
evasion, and the main burden of them fell on the individuals earning 
their income in the form of regular salaries. The government budget 
was for the most part in deficit, the deficit was financed either by 
foreign aid or by borrowing from the private sector. The government 
made little attempt to bridge the gap between expenditure and revenue 
by raising taxes. As for the composition of government expenditure; 
most of it was devoted to current expenditure, of which the expenditure 
on defence was the largest component. Before 1950 hardly any of the 
government expenditure was for development projects, but the share of the 
development expenditure increased over time.
(vii) The balance of visible trade of the balance of payments was 
permanently in deficit throughout the period of study. It was partly 
covered by surplus on the invisible account. Earning repatriated by 
Jordanians working abroad, earnings from tourism and investment income 
particularly the rate of interest earned by the Central Bank on its 
deposits abroad, were the major items on the invisible account.
Though the balance on visible trade and the balance of goods and 
services of the balance of payments were in deficit, the picture changes 
if we add to the above balances the unrequited transfers and the balance
on capital transactions in the non-financial sector. The balance of 
payments on the extended definition was in surplus over 1960-1969 with 
the exception of the years 1960, 1963 and 1969. In fact foreign aid 
not only offset the deficit on c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  h u t  i t  a l s o  a d d e d  t o  
the country's foreign exchange reserves.
Jordan maintained large foreign exchange relative to the volume of 
its external trade; as a result, income on the portfolio investment 
abroad by the Central Bank appeared as a significant item on the 
invisible account. Jordan followed a liberal trade policy, as compared 
to some of the Arab countries. Imports were lightly taxed, the reason 
for this was the ease with which Jordan managed to obtain, due to its 
geopolitical position, foreign aid.
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CHAPTER II
PART ONE: FOREIGN AID TO JORDAN - DEFINITIONS AND DATA
In this chapter and the following one, we propose to describe the 
magnitude, kind and sources of foreign aid received by Jordan over the 
period 1924 - 1972. Data on foreign aid to Jordan are not readily 
available, so the figures given are drawn from a number of sources.
The main Jordanian sources of data were the Central Bank, the Ministry 
of Finance, the Department of Statistics and the National Planning Council. 
The other sources of data are the agencies of donor governments, eg: 
the U.S. Mission, the United Nations Office and the British Embassy.
What we have done is to collate and combine the partial data to provide 
an overall statistical picture of aid to Jordan.
The flow of aid is divided into two categories viz., unrequited 
transfers (outright grants) and the repayable aid (loans). One of the 
aims of this chapter is to analyse the respective shares of unrequited 
transfers and loans in foreign aid to Jordan. Later on, we will compare
the respective compositions of aid to Jordan and other Middle Eastern 
and Asian countries. The flow of aid is farther analysed in terms of 
its sectoral distribution. Here, there is a difficulty: Comprehensive
figures on the sectoral distribution of unrequited transfers are not 
available. Since most of unrequited transfers took the form of 
budgetary support, the analysis of the composition of government 
expenditures does, at least to some extent, indicate the sectoral 
distribution of this type of aid. However, the figures on the sectoral 
districtuion of loans are analysed in chapter IV. The data on the 
overall sectoral distribution of loans is compiled from the tables, we 
constructed, on the sectoral distribution of loans by individual donor
countries.
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Apart from the analysis of the distribution of aid, we shall also 
examine the misrecording of aid flows to Jordan with a view to assessing 
the discrepancy between the actual and the recorded flows.
A - DEFINITIONS:
By aid (or foreign assistance), we mean funds and goods and 
services x transferred to Jordan by external non-resident sources
in gross terms (gross of debt service payments). Specifically, it 
includes: (a) budgetary support in the form of grants, technical 
assistance and foreign loans; (b) unrequited transfers by the United 
Nations, Relief and Works Agency (U.N.R.W.A.)X; and (c) private unrequited 
transfers. Unrequited transfers refer to the value of budget support, 
technical assistance, U.N.R.W.A. transfers and private unrequited 
transfers. Remittances from Jordanian emigrants (repatriation earnings), 
together with receipts of religious institutions, constitute almost the 
whole of private unrequited transfers. As for loans, the term "aggregate 
loans refers to loans extended to the Central government and public
agencies.
In compiling the data, we have used the following criteria: (a) the 
receipts in question must have resulted either in transfer of cash, or 
goods or services (technical assistance) or a combination of them during 
the period under study; (b) aid must have come from abroad and from 
non-residents. On. one hand, we do not include remittances from 
Jordanian residents working abroad as a part of foreign aid. On the 
other, we include remittances from Jordanian emigrants. The first is 
considered part of invisible exports while the latter part of capital inflow.
1 The 1948 Arab-Israeli War displaced a __ _The United Nations instituted a proerai,,,..» v, ^a^estinians.
Since 1950, relief for Palestinian 5 ^ . !  s £°r the re£“S«s- 
of the United Nations Relief and U n r lfo  A 38 ^en under the aegis 
t„o, for a detailed d i . c » ^ ' ' ^ ^  ¡ £ , £ P t . r  H L  Part
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(c) In computing the aid figures, we have neglected the political 
motives behind it. Moreover, we have also neglected the economic 
effects of aid. In other words, the question of whether or not 
foreign aid contributes to the country's economic development, is not 
regarded relevant when measuring the volume of foreign aid; (d) for a 
flow to qualify as aid it must involve a measure of concession. In 
compiling figures on aid, we have excluded flow of short-term funds- 
trade credit - on the ground that such flows form an integral part of 
international trade in commodities and as such they involve no 
concessions other than facilitating trade; and finally, (e) aid is 
measured on a gross basis i.e., debt service charges and repayment of 
loans are not deducted from aid received by Jordan. The measurement 
in gross terms is justified, since loans, till recently, accounted for 
a small proportion of the total aid flows. Repayments of the 
principal and of interest charges on such borrowings were relatively 
small during the period. Netting those figures from total aid receipts 
does not make any significant difference to our analysis.
B - FOREIGN AID DATA
The inflow of aid is recorded by a number of different agencies. 
Some of the aid to Jordan went unrecorded, this is particularfyso in the 
case of unrequited transfers. During the early part of the 1924-1949 
period, it was mainly the services offered to Jordan by the British 
government and international and religious agencies and the assistance 
from the government of Palestine which were left unrecorded. Some 
instances of these were pointed out in Konikoff's survey on Transjordan: 
"There is, for instance, the Transjordan section of the Hejaz Railway 
administered and maintained by Palestine which has, in addition,
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participated in the improvement of roads in Transjordan, in the up keep 
of certain medical services, etc. The High Commissioner, too, is 
paid solely by Palestine, although he holds a commission for both 
Palestine and Transjordan, while the cost of the British Resident at 
Amman and his staff, which was previously borne by Transjordan itself, 
has since April 1934 been charged to Imperial Funds. All these 
expenses do not appear in Transjordan Budget figures and only one sixth 
of the cost of the Transjordan Frontier Force was included therein, 
although the force is mainly stationed and principally required for 
service in Transjordan. Last but not least, about half of all 
services towards public health and public education are performed and 
financed by foreign religious and charitable institutions."^
Figures of budgetary support from Britain and aid-in-grants 
during the period 1944-1949 are not readily available and these are 
difficult , and at times impossible to acquire from the British and 
Jordanian records. We have found instances of misrecording and 
under-recording and unrequited transfers even during the later period, 
i.e: 1950-1972. Most of these were due to the fact that neither the 
government budgetary accounts (compiled by the Ministry of Finance) 
nor the balance of payments (compiled by the Central Bank) were constructed 
in any great detail. Furthermore, the aid figures in the budget 
accounts and the balance of payments do not tally. We will return to 
these discrepancies later.
However, it is possible to identify the types of aid which went 
unregistered: (a) aid-in-kind donated by external agencies, e.g: The United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (U.N.R.W.A.), the
1 A.Konikoff, oj>. cit., p.94.
World Food Programme (W.F.P.), the United Nations Development Programme 
(U.N.D.P.) and some religious institutions; (b) a part of military 
aid-in-kind offered directly to the Jordanian army. (Such as 
donations of military equipments and arms by the U.S.); and (c) grants 
and aid-in-kind given directly to some of the semi-governmental 
institutions, e.g,, the Municipality of Amman, the Royal Society for 
Scientific Research, Municipalities Loan Fund .... etc.
As far as U.N.R.W.A. unrequited transfers to Jordan are concerned, 
there were two main sources of misrecording: failure to accurately 
evaluate the value of the part of the aid given in kind and the misrecording 
of the U.N.R.W.A.’s cash transfers. U.N.R.W.A. makes some of the cash 
transfers through commercial banks who do not distinguish between 
U.N.R.W.A. transfers and other transfers which results in underestimation 
of aid in cash-by U.N.R.W.A. It frequently occurred that corrections 
were made on the consolidated statements of commerical banks submitted 
to the Department of Economic Research at the Central Bank. An 
examination of U.N.R.W.A. transfers to Jordan in 1967 and in 1971 shows 
an appreciable drop in both transfers in kind and those in cash. This 
decrease, it should be noted, happened at a time where the then prevailing 
circumstances point to the opposite. It was known that extra 
assistance was received to meet the needs and alleviate the hardships 
that resulted from the 1967 War and 1970 Civil War. This assistance 
took the form of food, medicine and other goods and it was in addition 
to the regular aid-in-kind from U.N.R.W.A. Yet, the data shows a 
significant decrease in the U.N.R.W.A. aid-in-kind during the period in 
question.
As for aid from other U.N. Agencies, we found that neither the 
Central government (the government budget) nor the Central Bank accounts
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(balance of payments) have comprehensive records of this. Actually,
Jordan received from the United Nations agencies, other than U.N.R.W.A., 
significant amounts of aid in cash and in kind. Aid from the United 
Nations agencies, as we will point out in chapter III, did contribute, 
in an important way, to the development of particular sectors of the 
economy.
Transfers from Jordanian emigrants (repatriation earnings) which 
form, together with receipts of religious institutions almost the whole 
of private unrequited transfers to Jordan, were also misrecorded.
Normally, these are channelled either through money exchangers (outside 
the banking system), or brought to the country in person. A proportion 
of this flow goes to Beirut market and a significant part of the earnings 
flow back to the country in the form of goods brought by Jordanians after
»
their visits to Lebanon and other countries. The Central Bank and the 
Department of Statistics, on their part, make estimates of repatriations 
through those channels, but the estimates are by no means reliable.
Further, in compiling the balance of payment figures, the Central 
Bank co-operates with other governmental departments. They provide the 
bank with statistics they themselves collect. The value of aid-in-kind for 
example, is sometimes assessed by customs officials or by officials in the 
Department of Statistics. However, there is no standard procedure, 
officials rely on the rule of thumb when assessing the value of aid-in­
kind. Besides, as happened in 1967 and in 1970, a high proportion
of aid-in-kind went completely unrecorded. Finally, the estimation 
and recording of military aid-in-kind poses a formidable problem, since 
the composition of the aid is not disclosed publically.
As we mentioned earlier, the total aid figures which appeared in 
the balance of payments differed from these in the Central government
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budget. What is more, these discrepancies could be observed in most 
years of the period under study. They could be ascribed to the 
following: (a) the fiscal year and the balance of payments year do not
coincide. Till 1966, the fiscal year started on Hay 1 and ended on 
April 31, while the balance of payments' data were compiled on a yearly 
basis starting on January 1^; and (b) the classifications used in the 
two sets of data were different. For example, the budgetary accounts 
register transfers at the end of a particular year as receipts of following 
year whereas the balance of payments accounts register aid transfers at 
the time of their receipts.
However, there are three main cases of discrepancy in the figures 
for unrequited transfers in the balance of payments accounts and those 
in the budget accounts. Unrequited transfers from the main donors viz., 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the Arab countries, are different
9in the two accounts . Aid in the form of unrequited transfers from the 
United States and the Arab countries, as registered in the budgetary 
accounts, was lower than that in the balance of payments accounts, J.D.
39.64 million and J.D. 36.08 million respectively. On the other hand, 
unrequited transfers from Britain, as they appeared in the balance of 
payments, were J.D. 31.3 million lower than that in the budget records. 
Further, we compared total aid from Britain in both the balance of payments 
and in the budget accounts and found that in the balance of payments accounts 
the misrecording of British loans was less serious than that of unrequited 
transfers. The misrecording of British aid at the balance of payments 
could be mainly ascribed to misrecording of grants particular in the period
Foreign aid figures were adjusted to make possible comparisons with 
key economic variables which are measured with reference to the 
calendar year.
See Appendix II, Table 8.
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prior to the establishment of the Central Bank of Jordan (before 1964).
The following table shows unrequited transfers from three main 
donors as they appeared in the balance of payments accounts and in the 
budget accounts^".
TABLE 2
UNREQUITED TRANSFERS TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FROM THREE 
MANOR DONORS - A COMPARISON 
1950-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
SOURCES OF 
UNREQUITED 
TRANSFERS
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(1)
CENTRAL BUDGET 
(2)
DIFFERENCES 
(3) - 1-2
U.K. 55.860 87.158 31.298
U.S.A. 214.360 174.717 39.643
Arab
Countries 225.530 189.450 36.080
Source: Appendix JU, Table 8
Moreover, not only were there discrepancies between the figures
collected by different Jordanian public agencies, but also between the 
figures published by Jordanian authorities and those published by donor 
countries. The important case in point is the aid given by the United 
States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). Table 2.A shows 
those differences. The total U.S. aid according to the U.S.A.I.D. was 
$175,5 m. higher than that recorded in the government accounts.
Similarly, the budgetary aid from the U.S. was $373.9 m. according to the 
U.S.A.I.D. and only $328.3 m. according to the government accounts.
1 Table 8 in Appendix _U gives a detailed comparison of data on unrequited 
transfers from the three main aid donors viz., the U.K., the U.S.A. and 
Arab countries.
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TABLE 2. A
U.S. AID TO JORDAN - A COMPARISON
U.S. AID FLOW TO J 
OF AID PROGRAMME T 
(IN MILLIONS OF U.
DRDAN FROM INCEPTION 
3 JUNE 30, 1970.
s . $ )
U.S. BUDGET SUPPORT TO JORDAN FROM 
INCEPTION OF AID PROGRAMME TO JUNE 30, 1970.
(IN MILLIONS OF II. 55. AI
U.S.A.I.D. Mission 
Report (Amman)
Jordanian
Budget
Sources
Difference U.S.A.I.D.
Mission
Report
(Amman)
Jordanian
Budget
Sources
Difference
569.30*
*
393.77 175.53 373.9 328.32 45.58
Sources: (a) Appendix I_, Table 1; (b) U.S. A 
Programs to Jordan, (Amman: U.S I.D. Mission, U.S, Economic Aid Mission, 31-8:rÌ970)“. "
51.1 m. Dollars were deducted for they represented the U.S. administration 
expenditures in Jordan thus definitions of aid in both sources were made 
comparable. Furthermore, annual figures appearing in the Jordanian sources were adjusted to suit the U.S. aid Calendar.
If it is assumed that the U.S, A.I.D. had no reason to over-estimate 
the flow of aid to Jordan, then it follows that the Jordanian official 
figures under-estimate the actual flow of aid to Jordan.
PARTTWO: MAGNITUDES OF FOREIGN AID AND THEIR MATH
During the 48 years under study (1924-25/1972-73), as shown by 
Table 2.B below, Jordan received J.D. 681.5 m. in foreign aid. 72.9% 
of this aid was received during the last 12 years of our study, i.e., 
1960-1972. This table, as well as Table 2.B, shows that most of aid 
received in the form of unrequited transfers or grants. Specifically, 
the proportion of grants in the total was more than 3/4. The signif­
icance of this ratio is that aid did not impose great financial oblig­
ations on the economy. On the other hand, loans, though a small 
proportion of the total, increased in relative importance over the 
latter years of study. Graph 1 shows the absolute levels of unrequited 
transers and total aid, while Graph 2 shows the respective shares of
loans and unrequited transfers in the total. (See Table 2 rUie i.c. on page7"?).
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TABLE 2.B
AGGREGATE FLOW OF FOREIGN Aip AND ITS BASIC 
COMPONENTS 1924-25/1972-73
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Aggregate Flow of Foreign Aggregate Flow of Foreign
Aid Aid
PERIOD PERIOD KUnrequited Loans Total Unrequited Loans Total
Transfers Transfers
1924-25
to
1933-34 89 — 89 1960 24241 1815 26056
1934-35
to
1943-49 620 -- - 620 1961 25265 776 26041
1949 : 3500 1000 4500 1962 22669 1317 23986
1950 9448 - 9448 1963 22863 1933 24796
1951 12885 - 12885 1964 22729 7179 29908
1952 13986 1500 15486 1965 23989 2616 26605
1953 16213 2100 18313 1966 18211 3590 21801
1954 16115 2870 18985 1967 47509 6792 54301
1955 13948 - 13948 1968 46763 5414 52177,
1956 19232 - 19232 1969 43297 4781 48Q78
1957 15766 - 15766 1970 41074 3155 44229
1958 24161 997 25158 1971 40067 13077 53144
1959 24206 500 24706 1972-3 53605 12105 65710
a - Aggregate unrequited Transfers 608022 •
b - Aggregate Loans 73515
c - Aggregate Foreign Aid 681536
Source: Appendix LI, Table 1.
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TABLE 2.C
rel ativ e importance of com pone nts of a g g r e g a t e f o r eign a id
1924 - 1972
PERCENTAGES
Aggregate Flow of Foreign Aggregate Flow of Foreign
Period Aid PERIOD Aid
Unrequited Loans Total Unrequited Loans TotalTransfers Transfers
1924-25
to ' '
1933-34 100 . 100 1960 93.03 6.97 100
1934-35
to
1948-49 100 - 100 1961 97.02 2.98 100
1949 77.77 22.23 100 1962 94.51 5.49 100
1950 100 - 100 1963 92.20 7.80 100
1951 100 - 100 1964 75.99 24.01 100 '
1952 90.31 9.69 100 1965 90.16 9.84 100
1953 88.53 11.47 100 1966 84.53 16.47 100
1954 84.88 15.12 100 1967 87.49 12.51 100
1955 100 - 100 1968 89.62 10.38 100
1956 100 - 100 1969 90.05 9.95 100
195 7 100 - 100 1970 92.86 7.14 100
1958 96.03 3.97 100 1971 75.39 24.61 100
1959-60 97.97 2.03 100 ,1972-73 81.57 18.43 100
Average %
1950-59 95.8 4.2 100
Average %
1960-66 89.5 10.5 100
Average%
1967-372 86.2 13.8 100
Average%
1960-72 88.0 12.0 100
Average %
1950-72 91.4 8.6 100
Source: Appendix II_ Table No. 1.
The nature of aid to Jordan is clarified further by classifying aid 
in a number of different ways (see Table 2.D). The table shows that aid in 
cash was more than 3/4 of the total, while aid-in-kind was only 18% of the 
total over the period 1950-1972. In addition, aid from bilateral sources 
was, on average, 78.4% of the total over 1950-1972 while 82.5% of the total 
over 1960-1972. In other words, the bilateral aid became more important 
over the later period of the study.
TABLE 2.D
THE CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN AID
PERCENTAGES
FOREIGN AID
Cash
(1)
!n Kind 
(2)
Total
1+2
Bilateral
(3)
Multilateral
(4)
Total
3+4
Grants
(5)
Loans
(6)
Total
5+6
Average % 
1950-1972 82.0 18.0 100 78.4 21.6 100 91.4 8.6 100
Average % 
1960-1972 78.5 21.5 100 82.5 17.5 100 88.0 12.0 100
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix 7f 1, 2, 6.
In the following analysis, foreign aid to Jordan will be examined 
in terms of its two major components viz., unrequited transfers (grants) 
and loans.
A. COMPONENTS OF UNREQUITED TRANSFERS AND THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
Unrequited transfers, as previously defined, can be divided into 
four components viz., budget support, technical assistance, U.N.R.W.A. 
transfers and private unrequited transfers. The first has always been 
the most important interms of its ratio to both the total aid and the 
total unrequited transfers. It constituted an average of 58.4% of 
the former and 63.9% of the latter, over the period 1950-19721. In 
absolute terms, as the following table shows, the budgetary aid was 
J.D. 405.9 million over the period under study.
1 See Appendix II, Table 2
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TABLE 2.E
LEVELS OF BUDGETARY AID (BUDGET SUPPORT) 
1924-25/1972-73
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Budget
Support
Period Budget
Support
Period Budget
Support
Period Budget
Support
1924-25 to 
1933-1934 89 1943 1967 1953 8537 1963 14003
1934 101 1944 17 1954 8420 1964 13682
1935 82 1945 18 1955 8957 1965 12836
1936 131 1946 n.a 1956 10957 1966 7929
1937 101 1947 n.a 1957 5000 1967 16896
1938 404 1948 n.a 1958 16389 1968 39550
1939 465 1949 3500 1959 16430 1969 37553
1940 809 1950 4898 1960 16436 1970 33070
1941 850 1951 7200 1961 16419 1971 34928
1942 1245 1952 7314 1962 14689 1972 44001
Total Budget Support 1924 1972 (In J.Ds.) 405,873,600
Source: Appendix _11, Table 2.
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As for the other components of unrequited transfers, the following 
table and Graph 3 show their respective shares in the total. Technical 
assistance was not an important element in the total volume of grants.
It averaged 4.9% over 1950 - 1972. On the other hand, transfers from 
the United Nation's Relief and Works Agency (B.N.R.W.A.) ranked second 
in terms of their share in the total unrequited transfers. (See Table 2.F.
At this stage, it is interesting to compare the respective position 
of unrequited transfers to Jordan and other Middle Eastern and Asian 
countries who, with Jordan, were recipients of aid over the period 1960- 
1972. Jordan is among the first three when countries are ranked 
according to the following ratios: The ratios of grants received to
export earnings, imports and gross domestic product. In addition, 
among the aid-receiving countries mentioned above, Jordan ranked second 
in receiving unrequited transfers in relation to her population. The 
following table shows the position of Jordan in relation to other recip­
ients of unrequited transfers. (See Table 2.G. p77).
As far as the sectoral distribution of unrequited transfers is 
concerned, we pointed out earlier that the relevant figures are not 
available. Lacking something better, we use the distribution of 
government expenditures as the indicator of the distribution of the aid 
given in the form of budgetary support. By and large, as we will 
point out later, most of government expenditures went to a few sectors, 
and some sectors received practically none of the government expenditure.
To start with, three quarters (78.8% of the total over the period 1950 - 
1972) of government expenditure was recurrent expenditure. On the 
other hand, development expenditure (classified as capital expenditure) 
averaged 21.2% of the total. There was a slight change in the 
composition of government expenditures over the period 1950 - 1972
In 1950, development expenditures constituted 21.7% 0f total
P76).
TABLE 2.P
UNREQUITED TRANSFERS ASP THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OP THEIR COMPONENTS 
1924-25/1972-73
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Total Components of Unrequired Transfers Total Components of Unrequited Transfers
Period Unrequited as Percentage of Total Unrequited ’eriod Unrequited as Percentage of Total Unrequited
Transfers Transfers (Percentage) Transfers Transfers
Budget Technical U.N.R.W.A. Privati Budget Technical U.N.R.U.A. Private
Support and Transfers Unrequ Support and Transfers Unrequited
Economic ited Economic Transfers
Assistance Transf Assistance
era
1924-25
to
1933-34 89 100 1960 24241 67.80 4.6 21.82 5.74
1934-35
to
1948-49 6191 100 1961 25265 64.98 7.8 20.38 6.79
1949 3500 100 - - 1962 22669 64.79 4.5 23.20 7.51
1950 9448 51.84 - 31.64 16.51 1963 22863 61.24 7.4 24.10 7.29
1951 12885 55.87 - 26.07 18.04 1964 22729 60.19 7.6 23.62 8.58
1952 13986 52.29 • - 31.17 16.53 1965 23989 53.50 10.2 25.05 11.28
1953 16213 52.65 2.8 29.97 14.61 1966 18211 43.53 10.7 30.86 14.87
1954 16115 52.24 3.3 34.12 10.32 1967 47509 79.20 5.0 10.10 4.84
1955 13948 64.21 2.4 33.40 - 1968 46763 84.57 5.0 11.76 2.99
1956 19232 56.97 ■ - 23.08 19.94 1969 43297 86.73 1.9 7.78 3.57
1957 15766 31.71 6.3 31.07 30.95 1970 41074 80.51 5.7 10.98 2.77
1958 24161 67.83 9.1 19.65 3.42 1971 40067 87.17 1.1 8.88 2.79
1959 24206 67.87 6.1 22.30 3.72 1972 53605 82.08 0.8 12.72 4.34
Average Z *
1950-59 55.35 .4.3 28.2 13.4
Average Z 
1960-66 
Average Z
59.43 7.5 24.1 8.9
1967-72
AverageZ
83.38 2.5 10.4 3.6
1960-72 
Average Z -
70.48 5.2 17.8 6.4
1950-72 63.90 4.9 22.4 9.5
Source: Appendix II, Table 2. 
Average percentage for 1953-1959
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T A B U  2.1
HANKS OF SELECTED MIDDLE > 
ACCORDING TO RATIO OF UKK 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES.
1960-197
ISTTRn  AND ASIAN COUNTRIES
ICITED TRANSFERS TO CERTAIN
________ m a ______________
Ranks of Countries According to Ranks of
1963
Countri ea Accord 
ted Trans
ing to 
fara__to
Ranks of 
Ratio of
Exports
(X)
1968
Countries According to 
tinrpfluited Transfers to
Ranks of 
Ratio of
Exports
(X)
__ 126
Count
..Unreç
Import
(H)
<es According to 
ited Transfers t
Z --------i m --------------
Ranks of Countries According to Ranks oJ 
.Ratio _o_f 
Exports
(X)Exports(X)
Imports
(M)
Gross
Domestic
Product
(GDP)
Popul­
ation
(P)
Exporta
(X)
Imports
(M)
Gross
Domestic
Product
(GDP)
Popul­
ation
(P)
Imports
CM)
Gross 
Domestic 
Product i 
(GDP)
Popul­
ation
(P)
! Gross 
'Domestic 
^Product 
! ÍCDP)
Popul­
ation
(P)
Exports
(X)
Imports
(M)
Gross
Domestic
Product
(GDP)
jPopul-
ation
(P) .
Jordan, i i i 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 i 2 i i
I
1 ii 2 i i i 2 1 1
Egypt 9 9 8 8 - - - - 4 3 3 5 4 2
Í  3 ■ 4 4 3 3 4 4
India 7 7 7 9 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 9 8 8 j 7 9 8 6 9 9 8
Israel 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 1 , 2
Greece 3 6 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 5 S 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3
Tunisia 5 3 3 4 6 5 4 4 6 6 4 4 7 6 4 3 7 5 5 5 9
Morocco 8 8 8 7 8 8 7 7 8 8 7 6 6 7 3 6 6 7 6 6 6
Pakistan « 4 3 6 4 3 5 5 5 4 6 7 3 3 Í 7 J 7 7 8 ! 5
Turkey 6 5 t 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 « 8 9 9 e I 7
-----(17
Imports
(M)
Source; Appendix II, Table 4,
1971
Unteiiuiied_Icanster»_ta.
1
3
7 
2
4
8 
6
5 
9
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
(GDP)
Popul­
ation
(P)
Ranks of Countries A_ j ■
ExportsQQ Importé(M) Gross Domestic 
Product 
(GDP)
Popui
ation
(P)
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expenditures and they increased to 33% in 1972. However, one should 
be careful in drawing conclusions, since part of the change was of a 
purely nominal character. In the government accounts, at times, 
development expenditure was not distinguished from other forms of expend­
iture. For example, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1970 
Civil War in Jordan, there was widespread displacement of individuals 
and extensive damage to private and industrial property. The government 
compensation to individuals and firms for the damage was recorded in the 
government accounts under development expenditure. It was done on the 
grounds that they were non-recurrent expenditures. Furthermore, some of 
the cost of servicing government debt (excluding the debts for defence) 
was classified as development expenditure on the same grounds.
Expenditures on defence and the maintenance of internal security 
represented by far the largest proportion of government expenditures. 
(Defence expenditures are part of current expenditures). Over the 
period 1950 - 1972, they absorbed more than half of the government 
expenditures (an average of 54.4%). This is not surprising, given the
geo-political position of the country and the political instability in
. 1the area .
One could, with ample justification, conclude that most of the 
unrequited transfers went towards maintaining the high level of 
expenditures on defence. Table 2.H as well as Graph 4 shows the
2distribution of government expenditures over the period 1950 - 1972 . 12
1 This will be discussed further in Chapter III when we come to discuss 
the motives behind aid to Jordan.
2 For more details on the sectoral distribution of government expenditures, 
see Appendix II, Table 5.
TABLE 2.H
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OP GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
1950-1972
AVERAGE PERCENTAGES
Public
Admin­
istra­
tion
Defence
(Army)
Security
Internal
and
Affair s
Inter­
nation­
al
Affairs
Fiscal
Admin- Economic „Servie ÏS Cult- Commun-
Period» Security Other To tal tion try of 
Nation­
al
Economy
Planning
Council
Public
Works
Ministry 
of Agric­
ulture
Region­
al
Corpor­
ation
Other Total
Educ­
ation Health
Social
Affairs
and
Others
Total
and
Inform­
ation
Ministry 
of Comm­
unication
Ministry
of
Trans­
port
Other Total
Recurring
Expend­
iture
Devel­
opment
Expend­
iture
Total
Expend­
iture
Period
Average
Z
1950-59 l.i* 54.79 7.71 1.33 9.04 0.88 8.30 0.11 8.85 .4.24 1.65 0.13 15.0 4.96 2.16 1.40 8.53 0.48 1.69 0.16 1.85 82.99 17.01 100
Average
X
1950-59Average
Z
1960-66 0.96 44.34 6.24 1.24 7.48 1.34 10.18 0.25 8. 75 4.07 1.52 .
r ...t
2.33 17.86 8.70 3.80 0.81 13.31 1.38 2.60 0.42 3.06 79.89 20.11 100
Average
X
1960-66Average
Z
1967-72 0.79 40. 78 4. 70 1.12 5.83 1.17 20.29 0.19 6.14 3.46 1.27 . 2.74 13.41 7.21 2.95 0.61 10.79 1.95 1.75 0.47 2.51 70.48 29.52 100
Average
X
1967-72Average
Z
1960-72 0.88 42.70 5.53 1.18 6.72 1.26 14.85 0.23 7.55 3.79 1.41
*
1.68 ' 2.52 15.81 8.02 3.41 0.72 12.15 Í .64 2.21
**
0.25 0.44 2.81 75.55 24.45 100
Average
Z
1QOY-77
1950-72 0.99 47.96 6.48 1.25 7.73 1.09 12.00 0.18 8.12 3.99 1.51 -
!
1.48 15.46 6.69 2.87 1.02 10.58 1.13 1.98 0.32 2.39 78.78 21.. 22 100
Averege
X
1950- 72
Source: Appendix I_I, Table 5 and Table 5»a.
* Average X for 1962-1972 
**
Average X  for 1965-1972
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The second important component of government expenditures is what 
is termed in the government budget accounts as "the economic services 
expenditures", i.e., expenditures of government ministries and agencies- 
who are directly concerned with the functioning of the economy, e.gi 
The Ministry of National Economy, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Public Works, the National Planning Council and the Regional 
Corporation. (As shown in Table 2.H above)^. This category, on 
average, absorbed 15.5% of the total government expenditures over 1950 - 
1972. One can detect a slight shift in the government expenditure 
towards this category. Over the period 1950 - 1972 its share in the 
total increased by 5.39%.
An indication of the hierarchy of importance attached to different
types of expenditure is provided by the following comparison.- Over the
period (1950 - 1972), the expenditure on agriculture (part of economic
services expenditure) was 1.5% of the total while the expenditure on
fiscal administration was 12.0% of the total: third largest component
2 ,of government expenditure . Expenditure on Social Services ranked fourth.
It absorbed about 11% of the total government expenditures. Of the expenditure 
in this category, 6.7% (of the total expenditure) went to education and 
2.87% to health, over the period 1950 - 1972.
It is clear that the government devoted most of its expenditure to 
defence and the maintenance of other state apparatuses, e.g: police, 
administration etc., and relatively little to the development of agricult­
ure and industry. Given this pattern of the government expenditure 
and the fact that most of aid to Jordan was given in the form of budgetary 12
1 The regional Corporation is a governmental agency directly concerned 
with the execution of economic projects in the Valley of Jordan.
2 Expenditure on fiscal administration includes administrative expenditures 
of the Ministry of Finance and Customs, the Budget Department, the 
Income Tax Department and the Lands Department.
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aid leads us to conclude that foreign aid, for most part, sustained 
the apparatuses of the state rather than furthered the economic develop­
ment of the country. It is pointless to speculate what the pattern
of the government expenditure would have been had Jordan not received 
aid. However, we take the view that the priorities of the government 
are affected by the availability of aid.
B. FOREIGN LOANS
Since foreign loans will be discussed in chapter IV , their 
discussion here is kept brief. .
Under the category of loans, we included the loans received by the 
Central government and those received by the semi-governmental agencies, 
e.g: The Industrial Development Bank, The Agricultural Credit Corporation, 
The Royal Jordanian Airlines. Since, as we pointed out above, most of 
the foreign aid to Jordan took the form of unrequited transfers, debt 
service payments, as well as outstanding debts, were small compared to 
those of other developing countries.
Over the period 1949 - 1972, loans totalled J.D. 73.5 m., this 
represents 12.0% of the total aid to Jordan over the period. Loans 
were insignificant in the 1950's. Their share in the total increased 
in the early 1960's and over the subsequent periods. They averaged 
12% of total aid over 1960 - 1966 but increased to 16% of the total over 
1970 - 1972. (See Table 2.B above). Table 2.1 and Graph 5 show 
the total flow of foreign loans and its two basic components, i.e., 
government loans and government-guaranteed loans.
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TABLE 2.1
INFLOW OF GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT - GUARANTEED 
LOANS (ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS)
1949 - 1950 to 1972 - 1973
IN JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Government Loans (1) Government-Guaranteed 
Loans (2)
Total (3) = 1 + 2
1949/50 to 
1953-1954 4,600,000 4,600,000
1954/55 to 
1959/60 4,366,700 —  ' 4,366,700
1960 1,500,000 315,095 1,815,095
1961 500,000 275,639 775,639
1962 1,188,700 127,826 1,316,575
1963 1,910,000 22,623 1,932,650
1964 7,039,100 139,931 7,179,041
1965 2,615,600 - 2,615,646
1966 3,589,900 - 3,589,859
1967 3,687,900 3,104,013. 6,791,874
1968 5,394,900 19,092 5,413,976
1969 4,676,200 104,537 4,780,768
1970 2,072,500 1,082,556 3,155,034
1971 6,985,100 6,091,728 13,076,732
1972 11,389,800 715,064 12,104,889
Total 61,516,400 11,998,104 73,514,500
Source: The Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, the Fiscal 
and Monetary Division (unpublished data, in Arabic); see also 
Appendix II, Table 1.
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C “ SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
i. What we have done in this chapter is to collate and combine the 
data on foreign aid from diverse sources to arrive at the figure for 
total aid to Jordan. Moreover, we have rearranged and classified 
the figures so as to indicate the composition of aid.
ii. There are a number of problems in compiling the data on aid to 
Jordan: (a) the data on aid is collected both by the Central Bank and 
the Ministry of Finance. The diversity/sources would not be a problem 
but for the fact that the two institutions use different conventions, 
e.g: the definition of Statistical year, when collecting data. As a 
result, the figures from the two sources do not tally. Not only that 
there is a discrepancy between the figures of the Central Bank and that 
of the Ministry of Finance, there is also a discrepancy between those 
figures and that provided by the donor countries. The latter 
discrepancy is due to the fact that a part of foreign aid has not been 
recorded by any agency in Jordan.
All of the unrecorded aid has been in the form of unrequited 
transfers, and this is due to the fact that they imply no future financial 
obligation on the country. A large portion of the unrecorded unrequited 
transfers was in kind, its inclusion in data poses the problem of 
valuation. The problem is complicated in view of the fact that the aid- 
in-kind consisted of a variety of commodities.
iii. At a general level, there are two points to be made about aid to
Jordan: (a) The country has subsisted on aid since its creation. During
the 48 years under study (1924-25/1972-73) Jordan received J.D. 681.5 million 
in foreign aid. (b) The flow of aid has been very high in relation to 
macro-economic variables, e.g: G.D.pi, export earnings. The high volume
of aid becomes more obvious if we compare aid to Jordan with aid to other 
underdeveloped countries.
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iv. As for the composition of foreign aid, most of it was in the 
form of unrequited tranfers. They averaged 91.4% of total aid over 
the period 1950-1972. Again in this respect, the unrequited transfers 
have been high in relation to macro-economic variables, e.g: exports, 
imports, G.D.p. Unrequited transfers to Jordan compare favourably with 
that of other recipient countries. Jordan is among the first three 
when countries are ranked according to the following ratios: The ratio 
of grants received to exports, imports and gross domestic product. In 
addition, among the aid-receiving countries mentioned above, Jordan ranked 
second in receiving unrequited transfers in relation to her population.
Of the unrequited transfers, the budgetary aid was the largest 
component. The category "budgetary aid" dates from the 1920's when 
the British government started giving an annual grant to finance the 
Jordanian government expenditure. Though loans account for a small 
part of the total, over the 1950's, their relative importance increased 
over the latter years of the study.
v. The data on the utilization of unrequited transfers is not 
available except in the cases where they are tied to specific uses. 
However, we used the pattern of government expenditure as the index 
for the pattern of utilization of what is termed the budgetary aid.
An analysis of the composition of the government expenditure shows that 
most of it was devoted to defence and the maintenance of administrative 
machinery, and relatively very little on economic development. The 
conclusion is that aid, at least in the form of unrequited transfers, 
was not geared towards economic development.
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CHAPTER III
PART ONE: THE MOTIVES BEHIND FOREIGN AID TO JORDAN 
A - INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, which is an extension of the previous one, 
we analyse the sources of aid and the motives, economic and political, 
behind it. Host of the aid to Jordan has come from the Western 
Countries on a bilateral basis. A discussion of Western interests in 
the Middle East will, therefore, provide a general background to the 
analysis of donors’ interest in the area. Later on, we go on to examine 
in detail the magnitude and the nature of aid from each of the main 
donors of aid to Jordan, viz., the United States, Britain, etc. The 
detailed discussion of aid on a source by source basis is meant to 
confirm the general argument that Jordan has managed to receive a large 
amount of aid by virtue of its geo-political position.
The dependence of Jordan on bilateral aid will be examined, and 
continuity and uncertainty, as the main aspects of this type of aid, 
will also be dealt with in relation to Jordan. Furthermore, we will try 
to find out whether Jordan has had options in selecting its sources of 
foreign aid.
As it has been mentioned above, we will deal with a few political 
factors which had influenced the giving of aid to Jordan, since such aid 
was motivated predominantly by political considerations. The following 
discussion will support this view.
The 1940s saw the emergence of new states in the Middle East, each 
with its own particular ideology and affiliations. This led to a 
division of the area into rival camps. While the so-called "moderate 
camp" leaned more towards the West, the so-called "progressive camp"
directed its policies in the opposite direction. The members in each 
camp supported each other. For instance, Saudi-Arabia and Jordan 
co-operated with each other, despite the historical rivalry that existed 
between the ruling families in the two countries, i.e., the Saudis and 
the Hashemites.
The West, on her part, gave her full economic and political 
backing to the two "moderate" monarchs. Here, we are interested in the 
reasons for which the Western Countries supported the "moderate camp".
To understand the aid policy of Western countries, one has to analyse 
Western interests in the Middle East. The Western interest in the area 
is due not to one but to a number of different factors.
At this stage, it is necessary to indicate briefly why a dis­
cussion of political factors is complementary to an economic analysis 
of aid to Jordan. Foreign aid to Jordan is a phenomenon, concomitant 
with the creation of Jordan as a political entity. From the time of her 
creation, aid has been given to ensure her survival. Given the manner 
in which the State was created, it could be argued, with justification, 
that the State could not have survived but for economic aid. So right 
from the start, the motives behind aid to Jordan were explicitly 
political. In a number of other underdeveloped countries, foreign aid 
is a post-Second World War phenomenon, while aid to Jordan predates from 
the 1920s.
To start with, it must be pointed out that Jordan is not of any 
particular economic interest to the major donors. The country is not 
well endowed in natural resources and it is not significant as a market 
for the products of industrial countries. As such, economic stakes are 
not very high in Jordan herself. Jordan's importance in international 
politics arises from her geo-political position. The country separates 
Israel at its weakest flank from other Arab countries. Furthermore,
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Jordan is home for most of the Palestinian refugees, the increase in 
the political importance of Palestinian political organisations has 
meant a corresponding increase in the importance of Jordan.
As a result of constant rivalry between the East and the West in 
the region, Jordan is seen as a country which, though not a part of the 
regional political pacts, strengthens the pro-Western camp in the 
Middle East. Jordan and Saudi-Arabia have always been the main bulwarks 
of the pro-Western camp in the region, and it is these two countries 
in conjunction with other pro-Western states (an ever-changing category) 
who constituted a block friendly to the West and opposed to the pro- 
Soviet block. However, it is necessary to point out that the pro- 
Western alliance has not been just to the advantage of Western countries 
but also to the political and economic advantage of the countries who 
have been parts of the alliance.
B - WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The view that the Middle East is a region of great political and 
economic importance is accepted by everyone. For Western countries, 
the region is an important, if not the most important, source of 
strategic raw materials (in particular oil). However, it is wrong to 
think that the interest in the region is merely economic. The geo­
politics of the area has a lot to do with it. The mere existence of 
Israel and Western interest in its survival is sufficient to make the 
area politically important for the West. Furthermore, the area is of 
economic and political interest not only to the West but also to the 
Soviet block. It is Soviet interest in the area which makes the West, 
in particular the United States, extremely sensitive to political 
changes, even minor ones.^
1 See the statement by Mr Dulles to a joint session of Foreign
Relations and Armed Services Committee of the Senate, 14 Jan. 1957. 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International 
Affairs, 1957, (L-ondon: Oxford University Fress, 1950), pp.247-254.
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In other words, Western interests in the Middle East are determined 
by the endowment of natural resources and geographical location of 
the area, ideological and political rivalries between the two super 
powers and commitment to the existence and survival of Israel,
To deal with the American interest in the Middle East first,
W.M. Rountree, an ex-U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near East and South 
Asia Affairs, raised the following question, in an address to the 
National Conference on the Middle East: "What do we as Americans want 
in the Middle East?" * He answered it in terms of four fundamental 
objectives: "First, we believe in and hope for the creation of strong 
and independent nations which are able to resist the efforts of 
international Communism to subvert the area. Secondly, we believe in 
contributing, if required by the nations of the area, to their security. 
In broad sense, their security is our security. Thirdly, we wish to 
assist the countries of the area in resolving their disputes in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Fourthly, we wish to contribute to the progress and development of the 
nations of the Middle East. We firmly believe that the fulfilment of 
the national interests of the U.S. will follow naturally from the 
pursuit and achievement of these objectives." Furthermore, he argued, 
the Middle East is "a striking and significant area. If there is any 
Corner of the World that can most accurately be called the cross-roads 
of culture, of people and of political trends, as well as from the 
geographical point of view, it is the Middle East." The so-called
Eisenhower's Doctrine, accepted by the U.S. Congress on March 9, 1957, 
was an explicit statement of the motive behind American policy in the 
Middle East, i.e., to combat Communism by economic and military aid with 12
1 W.M. Rountree, "The Middle East: Fundamentals of American Policy", 
Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1957, pp. 974-975.
2 ibid., p.973.
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a view to strengthening the pro-Western governments in the region.*
As for economic interest in the region, Eisenhower, in his message
to the U.S. Congress on the 5th of January 1957, stated that the Middle
2East "provides a gateway between Eurasia and Africa." In addition, "if 
the nations of the area should lose their independence, if they were 
dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a 
tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life 
would be subjected to near-strangulation. Western Europe would be
3endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no NATO."
And later Nixon in his statement of the United States policy for the 
1970s referred to the Middle East as a "reservoir of energy resources on
4which much of the world depends."
The Arab-Israeli conflict occupies large space in Western policy 
documents on the Middle East. In particular, for the United States the 
survival of Israel as an independent state is an important objective of 
foreign policy. To quote: "those normal, human and political aspects of 
Western relations to Israel and other friendly states of the area should 
be viewed as reinforcing the security interests of the United States and 
its European allies!'^ Further, the big Western powers have assumed a 
moral and political responsibility, both in sponsoring the establishment 
of this state in a hostile Arab world, and in preserving its independence, 
and that of other regimes in the area.  ^123456
1 See the text of Eisenhower Doctrine in the U.S. Senate, Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Background Documents Relating to the Middle East. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1969); see also 
William R. Polk, "A Decade of Discovery: America in the Middle East, 
1947-1958," St. Antony*s Papers, no.11, Middle East Affairs, no.2,
1961, pp. 49-80.
2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International 
Affairs, 1957, op.cit., pp. 233-240.
3 ibid., pp. 233-240.
4 Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Policy for the 1970s - Shaping a Durable Peace, 
A Report to the Congress, (n.p., no.pub., May 3, 1973), p.47.
5 Eugene U. Rostow, "The Middle Eastern Crisis in the Perspective of 
World Politics," International Affairs, vol. 47, no. 2, April 1971, 
pp. 275-288.
6 ibid., pp. 275-288; see also Evron Yair, The Middle East: Nations, 
Superpowers and Wars, (London: Elek, 1973), p.148.
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In a report prepared by Hamilton Armstrong on the Middle East 
and U.S. assistance programme, he referred to two major problems, the 
solution of which would contribute to the fulfilment of American 
objectives in the area, the two problems being the division among 
Arab states, and the "animosity between the Arab states and Israel." ^
He advocated foreign aid as a means towards solving both problems, and 
stressed the necessity of American efforts in securing a "modus vivendi"
between Israel and one or more of the Arab countries. His recommendations
. 2do no more than to reiterate the established American view.
These objectives were repeated by Nixon in 1973 when he impressed 
on the Middle Eastern countries to come to terms with each other and
3accept the existence of Israel. As a part of his policy towards the
Middle East, he requested Congress to double American aid to U.S. $5,180 m.
(£2,160m.). In addition, he requested Congress to approve $250 m. in
4economic aid to Egypt. This aid was in recognition of the fact that 
Egypt was following a moderate policy towards Israel. In particular, 
the United States has used aid to reward those Middle Eastern countries 
which were following a policy complementary to that of the United States.
It was openly emphasised that aid was meant to "strengthen the moderate 
forces."  ^12345
1 Hamilton F. Armstrong, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq - Report on United 
States Foreign Assistance Programs, (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1957), Survey no. 2, Feb. 1957, pp. 1-7.
2 ibid., p.7.
3 Richard M. Nixon, op.cit., p.47.
4 The Times, April 25, 1974, p.7, column 1-4.
5 ibid., pT7, column 1-4.
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Mutatis mutandis, the Middle Eastern policies of Western European 
countries were the same as those of the United States. For example, 
West Germany started giving aid to Middle Eastern countries as a 
result of the United States' suggestion that she should contribute to 
Western strategy, either by giving support for the American military 
units stationed in West Germany, or by contributing financially to 
Truman's Point Four Programme. West Germany had an additional 
political interest in giving aid, namely, to stop Arab countries from 
recognising East Germany.^ However, the mere fact that West Germany 
is part of the Western alliance, is a sufficient indicator as to the 
nature of West Germany's Middle Eastern policy, i.e., it runs almost 
parallel to that of the United States and other Western countries.
The interests of the United Kingdom were similar to those of other
Western countries in the Middle East, specifically combating Communism,
safeguarding international routes of communications, guaranteeing the
existence of Israel and ensuring an uninterrupted flow of strategic raw
materials from the Middle East to Europe. In fact, the Tripartite
Declaration of 1950 and the Baghdad Pact represented the political
2interest of Britain and her allies in the region. 12
1 See Judith Hart, Aid and Liberation: A Socialist Study of Aid Policies. 
(London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1973), p.169.
2 See the following: (a) The Declaration of Common Purpose by President
Eisenhower and Mr Macmillan, Washington, 25 Oct., 1957 in Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs. 
op.cit., 1957, pp. 400-403; (b) The Declaration issued at the
Ministerial Meeting of the Baghdad Pact, London, 28 July, 1958, ibid., 
1958, p. 369; (c) Mr Lloyd's statement regarding the situation in
Lebanon, 19 May, 1958, ibid., 1958, p. 265; (d) Mr Lloyd's statement
in the House of Commons regarding the situation in Iraq and the 
Lebanon, 15 July, 1958, ibid., 1958, p. 288; and (e) Mr Gaitskell's
speech in the House of Commons debate on the Middle East, 7 March, 1956, 
ibid., 1956, p. 15.
At this stage, we will link the discussion on the general 
interests of the donors in the whole of the Middle East with that on 
their interests in Jordan. The analysis of both will contribute to 
the view that foreign aid to Jordan, as far as the Western donors are 
concerned, was motivated by political ends. To begin with, we will 
examine the interests of Britain in Jordan and, later on, the interests 
of the United States. The two countries together were the main source 
of aid to Jordan.
C - THE MOTIVES BEHIND BRITISH AND U.S. AID TO JORDAN 
1 " MOTIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
It is best to start this discussion by recalling briefly the events 
which led to the creation of Jordan, and Britain's role in those events. 
Jordan herself, as Arnold J. Toynbee described her creation, was "an 
artificial entity which had only been called into existence by the 
exigencies or accidents of international politics."  ^ In return for 
their support during the First World War, Britain promised independence 
to the Arabs. Immediately after Allenby's victory, an Arab National 
State was set up in 1918, incorporating Transjordan with Damascus as 
its capital and Amir Faysal Ibn Hussein as its head. This national 
state did not survive long, for the French invaded Syria in 1920. Trans­
jordan escaped French occupation, because it constituted part of the 
British sphere of influence. The French recognised this in a secret 
agreement with the British. Instead, what emerged in place of the 
proposed Arab National State was Jordan. A. Toynbee said: the
extinction of the Arab Government of Damascus made it necessary for the
2British Government to honour its pledges in some alternative way." 12
1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International 
Affairs. 1928, (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 321; see 
also H.F. Armstrong, op.cit.. p.3; A. Konikoff, op.cit., p.100.
2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International 
Affairs, op.cit., vol. 1, 1925, p. 362.
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Jordan remained heavily dependent on Britain and was linked with the 
latter by treaties of alliance viz., the 20th of Feb., 1928 Agreement 
and the Treaty of Alliance, and its amendments on March 22nd, 1946, and 15th 
of March, 1948.*
Meanwhile, in discussing Western interests in Jordan, one should 
not ignore the general question of Western interests, in the Middle 
East, examined above. Ideology, political and the Arab-Israeli problem 
is at the centre of Western interest in the Middle East, in general, and 
in Jordan in particular. Economic interests are not of prime importance 
in the case of Jordan. Therefore, foreign aid to Jordan, as part of 
Western policy, particularly U.S. policy, should be looked at within 
the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the struggle of ideologies 
in the area.
An indication of the British interest earlier on is provided by
Articles 10 and 17 of the 1928 British and Transjordan Agreement, as well
as by the two amendments of the treaty in 1946 and 1948. Article 10 of
the 1928 Agreement stipulates that: "His Britannic Majesty was to be at
liberty not merely to maintain armed forces in Transjordan but to raise,
organise and control them there, whereas the Amir was not to do likewise
2without His Britannic Majesty's consent." Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the
31946 Treaty Annex express objectives of a similar nature. 123
1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International 
Affairs, op.cit., 1928, p.323; See Treaty of Alliance between His 
Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and His Highness the Amir 
of Transjordan, London, 22nd March, 1946, Accounts and Papers, State 
Papers, Session 1, Aug. 1945 - 6 Nov. 1946, Treaty Series no. 32 
(1946), Comd. 6916, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, n.d.), 
vol. XXV; and Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in respect of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and His 
Majesty the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, AmmanT 
15th March, 1948, Accounts and Papers, op.cit., session 21 Oct. 1947 - 
13 Sept. 1948, Treaty Series no. 26 (1948), Comd. 7404, vol. XXXI.
2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International 
Affairs, op,cit., 1928, pp. 323-324.
3 Accounts and Papers, op.cit., Treaty Series no. 32 (1946), Comd. 6916.
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In addition to using Jordan as a British military base, the safe­
guarding of Israel from hostile Arab countries was another British 
objective. The political crisis of 1956-1957 in Jordan which led to 
the dismissal of the British Commander of the Arab Legion, General 
Glubb Pasha, and the subsequent events point to British interest in 
Jordan. The dismissal led to concern and protest on the part of 
both sides of the British House of Commons. The British believed that 
their presence in Jordan had a restraining influence on Jordan in her 
policies towards Israel, in that the British control of the Jordanian 
army prevented it from joining other Arab armies in the case of an 
armed conflict with Israel. According to a statement by Mr Gaitskell 
in the British House of Commons' debate on the Middle East on March 7, 
1957, the presence of General Glubb Pasha exercised a restraining 
influence on the Arab Legion as well as on Jordanian policy towards 
Israel.*
Britain offered Jordan annual subsidies to keep the country's
administrative and political machinery in operation. The dismissal of
General Glubb Pasha uncovered the motives behind the British aid: "there
is now every real danger that if the subsidy continues we find ourselves
subsidizing the maintenance of a force which might well go into action
against Israel in circumstances in which we have to go to the defence
2and assistance of Israel." Jordan was under the direct political
tutelage of Britain until 1956, the year which saw the termination of the 
1948 Treaty of Alliance. Afterwards, the United States displaced Britain 
as the main economic benefactor and the political protector of Jordan. 12
1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International 
Affairs, op.cit., 1956, p.15.
2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International
Affairs, op.cit., 1956, p. 16.
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Later, Britain tried to retain her political influence in the Middle
East by sponsoring the Baghdad Pact and impressing on Jordan and other
Arab countries to join the Pact. It was then thought that by getting
Jordan to join the Pact, the Western powers could group the moderate
pro-West regimes together to oppose Communist influence in the area,
as well as isolate other regimes who were following policies which were
not complementary to those of the West.
Despite the British pressure, Jordan did not join the Pact. The
main reason for the refusal was the wide spread hostility in Jordan
towards the pacts sponsored by the United States and Britain -
as a result of these countries' support for Israel.^- However, British
policy of temptation and persuasion was not fruitful. Sir Gerald Templer,
the chief of the British Imperial General Staff, was not able to obtain
a definite Jordanian commitment for joining the Pact despite the gift of
2ten Vampire jets and other promises of more aid to the Jordanian army.
Despite the renunciation of the treaty in 1956 and Jordan's refusal to
join the pacts, British interests remained aiming at preserving the
integrity of Jordan. At one time, they manifested themselves in the
landing of British troops in Amman in the aftermath of the 1958 coup 
3d'e tat in Iraq. 123
1 See Egypt’s reaction to the Pact in R. Stephens, Political Leaders of 
the Twentieth Century -Nasser, A Political Biography, (Harmondsworth: 
The Penguin Press, 1971), p.175.
2 R. Stephens, op.cit., p.174.
3 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International
Affairs, op.cit., 1956-1958, pp. 373-377.
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II - MOTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Since the late 1950s, Jordan has been heavily dependent on the 
United States of America for economic, military and technical 
assistance. In this section, we will try to look at the United 
States’ interests in Jordan. With appropriate modification it will 
be seen that the United States' interest in the Middle East as a whole 
is similar to her interest in Jordan.
The present boundaries Cde jure, not de facto) of Jordan are 
products of two different sets of events in the Middle East, namely; 
the events following the break up of the Turkish Empire in the early 
twenties and the creation of Israel in 1948, The American interest 
in Jordan dates from the creation of Israel, Even if there were no 
Israel, the Middle East in general and Jordan in particular would have 
been of interest to the United States by virtue of her being a super 
power with global interests and the economic and geographical importance 
of the region. The political and ideological divisions in the Middle 
East are not creations of foreign powers, instead they are rooted in 
domestic factors. However, foreign intervention, either political and 
military or economic, has given these divisions an additional sig­
nificance, i.e., they have become part of global divisions between the 
West and the East.
The question that arises at this stage is ; what are the ways in 
which the United States of America is involved in Jordan? A 
prominent American official had recognised two problems in the Middle 
East, i.e., Arab animosity towards Israel and rivalry among Arab states.*
1 Hamilton F. Armstrong, op.cit., pp. 2-3.
problems. He recognised the importance of Jordan as "the logical
spot to begin, if a new attack on the Israeli-Arab dispute is to be
made." * His justification of this view was that Jordan is "a weak
country with artificially drawn frontiers, a fragile economy and half
2a million refugees." A programme of action was, therefore,
proposed to solve the Palestinian refugee problem, and here one
can see one of the main motives behind the American aid to Jordan.
Hamilton Armstrong had suggested, among other things, "a 10-year
United Nations loan to Jordan, to be supported largely by a U.S.
contribution, to finance its economic development and provide, for its
internal security, on condition that the remainder of the refugees in
Jordan become the charge of the Jordanian government and merged into
3the local social economy." The United States was trying, in fact, 
to draw a plan aimed, among other things, at solving the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The objectives of the U.S. were plainly stated: "to mitigate 
hostility between Arabs and the Israelis by reducing the economic 
causes of friction between them. Both results (solving the problem of 
inter-Arab rivalry and the Arab-Israeli conflict) if they could be 
obtained, would check the Communist growth, in the area 
and diminish the risk of Soviet intervention there, politically or 
militarily."  ^1234
American aid, as he saw it, could contribute towards solving both
1 Hamilton F. Armstrong, op.cit., p.3.
2 ibid., p.3.
3 ibid., p.3; see also other proposals pertaining to the whole 
Middle East.
4 ibid., p.7.
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The concern for the independence of Jordan, which is at the core
of the United States' policy in the area as well as the basic official
justification of giving aid to Jordan, go further than the Arab-
Israeli conflict. One of the main aims was the maintenance of the
socio-political 'status quo' in Jordan, and preserving her separate
identity among the Arab countries of the Middle East. In other words,
the United States had wanted Jordan independent of the grouping of the
Arab states not sympathetic to the United States.
The Eisenhower Doctrine was in actual feet a programme for
maintaining the 'status quo' in certain countries of the Middle East.^
In fact, the doctrine was empirically tested when Jordan faced internal
instability just before and after the dismissal of Premier Suliman El-
Nabulsi's Cabinet. The fears of an imminent coup d'etat in Jordan
resulted in the dispatch of the United States' Sixth Fleet to the
Eastern Mediterranean. The show of strength was meant to demonstrate
2American interest in the internal politics of Jordan. The Jordanian
government headed by Premier Suliman El-Nabulsi was a coalition of
left-wing parties which adopted slogans of freedom for all citizens,
freedom from other powers, unity with other Arab countries and fight
against colonialism and the rejection of any peace or negotiations with 
3 . .Israel. It was no surprise that the dissolution of this Cabinet meant 
to the West a defeat for Nasser and his Arab allies, and a victory for 
the United States' new Middle Eastern policy. King Saud, on his part, 
gave support to Jordan, and the United States declared Jordan's
• 4independence to be a matter of vital concern to the United States. 1234
1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International 
Affairs, op.cit., pp. 233.234.
2 ibid., 1957, p.289; see also Mr Dulles' press conference on the events 
in Jordan in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin, op.cit., May 1957, 
p. 768.
3 For excerpts from ministerial speeches, see Hani Khair, op.cit., pp.81-86.
4 R. Stephens, op.cit., p.262.
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The United States reiterated its commitment to the independence 
and autonomy of Jordan once again in September 1970. 1969 and 1970 saw
the erosion of political control and authority in Jordan as a result 
of the development of Palestinian organisations and a decrease in 
Jordan's position among Arab countries owing to her conciliatory 
stance towards Israel. The events of 1969 and 1970 finally led to a 
civil war in the course of which Syrians intervened to support the 
Palestinians. The United States, in turn, sided with the Jordanian 
government and hinted at direct intervention, by placing various air­
borne U.S. units on alert.* Israel, on her part, was also closely 
watching the events in Jordan, to ensure that there was no change in
the military and the political situation in Jordan resulting in a shift
2in the balances of forces unfavourable to Israel. Briefly, it can 
be said, that the preservation of the political independence and the 
'status quo' in Jordan has been a main objective for both the United 
States and Israel.
As far as opposition to Communism is concerned, Jordan has been, 
together with Saudi Arabia, one of the countries most hostile to the 
Soviet block. It was only after 1967 that Jordan established diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union. The People's Republic of China is not 
as yet recognised by Jordan. Furthermore, Jordan has shown inclinations 12
1 William Quandt, "The Middle East Conflict in the U.S. Strategy,
1970-1971," Journal of Palestinian Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, Autumn 1971, 
pp. 39-52; see also Yair Avron, op.cit., p.159.
2 R. Stephens, op,cit., p.217; see also Major-General Moshe Dayan,
Diary of the Sinai Campaign, (New York: 1967), p.28, quoted in
R. Stephens, op.cit., p.218; W. Quandt, op.cit,, p.47; M.H. Heykal
in an article in Al-Ahram, the semi-official Egyptian newspaper, on 
16 October 1970 quoted by R. Stephens, op.cit., p.552; Yair Avron, 
op. cit., p. 160.
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to join Western pacts that are known for their enmity to Communism, 
i.e. Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. The American justification 
for the U.S. aid to Jordan and other Arab countries, Lebanon for example, 
are couched in terms of the benefits expected to follow from aid in 
future. The reasoning goes: there is less likelihood that those 
countries (i.e., those receiving aid) will be sucked into what is termed 
as "aggressive blocks"; world tension can be thus reduced; and finally, 
the free economic system can be given chances of survival. ^
Finally, the United States has other interests in Jordan apart from
the ones mentioned above. The United States' aid to Jordan had been
intended to show to other Middle Eastern countries the rewards a country
2could reap by following Western principles of free enterprise. The 
economic and social projects, e.g. development of transport and 
communications, provision of educational facilities, were meant to 
demonstrate to other Arab countries the beneficent effects of political 
co-operation with the United States.
In the analysis presented above, it was noticed that aid donors, 
particularly Western ones, had important interests in the Middle East as 
a whole, and in Jordan in particular. It became clear that the United 
States and the Western European countries had identical interests and, 
with a few modifications, identical policies in the Middle East in general, 
and in Jordan in particular. We have argued that the Western countries had 
a political, rather than economic interest in Jordan. On this basis we can 12
1 Hamilton F. Armstrong, op.cit., p.2.
2 Leo Tansky, U.S. and U.S.S.R. aid to Devdoping Countries: A Comparative 
Study of India, Turkey and the U.A.R. (New York: Praeger, 1967),
Chapter 1, p.16.
argue that the aid to Jordan from those countries was principally 
motivated by political factors. Jordan has managed to receive a large 
amount of foreign aid from the Western countries because of her geo­
political position, and the policies she has followed in the Middle 
East. So in effect, the Western aid to Jordan is a remuneration for 
adopting political positions complementary to those of the West.
102
PART TWO: MAIN SOURCES OF FOREIGN AID TO JORDAN AND THEIR CHANNELS
Most of foreign aid to Jordan has been bilateral. From 1923 to 
1949, Britain was the sole donor of aid. Thereafter, from 1949-1956 
the share of British aid in the total decreased. The reason behind this 
was that Britain emerged from the Second World War weaker and burdened 
with financial obligations. On the otherhand, the United States was the 
sole Western country which emerged from the War rich and capable of meeting 
her political and economic obligations. The United States entered the 
political scene in Jordan and filled the vacuum created by the departure 
of England. The termination in 1956 of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 
1948 marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. From 1957 
to 1966, the United States was an important, if not the most important, 
source of aid. It alone accounted for three quarters of total Western 
aid to Jordan over the period 1957 - 1966 and more than half of the 
total aid over the same period. The increased economic involvement of 
the United States coincided with the creation of the state of Israel 
and the departure of Britain from the political scene.
The period 1967 - 1972 marked another change in the sources of foreign 
aid to Jordan. The aid from the oil-rich Arab countries became significant 
only after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. It was because of the 
repercussions of the War on Jordan half of which fell under Israeli 
occupation.
Table 3 and Graph 1 show the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America and the Arab countries as the three main aid donors to Jordan.
They also show the relative importance of aid from these donors.
TABLE 3
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN AID FiOM THE MAJOR DONORS
AVERAGE PERCENTAGES
Period
Unrequited Transfers 
front Countries as Z 
of Aggregate Unre­
quited Transfers
Aid from Countries 
to Central Govern­
ment as Z of Total 
Government Receipts 
of Foreign Aid
Budget Support from 
Countries as Z of Total 
Budget Support
Aid-in- Loans from 
Countries as Z of Total 
Flow of Loans
Total Aid from Countries 
as Z of Total Aid Flow 
to Jordan
' United 
King­
dom
USA
Arab
Coun­
tries
United
King­
dom
USA
Arab
Coun­
tries
United
King­
dom
USA
Arab
Coun­
tries
United
King­
dom
USA
Arab
Coun­
tries
United
King­
dom
USA
Arab
Coun­
tries
Average Z 
1924-1949 100 - 100 . . - « 100 - 100 - _ 100 • •
Average Z 
1956-1966 12.0 52.3 - 12.5 72.2 - 21.3
*
84.97 -
**
47.2
***
8.19 - 14.2 45.0 a-
Average Z 
1960-1966 7.96 63.85 - 13.43 74.46 9.33 13.42 86.56 - 32.12 8.19 40.86 9.44 52.90 6.43
Average Z 
1967-1972 - 17.48 68.04 2.84 19.44 72.51 19.59 79.98 14.23 25.46 19.61 2.37 18.08 61.69
Average Z 
1960-1972 - 42.45 51.66 8.54 49.07 38.49 - 55.66
f
23.86 16.49 31.05 6.18 36.80 ' 31.94
Source: Appendix II, Table 1.
* Average Z for 
** Average Z for 
*** Average Z for 
**** Average Z for
the years 1958-1966. 
the years 1959-1966. 
the years 1960-1966. 
the years 1965-1972.
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The literature of foreign aid has drawn attention to particular 
shortcomings of bilateral aid: e.g., predominance of political 
over economic considerations, the lack of co-ordination between different 
aid donors, economic strings, e.g., all purchases have to be from donor 
countries, etc. However, in spite of widespread criticism of bilateral
aid, it is still the main form in which aid is given to underdeveloped
„ . 1countries.
The sources of bilateral aid to Jordan changed. Until 1949, all 
aid was bilateral and Britain was the sole source of this type of foreign 
aid. From 1949 onwards, multilateral aid was given by some multilateral 
agencies such as U.N.R.W.A. and other United Nations agencies and the 
International Development Association (I.D.A.) Table 3.A and Graph 2 
show the volumes and the relative importance of both bilateral and 
multilateral aid to Jordan over the period under study. (See Table 3.A p.105) 
It can be seen from the table that bilateral aid decreased gradually 
but not by a great amount. It constituted, on average, 89.4 and 78.4 
percent of total aid over the two successive periods of 1967 - 1972 and 
1950 - 1972. International organisations have been a minor source of 
foreign aid to Jordan. Though Jordan has been an important recipient of 
aid, donors of aid to Jordan have not so far established among themselves 
a conceited programme. In other words, aid to Jordan was not channelled 
through aid Consortium or any other form of Grouping. The reasons for
(1) See the following: T. Balogh, "Multilateral v. Bilateral aid,"
Oxford Economic Papers, New series, Vol. 19, No. 3. 1967, pp 328- 
330; and pp 332 - 344; J. Audibret, "Bilateral Aid," in R. Robinson 
ed., International Co-operation in Aid, Impressions and Papers of the 
Fifth Cambridge Conference, 4-17 September 1966, at Jesus College, 
Cambridge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Overseas Studies Committee, 
1969); Mahbub ul Eaq, "Tied Credits - A quantitative Analysis," in 
J. H. Adler ed., Capital Movements and Economic Development, (New York: 
St. Martin's Press Inc., 1967), pp 326-359; H. W. Singer, "External 
Aid: For Plans or Projects," Economic Journal Vol. 75, 1965, pp 539 - 
545.
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TABLE 3.A
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL FOREIGN AID TO JORDAN 
1924-25 - 1972-73
Period Components of Bilateral Aid 
as X of Components of Aggre­
gate Foreign Aid
Components of Multilateral Aid 
as X of Components of Aggre­
gate Foreign Aid
Unre­
quited
Trans­
fers
Loans Total
Unre­
quited
Trans­
fers
Loans Total
1924-25 to 
1933-34 100 100
1934-35 to 
1948-49 100 _ 100
1949 100 100 100 -
1950 68.35 - 68.35 31.65 31.651951 73.92 - 73.92 26.03 _ 26.081952 68.82 100 71.84 31.18 - 28.161953 70.02 100 73.46 29.98 26.541954 65.87 100 71.02 34.13 _ 28.981955 66.59 - 66.59 33.41 33.411956 76.91 - 76.91 23.09 ‘ 23.091957 68.92 - 68.92 31.08 — 31.081958 80.34 100 81.11 19.66 — 18.891959 77.69 100 78.14 22.31 — 21.861960 78.17 100 79.69 21.83 » 20.311961 79.61 100 80.22 20.39 - 19.781962 76.79 100 78.07 23.21 — 21.931963 75.89 99.29 77.72 24.11 0.71 22.281964 76.37 92.54 80.25 23.63 7.46 19.751965 72.97 63.83 72.07 27.03 36.17 27.931966 66.01 91.74 70.25 33.99 8.26 29.751967 87.75 88.93 87.89 12.25 11.07 12.111968 88.23 93.32 88.76 11.77 6.68 11.241969 92.21 95.93 92.58 7.79 4.07 7.421970 83.97 95.48 84.79 16.03 4.52 15.211971 . 90.42 98.68 92.45 9.58 1.32 7.551972 87.27 93.31 88.38 12.73 6.69 11.62
Average X  
1924-25 to 
1948-49 100 100 100
Average X 
1950-59 71.74 100 73.02 28.25 26.97
Average X  
1960-66 75.11 92.48 76.89 24.88 13.15* 23.10
Average X  
1967-72 88.31 94.27 89.14 11.69 5.72 10.86
Average X  
1960-72 81.20 93.31 82.55 18.80 8.69** 17.45
Average X  
1950-72 77.10 94.2*** 78.41 22.91 8.69** 21.6
Source: Appendix II, Table 6.
* Average percentage for 1963-66; ** Average percentage for 1963-72; 
_*_**. ^ AyeraRe percentage f or_19_5_8-72, ___'j___ ;__ ^______________
I0
5‘ 
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an excessive reliance on bilateral aid are historical, in particular 
owing to the political history of the country and the region.
However, Jordan's freedom in reducing dependence on bilateral aid 
has been limited: (a) the country's political position has been delicate 
which is bound to create dependence on the main sources of aid. These 
sources have been, at the same time, the countries which have bemgiving 
political support to Jordan. Therefore, shifting or diversifying aid 
channels appears not to be politically feasible; (b) biases and 
nationalism on the part of donors, have made bilateral aid the favourite 
channel for exercising power and influence and for pursuing their self- 
interest; and (c) Jordan's economic leadership, as well as that of her 
administration, have been incompetent. Accordingly, awareness of 
shortcomings in bilateral aid was lacking. In general, one could say that 
foreign aid to Jordan was kept bilateral but the bilateral sources 
changed over the period under study.
An examintion of the sources of foreign aid will: (a) indicate the 
volumes of aid and the relative importance of each donor in the overall 
stream of aid; (b) refer to the effect of Jordan's political leanings 
on her choice of sources of aid; and (c) show the problem of discontinuity 
and uncertainty as aspects of bilateralism.
A. SOURCES OF FOREIGN AID - AN ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY 
I - BRITISH AID - MAGNITUDES AND COMPONENTS
Over the period 1924 - 25/1972 - 73, Jordan received from Britain 
J.D. 106.0 m. in aid. The amount of J.D. 87.2 million was in the form 
of grants to the Central government. Table 3.B and Graph 3 show the 
volumn of British aid to Jordan as well as its components.
TABLE 3 .  B
BRITISH ATP TO JORDAN 
1924-25/1972-73
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Unrequited Transfers Loans Total U.K. Flow U.K. Aid to
Budget
Support
Technical 
& Economic 
Assistance
Total (1)
Loans to
Central
Government
Government
Guaranteed
Loans
Total (2)
of Aid to Jordan 
(1 + 2) - 3
Central Govern­
ment (Unrequited 
Transfers + Loans)
1924-25 to 
1933-34 89 89 89 89
1934-35 to 
1948-49 6191 6191 6191 6191
1949 3500 - 3500 1000 - 1000 4500 4500
1950 4898 - 4898 - - - 4898 4898
1951 7200 - 7200 - - - 7200 7200
1952 7314 - 7314 1500 - ' 1500 8814 8814
1953 8537 - 8537 2100 - 2100 10637 10637 :
1954 8420 - 8420 2870 - 2870 11290 2870 .
1955 8957 - 8957 - - - 8957 8957
1956 10957 - 10957 - - - 10957 .10957
1957 - - — - - - - —
1958 4778 - - 4778 997 - 997 5775 5775
1959 1970 - 1970 500 •- 500 2470 2470
1960 2416 - 2416 500 - 500 2646 2646
1961 3209 - 3209 500 - 500 3709 3709
1962 1829 - 1829 700 - 700 2529 2529
1963 1500 * 1500 700 - 700 2200 2200
1964 1500 - 1500 . 700 - • 700 2200 2200
1965 1400 - 1400 700 - 700 2100 2100
1966 1300 - 1300 250 - 250 1550 1550
1967 964 500 1464 735 - 735 , 2199 2199 ‘
1968 - « - 827 - 827 827 827
1969 - - 1253 - 1253 1253 1253
1970 - - - 262 - 262 262 262
1971 « • - 1769 - 1769 1769 1769
1972 - - * 1257 112.3 1370 1370 1257
Totel^n
Jordanian 86,658,600 500,000 87,158,600 19,119,310 112,300 19,231,610 106,390,200' 106,277,900
Dinars)
Source: Appendix II, Table 1
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Over the period under study, the relative importance of British 
aid had constantly declined. Whereas up to 1950 it constituted almost 
the whole of foreign aid to Jordan, its proportion of the total declined 
to an average of 11.0% over 1958-1960, and then to only 6.2% over 1960- 
1972 (see table 3 above).
Traditionally, British aid to Jordan has taken the form of grants 
and a limited range of technical assistance. Out of the total aid 
received from Britain, 82% was in grants and the remainder was in loans. 
Technical assistance was mainly in the form of British advisers to both 
the army and the civil administration. The other form of grants was in 
cash. It was for financing government expenditures (budget support).
Until 1956, all the budgetary aid received by Jordan came from Britain. 
From then on the British share dropped sharply, it was only 13.4% of 
total budget support over the period 1958-1966. In 1967, Britain 
stopped giving this form of aid to Jordan altogether, and increased her 
aid-in-loans. Of the total loans received Britain contributed an 
average of 47.2% over 1958-1966 and an average of 24.0% over 1960 - 1972.
Since most of the government expenditures was devoted to the up 
keep of the army (as shown in Chapter 11), most of British aid, in effect, 
went towards maintaining the Jordanian army. In the beginning*the British 
aid was more or less exclusively geared towards the maintenance of the 
administrative structure and the army. It thus laid down the basis of 
the state which Britain herself created.
The pattern of distribution of British aid is compatible with the 
general pattern of aid distribution discussed in Chapter H-.» where we 
found that foreign aid, in the form of unrequited transfers, was mainly 
spent on maintaining the army and the administrative set-up.^ - By acquiring
(1) Discussion of the sectoral distribution of loans is available in 
Chapter IV.
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British aid, the Jordanian government was also made capable of 
maintaining the increase in its recurring expenditures with little 
reliance on domestic resources (particularly taxes).
II AID FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - MAGNITUDES, COMPOSITION
AND SIGNIFICANCE
On February 27, 1951 the United States and Jordan entered into an 
agreement, whereby U.S. technical assistance was officially given.
The importance the United States accorded to Jordan reflected itself not 
only in political support but also in economic aid and technical 
assistance to the country. According to the United States mission in 
Jordan, aid was given "because of increasing concern over the deterioration 
of stability of the Middle East and in recognition of Jordan's key 
position in preserving stability."*
The diminishing British aid to Jordan as a result of economic crisis 
at home and winding up of overseas commitments and, later on, the 
termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance marked the 
beginning of U.S. aid to Jordan. On 29 April, 1957 the Jordanian Foreign 
Minister, Samir Pasha Rifai, sent a note to the U.S. Ambassador in Amman,
Mr Lester D. Mallory, asking for U.S. economic aid. The same day, a 
reply was made offering U.S. $10.0 million in accordance with the provisions 
of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended. The following day, April 30, 
the nationalist government in Jordan headed by Premier Suliman El
1. United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.), 
U.S. Assistance to Jordan, (Amman: U.S.A.I.D., Dec. 21, 1966); 
see also part one - C, above, for discussions on the U.S. motives 
behind extending aid to Jordan.
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Nabulsi was dissolved.
Notwithstanding the ambiguity in U.S. statistics on aid to countries, 
particularly to Israel, Jordan and Lebanon, a U.S.A.I.D. report, 
prepared for the use of the U.S. Congressional Committees which are 
concerned with foreign aid viz., the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Appropriation Committee 
and the Senate Appropriation Committee, showed that 4.11% of total grants 
(the equivalent of $668.4 m.) given by the United States to developing 
countries of the Near East and South East Asia (N.E.S.A.) went to Jordan. 
However, if one were to arrange those countries according to amounts 
received from the U.S., Jordan would rank fifth among recipient countries. 
This is, in fact, a clear evidence which supports what we discussed 
earlier, i.e., the great interest of the United States in Jordan. The 
following table, as well as Graph 4, shows Jordan's position with regard 
to aid received from the United States. (See Table 3.C p. 111).
The following table shows that over the period 1953 - 1972, the 
United States gave J.D. 189 million in aid to Jordan. The flow of aid 
was highest in 1959 (J.D. 15.9 m.) Thereafter, the flow gradually 
declined until 1971, when it noticeably increased.
Of the total United States' aid, 92.4% was in the form of outright 
grants. From 1959, the proportion of U.S. aid in the total declined. On 12
2
1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International 
Affairs, 1957, op.cit., pp. 287-289.
2 United States' statistics on aid to countries in the Middle East, 
particularly Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, were not clear: firstly, 
certain types of U.S. aid were labelled as "classified information" 
such as grants and military aid. Secondly, technical and economic 
assistance (technical and project aid) were lumped together under 
one title.
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U.S. AID TO SOME LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR EAST AND 
SOUTH EAST ASIA (N.E.S.A.)*- JORDAN'S POSITION
1946-1971**
TABLE 3.C
IN MILLIONS OF U.S. $ - U.S. FISCAL YEARS
Country Economic & Military Aid over the period 
1946-1971
Grants as 
% of Total
Grants as 
% of Total
Loans Grants Total Total 
Less 
Repay­
ment of 
Interest
Grants to 
NESA
Countries
Aid to NESA 
Countries
Egypt 617.8 292.7 910.6 750.9 1.8 0.9
Iraq 26.7 77.4 104.1 90.0 0.47 0.24
Israel classi­
fied
370.2 classi­
fied
classi­
fied
2.27 1.14
Greece 366.0 3586.8 3952.7 3688.7 22.07 11.13
Iran 1298.6 1289.7 2588.2 2034.0 7.93 4.0
Jordan classi­
fied
668.4 classi­
fied
classi­
fied
4.11 2.07
Lebanon classi­
fied
92.9 classi­
fied
classi­
fied
0.57 0.28
Syria 24.0 36.6 60.7 56.5 0.22 0.11
Turkey 1520.3 4457.8 5978.1 5593.6 27.4 13.83
Yeman
Demo­
cratic
Repub­
lic 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.01
Yeman
Arab
Repub­
lic 42.7 42.7 42.7 0.26 0.13
Afgha­
nistan 100.1 319.9 420.0 371.6 1.96 0.99
Paki­
stan 2363.6 2331.9 4695.7 4314.5 14.34 7.23
Total 
US Aid 
to NESA 
Coun­
tries 15965.8 16251.3 32217.1
Source: Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and 
Grants and Assistance from International Organisations,
Obligations and Loan Authorization, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1971, 
(n.p., n.pub., May 24, 1972).
Notes: * The term LDCS refers to less developed countries; countries have
been classified "less developed", on the basis of the standard list 
'/'S. '■ of less developed countries" used by the Development Assistance 
Ççmmittee of the QRCD in compiling its statistics on the flow of 
financial jpespuçces£ the abbreviation )ÆSA refers to the less
developed countries in the Near East and South East Asia viz., 
Afghanistan, Ceylon, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, 
^ I s r a e l ,  Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, 
Syria, Turkey, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen Democratic Republic, 
Central Treaty Organisation and Near East and South Asia Regional.
** This table is constructed from information appeared in the above-­
mentioned source.
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average, it was 54.4% of the total aid to Jordan over 1958-1966, 52.9% 
over 1960-1966 and 36.8% over 1960-1972.^ (See Table 3.D. p.113).
The composition of the United States aid to Jordan, in fact,
reflected the role of the United States in Jordan, previously played
by Britain, i.e.#maintaining the defence and the administrative set up
of the country. 92.4% of the total U.S. aid to Jordan was in the form
of outright grants. The remainder was in the form of loans. Until 1967,
unrequited transfers (grants) from the United States represented
approximately two thirds of the total unrequited transfers to Jordan.
2Loans were insignificant until 1967, but thereafter they increased.
Graph 5 shows the relative importance as well as volumes of U.S. aid 
to Jordan.
In the remaining discussion, we will deal with three main 
components of U.S. aid to Jordan, i.e., budget support, technical and 
economic assistance and U.S. commodity aid.
(a) - BUDGET SUPPORT
With regard to budget support from the United States, it can be 
seen from Table 3.D that from 1957, the year the United States formally 
began giving this type of aid to Jordan, up to 1966, an average of 
85.0% of total budget support was from the United States of America. This 12
1 See Table 3, p.103.
2 See Appendix II, Table 7
TABLE 3. D
UNIT -p STATES AID TO JORCAN
1953-1972
IN THOU. SANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Unrequited Tran sf ere Loan« !
Total U.S. 
Aid to
Aggregate A it d Flow 
to Jordan
Components of U.S. Aid as I 
Components of Aggregate Aid Flow US Aid to Government
Receipts
of
Foreign
Aid
US Aid to Government ee X 
of Total Government 
Receipts of Foreign Aid
US Budget Support 
se X of Total 
Budget Support
US Technical 6 Economic
Budget Support Technical 6 
Economic 
Assistance
Total
(1)
Loans to
Central
Government
Government*
Guaranteed
Loans
Total
(2) (1 ♦ 2) - 3
unrequited ¡ 
Transfers j
------------- i
Loans
Aggregate 
Aid FI otr
US Unrequited Transiers as Z"*"' 
o f Total Unrequited Transfers
US Loans as X 
of Aggregate 
Loans
Totalfo)
Government 
(Unrequited 
Transfers ♦ Loans
Technical 4 Economic 
Assistance
1953-54 - 446 446 - - - 446 16213 1 2100 18313 2.75 2.43 446 11083 4.02
------ -- * 100.00
1954-55 - 531 531 - - 531 16115 2870 18985 3.29 2.7 531 11821 4.49 100.001955- 56
1956- 57 _
331 331
_ — ee
331 13948 j 
19232 /. -
13948
19232
2.37 - 2.37 331 9288
10957
3.56 - 100.00
1957-58 - 986 986 - - - 986 15766 - 15766 6.25 • 6.25 986 5986 16.47 m 100.001958-59 11611 2194 13805 - - v - - 13805 24161 : 997 25158 57.14 _ 54.87 13805 70.51 70.85 100.00
1959-60 14460 1475 15935 - - “ 15935 24206 ? . 500 24706 65.83 _ 64.49 15935 18405 86.58 88.01 100.001960-61 14290 1123 15413 - 315 315 15728 24241 1815 26056 63.58 17.36 60.36 15413 19059 80.87 86.94 100.001961-62 13210 1978 15188 - 276 , 276 15464 25265 776 26041 6o.ll 35.59 59.38 15188 18897 . 80.37 80.46 100.001962-63 12860 1016 13876 - 128 , 123 14004 22669 i ! 1317 23986 61.21 9.72 58.38 13876 16894 82.14 ' 87.55 100.001963-64 12503 1625 14128 - 23 23 14151 22863 ; 1933 24796 61.79 ' 1.19 57.07 14128 17595 80.30 89.29 96.611964-65 12182 . 1647 13829 - 140 ! 140 13969 22729 i 7179 29908 60.84 1.95 46.70 13829 22446 61,61 89.04 95.481965-66 11436 1911 13347 - - • • 13347 23989 ! 2616 26605 55.64 ■ 50.16 13347 17887 74.62 89.09 78.481966-67 6629 1349 7978 283 - 283 8261 18211 Ì 3590 21801 83.81 7.88 37.89 8261 13473 61.32 83.60 69.041967-68 6126 770 6896 1209 - 1209 8105 47509 6792 54301 14.52 17.80 14.93 8105 44097 18.4 16.11 41.131968-69 1949 313 2262 968 - 968 3230 46763 ( I 5414 52177 4.84 17.88 6.19 3230 45258 7.14 4.93 100.001969-70 - 619 819 1010 - 1010 1829 43297 1 4781 4807 8 1.89 21.13 3.80 1829 43053 4,25 99.391970-71 - 266 266 757 - 757 1023 41074 3155 44229 0.65 24.00 2.31 1023 37497 2.73 11.301971-72 16976 169 17145 442 5885 6328 23473 40067 1307 7 53144 42.79 48.39 44.16 17587 42372 61.51 48.60 36.821972-73 21090 446 21536 2271 587 2857 24393 53605 : 12105 65710 40.18 23.60 37.12 23807 55845 42.63 47.93 98.24
To Cel (in 
J« Dinars! 155,322,000 19,395,000 174,717,000 6,940,300 7,353,800 14,294,100 189,011,100 561,923,300 i 71,014,500
1
632,937,300 ■ 181,657,400 *81,491,400
Source: Appendix XXy Table X.
* Loane fron the United States Develcpment Fund + Export-Import Bank + 
soroe American Commercial Banks.
>ÌII
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average dropped over the period 1960-1972 to 55.7%. The peculiarities 
of budget support are that it was historically an extention of the budget 
support Jordan used to get from Britain, it was not tied and it was in 
the form of cash. The main function of the budgetary aid was to help 
the Jordanian government maintain its administrative and defence expenditure.
(b)~ TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.1
United States' "technical assistance" to Jordan is technical services 
provided by the United States' government (advisers and instructors) plus 
the cost of training Jordanians in American institutions. As for 
"economic assistance", it is the cash grants given by the United States 
to the government of Jordan to be spent on specific economic projects.
Of the total technical and economic assistance received by Jordan 
(J.D. 24.7 million) the United States contributed 78.0% (J.D. 19.4 million).
There are no reliable data on the sectoral distribution of technical 
and economic assistance. Nevertheless, we have managed with the help of 
reports from American agencies to put together the following picture:
1 The United States statistics on technical and economic assistance do not 
divide the technical part of this type of assistance from the part 
representing cash for project-tied aid. Both components are lumped 
together.
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TABLE 3.E
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. TECHNICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM INCEPTION OF AID 
PROGRAMME TILL 1966, 1969, and 1970.
IN MILLIONS OF Ù. S. DOLLARS
Number Sectors
Till
June 30th 1966
Till
June 30ti 1969
Till
June 30th 1970
Values % Values % Values %
1 Agriculture 
and Natural 
Resources 25.938 30.6 26.7 28 27.2 28
2 Transport 18.623 22.0 18.7 20 19.4 20
3 Industry 
and Mining 
(including 
Tourism) 8.641 10.2 10.5 11 10.7 11
4 Education 6.872 8.1 7.2 8 7.8 8
5 Health and 
Sanitation 4.431 5.2 4.9 5 4.9 5
6 *All others 20.250 23.9 26.4 28 27.1 28
Total 84.755 100 94.4 100 97.1 100
Source: (a) United States Agency for International Development,
U.S. Assistance to Jordan, (Amm^n: U.S.A.I.D., Dec. 21, 1966); 
(b) and U.S. Economic Aid Programs to Jordan, (Amman: U.S.A.I.D. 
October 7, 1969); (c) and U.S. Economic Aid Programs to
A Jordan, (Amman: U.S.A.I.D., Aug. 31, 1970).
Includes technical aid to public administration, Public Safety, 
Community development, general and miscellaneous and technical 
support cost.
The table above shows the distribution of both technical and economic 
assistance to the different sectors of the economy. From the table it 
can be seen that most of the technical and economic assistance was directed 
towards agriculture and transport. These two sectors absorbed approximately 
50% of total United States technical and economic assistance. Irrigation 
and water resources projects, particularly the East Ghor Canal project, 
absorbed most of this type of American aid given since the inception of 
the United States aid programme to Jordan (1953) till June 30, 1966.
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The East Ghor Canal Project was an irrigation and drainage project 
designed to serve 120,000 dunums of farm land in the first stage and 
an additional 20,000 dunums in the second stage.^
The transport item in the previous table represented technical and 
economic assistance towards the development of transport and communications. 
It was geared to the construction, maintenance and management of 
communications facilities and roads. The miscellaneous items reprsent 
expenditures on community development schemes which fall within the 
framework of infrastructure, such as the construction of schools, clinics, 
houses, water and sewage systems and marketing centres. They also include 
expenses for maintaining the United States' A.I.D. Mission and assistance 
given to the Municipal and Village Loan Fund. The latter is an institution 
specialising in giving loans for the development of villages and cities in 
Jordan. On the whole, the analysis of the distribution of the United 
States' technical and economic assistance shows that most of it went to 
the development of economic infrastructure. In particular, 60% of the 
American technical and economic assistance received was for infrastructural 
projects.
Furthermore, the United States technical and economic assistance 
programme provided for the technical training of Jordanians. The training 
programme was related to three main fields: eductation, agriculture 
and public administration. The following table summarises the distribution 
of participants on the basis of the field of training.
1 1 dunum equals 1000 sq. m.; 1 acre equals approximately 4 dunums.
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TABLE 3.F
DISTRIBUTION OF JORDANIANS - TRAINED ABROAD ACCORDING 
TO FIELD OF ACTIVITY (1951-52 - JUNE 30, 1969).
Field of Activity No. of Participants
Education 416
Agriculture 279
Public Adminis­
tration 219
Health 209
Engineering 138
Tourism 86
Highway 57
Industry 43
Public Safety 41
Business adminis­
tration 7
Total 1495
Source: U.S.A.I.D., U.S. Economic Programme to Jordan, op. cit., p.2.
(c)" THE U.S. COMMODITY AID
The American aid to Jordan in the form of agricultural commodities 
went through two phases. In the first phase, i.e., the period from 
1952 till 1966, this aid took the form of grants but in the second phase 
commodity aid had to be paid for either in Jordanian dinars or in dollars. 
Besides, this type of American aid was given under a number of different 
headings: Over the period 1952 - 1954, Jordan received grants of Wheat 
from the United States on an emergency basis under the United States' 
Public Law No. 216. Thereafter,and until 1966, United States' Commodity 
aid was given under the U.S. Public Law No. 480, titles JLl^ and 111.
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Under title 11^ , commodity donations were made to meet famine and other 
extraordinary relief needs while under title 111, commodity donations 
were made to non-profit agencies engaged in distributing such products 
in Jordan. However, from 1966 till 1972, U.S. commodity aid was given 
under titles 1^ and TV, i.e., commodity aid in exchanges for Jordanian 
dinars and for dollars, respectively.
The proceeds from the sale of U.S. commodities given in aid in the 
domestic market fall into two categories according to the title under 
which the U.S. commodities are provided. Those proceeds are designated 
"counter part funds," for they represent the counterpart of the "U.S. 
dommodity aid" which has been offered to Jordan and are put into two 
separate accounts: The account of the government of the United States 
of America and the account of the government of Jordan. The former 
represents the local currency value of U.S. commodity aid offered to 
Jordan. As the U.S. aid agreement puts it, the local currency payments 
are deposited in "the account of the Government of the United States of 
America in interest-bearing accounts in banks selected by the Government 
of the United States of America in the importing country."^ Similarly 
the proceeds from the sale of U.S. commodities under titles and 111, 
for extraordinary needs are also deposited in this account.
Strictly speaking, counterpart funds arising from selling U.S. 
commodities under title 11 (U.S. $ 17.7 m.) were donated to voluntary 
relief agencies operating in Jordan, i.e., the Lutheran World Federation, 
Catholic Relief Services and C.A.R.E. On the otherhand according to the
1 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for Sales of 
Agricultural Commodities, (Amman: n. pub., 1171), Article Ll.c, p.5.
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reports provided by the United States' Mission in Amman, counterpart 
funds arising from selling U.S. commodities under title £  were partly 
used for covering U.S. expenses in Jordan and partly for financing 
development projects.
As for the account of the government of Jordan, it represents 
the proceeds from the sale of U.S. commodities given in aid under title 
IV. These proceeds are intended to finance development projects and 
withdrawals from this account cannot be made without the prior permission 
of the United States Mission in Amman.
Table 3.G shows that total U.S. commodity aid to Jordan over the 
period 1952 - 1966 was U.S. $ 74.3 million in value. (See Table 3.G p 120).
U.S. commodity aid under titles £ and TV totalled U.S. $ 11.2 million, 
the equivalent of J.D. 4.0 million over the period 1966-1972. The 
following table gives the actual disbursements of commodity aid under 
both titles.
TABLE 3.H
ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS OF COMMODITY AID UNDER THE 
UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAW No. 480. (TITLES 7  and Tv
1966 - 1972
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS AND THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Title I Title IV Total
Jordanian U.S. * Jordanjan U.S. Jordanian U.S.
Dinars Dollars Dinars Dollars Dinars Dollars
1966 208 582 Ml 208 582
1967 102 286 606 1696 708 1982
1968 3 8 628 1757 631 1765
1969 129 361 454 1270 583 1631
1970 339 949 407 1140 746 2089
1971 442 1238 - 442 1238
1972 91 ■ 255 597 1672 688 . 1927
(T7E)Total L314,000 3,679,200 2^91,000 7.535,000 4.005,000 11.214.200
Source: Compiled from The Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic 
^ Research, Fiscal and Monetory Division.
Title I Commodity values (sales for local currency) were converted 
from Jordan dinars/lB U.S. dollars at the rate of l.j.D * 2.8 dollars 
The same procedure was adopted when converting title TV Dollar 
commodity values into their equivalent in Jordanian dinars.
TABLE 3.G
UNITED STATES COMMODITY AID TO JORDAN UNDER PUBLIC LAW NO. P.L.480.
TITLE I TO TITLE IV
1952-1966
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S.$ AND THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
U.S. Title Title II Title III Title Total
Fiscal
Year
I U.S. Dollars Jordanian
Dinars
U.S. Dollars Jordanian
Dinars
IV Ü.S.
Dollars
Jordanian
Dinars
1952 — — — — ■ — — 1284 * 459
1953 - - - - - - 1285 * 459
1954 - - - - - - - -
1955 - - - 1425 509. - 1425 509
1956 - - - 541 193 - 541 193
1 9 5 7 - - — 793 2 8 3 - 793 2 8 3
1958 - 3454 1234 1140 1 407 - 4594 1641
1959 - 13965 4988 1737 620 - 15702 5608
i960 - - — 1519 543 - 1519 543
1961 - 17531 6261 2926 1045 - 20457 7306
1962 - - - 1341 479 - 1341 479
1963 - 11413 4076 1927 688 - 13340 4764
1964 - 7665 2738 1894 676 - 9559 3414
1965 - - - 877 313 - 877 313
1966 - - 1599 571 — 1599 571
Total
1952 - 
30 June 
1966(J.Ds)
5^)28,000 19?95,800 17,719,000 6^28,100 74^16,000 2(^541,400
Source: U.S.A.I.D., op.cit., Dec. 21, 1966.
* A delivery of $2,569,000 worth of wheat (J.D. 918 thousand) was made in 1952 and 1953 on an emergency basis 
and under the U.S. Public Law no. 216.
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The effects of U.S. commodity aid on the economy of Jordan depends 
significantly upon the title under which such aid is given and the use to 
which the counterpart funds are put. As the first type of U.S. commodity 
aid (titles _II and III) took the form of outright grants, the following 
effects could be observed: The high rate of increase in population, 
frequent changes in weather conditions and slow growth in agricultural 
production were the factors which made Jordan a food-deficit country.
U.S. commodity aid (titles jHt and III) helped bridge the gap between 
demand and the domestic supply of food. This type of commodity aid did 
not impose any foreign exchange obligations on the economy. But it
did imply a saving of foreign exchange in that but for the money Jordan
would have had to pay for food imports from other sources. However, 
the saving of foreign exchange was not very significant in comparison 
to total foreign aid received by Jordan. Total United States' commodity 
aid under titles JLI and III constituted an average of 5.4% of total 
foreign aid to Jordan over the period 1952 - 1966.
As for the effects on the economy of the U.S. commodity aid under
titles 1^ and , i.e., sales for local currency and for dollars 
respectively, the following points should be observed: (a) The prices 
of U.S. commodity aid are determined by the state of demand and supply 
in Jordan. Prices fluctuate, they are high in periods of deficits and 
low in periods of surpluses. In all cases, commodity aid has a depressing 
effect on prices of food.
The dumping of U.S. commodities given in aid at low prices will 
affect the long-term elasticity of supply of agricultural products. It 
will cause distress to domestic farmers and discourage them from increasing 
production. In other words, it can be said that the fluctuations in the 
prices of agricultural commodities caused by U.S. commodity aid, discourage
1 2 2
fanners from acquiring credit. So this type of aid affects the long-term 
supply elasticity of agricultural products; (b) Apart from the payment 
for the commodities given in aid, the U.S. surplus commodities had other 
conditions attached to them. Some of these conditions affect agricultural 
production in the same manner described above. For example, it was 
required that the Jordanian government should "take all possible measures 
to prevent the export of any commodity of either domestic or foreign origin 
which is the same as, or like, the commodities financed under this 
agreement during the export limitation period specified ...."^ This
condition meant that Jordan could not export a number of agricultural
. . .  . 2commodities m  the years when domestic supply exceeded demand; (c) To
the extent that the United States utilized part of the counterpart funds 
to pay for the expenditure by the United States' agencies in Jordan which 
would have had to be paid for in dollars, the inflow of foreign exchange 
was correspondingly reduced; (d) the counterpart funds were partly used 
for financing investment projects, and, at times, the Jordanian government 
used the counterpart funds to finance its current expenditure. The latter 
implies that to an extent the counterpart funds were treated as a 
substitute for tax revenues. Nevertheless, the counterpart fund is a 
poor substitute for revenues from taxes, for the reason that it is not a 12
1 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, op. cit., Dollar 
Credit Annex, Article H T  A.3, p.8.
2 Examples on the effects of U.S. commodity aid on the agricultural 
production of Pakistan, Formosa and Greece are available in Hamza 
Alavi and Amir Khusro, Pakistan: The Burden of U.S. Aid, in R.I.
Rhods ed., Imperialism and Underdevelopment - A Reader, (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp 62-78; See also C. Boris Swerling, 
discussing the effects of U.S. commodity aid on the exports of 
Pakistan. A discussion paper presented by John H.Davis, "Agricultural 
Surpluses and Foreign Aid," American Economic Review - Papers and 
Proceedings, Vol. 49, May 1959, p. 244.
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certain source of revenues; and (e) counterpart funds give the United 
States elbow-room for exerting pressure on the investment policies of 
the Jordanian government through exercising power over issuing or 
withholding approvals of withdrawals from such accounts. Lack of access 
to instances of such exercises of power, however, hides, but by no 
means negates their occurences, nor the potentiality of such.
It can be said that the U.S. commodity aid under titles _II and III 
did not impose any foreign exchange obligations on the economy and it 
helped bridge the gap between the domestic demand and the supply of 
food. On the other hand, U.S. commodity aid under titles 1^ and IV had 
negative effects on the economy. The dumping of U.S. commodities given 
in aid at low prices will affect the long-term elasticity of supply of 
agricultural output. Besides, the restrictions imposed by the United 
States on the exports of agricultural products will similarly affect 
agricultural output. Finally, the use of counterpart funds as a source 
of government revenues was a poor substitute for taxation and it inhibited 
the reform of existing tax laws; the use of counterpart funds as a 
substitute for dollar expenses (the expenses of U.S. agencies in Jordan) 
had reduced the overall inflow of dollars to Jordan and; the use of 
counterpart funds as an instrument for affecting the Jordanian government 
investment policies had served the interests of the United States.
Ill AID FROM THE ARAB COUNTRIES
The flow of aid from Arab countries was erratic, because it was 
govaned by the volatile circumstances that affect pan-Arab politics.
In its earlier stage, Arab aid took the form of budget support and 
technical assistance, and later on it took the form of loans given to 
the central government. Over the period 1957-1972, Arab aid totalled 
J.D. 206.0 million, 91.8% of which was received after the 1967 war. Its 
flow started in the late 1950's when it took the form of 'Solidarity
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grants" to the government budget. The termination of the 1948 Anglo- 
Jordanian Treaty of Alliance in 1956, led to an accord among Arab 
countries to provide regular aid to Jordan. The four signatories 
to the accord were Egypt, Syria, Saudi-Arabia and Jordan. Article No.2. 
of this accord reads: "The governments of the Republic of Syria, the 
Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia, and the Republic of Egypt, shall share in the 
expenditures emanating from the obligations falling on the government of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as a result of the policy of cooperation 
and solidarity for bolstering Arab existence and independence ...."^
Those expenditures totalled 12.5 million Egyptian pounds, annually, or 
the equivalent.
However, in actual fact, the pledge never fully materialised.
Jordan received only J.D. 5.0 million under the accord to compensate
for the loss of British aid following the termination of the Anglo-
2Jordanian Treaty of 1948. Arab countries were too divided among 
themselves to follow any concerted programme of aid. Following the 
failure of Arab countries to provide aid, King Hussein once again turned 
to the West (in particular the United States) for aid. Saudi-Arabia was 
the sole signatory to the accord which paid her share, whereas the other 
two broke pledges, notwithstanding the binding clauses of the accord: 
the solidarity accord was "concluded for ten years .... (and) after this 
date, the Treaty will continue unless a year's notice regarding its 123
1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International
Affairs, 1957, op.cit., pp.255-257. ="~~’
2 Ibid., pp. 255-257.
3 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International 
Affairs, 1957, op. cit., pp.288-289.
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termination is served .... through diplomatic channels."^ It is 
worth noting that the continued Saudi aid was a display of solidarity 
between the two moderate regimes in the Middle East.
Arab countries got together once again following the 1967 Arab- 
Israeli War. Under the Khartoum Agreement - the end - result of the 
conference of the Arab heads of state in 1967, Kuwait, Libya and 
Saudi Arabia agreed to provide an annual grant of J.D. 37.7 million to 
Jordan. Not surprisingly, and under the pretext of the 1970 civil 
strife, when the Jordanian army went into action against the Palestinian 
organizations, Kuwait and Libya stopped their aid contributions. This 
provides another evidence for the uncertainty of aid from Arab countries. 
Table 3.1 shows the total flow of aid from Arab countries.
(See Table 3.1 p. 126).
Over the period 1957-1972, Jordan received from the oil-rich Arab 
countries J.D. 206.6 million in aid. It can also be seen from Table 3.1. 
that a large proportion of the Arab aid took the form of budget support 
(J.D. 185.0 million).
Table 3.J, as well as Graph 6, shows the relative importance of
Arab aid to Jordan over 1957-1972. Arab aid to the Jordanian budget
represented an average of 80% of total budget support over the period
1967 - 1972. As for the contribution of Arab aid in terms of total aid,
it averaged 61.7% and 31.9% over the two successive periods, 1967 - 1972
and 1960 - 1972. (See Table 3.J p. 127).
As far as loans from the Arab countries are concerned, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia were the two main lenders. The two between themselves
2provided about a third of the total loans given to Jordan. Loans from 
these two countries were for financing infrastructural projects. Kuwait, *2
1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International 
Affairs, 1957, op. cit., Article 4, p. 256.
2 See Table 3 page 103.
TABLE 3.1
AID FROM ARAB COUNTRIES - AGGREGATES, TYPES AND SOURCES
1957-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Budget Support Technical & Economic Total
Loans to the Central 
Government Total Grand Total
Ass istance (3) = 1 + 2 Kuwait (4) Saudi-Arabia
(5)
(6) = 4 + 5 A + 'XArab Countries 
(1)
Arab League 
(2)
1957 5000 5000 5000
1958 - - - - - - -
1959 - - - - - - -
1960 - - - 1000 - 1000 1000
1961 - - - - - - -
1962 - - - 239 - 239 239
1963 — - - 585 - 585 585
1964 — - - 5488 - 5488 5488
1965 - 474 474 919 - 919 1393
1966 - 569 569 1047 1500 2547 3116
1967 30947 1022 31969 537 ■ - 537 32506
1968 37601 - 37601 227 1499 1726 39327
1969 37553 - 37553 564 1499 2063 39616
1970 33070 2072 35142 277 501 778 35920
1971 17952 279 18231 262 357 619 18850
1972 22911 *“ 22911 655 655 23566
In Jor-
danian
Dinars
185,034,000 4,416,000 189,450,000 11,798,600 5,357,143 17,155,800 206,605,800
Source; Appendix II, Table 1.
N)O'
\TABLE 3.J
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF ARAB AID TO JORDAN 
1957-1972
PERCENTAGES
Components of Arab Aid to Jordan as % of Components Arab Aid to Arab Budget Support
Period of Ag
Arab Unrequited 
Transfers as % 
of Aggregate 
Unrequited 
Transfers
gregate Aid
Arab Loans as 
% of Aggre­
gate Loans
Total Arab Aid 
as % of Aggre­
gate Aid Flow
Central Govern- 
ment as % of 
Total Government 
Receipts of 
Foreign Aid
as % of Total Budget 
Support
1957 31.71 - 31.71 83.52 100.0
1958 - - - - -
1959 - - - - -
1960 - . 55.09 3.83 5.24 -
1961 - - - - -
1962 - 18.13 0.99 1.41 -
1963 - 30.29 2.36 3.32 —
1964 - 76.44 18.34 24.44 -
1965 1.97 35.12 5.23 7.78 -
1966 3.12 70.95 14.29 23.12 — ■
1967 67.29 7.90 59.86 73.71 81.36
1968 80.40 31.88 75.37 86.89 95.07
1969 86.73 43.15 82.40 92.01 100.0
1970 85.55 24.65 81.21 95.79 100.0
1971 45.50 4.73 35.46 44.48 51.39
1972 42.74 5.40 35.86 42.19 52.06
Average %
9.331960-1966 - 40.86 6.43
Average Z
72.51 79.981967-1972 68.04 19.61 61.69
Average %
1960-1972 — 31.05 31.94 38.49
Source; Table No. 1, Appendix II.
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for instance, offered loan for the following: the construction of 
hotels to help develop the tourist industry, exploitation of phosphate 
resources, generating electricity, loans to specialized credit 
institutions viz^ the Industrial Development Bank and the Municipal 
Loans Fund. The same is true for the loans from Saudi Arabia. For 
instance, the main infrastructural scheme financed by Saudi Arabia 
was the construction of the Aqaba-Maan road which connects Jordan with 
the Saudi borders.
In certain respects, aid from Arab countries worked in the same 
manner like that from Britain and the United States. The Jordanian 
government was able to increase its current expenditures, as well as 
large defence expenditures, which, on average, accounted for more than 
50% of the total government expenditures. Further, aid from Arab 
countries helped in sustaining the level of employment in the government 
services, and helped creating further job opportunities. It can thus 
be said that without the aid from Britain, the U.S.A. and the oil-rich 
Arab countries, the Jordanian government could not have maintained either 
the composition or the volume of its expenditure.
In other respects, funds from oil-rich Arab countries were different 
than those from the Western sources in that they were not tied, none of 
them was in kind, technical assistance was not significant and finally 
they were more susceptible to political changes.
IV AID FROM WEST GERMANY
Aid from West Germany was of two types: Firstly, technical and 
economic assistance, and secondly, loans tied to projects and to purchases 
on the German market. Technical aid was directed towards the following:
(a) providing technical know-how for operating German imported machinery,
(b) training in agricultural economics and irrigation,
(c) training in port management and city traffic, and
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(d) the conduct of feasibility studies, particularly those related to 
the establishment of chemical and fertilizers industries.
Project-tied loans from West Germany, totalled J.D. 9.5 million.
They averaged 13.7% of total loans over 1962-1972. In percentage terms, 
total West German aid was, on average, 2% of total foreign aid to Jordan 
over 1962-1972.
What is important about W. German aid is that most of it was given 
as project-tied aid. The projects selected for aid were those which 
relied on capital goods manufactured by German companies. As a result, 
the German-financed projects had a very high import-content. By far 
the highest proportion of this project-tied aid went towards financing 
the expansion of facilities at the Port of Aqaba, the sole port in Jordan, 
and the construction of a 116-kilometre railroad between Hittiya and 
A.qaba. The latter is meant to provide an export outlet for the 
phosphate from the mines at Hasa. The following table, however, shows the 
volume, composition and the relative impostance of West German aid to 
Jordan since the inception of the West German aid programme in 1962.
(See Table 3.K p. 130).
It can finally be said that aid from West Germany took the form of 
loans; it was project - and procurement-tied aid, none of it was in the 
form of budget support and it contained a very limited range of technical 
assistance.1
1 We will have more to say about the distribution of loans in the 
next chapter.
TABLE 3.K
AID FROM WEST GERMANY - COMPOSITION AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
1963-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Technical and Economic Loans to Central Government Total Aid Aid From
Period Assistance from West 
Germany
West Germany 
as % of Total 
Aid FlowAbsolute Percentage of Absolute Percentage ofValues Total Technical 
and Economic 
Assistance
Values Total Loans
1962 - - 250 17 250 1
1963 57 3 611 32 668 3
1964 78 5 316 4 394 1
1965 50 2 51 2 101 0.4
1966 36 2 213 6 249 1
1967 80 3 455 7 535 1
1968 - - 1512 28 1512 3
1969 - - 156 3 156 0.3
1970 - - 133 4 133 0.3
1971 - - 554 4 554 1
1972 - . . — 5215 43 5215 8
In
Jor­
danian
Dinars
301000 9465900 9766900
Source: Table No. 1, Appendix II.
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V FOREIGN AID FROM THE UNITED NATIONS
(a) TRANSFERS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY 
" (U-N.R.W.A.)
The creation of-Israel and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 displaced 
a large number of Palestinians. By far the largest proportion of 
Palestinians took refuge in Jordan. During the 1967 War, Israel 
occupied the West Bank of the River Jordan which further increased the 
number of refugees on the East Bank of the River. About 730,496 
Palestinian refugees are registered with U.N.R.W.A. in Jordan and 
they receive (or are eligible for) some form of assistance: Of those 
registered 503,265 are on the East Bank and 227,231 on the West Bank. 
Besides those, there are 230,852 displaced people (not treated as 
refugees) on the East Bank who were the casualities of the 1967 War.^
The United Nations instituted a programme of help for the refugees 
in 1950. A very large proportion of multilateral aid to Jordan was 
given by the United Nations. The projects, financed by the United 
Nations relief and Works Agency (U.N.R.W.A.), the largest U.N. agency 
working in Jordan, constituted an important part of the socio-economic 
infrastructure of Jordan. The services financed by U.N.R.W.A. funds 
were relief, health care, welfare and educational services. These
1 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, 
(U.N.R.W.A.), A Survey of United Nations Assistance to Palestine 
Refugees,(Beirut: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1972), p.4; see also United 
Nations, Report of the Commissioner - General of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 
(New York: United Nations, 1973), General Assembly, 28th Session, 
Supplement No. 13, p.8.
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services were provided as part of governmental services.
Since 1950, under the aegis of U.N.R.W.A., Jordan received about 
J.D. 5.0 million per annum. A little more than 50% of those transfers 
was in cash, and the rest was in kind. Food stuff was the largest 
component of U.N.R.W.A.'s aid-in-kind. U.N.R.W.A. aid, on average, 
constituted between 20.6% and 22.4% of the total aid and total unrequited 
transfers, respectively over 1950 - 1972. Table 3.L and Graph 7 show 
its volume, composition and importance in relation to total aid flow, 
as well as to components of aid flow. (See Table 3.L p. 133 ).
U.N.R.W.A. aid, the largest component of the United ifctions aid to 
Jordan, made a very important contribution to the economic development 
of the country. Some of its effects were similar to those given under 
the United States commodity aid (PL. 480). U.N.R.W.A.'s transfers-in- 
kind met a significant proportion of the aggregate demand for basic 
food commodities in Jordan. The importance of these transfers can be 
seen in the fact that the refugees registered with U.N.R.W.A. constituted 
28% of the total of population of Jordan. But for this aid-in-kind 
Jordan would have had to spend a large sum of money on importing food.
The value of U.N.R.W.A.'s aid-in-kind, as a percentage of the country's 
total imports of foods stuffs, was 31.0% in 1952, 30.0% in 1955, 23.0% 
in 1959 and 17.0% in 1972. The aid-in-cash went towards maintaining 
the socio economic services provided by the agency. U.N.R.W.A. provide 
integral and comprehensive health services, i.e., curative and preventive 
medical care services.
As far as the contribution of U.N.R.W.A. to domestic capital 
formation in Jordan is concerned, U.N.R.W.A.'s expenditures on the 
construction of schools constituted an average of 1% of Jordan's gross
TABLE 3 .1 .
BLOW OF UNREQUITED TRANSFERS PROM U.N.R.W.A. - 
VOLUMES, COMPOSITION AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
1950-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Transfer« from the United Nations Relief (U.N.R.W.A.)
and Works Agency U.N.R.W.A.'s Transfers as percentage of:
Transíers-ln-Caah 
(1)
Transfers-
(2)
in-Kind Total Transfers 
(3) - 1 + 2
Total Unrequited 
Transfers
Total Flow of 
Aid
Absolute
Velues Z
Absolute 
Values Z
Absolute
Values Z
1950 1080 36.12 1910 63.88 2990 100 31.64 31.65
1951 2520 75.00 840 25.00 3360 100 26.07 26.08
1952 2580 59.17 1780 40.83 4360 100 31.17 . 28.15
1953 3530 72.63 1330 27.37 4860 100 29.97 26.54
195* 3020 54.91 2480 45.09 5500 100 34.12 28.97
1955 2990 64.16 1670 35.84 4660 100 33.40 33.41
1956 2710 61.0* 1730 38.96 4440 100 23.08 23.09
1957 2750 56.12 2150 43.88 4900 100 31.07 31.08
1958 2560 53.89 2190 46.11 4750 100 19.65 18.88
1959 2710 50.19 2690 49.81 5400 100 22.30 21.86
1960 3090 58.41 2200 41.59 5290 100 21.82 20.30
1961 3010 58.45 2140 41.55 5150 100 20.38 19.78
1962 2550 *8.48 2710 51.52 5260 100 23.20 21.93
1963 2880 52.27 2630 47.73 5510 100 24.10 22.22
196* 2700 50.28 2670 49.72 5370 100 23.62 17.96
1965 3520 58.57 2490 41.43 6010 100 25i05 22.59
1966 3290 58.54 2330 41.46 5620 100 30.86 25.78
1967 2230 46.46 2570 53.54 4800 100 10.10 8.84
1968 1950 34.45 3550 64.55 5500 100 11.76 10.54
1969 970 28.78 2400 71.22 3370 100 7.78 7.01
1970 19*0 43.02 2570 56.98 4510 100 10.98 10.20
1971 280 7.87 3280 92.13 3560 100 8.88 6.70
1972 2130 31.23 4690 68.77 6820 100 12.72 10.38
Average Z
1950-59 58.32 41.68 100 28.2 26.97
Average Z
1960-66 55.00 45.00 100 ' 24.1 21,51
Average Z
1967-72 32.14 67.87 100 10.4 8.95
Average Z
1960-72 44.45 55.55 100 17.8 15.71
Average Z
1950-72 50.48 49.52 100 22.4 20.61
Source: Appendix II, Table« 1 and 2
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domestic capital formation over 1959 - 1972. Besides, U.N.R.W.A. 
also helps in the construction of sanitation facilities, the 
construction and maintenance of roads and paths in sparsely populated 
areas. In normal circumstances, these schemes are carried out by the 
government of Jordan. Table 3.M. shows U.N.R.W.A.'s contribution to 
domestic capital formation in Jordan over the period 1959 - 1972.
TABLE 3.M
THE SHARE OF U.N.R.W.A. IN DOMESTIC CAPITAL 
FORMATION IN JORDAN.
1959 - 1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Gross Domestic U.N.R.W.A.'s U.N.R.W.A.'s
Period Capital Format­
ion. (GDCF)
Expenditures on 
Construction^
Expenditures on 
Construction as 
Percentage of 
GDCF
1959 12.57 0.36 0.030
1960 17.09 0.14 0.010
1961 18.92 0.20 0.011
1962 20.22 0.27 0.013
1963 20.00 0.10 0.010
1964 25.29 0.08 0.003
1965 27.79 0.05 0.002
1966 28.09 0.10 0.350
1967 25.62 0.16 0.620
1968 37.49 0.46 1.230
1969 64.39 0.89 1.380
1970 40.06 0.50 1.250
1971 49.83 0.49 0.980
1972 44.06 0.70 1.590
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts,
1967 - 1972, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, May 1973).
It comprises expenditures on construction, mainly the 
construction of schools and other educational institutions.
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As for investment in human capital, education was one of the main 
services provided by the agency. Infact, education absorbed nearly 
half of total U.N.R.W.A.'s budget in 1972.^ The following table shows 
that, on average, the number of pupils in U.N.R.W.A's elementary and 
preparatory schools accounted for more than a third of total number 
of school children in public schools.
TABLE 3.N
STUDENTS IN U.N.R.W.A. AND IN GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 
A COMPARISON.
1963-1972
Period
No. of Elementary and Preparatory 
Pupils in: Ratio of 1 to 2U.N.R.W.A./U.N.E.S.C.O 
Cl)
Government 
Schools(2)
1963 54023 219477 24.6
1964 59088 241932 24.4
1965 65336 258253 25.2
1966 71915 276862 25.9
1967 78687 174188 45.6
1968 78180 189911 41.1
1969 90289 210845 42,8
1970 102283 235456 43.4
1971 107217 252353 42.4
1972 116614 277976 41.9
Average %
1967-72 42.87
Average %
1963-72 35.73
Source: (a) United Nations, Report of the Commissioner-General,
op.cit., p.85; (b) Jordan Ministry of Education,
the Statistical Yearbook, (Amman: Department of Statistics 
Press, relevant years).
1. U.N.R.W.A., A survey of United Nations Assistance to Palestine
Refugees, on. cit.. p. 14.
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U.N.R.W.A. also makes an important contribution to vocational 
training in Jordan. It rims four vocational training centres, two 
of which are situated on the East Bank. Like U.N.R.W.A. schools, 
vocational centres are operated under the supervision of U.N.E.S.C.O. 
The following table shows U.N.R.W.A. - U.N.E.S.C.O. training centres 
in Jordan. *
TABLE 3.0
U.N.R.W.A./U.N.E.S.C.O. TRAINING CENTRES IN JORDAN 
1971-1972
Location Type of Training Sex andNo. of Trainees
East Jordan
* 1 - Amman Vocational 55 women
Teacher 166 women
Teacher 182 men
2 - Wadi seer Vocational 608 men
West Bank
3 - Kalandia Vocational 376 men
Teacher 271 women
4 <- Ramallah Vocational *328 women
Teacher **301 men
Source: U.N.R.W.A., A Survey of United Nations Assistance to Palestine 
Refugees, op. cit., p.17.
* Includes 20 men in courses for laboratory technicians and 
assistant pharmacist.
** Induces 14 women who are part of 61 trainees receiving a third 
year of eduction to qualify as preparatory teachers.
U.N.R.W.A.'s financing of vocational and non-vocational educational
programmes in Jordan relieved the public sector of expenditures that
would have otherwise been incurred by the government. For example,
U.N.R.W.A. puts the annual costs per student in its educational centres
as follows :
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(a) Elementary school, 50 U.S. $ per pupil.
(b) Preparatory school, 83 U.S. $ per pupil.
(c) Trainee in teacher training centres, 900 U.S. $.
(d) Trainee in vocational training centres, 850 U.S. $.* However, 
as the Jordanian economy has had a shortage of skilled manpower, 
technical and educational know-how provided by those U.N.R.W.A. programmes, 
in fact, corresponded to the developmental needs of Jordan. It can also 
be said that aid from U.N.R.W.A. was the most regular aid to Jordan and
it was mainly in the field of Social and Educational services.
(b) - AID FROM OTHER UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES
Aid from other United Nations' agencies went unrecorded. The least 
unreliable account viz., the balance of payments, did not even show 
records of such aid. So we have to rely on the agencies providing aid 
to Jordan for data. Aid from other United Nations' agencies, at the 
outset, took the form of irregular technical assistance. Experts, 
scholarships and training equipments were provided to the Jordanian 
public sector. Later on, it changed to semi-regular technical assistance 
and emergency aid. The World Food Programme (W.F.P.) and the United 
Nations Development Programme are the main U.N. agencies working in 
Jordan.
W.F.P. activities were intended to support the creation of the social 
and economic infrastructure in Jordan by giving food aid. 75% of the
1 Data were collected from U.N.R.W.A. Office, Amman, 1974.
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food aid was distributed to workers employed on selected projects 
as part of their wages. The remainder 25% was sold locally to cover 
transport and other ancillary costs of projects. The projects chosen 
were labour-intensive and most of them were located in the rural areas 
where the unemployment problem was acute.
As far as the United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.) is 
concerned, it started in 1966 under the aegis of the Programme of 
Technical Assitance and the Special Fund Programme. Financing 
feasibility studies, economic research and in certain instances 
financing projects on a pilot basis, were the main areas of assistance.
Table 3.P shows the sectoral distribution of projects financed 
by the two above-mentioned agencies. It shows that the total amount 
of aid allocated for the 21 projects which the United Nations' agencies 
financed was U.S. $ 32.01 million (J.D. 11.43 million). 47% of this 
amount, i.e., U.S. $ 15.092 million was spent on projects started and 
finished before December, 1972. (See Table 3.P p. 139).
The sectoral distribution of aid from other United Nations agencies 
could be shown in percentage terms. Table 3.Q below shows that most 
of the United Nations' aid went to the agricultural sector which 
absorbed 65.0% of total United Nation's aid to Jordan. It was followed 
by the social services (L.e., emergency aid to refugees and displaced 
people).* 1
1 For a list of all approved small-scale projects, see Appendix II, 
Table 11.
TABLE 3.P
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OP PROJECTS FINANCED BY THE UNITED NATIONS 
AGENCIES IN JORDAN - TERHINATED AMD IN PROGRESS
Sector No. of 
Project
Project
Duration Name of Project
Starting
Date
1--------
Re-act­
ivation
Date
Expect­
ed Date 
of Accom- 
li shine nt
Remarks on Sources 
of Implementation 
Difficulties
Total
U.N.DsP.
Contri­
butions
**
T6tal 
Govt. 
Contri-- 
butions
Execut­
ing
Agency
*
So. of 
Experts
\ -  Agric-
ultur« 
a - U.N.D P. 1 3 years Agricultural
Marketing
1964 1971 1976 1970 Civil Strife 
in Jordan
$ 749,350
J.D.
200,400 F.A.O. 4
2 5 years Animal Health 
Institute
1967 1971 Dec
1974
1970 Civil Strife S1P64.300 1636,019 F.A.O. 8
3 5 years Dry Land Fanning 1968 1971 Sept
1974
1970 Civil Strife SU99.704 627,571 F.A.O. 8
4 3 years Fishery Development 1968 Suspend­
ed 1974
Failure of Refrig­
erating System and 
Breakdown of Vesse 
motor
( 966,000 
s
1442,597 F.A.O. l Exp­
ert 
1 1
5 3 years Tobacco Develop­
ment
1970 July
1972
Mid.
1975
Transfer of the 
Project Manager in 
August 1971
$ 431,200 J.D.
129,088
F.A.O. 2
6 3 years Development and 
Use of Ground 
Resources of East 
Jordan
1972 Dec.
1973
— $ 528,600 J.D.
13,630 \A.O. 7
7 5 years Development of 
Agricultural Field 
Research and Ext­
ension Services
1972 1977 $ 861,000 J.D.
251,900
\A.O. 2
> -  W.F.P.
L Terrain 
«ted 
P ro je c
8
•
ts
Pilot Project tor 
Bedouin Settlement 
and Improvement 
of Nomedi Sheep 
Husbandry
Term­
inated 71,675.IOC F.P,
9 Soil Conservation 
and Olive Tree 
Planting in Three 
Pilot areas
Term­
inated $1.718.10t J.F.P.
10 Construction of 
Agricultural Roads 
and Public Amen­
ities
Term­
inated $2.047.800 f.F.P
11 Pilot Project for 
Planting Village - 
Wood lots
Term­
inated $ 245.800 ,F.P
ii Oper­
ated 
P rojec .s 12 4 years Soil Conservation 
and Fruit Tree 
Plaiting in Select­
ed Areas 1
June
1969
Dec.
1973 $8.103.000
» .
7.227.03C W.F.P.
u 0 years Development of 
Dryland Farming
July
1969
July
1977 $1.162.500 $ 436,001 W.F.P
B - The 
Ind­
ust­
rial 
Sector.
14 Phosphate Explor­
ation and Benefic­
ation Studies
-----
1971 1973
Dec.
1973
Delay in Proc­
u r i n g  the Drill­
ing Equipment and 
Fire that hit the 
H.R.A. Laboratory 
and Destruction of 
Benefication Data $ 889.234
J.D.
212,23
U.N.O.
T.C. 5
15 5 years Centre for Indust­
rial Development 1965
March
1972
Term­
inated
June
1973
Substantial Delay 
in Recruiting 
Experts and 1970 
Civil Strife. $1.154.100 $664.526
U.N.1. 
D.O
Z — Tran­
sport 16 Restoration of Hed- 
iaz Railway
Term­
inated $1.264.200 rf.F.P
) — Educ­
ation
17 Improvement of Nut­
rition in Education­
al Establishments
Term­
inated $ 11,900 U’.F.P.
17a 7 years Improvement of Nut­
rition in Education­
al Establishments
July
1968
July
1976
— ...........-
$ 637.800 81.574.KÄW.F.P
S - Urban 
Devel­
opment 
L Terminat ad 18
Slum Clearance in 
Amman
Term­
inated $ 252,300 I.F.P.
“I
Li Operate d 19 Slum Clearance, Tree 
Planting, Urban Road 
and Land Scaping in 
Amman $ 372.400 W.F.P.
P - Social 
Uelfar : 20
Emergency Aid to 
Refugees and 
Displaced Persons
T e n ^
inated $5.756,900 W.F.P.
» - Housin 
Build­
ing an 
Physic 
Planni
S#
i
al 21 
PS
5j years
Assistance to the 
Jordan Housing 
Corooration 1968
Dec.
1974
•
$919.000
J.D.
259.300
U.N.O. 
1 T.C. 8
Total
32,010,288
Source: We relied on the following sources for the construction of this table:
(a) United Nations, The United Nations, Development Programme in Jordan, (Amman: The National Printing Press, Nov, 1973);
(b) U.N. -  P.A.O., World Food Programme in Jordan. 1963-1973. (Amman: The Agricultural Information - Ministry of 
Agriculture, Dec. 1973).
* U.N.O.T.C.
F.A.O.
U.N.I.D.O,
W.F.P.
United Nations Office for Technical Cooperation 
Food and Agriculture Organisation.
United tttions Industrial Development Organisation. 
World Food Programme.
** Projects which are executed by W.F.P. are also financed by it.
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TABLE 3.Q
DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED NATIONS' AID TO JORDAN
PERCENTAGES
Agriculture 65%
Social Welfare 18%
Transport 4%
Housing, Building & Physical Planning 3%
Industry 3%
Education 3%
Urban Development 2%
100%
Source: Constructed from information appeared in the United Nations 
Publication on Jordan. (See sources of Table 3.P 139 ).
By allocting untied funds towards the development of agriculture
in Jordan, aid from the United Nations was greatly in harmony with
the economy’s needs, contrary to most bilateral aid disbursements.
It was more liable, than any other form of bilateral aid, to contribute
towards filling the economy’s continued gap between the demand for and
supply of food. Further, the adoption of labouirritensive techniques in
United Nations* aid-financed projects was compatible with the labour
surplus position of the economy.
VI OTHER SOURCES OF FOREIGN AID
Other sources of foreign aid to Jordan include the following:
(a) The International Development Association (I.D.A.)
(b) The Danish Government.
(c) ENI-EMPEX (ENI is a Belgium Company and EMPEX is French); and
(d) C. ITOH and Co. (Japan).
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Aid from the above sources consisted of loans over the period 
1963-1972. The International Development Association (I.D.A.) gave 
a total amount of J.D. 4.2 million in loans for developing the agric­
ultural sector. Building the Amman-Zerga highway and the Amman water 
supply system were two other important projects financed by the I.D.A.
The Danish government agreed to make interest-free loans to 
Jordan which amounted to 12.0 million kroner. These loans were tied 
to specific projects and to procurement in Denmark. The amounts given 
were for financing the construction and equipment of the Amman and 
Irbid slaughterhouses. Until 1972, an amount equivalent to J.D. 556.7 
thousand Idinars had actually been spent on these two projects. As 
far as the Belgium and French companies (ENI-EMPEX) are concerned, 
an amount equivalent to J.D. 3.100 million was given by them for 
financing the construction and furnishing of Amman Grand Hospital.
Finally, a Japanese company (C.ITOH and Co.) offered Jordan 
the amount of J.D. 0.875 million- for the construction, equipment and 
operation of a land Satellite Station in Baqa near Amman.
B - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION;
Cl) Motives behind foreign aid are complex and diverse which could be
ascribed, in a way, to the diversity of political objectives themselves.
As far as Jordan is concerned, foreign aid was concomitant with Jordan's
creation in which international politics played a major role. Political
motives in offering aid to Jordan overshadowed other interests. In the %
first place, the country itself does not represent an important economic 
stake for donors. Her importance has been more, the function of the 
geopolitical factors.
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(ii) On the question of the sources of aid, we found that most of the
aid came from Western sources. Countries and institutions of the West were 
the source of some 65.4% of aid received over 1958-1966, and over half 
of total aid in other periods. The United States alone accounted for 
three quarters of total Western aid. The reasons for the preponderance 
of Western sources among donors were political. Jordan was firmly attached 
to Western countries, particularly Britain and the United States and the 
ruling apparatuses were decidedly anti-communist. As for Jordan’s options 
in receding aid, one could say they were narrow. In short, with Jordan 
largely owing her creation and stability to Western countries beisdes 
the instable political climate of the area, the country was shouldered with 
ideological and political obligations which narrowed its options in 
looking for other sources of aid.
(iii) On the question of aid channels, Jordan received the bulk of her 
foreign aid on bilateral basis. No doubt, it is in the nature of bilateral 
aid relationship that aid is given on certain conditions. However, by 
prolonging her dependence on this type of aid, Jordan overlooked several 
shortcomings of aid received. Discontinuity, for example, was a short­
coming that characterised aid relationship between Jordan and donors. That 
is to say, British as well as American aid was on annual basis frequently 
subjected to adjustments, revision, interruptions and delays. This was 
equally true with regard to Arab aid. It was a volatile phenomenon 
connected with the volatility that characterises pan-Arab politics,
(iv) Jordan seems to have been of special importance to the United 
States. Off the total U.S. aid to the less-developed countries in the Near 
East and South East Asia over 1946-1971, 4.1% went to Jordan, which, in fact, 
gave her a unique position among those countries, i.e., she ranked the fifth.
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Examination of the distribution of American economic and technical 
assistance - according to U.S. distribution, shows that up to 1966, 
agriculture, particularly the East Ghor Canal project, absorbed 
approximately 30.6% of total U.S. technical and economic assistance 
whereas transport received 22.0% of the total. Thereafter,the distribution 
showed a relatively increasing trend in favour of transport. Almost all 
of the aid allocated to transport went to the contruction, maintenance and 
management of roads. On the whole, 60.0% of all U.S. technical and 
economic assistance went to infrastructure. With regard to budgetary 
aid, the U.S. contributed to over half of total government budget support.
U.S. commodity aid to Jordan (P.L.480) represented a small proportion 
of total aid flow. Over the period 1952-1966, commodity aid under titles 
II and III (non-repayable aid), constituted an average of 5.5% of aggregate 
aid to Jordan. Aid under titles I and IV (repayable aid) constituted, on 
average, 1.7% and 10.7% of total aid and total U.S. aid to Jordan respect­
ively over 1966-1972. Commodity aid under titles II and III did not 
impose any foreign exchange obligation on the economy and it helped bridge 
the gap between the domestic demand and the supply of food. On the other 
hand, commodity aid under titles I and IV, had had some negative effects 
on the economy: To the extent that the United States utilized part of the 
counterpart funds to pay for the expenditure by the United States* agencies 
in Jordan which would have had to be paid for in dollars, the inflow of 
foreign exchange was correspondingly reduced. The dumping of U.S. commodity 
given in aid at low prices affected the long-term elasticity of supply of 
agricultural products. In other words, it can be said that the fluctuations 
in. the prices of agricultural commodities caused by U.S. commodity aid, 
discouraged farmers from acquiring credit. So this type of aid affected 
the long-term supply elasticity of agricultural products.
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Apart from the payment for the commodities given in aid, the 
U.S. surplus commodities had other conditions attached to them. Some of 
these conditions affect agricultural production in the same manner 
described above, for example, Jordan cannot export a number of agricultural 
commodities in the years when domestic supply exceeds demand (commodities 
which are the same as, or like, the commodities financed under aid 
agreement). However, if one bears in mind the fixed financial obligations 
of the agricultural sector to creditors in Jordan, the U.S. surplus commodities 
accompanied by the above condition tended to decrease income of workers 
in this sector.
The partial utilization of counterpart funds in financing government 
current expenditures, was a poor substitute for revenues from taxation 
for the simple reason that they are not a certain source of revenue.
By controlling withdrawals from counterpart accounts, the U.S. gave herself 
the opportunity to influence Jordanian investment policy. However, lack 
of access to instances of such practices hides their occurrences, but by 
no means negates them.
V Multilateral aid came from a few sources. By far the largest part
was from the United Nations. U.N.R.W.A.'s transfers were the largest
til©component of such aid. Their contribution to/economy of Jordan can be 
put in the following terms: Aid from U.N.R.W.A., particularly transfers- 
in-kind, contributed towards satisfying more than one quarter of the 
country's aggregate demand for food. Thereby, it released some of the 
domestic resources that would otherwise have been added to the food 
import bill.
Cash transfers contributed towards the provision of integral and 
comprehensive health and educational services. Education, for instance, 
absorbed nearly half of total U.N.R.W.A.'s budget. It was found that 
the numberof pupils in U.N.R.W.A.'s elementary and preparatory schools.
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accounted for more than one third of those in government schools.
Further expenditures by U.N.R.W.A. on the construction of schools 
constituted an average of 1% of gross capital formation in Jordan over 
1955-1972. Finally, if one bears in mind the economy’s need for skilled 
manpower, the provision of technical and educational know-how by 
U.N.R.W.A. has, in fact, corresponded to the development needs of the 
Jordanian economy.
The World Food Programme (W.F.P.) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (U.N.D.P.) have been the other two United Nations' agencies 
co-operating in terms of the execution of projects in Jordan. More 
than half of their aid (65.0%) went to agriculture. Social welfare 
activities came next in terms of their share in total aid from this 
source. However, by favouring the agricultural sector, distributing 
food to workers engaged in projects, selecting labour-intensive projects 
and locating them in unemployment -struck areas, and finally financing 
feasibility studies and research, United Nations’ aid appeared in harmony 
with the economy’s priorities.
Finally, aid from the International Development Association (I.D.A.) 
was another type of multilateral aid given to Jordan. Infrastructural 
investment in the agricultural sector was the main area of investment in 
which this aid was concentrated.
As far as the sectoral distribution of aid is concerned, it is 
reasonable to say that aid from multilateral agencies was compatible 
with the development needs of the economy, contrary to the bilateral aid 
received during the same period.
VI Foreign aid given by the major donors, i.e., Britain, the U.S. and 
the oil-rich Arab countries enabled the government of Jordan to sustain 
increases in recurring expenditures, as well as covering a defence bill of
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more than half of total public expenditures. In the absence of such 
aid, Jotrdan would not be able to continue the aforementioned pattern 
of expenditures, without recourse to drastic changes in levels and 
composition of budget expenditures, as well as in the domestic sources 
of revenues. At the same- time, foreign aid released some of the 
domestic resources that otherwise would have been used to cover military 
expenditures.
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CHAPTER IV
PART ONE: THE LEVELS OF AND THE GROWTH IN INDEBTEDNESS AND THEIR 
BURDEN ON THE ECONOMY.
In the previous chapters, we discussed the magnitude, composition
and sources of foreign aid to Jordan since the foundation of the country.
In this chapter we are concerned with the total volume of debt, the debt
service payments, the burden of debt on the economy and the sectoral
willdistribution of foreign loans. Besides these we/also discuss the terms 
on which loans were given. The latter will only include a discussion of 
the financial terms of the loans and in the next chapter we will discuss 
the non-financial terms of loans, e.g.: restrictions on the manner of 
utilisation of loans.
As we pointed out earlier, a large part of foreign aid was in the 
form of grants given to the Jordanian government to finance its current 
expenditure, while a relatively small portion was in the form of loans 
either tied to particular projects or tied to both projects and imports 
from donor countries. Though overall the proportion of loans in the 
total aid given to Jordan was small, aid in the form of loans steadily 
increased over the later part of the period of study. For example, the 
share of loans was only 4.0% of the total aid in 1958, but it rose to 
18.0% in 1972. The increase can be explained by changes in aid policies 
of donor countries who, for one reason or another, switched to giving aid 
in the form of loans rather than in the form of grants. The share of 
loans: in the foreign aid received by Jordan is still low as compared to 
that for other underdeveloped countries.
Loans like grants, constitute an inflow of capital to the recipient 
country. In this sense, the economic analysis of the effects of loans is 
no different from that of grants. However, in the case of loans, an
148
additional factor has to be taken into account, namelyjloans, unlike 
grants, after a time lag, generate an outflow of capital in the form of 
repayment of the principal and the payment of interest on loans. The 
repayment of loans would pose no problem if the outflow of capital as 
a result of loans already contracted is always matched by the inflow 
of capital either in the form of more loans or private foreign investment. 
In the case of Jordan, there is no reason to believe that the outflow 
will always be matched by an off-setting inflow of capital. We have 
already emphasised the fact that the generosity of aid donors towards 
Jordan is mainly a result of the geo-political position of the country 
and the political situation in the Middle East. The political situation 
in the Middle East, volatile as it is, gives us no reason to believe that 
Jordan will always receive preferential treatment from aid donors. So 
far as private foreign investment is concerned, it is as yet of no great 
significance in Jordan. The country has very few attributes to attract 
foreign private investors. It is not well endowed in mineral resources, 
so it is unlikely to receive a significant proportion of private foreign 
investment going into mining and the exploitation of natural resources. 
Jordan is not one of the developed underdeveloped countries, like Brazil, 
so it is unlikely to attract foreign investors interested in setting up 
industries to serve the domestic market. As a consequence, the question 
of the repayment and the burden of foreign debt is an important one for 
the Jordanian economy.
A - LEVELS OF AND GROWTH IN INDEBTEDNESS (TOTAL OUTSTANDING DEBT .
AND ITS GROWTH).
Over the period 1924 - 1972, a total of 73.5 m.J.D. was received 
in the form of loans. This represents only 10.0% of the total aid flow 
over the period.1 The following table shows a detailed breakdown of the 
total outstanding debt and the rate of its increase on annual basis.
1 Appendix II, Table 1
TABLE 4
GROWTH IN TOTAL OUTSTANDING DEBT
1960 - 1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
TOTAL OUTSTANDING TOTAL OUTSTANDING ANNUAL RATE OF TOTAL OUTSTAND- TOTAL OUTSTAND-
PERIOD DEBT (ACCUMULATED DEBT (INDEX: GROWTH IN OUT- ING DEBT AS % ING DEBT AS %
FIGURES)* 1960 = 100) STANDING DEBT OF G.N.P. OF G.N.P. (3 YEAR
MOVING AVERAGE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1960 10.8 100 20.0 1.2
1961 11.5 106 6.0 0.6 0.9
1962 12.8 118 11.0 1.0 1.0
1963 14.7 136 15.0 1.3 2.1
1964 21.3 197 45.0 4.1 2.2
1965 23.7 219 11.0 1.3 2.4
1966 26.9 249 14.0 1.7 2.0
1967 33.0 305 23.0 3.0 2.4
1968 37.8 350 14.0 2.4 2.3
1969 41.'5 384 10.0 1.6 * 1.6
1970 43.4 401 5.0 0.9 2.4
1971 . 54.7 506 26.0 4.8 3.2
1972 64.5 597 18.0 3.9
Source: Appendix III, Table I and Table 2.
iff Total outstanding debt in a particular year refers to the sum of debts actually received minus debt amortization
payments up to that date.
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From the table above and Graph 1, it is clear that the total 
accumulated debts of the economy have steadily increased over the years.
In particular, the total outstanding debt (column 2) increased sixfold 
over the period 1960-1972. The average rate of growth over the period 
was 16.8%. However, the year-to-year rate of growth, as can be 
seen from column 3, fluctuated widely. In part, fluctuations in the 
loans received are explained by fluctuations in aid received by Jordan 
from year to year in that loans constitute a part of the total aid.
Moreover, given the fact that project-tied loans constituted a part 
of the total, fluctuations are partly explained by the simple fact that 
loan-financed projects are often lumpy and non-recurring. For example, 
exceptionally high rates of growth of debt in 1964, 1967 and 1971 (appeared 
in Table 4 above) are due to the following projects, shown in Table 4.A.
(See p.|SI )•
From the table it can be seen that one or two projects accounted 
for most of the loans during each of the three years under study.
Finally, column 5 in Table 4 shows that the accumulated debt/G.N.P. 
ratio fluctuated widely over the period 1960-1972, but it was high in the 
last two years of the study as compared to other years. The low ratio and 
low rate of growth in 1970 can be attributed to the Civil War in that year. 
The Civil War disrupted the economic life of the country, and it affected 
the position of the country vis a vis some Arab countries. Though the ratio 
is high in the last two years, it is difficult to say on the basis of yearly 
data that the series exhibit a rising trend over time. We calculated three 
year moving averages in order to average out the effect of fluctuations 
in loans received by Jordan from year to year. It can be seen from column 6 
that moving average series does, with two exceptions, show a steadily rising 
trend over time.
TABLE A.A
THE MAIN LOAN-FINANCED PROJECTS IN 1964, 1967 AND 1971
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
SOURCE TITLE OF PROJECT 1964 1967 1971
Amount % of Total 
Debt in 1964
ihnount % of Total 
Debt in 1967
Amount % of Total 
Debt in 1971
1 - Kuwait The Phosphate Project and 
the Yarmouk River Project. 5.5 76.4
2 - ENI-IMPEX Amman Grand Hospital. 3.1 45.6
3 - A.I.D. The Agricultural Credit 
Corporation. 0.8 12.0
4 - The Exim- 
bank Purchase of Boeing Aircraft 5.9 45.1
5 - The United 
Kingdom Electricity and Water 
Projects CO•H 14.0
Total 5.5 76.4 3.9 57.6 7.7 59.1
Source: Appendix III, Table 1.
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B - DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS: LEVELS, GROWTH AND DEBT SERVICE CAPACITY.
The increase in total outstanding debt sooner or later, leads to an 
increase in the outflow of capital in the form of debt service payments. 
The following table gives details of the debt service payments on yearly 
basis. Furthermore, Graph 2 shows the pattern of growth in debt service 
payments.
TABLE 4.B
DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS - LEVELS AND GROWTH 
1960-1972
IN JORDANIAN DINARS
PERIOD DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS
ANNUAL RATE OF 
GROWTH IN TOTAL 
DEBT SERVICE 
PAYMENTS (4)(%)
INDEX:DEBT 
SERVICE 
PAYMENTS 
1961=100 (5)
PRINCIPAL (1) INTEREST (2] TOTAL (3) 
= 1+2
1960 4513 4513 . 13
1961 16153 18805 34958 674.6 100
1962 33714 ■ 20358 54072 54.6 155
1963 95680 93358 189038 249.6 541
1964 550986 110722 661708 250.0 1893
1965 186574 109929 296503 -55.1 848
1966 418706 137898 556604 87.7 1592
1967 632261 248920 881181 58.3 2521
1968 635095 320035 955130 8.3' 2732
1969 1063625 407535 491160 -48.5 1405
1970 1260529 374782 1635311 232.9 4678
1971 1767663 799373 2567036 56.9 7343
1972 2324240 . 841196 3165436 23.3 9055
Source: Appendix III, Table 1 and Table 2.
* .Debt service payments refer to the annual total payments of interest and 
principal.
From the table and column 4 it can be seen that the debt service payments,
v/Lth the exception of the years 1965 and 1969, increased every year. The 
♦exceptionally high rates of growth in early 1960's, in particular 1961, 1963 
and 1964, are due to the fact that the debt service payments were very low to 
start with. Jordan borrowed very little in the 1950's and the repayment of 
loans received in the 1950's did not start till the early 1960's. On the
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other hand, the high rate of growth in 1970 is explained by the loans 
acquired by Jordan on commercial terms. The rate of interest on these 
loans was high, and their repayment started soon after their receipt. The 
negative rates of growth in 1965 and 1969 are partly explained by uneven 
spacing of loans and deferrment of the debt service payments falling, due 
to economic difficulties. The low rate of growth in 1968 is mainly explained 
by the after effects of the 1967 war.
I - THE BURDEN OF DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS:
So far we have only described the total outstanding debt and debt service 
payments. These figures do not by themselves have any economic significance 
as economic indices of the debt burden of the Jordanian economy and its 
debt servicing capacity. In the literature the ratios debt service payments 
/G.N.P. and debt service payments/export earnings are normally used to denote 
the burden of debt and debt service payments on the economy. In the case 
of the first G.N.P. is taken as the index of the debt servicing capacity of 
the economy, while in the case of the second export earnings. There are strong 
objections to both as satisfactory indices of the debt servicing capacity of 
the economy. The main objection to G.N.P. as the index is that as far as 
Jordan is concerned, foreign debts have to be repaid in one of the internationally 
acceptable currencies of which the Jordanian Dinar is not one. Neglecting the 
inflow of funds on the capital account, this restriction on the form of 
repayment implies that it is not the G.N.P., the total flow of goods and 
services produced in the economy, but the internationally traded goods and 
services produced in the economy which determine the capacity to service 
foreign debts. Here, one should take into account that a substantial 
proportion of Gross National Output in Jordan consists of services most of 
which cannot be sold internationally. On the other hand, agricultural and
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industrial products produced in the country could be sold internationally; 
but they account for only a small part of G.N.P. As a result, so far 
as Jordan is concerned, the ratio debt payments/G.N.P. or G.D.P. under­
estimates the capacity of the Jordanian economy to service its debts 
from its own resources. Instead, a more accurate index of the capacity 
is the ratio of foreign debts to internationally traded goods produced 
in the economy. The data as it is organized does not permit the comput­
ation of this ratio.
As for the ratio of debt service payments to export earnings, the 
ratio is an index of the burden imposed by the debt service payments on 
the import capacity of the economy in the absence of capital inflows. 
However, the significance of the ratio as the index of the burden actually 
imposed on the economy as a result of debt service payments depends on 
the importance of the foreign trade sector and the sources of the foreign 
capital. These two factors vary from one economy to another, as a result, 
the ratio does not have the same significance for all economies. Economists 
differ about the significance of the ratio. For some it is an index of 
the credit-worthiness. Economists such as R. Mikesell, have questioned 
the significance of this ratio as an index of the likelihood of default 
or burden of foreign debt. He has argued that the history of default 
on loans does not provide enough evidence on what determines the maximum 
ratios borrowers can weather without falling into default or interfering 
with the flow of investment and debt service payments. It occurred that 
at the same and different ratios, borrowers both fell into and avoided 
default.^
1 R. F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, (London: Weidenfeld 
and .Nicolson, 1968), p.118; see also United Nations, Debt Problems 
of Developing Countries, (New York: U.N., 1972), TD/118/supp.6/Rev.l, 
p.ll; Dragoslav Avramovic, Debt Servicing Capacity and Post War Growth 
in International Indebtedness, pp.101-103, 1958, quoted by Dragoslav 
Avramovic, et al, Economic Growth and External Debt, (Baltimore:
The John Hopkins Press, 1966), p.39.
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The table below (Table 4.C., see p. 156) gives the two ratios for 
each of the years between 1960 - 1972. The critical comments above cast 
doubts on the usefulness of these ratios. Here, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the "actual" and "potential" burden of debt and debt 
service payments. We do not regard these ratios as indices of the actual 
burden; because as we argue in a greater detail later, Jordan has used its 
foreign aid receipts to service her debts. On the other hand, these ratios 
do give an idea of the burden debts and debt service payments will impose 
on Jordan in case she does not receive as much aid as she has done in the 
past.
Table 4.C shows the debt service ratio, i.e. debt service payments/ 
export earnings, increased from 0j04%in 1960 to 9.3% in 1972. Inspite of 
this increase the ratio remains low on average, it was 3.2% over the whole 
period. As to the ratio of outstanding debt to G.N.P., it was also low 
almost throughout the period 1960 - 1972. Moreover, debt service payments 
were low if judged against the country's G.N.P. and G.D.P. Despite these 
low ratios, one should not overlook the fact that debt service payments 
were claiming increasing shares of the country's export earnings and 
total income. Besides, the debt service payments as they appear in the 
government statistics were under-recorded which casts further doubts on 
the seemingly favourable debt position of the country as judged from the 
above mentioned debt ratios. Under-recording of debt service payments 
is due to the fact that the Jordanian army finances a part of its 
purchases of equipment and military hardware by drawing on loans offered 
by different Western sources. The volume of these loans as well as their 
debt service payments are not published.*
However, here it is necessary to point out that the ratio debt 
service payments to export earnings is a misleading index of the actual 
burden debt service payments have imposed on the import capacity of the 
economy. Over the period of study, on average, exports paid for no more
1 See Chapter II, pp. 64-70.
TABLE 4.C
DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS, EXPORT EARNINGS AND DEBT SERVICE RATIOS
1960-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS AS % OF Total Outstanding
PERIODS Debt Service Export Debt Service Gross National Gross Domestic Debt as % ofPayments Earnings Ratio Product Product G.N.P.
(Total) (3) = 1/2 (G.N.P.) (G.D.P.)
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6)
1960 0.0045 12.8 0.035 0.004 0.005 1.2
1961 0.035 17.0 0.206 0.030 0.032 0.6
1962 0.054 19.0 0.283 0.040 0.050 1.0
1963 0.189 20.3 0.931 0.140 0.161 1.3
1964 0.662 24.6 2.689 0.410 0.489 4.1
1965 0.297 28.6 1.040 0.160 0.197 1.3
1966 0.557 32.1 1.734 0.300 0.372 1.7
1967 0.881 27.7 3.181 0.430 0.498 3.0
1968 0.955 28.3 3.375 0.480 0.567 2.4
1969 0.491 32.3 1.521 0.210 0.248 1.6
1970 1.635 ' 32.2 5.079 0.730 0.863 0.9
1971 2.567 20.8 12.342 1.100 1.267 4.8
1972 3.165 34.2 9.256 1.250 1.459 3.9
Source: Appendix III, Tables 1, 2 and 3.
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than 16.1% of imports. The persistent deficit on the visible account 
of the balance of payments was for most part, as we pointed out earlier, 
financed by grants.from the aid donors. The following table shows the 
ratio of export earnings to total imports and the extent of the country's 
balance of payments deficits.
TABLE 4.D. ■
THE RATIO OF EXPORTS TO IMPORTS AND BALANCE . 
ON GOODS AND SERVICES
AVERAGE PERCENTAGES
1950-1954 1955-1959 1960-1969 1970-1972
Exports/Imports ratio 14.0 14.5 '< 15.7 17.2
Balance on Visible 
Trade -14.4 -26.4 . -44.0 -65.3
Balance of Goods and 
Services -12.9 -23.3 -33.9 -57.9
Source: (a) Table l.AD, p.54; (b) Table l.AF, p.58; (c) Table l.M, p.24;
(d) Table l.N,p.25.
From the debt service payments to export ratio the Jordanian economy 
does not seem heavily geared, and one is, as a result, tempted to draw 
the conclusion that Jordan can safely increase its indebtedness. But 
here it is necessary to point out that if for some reason (say a change in 
the political conditions) Jordan fails to receive aid as easily as it has 
done in the past, then she will have to pay for both debt service payments 
and imports out of her meagre export earnings which pay for a small part 
of imports.
We get a better view of the effect of political factors on the 
foreign exchange receipts by examining the time profile of each major 
sources of foreign exchange earnings in Jordan. The five main sources
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of foreign exchange were: exports, income from tourism, remittances from 
Jordanians working abroad, flow of foreign aid and income from investment, 
particularly the interest accruing to the Central Bank from its deposits 
abroad. (Table 4.E. see p.159 ).
The overall picture from Table 4.E below shows that until 1967 
foreign exchange receipts from each of the five sources steadily increased. 
Thereafter, the pattern changes. Foreign exchange earnings from exports 
(V.l) steadily rose and then dropped in 1967 owing to the Arab-Israeli 
War; but regained their previous peak in 1969. The drop in 1971 was due 
to bad agricultural harvest. Fruits and vegetables account for a high 
proportion of the total export earnings. Their share in the total was 
48.4% and 48.7% over 1960-1969 and 1970-1972, respectively.'*' What we 
can say is that exports earnings exhibit an increasing trend overtime, 
and the divergence from the trend is explained by exogenous factors, 
mainly political.
Remittances from Jordanians working abroad (V.2) show a steady 
increase over the period 1960-1966. The sudden drop in the remittances 
in 1967 is once again explained by the Arab-Israeli War in that year.
The War meant the loss of the territory to the West of River Jordan to 
Israel; as a result, the emigrants from the West Bank decreased the 
remittances of their earnings. Remittances from Jordanians working 
abroad is very sensitive to political factors within and outside the 
country. For example, the drop in remittances in 1970-1971 is explained 
by the Civil War in 1970 and the ensuing uncertainty. In 1972 there was 
a noticeable rise in remittances.
1 See discussion on exports in Chapter I, pp.^J.^5 a*ol 49-56»
TABLE 4.E
MAJOR SOURCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THEIR INDICES
1960-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
PERIOD SOURCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE INDICES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE(1966 = 100)Exports of 
Goods and 
Services 
(VI)
Remittances 
from Jordan­
ians Abroad 
(V2)
Tourism
Receipts
(V3)
jlnvestment
Income
(V4)
Aggregate 
Aid Flow
(V5) (VI) (V2) (V3) ' (V4) (V5)
1960 12.8 6.24 3.23 0.62 25.8 39 59 28 16 98
1961 17.0 5.25 4.34 1.19 26.1 52 49 38 32 99
1962 19.1 6.2 5.05 1.37 24.5 59 58 44 37 93
1963 20.3 6.17 6.00 1.11 24.6 63 58 53 30 93
1964 24.6 8.01 8.00 1=70 28.7 76 75 70 45 109
1965 28.5 9.28 9.8 2.60 27.8 88 87 86 70 105
1966 32.1 10.57 11.3 3.70 26.3 100 100 100 100 100
1967 27.7 6.55 6.8 4.4 54.3 86 61 60 118 206
1968 28.3 4.1 4.6 5.8 52.2 88 38 40 156 198
1969 32.3 6.92 4.54 6.9 48.1 100 65 40 186 182
1970 32.2 5.54 4.2 6.8 44.2 100 52 37 183 168
1971 20.8 4.97 3.1 5.8 53.1 64 47 27 156 201
1972 34.2 7.41 3.39 4.4 65.7 106 70 30 118 249
Source: (a) Appendix I, Table 2 ; (b) International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 
(Washington, D.C. : I.M.F., n.d.) vols.: 16 and 21; and (c) Appendix II, Table 1.
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Foreign exchange earnings from tourism (V.3) exhibit a similar 
behaviour over time. They steadily increased till 1966. Thereafter, 
foreign exchange earnings from this source steadily decreased and they 
did not regain their 1966 peak. As is the case with the remittances 
from Jordanians working abroad, this source of foreign exchange is highly 
sensitive to political factors. The loss of the West Bank of Jordan in 
1967 meant the loss of the important holy places and historical sites 
of interest to tourists.
Income from investment, particularly the interest earned by the 
Central Bank on its deposits abroad, steadily increased over the period 
with the exception of the two years that followed the 1970 Civil War.
As far as foreign aid, the largest item in foreign exchange receipts, 
is concerned, it, with some qualifications showed an increasing trend. 
However, as far as the period 1960-1967 is concerned, one cannot detect 
a strong increasing trend. There is a big jump in the volume of foreign 
aid in 1967. This big jump is mainly due to the generosity of the oil 
producing Arab countries following the War. From then on till 1971, 
the volume of aid decreases. Once again there is a big jump in the 
volume of foreign aid in 1971 and 1972. Moreover, it should be noted 
that foreign aid receipts are high in the years when the receipts from 
the first three sources are low, i.e. 1967 and 1971.
What emerges from the examination of the sources of foreign 
exchange is that exports, investment income and foreign aid were the 
only variables which exhibit an increasing trend over time. The last 
two are dependent on political factors. Leaving aside the foreign aid, 
exports of goods are the only reliable source of foreign exchange earnings 
in the country. Political events, the 1967 War and 1970 Civil War, have 
affected export earnings but their effect has been temporary.
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As far as Jordan's potential burden of debt service payments
is concerned, one must not overlook the fact that one of the important
determinant of debt service capacity is the country's ability to
selectively control its total imports.^ A rough indicator of the
economy's ability to do so could be the ratio of imported consumer
goods (other than food) to the total of importables. Here we assume
that a developing country such as Jordan can afford to cut down, without
much sacrifice, its imports of consumer goods as they can be regarded
luxuries. On the other-hand, imports of food or intermediate inputs,
can be regarded necessities. As far as Jordan is concerned, the ratio
of imported consumer goods to total imports had averaged 53.0%, over the
2period 1960-1972. Therefore, one can conclude that Jordan is potentially 
capable of drastically cutting her import bill. However, it should be 
noted that Jordan will still have a balance of payments deficit even if 
no consumer goods are imported. .
To conclude the argument: So far, the debt service payments have 
imposed no burden on the economy. From Table 4.F it can be seen that 
inflow of foreign exchange exceeded the outflow in most years. The country 
has not come up against the foreign exchange constraint. Jordan in this 
respect is very different from other underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, 
it is also clear that Jordan has financed her debt service payments through 
foreign exchange receipts from aid. From Table 4.F and column 12 it can 
also be seen that the country has been a net lender in most years,in that 
its foreign exchange reserves increased over time. So there is an element 12
1 See D. Avramovic, op. cit.. Chapter III, pp. 13-37.
2 See Appendix III, Table 3.
TABLE 4.F
INFLOW AND OUTFLOW OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
PERIODS
Inflow of Foreign Exchange (Major Sources) OutflowExchan
<r of Foreign
(Major Sources]
Rate
of
growth 
of 9
(ID
The
Difference 
Between 
6 and 9
(12) =
6-9
Export
Earnings
(1)
Remittances 
from Jord­
anians 
Working 
Abroad 
(2)
Tourism
Receipts
(3)
Investment
Income
(4)
Foreign
Aid
(5)
Total
Inflow
of
Foreign 
Exchange 
(6)=1+2+ 
+4+5
Imports 
3 (7)
Debt
Service
Pay­
ments
(8)
Total
Outflow
of
Foreign 
Exchange 
(9) = 
7+8
Rate
of
growth 
of 6
(10)
1960 12.8 6.24 3. 23 0.62 25.8 48.69 47.05 0.01 47.06 1.65
1961 17.0 5.25 4.34 1.19 26.1 53.88 46.63 0.03 46.66 10.7 -0.8 7.22
1962 19.1 6.20 5.05 1.37 24.5 56.22 51.80 0.05 51.85 4.3 11.1 4.37
1963 20.3 6.17 6.00 1.11 24.6 58.18 61.06 0.19 61.25 3.5 18.1 -3.07
1964 24.6 8.01 8.00 1.70 28.7 71.01 56.65 0.66 57.31 22.1 -6.4 13.70
1965 28.5 9.28 9.80 2.60 27.8 77.98 63.55 0.30 63.85 9.8 11.4 14.13
1966 32.1 10.57 11.30 3.70 26.3 83.97 76.60 0.56 77.16 7.7 20.8 6.81
1967 27.7 6.55 6.80 4.40 54.3 99.75 63.68 0.88 64.56 18.8 -16.3 35.19
1968 28.3 4.10 4.60 5.80 52.2 95.00 90.98 0.96 91.94 4.8 42.4 3.06
1969 32.3 6.92 4.54 6.90 48.1 98.76 108.69 0.49 109.18 4.0 18.8 rl0.42
1970 32.2 5.54 4.20 6.80 44.2 92.94 89.89 1.64 91.53 5.9 -16.2 1.41
1971 20.8 4.97 3.10 5.80 53.1 87.77 93.01 2.57 95.58 5.6 4.4 -7.81
1972 34.2 7.41 3.39 4.40 65.7 115.10 101.01 3.17 104.18 31.1 9.0 10.92
Source: (a) Appendix I,Table No.2.; (b) Chapter I,Table No.l. AD; (c) International Monetary Fund, Balance
of Payments Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., n.d.) Vols. 16 and 21; (d) Appendix II,Table No. 1.
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of arbitrage involved in the borrowing operations of the country 
in that Jordan lends at one rate, usually the commerical rate, and 
borrows at another rate, usually lower than the commerical rate.
However, we are not sure that the Central Bank is aware of this.
However, it is a mute question how far Jordan can keep on increasing 
her debt. The answer does not depend on economic but on political factors.
If it is assumed that political factors will always be to Jordan's 
advantage and she, as a result, will keep on receiving preferential 
treatment both from the Western and Arab aid donors; then it is clear that 
the country can safely keep on contracting more debts. However,- if an 
infavourable turn in political events, and a consequent decrease in foreign 
aid is assumed then there are strong economic arguements against levering 
the economy still further. The economic arguments in question are that 
export earnings cover only a small proportion of total imports, and that 
apart from earnings from the export of goods there are no stable sources-of 
foreign exchange. Just to give an idea of what the unfavourable turn of 
political events might be. The establishment of a separate Palestinian 
State on the West Bank - by no means a remote possibility, and a rightward 
turn towards the West on the part of Syria,may lead to a decrease in the 
political importance of Jordan.
11 SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS.
Government departments and private agencies do not compile or publish 
data on the sectoral distribution of loans. Apart from the lack of data 
on such distribution, the available data on loans provides nothing more than 
the titles of the projects financed by donors. Unfortunately, the titles 
were vague and confusing and they provide little information about the nature 
of projects financed by loans. The funds for project-tied loans were 
made available in the currencies of donor countries. We have expressed all­
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loans in terms of the United States dollars in order to arrive at the 
sectoral distribution of loans.
We have classified projects into sectors by reference to the final 
output of the activity in question. For example, any project linked with 
development of agriculture in any respect is classified under the 
agricultural sector. For example, the loan which granted for financing 
the study on dives marketing was classified under the agricultural sector.
The same procedure was also applied when classifying projects in other 
sectors. (See Table 4.G. p. 165 )•
From the table it can be seen that transport and health, between 
themselves absorbed more than 70.0% of the loans. The allocation to 
transport is more or less evenly divided between roads and railways 
and ports and airport facilities. Most of the allocation to transport 
was spent on a few projects. The following projects absorbed 56.0% of the 
total allocation for transport and 33.2% of the total loan disbursements:
Aqaba Port, the Amman-Aqaba highway, the Amman-Zarqa highway, Jerusalem,
Amman and Aqaba airports and the purchase of Boeing aircraft. The same 
is true for allocation to health. Funds that were spent on health came 
from only two loans and were meant for two hospitals: (A Belgian-French 
Company, ENI-IMPEX, gave the sum of J.D. 3.1 million for building, ,
furnishing and equipping the Amman Grand Hospital; the second loan, a West 
German one, was about 16.3 million D. Marks for equipping the Hussein Medical 
City). However, a large proportion of these amounts was spent on buying 
equipment from donor countries, as loans were project - and procurement - tied. 
On the otherhand, mining and manufacturing received only 1.8% of the total 
loans allocation. Finally, education and social welfare also received a 
very small share of the total.
TABLE 4.G
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN LOANS 165
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS
Sectors Actual Disbursements 
(Absolute)
Percentages
1 - Agriculture and
Irrigation 28715 5.03
la Irrigation 3424 0.60
lb Dams 11141 1.95
lc Other Agricult­
ural Activities 14150 2.48
2 - Transport 334133 58.72
2a Roads and Rail-
ways 160176 28.15
2b Ports & Airport
Facilities 173957 30.57
3 - Mining & Manuf-
acturing 10295 1.80
3a Mining 8622 1.51
3b Manufacturing 1673 0.29
4 - Electricity and 
Water Supply 16995 2.98
4a Electricity 9904 1.74
4b Water Supply 7091 1.24
5 Construction &
Housing 2139 0.37
6 Communication 10016 1.76
7 Touïism '/ ' 1018 i 0.17
8 Health i .-•! ! 1 66879 11.75 '
9 Social Welfare 3023 0.53
10 Education 168 0.02
11 Others
T------------------------------
95553 16.79
12 Total j 56 89 34 100.00
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix III: 5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3... 
5.16.
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The overall picture projected by the above table, makes it 
reasonable to say that the distribution of loans was heavily in the 
favour of a few sectors. However, to see the wider implication of the 
distribution, we have regrouped the sectors in the following manner:
1 Transport and Communication 60.48%
2 Health, Social Welfare and Education 12.30%
3 Construction, Housing and Water Supply 1.24%
4 Agriculture and Irrigation 5.03%
5 Mining and Manufacturing 1.80%
The above distribution shows a strong bias in the pattern. It is 
heavily biased in the favour of services the first three categoriesj while 
the goods - producing sectors the last, received a small share. Two 
questions arise at this point: (a) What are the factors which explain the 
sectoral distribution? (b) What are the effects of the sectoral distribution?
To deal with the first question one must mention the fact that 
most of the loans are project - and procurement - tied, so the distribution 
is to a large measure determined by the preferences of donors. Here, it is 
necessary to give the sectoral distribution of laons from each of the main 
donors separately: (Table 4.H. see p.167 )•
From the table, it can be seen that projects in transport and 
communication were most preferred by the aid donors. With a few exceptions, 
projects in agriculture did not get a large share; and, in general mining 
and manufacturing projects were least preferred. In particular as far as 
big donors were concerned viz., the U.S.A., the U.K. and W. Germany,
Table 4.H. below shows that the U.S., for instance, allocated around 56.4% 
of her loans to transport and communication, whereas the U.K. and West Germany 
gave 45.0% and 82.0%, respectively.^ On the otherhand, loan donors, such
1 For details of projects financed by each donor, see Appendix III, Tables 5 
to 5.16.
TABLE 4.H
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS FROM EACH OF THE 
.MAIN DONORS
PERCENTAGES
Donors
Sectors
*
U.S.À.
l
Britain Kuwait W. Germany Saudi Arabia I.D.A. Eximbank C.ITOH
&
Co.(Japan)
1 - Agriculture and 
Irrigation 11.0 29.0 19.0 50.7
2 - Transport and 
Communication 56.4 45.0 82.0 100.0 15.3 100.0 100.0
3 - Mining and
Manufacturing 2.2 0.3 29.0
4 - Health, Social 
Welfare and 
Education 15.4 0.9 17.4
5 - Electricity 14.5 2.0 0.6 __ _
6 - Construction and 
Housing and 
Water Supply 8.1 7.5 34.0
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix III: 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
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as Saudi Arabia, the Eximbank and C.ITOH & Co., earmarked 100.0% 
of their loans for projects in transport and communication. U.K.,
Kuwait and the I.D.A. were the few aid donors who did not show an overt 
bias in favour of transport and communication and against agriculture and 
mining. The U.K. for example, was the only Western donor that allocated 
a relatively high proportion of her loans to the basic goods producing 
sector viz., agriculture and irrigation (29.0%). Approximately 51.0% 
of I.D.A. loans were for agriculture and irrigation and 34.0% for water 
supply, whereas Kuwait gave 19.0% to agriculture and 29.0% to mining and 
manufacturing. It is, perhaps, fair to say that there was an over con­
centration of foreign loans in non-traded good sectors. This becomes 
significant when one comes to discuss the effect of loans on the debt- 
service capacity of the economy.
Where the loans are procurement-tied, it is clear that the choice 
of projects constrained by the commodities donor countries produce and 
they wish to sell abroad. Transport and communication projects such as 
railroads, ports and airport facilities and communication stations require 
material inputs and services, which western countries are well equiped to 
supply. Procurement-tied loans provide a good opportunity to aid donors 
to sell goods and services to the recipient country. But this factor does 
not by itself explain why projects in mining and manufacturing are neglected.
The second factor relevant in explaining the sectoral distribtuion 
of loans is the prestige donors hope to get from financing particular 
projects. Most of the prestige projects happen to be in the service sector. 
Highways, airports, railways, jet airliners and big hospitals, are,apart 
from being of economic use also monuments. As we explained earlier, the 
loans spent on health came from only two sources, (two loans) and were 
spent on two big hospitals, i.e., the Amman Grand Hospital and the Hussein
Medical City. The country could have benefited more of such resources, 
had they been used for setting up several small hospitals all over the 
country rather than two big ones, in Amman. However, the distribution of 
the above loans was meant, on the one hand, to promote the political 
image of the loan donors and, on the other, to strengthen the political 
position of the Jordanian administrative apparatus. The choice of the 
projects in the health sector was predominantly determined by prestige 
reasons.
Political ideology of loan donors is often a factor which may explain 
the sectoral distribution of loans. The bias against some sectors in 
particular mining and manufacturing sectors may be explained by the fact 
that donor countries are averse to granting loans to public bodies for 
the sectors which in their opinion should be serviced by private firms.
The political commitment to a private enterprise economy generally takes 
the form of division of economic activities into public and private sectors, 
and this decision may well bias the choice against some projects.
Finally, most of the loans were given to public bodies, so the range of 
economic activities carried out by the public sectors itself constrains the 
pattern of distribution of loans. Donors were constrained in their choice 
by the projects drawn up by public bodies in Jordan. We think that bias 
in favour of transport and communication is partly explained by the fact 
that projects in this sector are easy and obvious public projects to 
think of.
To conclude this discussion on the factors which may explain the pattern 
of distribution of loans. In general, it should be said that there is no 
single factor which on its own can adequately explain the pattern of 
distribution. It is fair to say that donors have preferences as to the 
projects they wish to finance. These preferences are jointly determined
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by economic, ideological and political factors. However, it is wrong 
to take the actual distribution as an unambiguous and faithful guide 
of donors* preferences. Donors when they are giving project tied-loans 
are partly con£rained by the list of projects drawn up by Jordanian 
authorities. The bias against some sectors, in particular agriculture, 
may be just due to the fact that Jordanian authorities have not come up 
with viable projects in those sectors. Jordanian authorities within limits, 
can influence the sectoral distribution of loans by compiling a list of 
projects.
Furthermore on the other hand the bias against agriculture may well 
be explained by the fact that agricultural extension services in Jordan 
are primitive and that Jordanian government has not drawn up a catalogue 
of viable projects in agriculture.
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The effect of the sectoral distribution of loans can be judged 
in terms of two basic indices. They are: firstly, the debt service 
capacity of the economy and secondly, the priorities of the economy.
The first may help us in finding out whether or not the distribution 
of loans that took place in the Jordanian economy improved the capacity 
of the economy to meet its foreign debt obligations. The second index 
may help us in finding out whether or not the loans received by Jordan 
were in line with the economy's investment priorities.
It appeared from the previous analysis that the distribution of 
loans was heavily biased in favour of the services sectors. By and 
large, these sectors do not directly contribute to the export earnings 
of the country. This particular form of distribution increases the 
burden of foreign debt and debt service payments.as measured by the 
afore-mentioned indices, i.e., debt service payments/export earnings 
and debt service payments/G.N.P. or G.D.P, Had the distribution of 
loans been directed more towards traded-goods sectors such as 
agriculture and mining and manufacturing, prospects of a better performance 
of the Jordanian economy and an increase in the probability of extracting 
a surplus to service the borrowed capital could have been made possible. 
However, it ought to be mentioned here, that the services sectors (roads, 
ports and airport facilities) indirectly contribute to exports. But 
whether or not investment in these sectors leads to an increase in exports, 
crucially depends on whether or not complementary investment in traded 
goods sector is undertaken. The actual fact was that overall, investment 
patterns in Jordan - as will be discussed in the forthcoming chapter, were 
influenced by the donors. Therefore, the investment carried out by the 
Jordanian authorities was in line with that of the donors.
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As far as the priorities of the Jordanian economy are concerned, 
they could be defined in terms of either the respective contribution of 
different sectors to G.D.P. or in terms of the distribution of the 
labour force. The agricultural sector is the largest single contributor 
to the national income in Jordan. It contributed about 21.5% of G.D.P. 
over the period 1954-1959 and 19.4% over the period 1960-1972. The 
mining and manufacturing sector, on the other-hand contributed to 
approximately 10% of G.D.P. over the period 1960-1972.
So far as the distribution of the labour force is concerned, 
agriculture provides employment to about a third of the population.
Its contribution to total employment was 33.4% and 32.9% in 1961 and 
1970, respectively.^"
In general terms, whichever way we look at the priorities of 
investment, the neglect of agricultural sector cannot be justified.
There may be economic arguments in favour of investment in transport 
and communication and health. So far as the latter is concerned it 
could be argued that the projects actually chosen were not in line with 
the requirements of the sector. Similarly, one could question the economic 
wisdom behind some of the projects. In particular, it is difficult to 
justify the purchase of Boeing aircraft on loan.
In conclusion, it can be said that loan financed projects did not 
make any appreciable impact on the debt service capacity of the 
Jordanian, economy, and the distribution of loans and the projects chosen 
in particular sectors were not necessarily in accordance with the 
investment priorities of the economy.
1 See Appendix III, Table 12.
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PART TWO: THE FINANCIAL TERMS OF LOANS AND THEIR EFFECT.
A - THE TERMS OF LOANS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY.
The terms attached to loans vary from one case to another. The terms 
with which we are concerned here are: (a).The rate of interest. (b) The 
grace period, i.e., the time lag between when the loan is granted and 
when the debt service payments start. (c) The length of loan, i.e. the 
period for which loan is granted, (d) The repayment currency. These 
are the financial terms on which loans are made available. Apart from 
these, there are non-financial terms attached to loans, e.g.: tying loans 
to specific projects and to procurements in the donors' home market, other 
strings and conditions which may accompany loans. In this part, we are 
solely concerned with the financial terms of the loans. We discuss the 
non-financial terms in the next chapter; apart from these, we are also int­
erested in determining the element of concession involved in loans from 
different sources.
Each of the terms listed above has its own significance. The importance 
of interest rate is clear enough. In general sense, it is the index of 
the cost of borrowing. Furthermore, the rate of interest in conjunction 
with the rate of growth of the economy indicates the behaviour of the ratio 
debt service payments/G.N.P. overtime. One would expect the ratio to 
increase if the rate of interest exceeds the rate of growth of the economy 
and vice-versa. Obviously, this statement is based on the assumption that 
the rate of growth of the economy is not affected by the investment 
financed by the loan.
_ __ Jhe, grace period, i.e., the number of years that elapse before the
repayment of the loans starts, draws its importance from the fact that 
there is, usually, a gap between when the investment is undertaken and 
when the returns from investment start accruing. One expects the time
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gap to vary from one project to another. Usually, the gap is long 
in the case of infra-structural projects, especially in the case of 
projects connected with transport, irrigation, health and education.
This may be so for the following two reasons: Infra-structural projects 
are to a large extent indivisible, and as a result it may take some time 
before the services which the projects yields are fully utilized. For 
example, roads and port facilities may remain under-utilized for some 
time due to the lack of sufficient demand. On the other-hand, the services 
provided may remain under-utilized due to the lack of ancillary or 
complementary services. Again, roads and port facilities provide an 
example of this. The question is how does one assess whether or not the 
grace period is of adequate length? In the case of projects financed by 
foreign loans and repayable in a foreign currency, the length of the 
grace period should be assessed by reference to the time it takes a project 
to yield benefits in the form of exportable goods and services, termed 
the gestation lag here. The qualification exportable goods and services 
is put in to take into account the fact that loans received as aid, with 
a few exceptions, have to be repaid in a foreign currency. The criterion 
suggested is based on the premise that it is the receipts from the project 
which should finance the repayment of the loan which went to finance it.
In short and in general terms, the argument is that the grace period of 
project-tied loans should bear some relation to the gestation lag of the 
project. We have already pointed out that most of the loans went to 
finance infra-structural projects, and one could argue that the desirable 
grace period for most of the loans received by Jordan is a long rather 
than a short one.
The length of loans derives its significance from the fact that 
benefits from a project do not accrue all at once but instead they are
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distributed over time. Once again in general terms, the argument is 
that the time over which a loan is to be repaid should bear some relation 
to the time period over which benefits are distributed. However, one 
should point out that the lengthening of loans is not an unmitigated 
advantage. The lengthening of loans decreases the burden of repayment 
only if the rate of return on the project exceeds the rate of interest.
In the case where the rate of return is lower than the rate of interest 
the lengthening of the period of repayment actually increases the burden 
rather than reducing it.*
The following table shows the range and diversity of the terms on
which loans were given to Jordan over the period under study. As can
be seen from the table, interest rates on loans varied, from zero % on
loans from the United Kingdom, Saudi-Arabia and Denmark, to 7.5% on
commerical loans. Grace periods, also varied, from 10 years on loans
from the International Development Association (I.D.A.) and some American
loans, (Table 4.1 see p. 176), to very few years or none on some commerical
loans. (U.S. aid given under the United States Public Law No. 480 (PL.480)
was partly given in grants and partly in loans. We do not discuss it here
since we have already done so in Chapter III). As for the maturity of
loans, it ranged from 50 years on I.D.A. loans, to four years on some
commerical ones. In most cases, loans had to be repaid in a hard currency.
Some of the loans given in the form of commodities, but they are an
exception to the rule. On overall basis, it appears at first sight that,
on average, the terms of loans made by the International Development
Association (I.D.A.) were the easiest. In particular, they were easier
than those offered by the United States and the United Kingdom - the two
main sources of loans.____________________________ ________________________
1 See J.M. Healy, The Economics of Aid, (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1971), chapter 5; see also Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics 
of Foreign Aid, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson^, 1968), Chapter 4 
and pp. 265-269.
TABLE 4.1
RANGE AND DIVERSITY OF LOANS TERMS ACCORDING TO 
SOURCE OF FINANCE
Loan
Terms
1
Countries
and
Institut­
ions
---- 5>
U.K. U.S.A. W.Germany Denmark
The Govt, 
of
Kuwait
The
Kuwait
Fund
Saudi—
Arabia
rhe Inter- 
îational 
Develop- 
nent Assoc­
iation 
C.D.A.
The Inter
national
Monetary
Fund
I.M.F.
Export
Import
Bank
----- '
■
ENI-
IMPEX
C.Iboh 
Si CO . 
(Japan)
Hommer- 
:ial
Banks ;
Interest Rate 0 1.75-4.63 2.75-4.75 0 3-3.5 4 0 0.75 l.J 6 5.5 6 7.5
Grace Period 6-7.75 1.58-10.33 4-8.75 4.75 3-5 3.1-6 6.5 10 2 4.8 0 1.83 1.33
Maturity of 
Loans 28.5-
28.75
19.58-
40.33
19.66-
30.17
19.25 17-25 11-15 14.5 50.0 5 7.8 12 9.33 4
.Currency of 
Repayment
Sterl­
ing
Pounds
U.S.Dollars 
and
J. Dinars
D.Marks D.Kroner 
or any 
convert- 
able
currency
s
K. Dinars
Sterl­
ing
Pounds
U.S.
Dollars U.S.Dollars U.S.
Dollars
U.S.
Dollars
Sterl­
ing
Pounds
U.S.
Dollars
U.S.
Dollars
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research (unpublished data in Arabic).
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If we take the terms of loans from commercial sources as indices 
of the terms on which Jordan could have borrowed from the International 
financial markets then we can say that all loans, with the exception of 
those from commercial banks, involved some element of concession on one 
count or the other. In general terms, it is difficult to find a 
convincing economic case for Jordan borrowing from commercial banks.
The rate of interest on those was too high and the maturity period too 
short. Jordan resorted to commercial banks for loans in 1971 as an 
emergency measure when Libya and Kuwait stopped the annual grant theyi 
gave to Jordan after the 1970 Civil War.
The terms of loans are too diverse to permit an easy comparison of 
the concessional elements in loans. One way to do so is to reduce all 
loans to a common denominator by calculating what is termed in the 
literature as the "grant" or the "concessional element". The grant 
element is the difference between the face value of a loan and the present 
value of all future debt service payments, discounted at a certain rate 
of interest.^- The obvious problem one faces here is at what rate 
should one discount the debt service payments? For the present purposes, 
the discount rate should represent the marginal gain from postponing the 
debt service payments by one time period, say a year. The discount 
rate should in that case be equal to the rate of return on the project 
financed by the loan. In general, there is no reason why the rate of 
discount should be the same for all projects. Ideally, one would like to 
calculate the present value of each loan by reference to the project 
financed by it. But, unfortunately, the data on the rates of return 
on projects financed by loans is not available. The reason for this is 
that Jordanian authorities did not undertake a detailed economic appraisal
1 United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Measurement 
of the Flow of Resources to Developing Countries, (New York: U.N., 1967). 
Annex 15; see also J.A. Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid", Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. XLV, 1963, pp. 360 - 367.
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of projects financed by loans. Lacking any better, we use the rate of 
return on government bonds (6.0%) as a proxy for the rate of return.
Table 4.J. lists the element of concession in different loans.
(See Table 4.J. p. 179 ).
Table 4.J. and Graph 6 show the following: (a) Most of the loans 
received by Jordan involved a significant degree of concession. As one 
would expect from the table listing the terms of different loans, the 
I.D.A. loans had the highest grant element in them (78.0%). (b) The
next on the list are the British ones (60.0%). (c) United States loans 
had, on average, a grant element of 36.2%, they ranked fifth on the list.
(d) Commercial loans did not have a grant element, and in certain cases, 
the grant element was negative. Negative "grant element" implies that 
the loan in question should not have been accepted by the Jordanian 
government. ,
However, it should be pointed out that the ranking of loans here is 
dependent on the chosen rate of discount. The maturity of loans, the 
grace period and the rate of interest vary widely, as a result we expect 
the ranking to change with a change in discount rate. Since the discount 
rate used here is arbitrary one cannot attach much weight to the relative 
positions of lenders when the difference in the grant element is not large.
General though it is, one conclusion one can draw from the analysis 
here is that in financial terms most of the borrowing by Jordan has been 
worthwhile. The qualification "in financial terms" is important because 
the conclusion, at least in the case of particular loans, may well be 
different when the "cost of procurement ties" is taken into account. The 
terms of loans, especially bilateral ones, have become progressively harder 
shorter maturités, higher interest rates etc. So what may have been true 
for the loans in the past may not be true for the loans in future. The 
reason for this sceptic note is that Jordanian authorities do not undertake 
a detailed analysis of the cost of loans.
1 7 9
TABLE 4.J.
"GRANT ELEMENT"* IN LOANS EXTENDED TO JORDAN
No. Loans Classified According to Source of Fund
Value 
of Loans
The Grant 
Element
The Average of 
Grant Elements 
(%)
1 The International Develop-
ment Association a. 1,500,000 78.8
(In U.S.$). b. 2,516,000 78.8
c. 3,000,000 78.8 78.8
d. 3,000,000 78.8
e. 6,000,000 78.8
f. 5,400,000 78.8
2 British Loans a. 12,900,000 57.8
(In Sterling Pounds) b. 800,000 58.7 fn oc. 900,000 58.5
d. 7,695,000 64.6
3 Denmark (D.Kroners) a. 12,000,000 47.5 47.5
4 Saudi-Arabia (U.S.$) a. 15,000,000 47.0 47.0
5 American Loans (U.S.$) a. 1,640,000 55.2
A - Dollar Loans b. 1,249,521 54.7
c. 6,300,000 56.4
d. 1,082,519 56.4
B - Commodity Loans
(Paid in Local
Currency) a. 1,314,000 12.2 36.2
B - Commodity Loans a. 1,695,887 26.8
(Paid in U.S.$) b. 1,756,890 25.5
c. 1,270,561 25.3
d. 1,139,983 25.6
e. 1.671,773 24.3
6 West Germany a. 15,120,000 23.4
(In D. Marks) b. 7,750,000 22.2
c. 18,500,000 26.5
d. 73,965,000 28.0 27.4
e. 60,000 35.5
f. 1,100,000 34.5
g* 18,500,000 35.7h. 3,000,000 13.9
7 The International
Monetary Fund
(I.M.F) (U.S.$) a. 4,500,000 22.3 22.3
8 Kuwaiti Loans a. 1,040,000 12.1
(In K. Dinars) b. 5,000,000 15.6
c. 3,000,000 11.7
¿1 85,000 17.4 16.7
c2 175,000 11.7
c3 240,000 21.3d7 4,600,000 27.0
9 ENI-IMPEX (J.Dinars) a. 3,100,000 2.5 2.5
10 C.Itoh & Co.(U.S.$) â. 2,450,724 00 00
11 Eximbank & Boeing Co.
(U.S.$) a. 9,200,000 00 00
12 Commercial Banks (U„S.$) a. 9,200,000 -6.6 -6.6
Source: Based on information collected from the loan agreements Jordan 
^ had entered into, over the period under study.
The grant element was calculated by using the following formula'1;
GE = (q-i)(2,5+T)(l+G)
5 TGE ■» Grant Element as percentage of the face value of a loan, 
q ■ Discount Rate i “ Rate of Interest
T * Maturity of a Loan G “ Grace Period.
(Gestation Period).
1 See G. Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered - The Grant Element 
in Development Lending. (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1966), pp. 101-112.
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B SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
(i) Loans accounted for 10.0% of the total aid which Jordan received 
over the period 1949-1972. Total accumulated debts of the economy have 
steadily increased over the years. In particular, it increased from J.D. 
10.8 million in 1960 to about J.D. 64.5 million in 1972. The ratios 
debt service payments to G.N.P. and that to export earnings despite 
their steady increase over the period 1960-1972, remained low.
(ii) So far the debt service payments have posed no problem to Jordan.
This is due to the fact that Jordan has used its foreign aid receipts 
to service her debts. One conclusion which can be drawn from the data 
is that the Jordanian economy is not heavily geared, and, as a result, 
the country can safely keep on contracting more debts, provided they 
are provided on right economic terms. However, it is necessary to 
qualify the conclusion. The conclusion is valid only if it is assumed 
that Jordan will keep on receiving preferential treatment from aid 
donors.
(iii) In assessing the "potential" burden of debt and debt service 
payments the following factors should be kept in view. Export earnings 
cover a very small proportion of imports (16.8% over the period 1960-1972) 
and most of imports are financed by foreign aid. Apart from the foreign 
exchange receipts on the capital account, the export of goods (mostly 
agricultural) remains the only stable source of foreign exchange. Jordan 
is not of economic but of political importance to aid donors. A change 
in political alignments in the Middle East may well mean a decrease in the 
political importance of Jordan and a consequent decrease in the flow of 
foreign aid. If a turn in political events unfavourable to Jordan is 
assumed probable then it cannot be argued that debt service payments will
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pose no problem to the country and the conclusion above has to be 
accordingly qualified.
(Lv) An analysis of the distribution of loans showed that the 
distribution was heavily biased in the favour of a few sectors.
Transport and health, between themselves absorbed more than 70.0% of 
the loans. Host of the allocation to transport and health was spent 
on a few projects. In contrast, only 1.8% of total loans was for 
mining and manufacturing and 5.0% for agriculture and irrigation. What 
the analysis shows is that the distribution was heavily biased in favour 
of the services sector and against the goods-producing sector.
(v) The pattern of distribution of loans did vary from lender to lender; 
but in general lenders favoured transport" and communication projects.
The pattern of distribution of loans is not explained by one but a 
number of factors. The relevant factors are, economic interest and 
ideological bias on the part of donors and the ability of Jordanian 
authorities to draw up viable projects.
fvi) Next we examined the economic effect of loan-financed projects.
Since most of the loan-financed projects were in the services sectors, 
it could be argued that they did not improve the debt service capacity 
of the economy. Next question we examined was whether or not the 
distribution of loans was in accordance with the priorities of the 
economy. There, the conclusion is that the neglect of agriculture in 
the disbursement of loans cannot be justified.
(vii) The financial terms of loans received by the Jordanian economy 
have varied greatly from donors to donor and from loan to loan. Interest 
rates varied from nil on loans from the United Kingdom, Saudi-Arabia and
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Denmark, to 7.5% on commerical loans. Grace period varied iron/years 
on loans from I.D.A. and some of the American ones, to very low, and 
even nil, on some commercial loans. As for maturity dates, they ranged 
from 4 years on some commercial loans, to 50 years on I.D.A. loans. 
Repayment was mostly in hard currencies. On the average, the terms of 
I.D.A. loans were the easiest, followed in order of easiness by those 
of the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom.
However, in order to show the degree of concessions in loans to 
compare the financial terms on which loans were given to Jordan, we 
calculated the "grant element" in loans, i.e., the difference between 
the face value of a loan and the present value of all future debt 
service payments. The result showed the following: (a) Most of loans 
received by Jordan with the exception of commercial loans involved a 
significant degree of concession. (b) The I.D.A. loans had the highest 
grant element in them (78.0%), followed directly by those from Britain 
(60.0%).
(viii) Finally, one could say that "in financial terms" most of the 
borrowing by Jordan has been worthwhile. The qualification "in financial 
terms" is important because the conclusion, at least in the case of 
particular loans, may well be different when the "cost of procurement 
ties" is taken into account. The term of loans, especially bilateral 
ones, have become progressively harder: shorter maturities, higher 
interest rates etc. So what may have been true for the loans/tfie past 
may not be true for the loans in future. The reason for this sceptic 
note is that Jordanian authorities do not undertake/detailed analysis of
the cost of loans
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CHAPTER V
THE NON-FINANCIAL TERMS OF LOANS AND THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECTS 
PART ONE: TYPES AND EFFECTS OF LOAN TYING 
A- TYPES OF LOAN TYING:
In the previous chapter we discussed the financial terms of the loans 
given to the Jordanian economy, i.e., interest rates, grace period, gestation 
period and the repayment currency in which loans are to be settled. In this 
chapter we discuss the nonrfinancial terms of loans, i.e., the tying of loans 
to projects and restrictions on the source of procurements. Though this 
chapter is specifically concerned with strings attached to loans, we also 
discuss, wherever it is relevant, the strings attached to the grants received 
by Jordan. It is worth noting that the tied aid given to Jordan is not by 
itself of great importance but the implications of it are. Foreign aid has 
increasingly taken the form of repayable double-tied loans. Further, these 
loans represent a financial obligation on the economy of Jordan and should 
be' paid back in due time. In this chapter we also discuss not only the 
ties attached to aid but also the relations between the donors and Jordan 
in a wider context.
Foreign aid is known to have many dimensions, and the aggregate 
volume tells little about the effect of aid until we know its composition 
and terms. Most of aid received by Jordan was bilateral, and no doubt 
strings are attached to it, which affected both economic and political 
policies of the country. The political and economic objectives of the 
ruling elite in Jordan have been influenced by those of the donors. The 
Parliamentary speeches of the 25 prime ministers who took office between
1951-1972, give an idea of these political and economic objectives.
Freedom of enterprise and opposition to Communism were emphasised as 
principal objectives by all of them. In general terms, these objectives 
are no different from those of the donors.
1 See H. Khair, Collections of Jordanian Ministerial Speeches, (Amman:
The Jordanian Press, n.d.), (In Arabic); on the question of 
opposition to Communism, see the above reference for the following 
speeches and messages: Premier Haza Majali, pp. 100-102 and King 
Hussein, pp. 132 and 133. See also King Hussein’s message to Premier 
Suliman Nabulsi in, Documents on International Affairs, op.cit., 
pp. 261-264, 1967; on the question of free enterprise ideology, see 
the following speeches in H. Khair, op.cit.,: Premier Bahjat Talhouni 
on his government's economic policy, p.165, Premier Wasfi El Tal, p. 173 
and finally, Premier Saad Joma's speech, p.183.
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Economie strings that accompanied foreign aid to Jordan (particularly 
loans), were mainly of two kinds, i.e., tied to projects and tied to 
projects and procurements in the donors' home markets. Generally speaking, 
most loans offered to the Jordanian economy were double-tied loans with 
the exception of few ones given by Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia, the World Bank 
and the United Nations. The latter loans were project-tied loans. It is 
worth noting in this respect, that the restrictions (strings) attached 
to the loans given to Jordan took the form of "formal restrictions", 
i.e., they were inherent in the loan agreements which Jordan entered into. 
Apart from these formal restrictions, there were also what economists have 
called "informal restrictions". "Informal restrictions" take the form of 
promise by Jordan (recipient) to follow certain policies, e.g., such as 
import liberalization. In actual fact, these informal restrictions took 
the form of an "understanding" between donors and the Jordanian government. 
These were accompanied by a tadt warning, to Jordan, about consequences, 
if evasion of informal restrictions occur. That means any departure 
from 'de facto restrictions would be considered as short-sighted on the 
part of the Jordanian government, and may cause difficulties in the
continuing or even the giving of aid.'*'
The other typesof restrictions were the'formal restrictions”. These 
restrictions were inherent in the loans agreements which Jordan entered
2into. They required Jordan to abide by clauses put down by the donors. 
Examples of such formal restrictions will be examined along with the
3discussions of the effects of loans restrictions on the Jordanian economy. 
Generally speaking, one can say that aid to Jordan, and particularly loans 
was tied to projects and to projects and procurements in the donors' home 
market. 123
1 See J. Bhagwati, "The Tying of Aid", in J. Bhagwati and Richard S.
Eckaus, Foreign Aid - Selected Readings, (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1970), p.239.
2 J.Bhagwati, op. cit., p. 239.
3 See Appendix III«a0 for exerpts from the loan agreements Jordan entered 
into, over the period of our study.
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B- EFFECTS of loan tying
At this point, we will try to analyse the possible effects of 
loans conditions on the Jordanian economy. But it is important to note 
here that since restrictions on loans were both formal and informal, 
there arises a difficulty of assessing the effects of the latter, i.e., 
informal restrictions. The difficulty is due to the fact that it is 
difficult to acquire a precise knowledge of informal restrictions except 
in a few instances. In contrast, formal restrictions are available in 
documents (loans agreements) form.
To get to the effect of "informal restrictions" attached to the aid 
to Jordan, one would do well to recall the case of the U.S. aid to Jordan 
previously mentioned in passing. When the United States budgetary support 
was the dominant aid to Jordan, i.e., in the late 1950's and the early 
1960's, the United States expressed her desire that utilization of U.S. 
grants should be for procurements in the U.S. market.*" This is an 
instance of informal restrictions, apart from formal restrictions and the 
aim of these was to ensure a market for the commodities produced in the 
United States'market. It practically affected the Jordanian import 
policy. These restrictions compelled Jordan to make a specific list of 
goods which could be imported only from the United States. The list 
included the following goods: passanger cars, trucks, radio sets, records, 
gramaphones, sulphur, refrigerators, air^onditioners, heaters, canned 
cheese, lubricating oil, wheat, flour, butane, gas cookers, toilet soap, 
weapons and hunting guns. The Jordanian Licensing authority compiled 
this list in consultation with the U.S. Aid Mission in Amman. It is worth 12
1 The International Monetary Fund, The Middle East Department and The 
Exchange Restrictions Department, Jordan, (Washington, D.C.:I.M.F.
March 28, 1962).
2 For a discussion and examples on how tied aid creates an atmosphere 
of adaptation in trade, see S.J. Anjaria and Anthony Lanyi, Aid Tyi"i', 
Some Implications For Recipients and Donors, I.M.F., Exchange and 
Trade Relations Department, (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., April 14, 19/1)
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noting that the U.S. Aid Mission, in recommending the list of restricted 
Commodities took care that demand for the goods in question was highly 
income-elastic, and thus ensuring an increasing demand for the 
commodities imported. The aim behind this list was to ensure that the 
U.S. aid, at least a part, comes back to the U.S. in the form of payment 
for commodities produced in the U.S. These forms of restrictions would 
mean a decrease in the real value of aid if prices of those items (tied 
commodities) are higher in the donor's market than in the World market.
The donor country is not necessarily the cheapest source of commodities 
in question and even in cases where the donor country is the cheapest 
source, the recipient country may have to pay higher prices because 
restrictions on procurements give the supplies in the donor country a 
monopolistic advantage. One can also add that there are two types of 
goods, those whose prices are generally quoted and publicly known and 
those whose prices are not. The second category normally includes capital 
goods, unless the recipients are experienced in World trade, then they 
would not know the prices of commodities and thus they are liable to 
overcharging. However, as we will examine the effects of tied loans on 
prices later on in this chapter, our discussion here is therefore brief.
Turning to the effect of the "formal restrictions" attached to the
aid received by Jordan, one could examine the effects of project-tied
loans as well as the effects of project- and procurements-tied ones (double-
tied loans). As we mentioned earlier, both kinds of tied loans were given
to Jordan but the second type, i.e. project - and procurements - tied
loans were predominant. At the outset, one ought to mention the fact
that project-tied aid does not normally affect the cost of loan to the
economy - its principal effect is on the allocation of resources,*- On
1 On the question of project-tied aid, see Albert 0. Hirschman and
Richard M. Bird, Foreign Aid - a Critique and a Proposal, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, July 1968), No. 9, p.6.
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the otherhand, procurement-tied loans do not affect the resource 
allocation, but they affect the real value of aid. The latter may 
imply a divergence between the nominal and the real value of aid. So 
in the case of double-tied loans one has to examine both the divergence 
between the real and nominal value of loans and the effect on resource 
allocation.
1 “ THE EFFECT OF PROJECT-TIED LOANS
Here, we discuss the economic effects of project tied loans in 
terms of the structural changes that took place in the Jordanian economy. 
If one were to look at developments in the Jordanian economy, one would 
see that the service-producing sectors, viz., public administration and 
defence, transport, ownership of dwellings, trade and banking and other 
services, accounted for a very large proportion of the total value added. 
In particular, they accounted for 64.2% and 66.5% of G.D.P., respectively 
over 1960-1969 and 1970-1972. In the forthcoming discussion, we will 
try to explain the ways in which the basic structural change took place 
within the Jordanian economy and the relevance of project-tied aid to 
such changes.
Most of aid in Jordan is allocated to the service sector. The 
increase in income as a result of investment in the services sector 
lead to an increase in demand for outputs of both the services sectors 
and the goods-producing sectors (material-producing sectors). In general, 
one can say that the elasticity of supply is low in the goods producing 
sector. The implication is that while all the extra demand for services 
is supplied by imports, only a part or none of the extra demand for goods 
is satisfied through domestic sources. The implication is that every 
investment in the services sector further biases the structure of the 
economy towards the services sector. This is especially true in the case 
of underdeveloped countries like Jordan which do not suffer from a 
shortage of foreign exchange.
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This pattern of development could be seen in Jordan. There was 
a persistent disequilibrium in the balance on visible trade. The service 
sector accounted for a very high share of G.N.P. and its share* actually 
increased. As far as the Jordanian economy is concerned, the service 
sector doesn't produce internationally traded goods. A large service 
sector means that a large proportion of income is derived from activities 
which do not directly contribute to exports earnings. Moreover, these 
activities increase imports, in the sense that they generally utilize 
imported inputs and that a part of income generated in the service sector 
is spent on imported consumer goods. In otherwords, two separate factors 
worked jointly to bring about the aforementioned structural changes in 
the economy of Jordan. For the sake of clarity one factor may be called 
the "structural factors" and the other could be called the "precipitating 
factors". Factors that are inherent in the economy of Jordan itself \riz., 
a relatively low resource endowment and low technical and administrative 
know-how, have created rigidity in the supply side of the material - or 
goods - producing sectors, in contrast to the services sectors. On the 
other hand, "precipitating factors" are those related to both the economic 
policies undertaken at home as well as to the aid policies of foreign donors.
To start with, the availability of foreign exchange via aid flows, 
the absence of a monetary policy (lack of foreign eschange controls and 
instruments of foreign exchange policy), the absence of a policy of 
selective imports restrictions, and finally, the biased distribution of 
foreign loans to certain sectors (projects) which has not been corrected 
by a countering bias in the distribution of investment from other sources 
by the government - all have worked together in precipitating an imports- 
surplus that made the economy dependent on it. Thus the growth of the 
goods - producing sectors has been slower and lower than that of the 
services-producing sectors.
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With regard to the effect of donors' policies, it can be argued 
that as loans were restricted to specific projects or sectors (the 
service sector), funds were distributed in a manner liable to increase 
the inelasticity of supply of the economy, initially caused by the low 
level of development. The services sector which was favoured by 
investment from donors, developed and income was also generated. The 
demand thus created was met by imports. This was solely because the 
elasticity of supply is lower in goods-producing sectors than in services- 
producing ones, and the latter do not produce commodities that can meet 
the increased demand, i.e., demand for internationally traded goods.
However, to test the argument that imports surplus has influenced 
the structure of the economy in the manner previously described, a simple 
correlation exercise could be done. Correlation co-efficients were 
found between the share of the imports-surplus in gross national income, 
on one hand (V^), and on the other, the share of services in gross domestic 
product (V2), and the share of agriculture, mining and manufacturing in 
gross domestic product, (V^). The results were as follows: (a) there 
was a positive correlation co-efficient between and (0.643);
(b) there was a negative correlation co-efficient between and (-0.694).
The negative correlation co-efficient between the share of the import- 
surplus in G.D.P. and the share of goods-producing sectors in G.D.P., i.e., 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing points to the effect of the biases 
and preferences of donors in favour of the services sector and against 
the goods-producing sectors. Incomes in the services sector increased 
and consequently demand for imports also rose. On the other hand, the goods 
producing sectors remained underdeveloped through both the lack of 
investment and the imports of foreign goods. However, the above results 
seem to strengthen our argument that the import-surplus (made possible 
through aid), has biased the structure of the Jordanian economy in favour 
of the services sector. A similar exercise was carried out by Fanny Ginor
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who found that these correlations were more pronounced for the group 
of 20 developing countries with imports-surplus in comparision with the 
rest of the 46 developing countries included in the sample.^
To shed further light on the effect of project-tied loans on the 
previously-mentioned structural change in the economy, we should consider 
the following: The project-tied aid policy has caused what is called 
"a price-reduction effect". Jordan, as a recipient country, one could 
arguejhas a demand schedule for investment projects in her economy that 
is related to the cost of those projects. If we assume that the "price 
per project" is measured in terms of the contribution which Jordan has 
to make to the project; then one would imagine that, as less of the cost 
is met by Jordan (or, in other words, as more of the cost is met by the 
donor), then the more attractive the project from the Jordanian point 
of view. The contribution on the part of donors to the total or partial 
cost of specific projects within the services sector in Jordan (through 
project-tied loans) has acted like a reduction in the price of the aided 
projects (not to forget its income effect) and thereby helped bias the 
choice in favour of the services sector, and away from the goods-producing 
sectors.
Supposing that aid were offered on a programme basis, i.e.,not tied 
to specific projects, and assuming the existence of an efficient 
administration in Jordan, one would expect foreign aid to create an income 
effect which would enable Jordan to increase her demand for projects in 
different sectors, rather than increasing demand for projects, in the
. 2 , ' ''V :‘services sector. 12*
1 Fanny Ginor, "The Impact of Capital Imports on the Structure of 
Developing Countries", Kyklos, Vol. 22, 1969, pp 104-123.
2 See Richard M. Bird, "The Influence of Foreign Aid on Local Expenditures",
Social and Economic Studies - Institute of Social and Economic Research,
Vol. 16, No. 2., June 1967, pp. 206-210; see also Mark A. Haskell,
Federal Grants-in-Aid: Their Influence on State and Local Expenditures",
Canadian Journal of Economics and Politic^-Science, Vol.XXX, Feb-Nov.
1964, pp.585-591. On the latter, R. M. BircfTrsd-based his article.
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II THE EFFECT OF DOUBLE-TIED LOANS
At this stage of our analysis, we ought to turn to the discussion 
of the effects of double-tied loans (the predominant kind of loans given 
to Jordan) on the economy. In order to do this, it is vital to give 
examples from accessible agreements that are relevant to this kind of 
tied loans. For this purpose, we have selected a representative sample 
which covers three agreements and three types of donors. Type A Agreement 
represents a donor giving project - and procurement-tied aid with no 
interest charges, e.g.: the agreement between the Government of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Danish Government for loan signed 
on June 20, 1966. Type B Agreement represents a donor outside the 
commerical category offering double-tied loan with interest charges, 
e.g.: Agreement between the U.S.A.I.D. Mission in Jordan and the Government 
of Jordan - A.I.D. Loan No. 278-H003, Jordan: Damiya Junction - North 
Shouna Road Reconstruction, September, 1965. Type C Agreement represents 
a donor offerirg double-tied finance with interest charges more or less 
at par with the cost of borrowing in the World money markets, e.g.: the 
agreement between the Royal Jordanian Airlines, Government of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, the Boeing Company and Export-Import Bank of the 
United States.*
Excerpts from the loan agreements in the sample (see Appendix III.a.)
show the following common factors: (a) emphasis is put upon tying loans
to specific projects and to procurements in the donor's home market;
(b) the imports financed by loans have to be shipped in vessels sailing
2under the donor country flag ; and (c) violations of agreement or default
on debt service payments by Jordan, would cause the suspension of loan
• ........ ■ ' ' ■ ■" , 3 ....disbursements, and make outstanding debts immediately due. *103
1
2
Excerpts from those agreements are in Appendix III.a.
Agreement Type A. op.cit. , Article VI; Agreement Type B. op.cit., Article 
V, Section 5.2. and Article 100, Section 100.1; Agreement Type C., 
op.cit., Article X-A.
Agreement#Type A. op.cit. Article XI;
103, Section 103.2; Agreement Type C. Agreement Type B. op.cit. , Article op.cit., Article Viii2 Section B.
3
192
In the following discussion, we will examine closely the effect on 
the Jordanian economy of the three common factors in tied-loan agreements.
On the question of double tying of loans to projects and procurements in 
the donors' home market, one could say the following: by offering double- 
tied loans, donors have had, to a certain degree, the upperhand in selecting 
projects that fitted their objectives. Accordingly, bearing in mind the 
low level of development, Jordan has, by accepting double-tied loans, 
substituted the donors' investment patterns (preferences) for her own.
In the first place, goods-producing sectors were allocated a small 
percentage of loans (as we indicated earlier), while some of the infra­
structural projects got the Lion's share. The following projects are a 
few examples of potential projects the Jordanian economy does have their 
raw material and human inputs, yet they failed to acquire a place on the 
donors' list of investment preferences: ceramics, glass ware, potash 
fertilizers from the Dead Sea, phosphate fertilizers, coloured stones, 
souvenirs and handicraft industries and finally, hides and skins. In 
contrast, Ground Satellite Station and other communications projects, 
purchases of Boeing jet plans, Amman Zarqa Highway and Hittiah Aqaba 
Rail Road, are examples of projects which do not produce material output 
or exportable goods which figured prominantly on the donors list of 
preferences.
Donors' ideological biases against public ownership of goods- 
producing projects, have affected Jordan's pattern of investment, in 
the sense that some of the infra-structural projects were given undue 
priority over other projects. As it is mostly western capitalist 
countries that give aid to Jordan, it is naturally in their interest to 
keep the Jordanian economy following the system of free enterprise. 
Furthermore, investment in infra-structural projects demands imports 
that can only be attained from the donors' markets. We do not, however, 
intend to imply here that those type of infrastructural projects are not
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necessary. Their importance is beyond doubt, but they should come at 
a later stage, after other projects such as agricultural projects and 
other goods-producing ones. It is beyond sound economics to purchase 
new Boeing aircraft, using $18.4 million of money borrowed on commercial 
terms, while the country could comfortably continue to utilize its 
already underutilized commerical fleet. Had the same borrowed money 
been spent on agricultural or mining projects, such as potash and phosphate 
fertilizers, the economy could have easily produced internationally traded 
goods, sufficient enough to pay for part of imported food products, fulfil 
the debt obligations, and may even have saved some foreign exchange.
It is worth noting that investment patterns in Jordan were influenced 
in the early stages of foreign aid. When the first Development Board, 
a planning body, was established in Jordan in 1950, it consisted of nine 
members, three of whom were representatives of U.N.R.W.A., that of the 
United States Operation Mission (Point Four) and a full-time British 
Secretary-General. The other six were leading government officials.
They were the Jordanian Prime Minister, the Minister of Economy, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Public Works, the Acting Director of Lands 
and Surveys and the Under-secretary of Finance. In a situation when the 
Board is headed by Cabinet Ministers, who are not technically competent 
to either draft or supervise development programmes, the foreign advisors 
would normally take the lead, spurred on by the fact that their countries 
are the suppliers of funds. As the Mission from the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.) stated: "the Board's 
authority to prepare plans for specific projects and to supervise their 
execution is limited to projects financed from funds made available to
the Board .... . but in practice the Board's activities have been limited
to supervising the expenditures of the United Kingdom Development loans.
1 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.), the
Economic Development of Jordan. (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1997), p. 426.
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Another revealing fact was: "the minutes of three years' meetings reveal
not a single important exchange of views about the economic development
of Jordan in general, or about the respective roles of the various agencies
represented on the Board".^ The conclusion of the World Bank report says
further: ".... the Board ought to be responsible for all negotiations
regarding the allocation and distribution of foreign aid funds and the
procurement and assignment of exports obtained under foreign technical
n 2assistance programs.
The practices of loan donors in tailoring projects which suit their 
investment preferences is dealt with not only by the World Bank report, 
but also by writers such as Loren Adler: "the scarcity of Jordanian 
planning experts plus the overwhelming dependence of the country on outside 
aid (predominantly from the U.S.) creates a situation in which much of 
the initiative towards planning springs from the foreign agencies, and
3indeed much of the actual work of planning appears to be done by them." 
Pakistan is a similar example. Hamza Alavi and Amir Khusro said:
"it is the I.C.A. which lays down the priorities in the plan, and the 
Planning Board reduced to little more than an adjunct of the I.C.A. 
Mission."^ 1234
1 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, op. cit. . pp.426- 
427; The first Development Board in Jordan functioned from 1952 to 1957, 
while the second has been functioning since 1957. Recently it was renamed 
"The National Planning Council".
2 Ibid., p. 429.
3 Loren Tedsell, "Planning for Technical Assistance: Iraq and Jordan,
The Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, 1961, p.401.
4 Hamza Alavi and Amir Khusro, "The Invisible Hand in Economic Policy," 
in R.I. Rhodes ed., Imperlialism and Underdevelopment: A reader,
(New Yorks Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 74.
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The mechanism of project selection in recipient countries has been, 
in certain cases, institutionalised by donors. The policy statement of 
the British Ministry of Overseas Development (O.D.M.), clearly indicates 
the legitimacy of taking the initiative in project selection in British- 
aided countries: "Until now this initiative has usually laid with the 
developing country itself. We intend, in future, to make a more deliberate 
efforts to select, in agreement with the recipient country, the field of 
activity or projects on which our aids should be concentrated."^
Practices of this Ministry and its affiliated agencies varied from one 
recipient to another. In Jordan, Britain played a big role in the selection 
of British-financed projects: "Britain, through MEDD (the Middle East 
Development Division), plays a much more significant role. The combined 
importance of the main donors is much greater than in both Turkey and 
Iran, since Jordan has very limited domestic resources (limited still 
further as a result of the Six-Day War). But while Britain is now only 
third among donors, its influence on policy is greater than its aid ranking 
would suggest. The influence stems directly from MEDD’s old-established
2position in Jordan, and the long period when British aid was paramount."
The work of British Middle East Division is summarised as follows:
"taking the three countries together (Turkey, Iran and Jordan) most of 
MEDD’s time on aid management work is thus devoted to project preparation, 
selection, supervision and evaluation, involving either capital or
,3 *
technical assistance or both. It is now rare for MEDD to be presented 
with a project request out of the blue. More often than not it will have 12
1 Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons and Command), "overseas 
Development: The Work of the New Ministry," Session 27, October 1964-8 
November, 1965. Comnd. 2736, Para. 112.
2 Andrzej Krassowski, "The Middle East Development Division," Journal
of Administration Overseas, Vol. XIV, No. 1. January, 1975, pp. 13-14.
3 Andrzej Krassowski, op. cit., p.14.
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hinted its interest in certain projects ...." British interference
in selecting projects is very common: "of the three countries, Jordan
has much the simplest procedures. Nearly all projects submitted, both
capital and technical, will have been inspired, worked out, or given
preliminary clearance, by MEDD advisors in the normal course of their
2discussions with the National Planning Council and the Ministries."
The practices of other donors, such as the United States, has been rather
similar to those of the United Kingdom, if not more dictatorial.
At this point, it seems fair to say that lack of motivation and
efficiency on the part of the economic and the administration apparatuses
in Jordan has played into the hands of the donors: it has increased their
capacity to take initiative in project selection, increased their
professional authority and finally, helped them deform Jordan’s investment
preferences in such a manner that allowed the achievement of their
objectives. Hence, donors had used their double-tied loans effectively
3in shaping the pattern of economic development in Jordan. Had there 
been an identity between Jordan's economic preferences and those of the 
donors, one would not have raised objections to such imposition of pref­
erences by the aid donors. But as they diverge, any imposition of donor’s
4preferences would do more harm than good to the economy of Jordan. 1234
1 Andrzej Krassowski, op. ¿it. , p.15.
2 Ibid., p. 16»
3 On the experience of Pakistan in this respect, see Hamza Alavi and 
Amir Khusro, op.cit., p. 73«
4 On the question of tied-aid, see H.W. Singer, "External Aid:
For Plans or Projects?," Economic Journal, Vol. 75, 1965, pp.539-545; 
See also Albert 0. Hirschman and R. Bird, op. cit., p. 12.
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One possible corollary to this imposition, is that firstly, the 
selected projects have a high import- content, and secondly, the 
choice of technique in the recipient country tends to be alien to what 
resources there are in the country.*
Though data on capital inputs and the value of outputs of industrial 
establishments are lacking in Jordan, there are other indicators that 
could be of use in telling us how far the policies of both donors and 
recipients could affect the choice of technique used in production.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that, as loans are double-tied and 
donors have had the initiative in tailoring projects and policies for 
recipient countries, imported items for those projects tend to reflect 
the resource endowment of the donor countries.
Jordan is a labour-surplus economy. The high rate of population 
growth is one of the constant problems Jordan faces, and she has not yet 
devised a comprehensive policy to tackle it. There is no comprehensive 
survey of the distribution of the labour force in Jordan. Yet, from the 
very few partial surveys on labour distribution, summarised in the 
following table, developments in labour inputs absorbed by both the service- 
and material producing sectors of the economy, can. be observed.
TABLE 5
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED LABOUR FORCE 
PERCENTAGES
POPULATION CENSUS (1961) ESTABLISHMENT SURVEY (1970)
SERVICE-PRODUCING
SECTORS
G00DS-PR0D- 
UCING SECTORS
TOTAL * 
PERCENTAGE
SERVICE-PROD­
UCING SECTORS
GOODS-PROD­
UCING 
SECTORS
TOTAL
PER­
CENTAGE
38.7 54.1 92.8 43.9 42.1 86.0
Source: Appendix III, Table 12.
The difference between these figures and 100%, is the percentage of labour 
force seeking work;
1 See J. H. Adler, "Multilateral Aid," in Ronald Robinson ed., International 
Co-operation in Aid - Impressions and papers of the Fifth Cambridge 
Conference on Development Problems, 4-17 September 1966, op. cit., 1969; 
See also Dr. Mahbub Ulhag, "Tied Credits - A quantitative Analysis," 
in J.H. Adler ed., Capital Movements and Economic Development, (New York: 
St. Martin's press, 1967) , p. 327.
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The above table shows jobs in the services sector increased . : .
from 38.7% in 1961 to 43.9% of the total in 1970, while jobs in the goods- 
producing sectors, shrank from 54.0% in 1961 to 42.1% of the total in 1970. 
In a way, the data shows the effect of tied aid. Jordan was forced to 
set up specific projects, import certain specific commodities from the 
donor country, and adopt policies, whereby Jordanian importers could easily 
acquire foreign exchange to pay for imports. Therefore, this form of 
tied aid has affected the choice of techniques, for it encouraged imports 
with high-capital-to-labour ratio, hence rendering the absorptive capacity 
of projects low, as far as labour inputs are concerned.^
So far we have examined the effect of donors’ policies on the choice 
of techniques in recipient countries. We should not, however, overlock 
the effect of the domestic policies of the Jordanian Government. The 
investment policy, whether formulated by the government departments' in 
Jordan or inspired by donors, has had, an effect on the selection of 
projects with low absorptive capacity of labour inputs. Because aid is 
project-and procurement-tied, it can be manipulated by donors who cover 
the import cost of projects, i.e., the cost of projects in foreign exchange. 
The project selection policy of Jordan, however, tends to be determined 
by the donors' aid policy which encourages projects of high-import content. 
(Intensive in foreign exchange).
In the period 1955-1972, Jordan enacted three laws on investment 
which set out incentives and means by which investors could be encouraged
1 Juliet Clifford, "The Tying of Aid and the Problem of 'Local Costs," 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 2. January, 1966, No. 2. p.156;
L. Pearson and his Commission had indicated how tied aid makes recipient 
economies adopt techniques alien to their countries resources. L. B. 
Pearson, Chairman, Partners in Development, (London: The Pall Mall Press 
Limited, 1969), p. 176.
to invest in projects of high-import-content. These laws lead to a 
high capital-to-Labour ratio. The three investment laws were: The 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment Law of 1955, the Encouragement of 
Investment Law No 1 of 1967 and the Encouragement of Investment Law 
No 53 of 1972. The latter has superseded its predecessors. The basic 
clauses related to our discussion of the effect of the domestic policies 
of the recipient country on the choice of techniques, are: (a) Import 
taxes and duties: fixed assets and their necessary parts are exempt from 
customs duties, imports fees and all other additional charges; (b) The 
acquisition of foreign exchange: all facilities were given to the 
encouraged projects for acquiring the foreign exchange needed for 
imported inputs (1955 Law). It is interesting to say that the 1967 and 
1972 Encouragement of Investment Laws made foreign exchange acquisition 
subject to the Central Bank's Foreign Exchange Regulations, which have 
not, so far, infringed investors' freedom in acquiring the needed foreign 
exchange; (c) Taxes on income and profits: net profits of encouraged 
projects are exempt from income taxes and the social services tax for a 
period of six years (Investment Law of 1967 and of 1972). The exemption 
could apply for nine years if the project is a public shareholding, or is 
located outside the municipality of Amman (Articles 16,17, and 18 of 1972 
Investment Law). After expiry of the period, a further exemption of only 
25% of net profits may be granted for 3-4 years (Investment Law of 1972);
(d) Taxes on property: land and buildings used in encouraged projects 
are exempt from all taxes on property for a period of five years (Article 
20, Investment Law of 1972). This exemption could apply for seven years 
if the project is a public shareholding or is located outside Amman 
municipality (Article 20, Investment Law of 1972).
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The preceding government regulations by themselves, 'ceteris 
paribus', encourage potential investors to invest in projects of high- 
imp ort-cnntent and low Labour-capital ratio. It was not surprising, 
however, that open unemployment rose from 7.3% in 1961 to 14% in 1970.^ 
Disguised unemployment, on the other hand, was even higher in both urban 
and rural districts.
When the actual distribution of loans to sectors of the economy was 
discussed earlier in Chapter IV, it was found that donors had a high 
preference for infrastructural projects, with inputs tied to their home 
markets. However, the biases of donors towards double-tied aid, coupled 
with Jordan's irrational economy policies, gave rise to a situation 
where the choice of projects and their techniques was alien to the 
country's resources.
In examining the adverse effects of double-tied aid, one encounters 
the problem of the high cost of tied commodities. It is not being 
repetitive, however, to recall that loans made to Jordan during our period 
of study were double-tied formally and informally. Jordan had to buy from 
the high-cost sources, not because the needs of the economy demanded it,
but because aid was project- and procurement-tied. It has been argued
. . . 3that tied goods tend to be costlier than those in free World market.
A.W. Lewis ascribes such a price limitation to the limitation of freedom 
to purchase in the open World market. When a case of double-tied aid 
arises, he argues, then the borrower's ability to negotiate prices of 
wanted supplies is diminished. Moreover, there may be cases where the 
recipient country finds itself forced to purchase from a single seller, 123
1 See Appendix III, Table 12.
2 See the effect of tied aid on the choice of technique in recipient 
countries in K.B. Griffin and J.L. Enos, "Foreign Assistance: Objectives 
and Consequences," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 18 
and supplement, 1969-1970, p.323.
3 See K.B. Griffin, "Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economic 
Development » "Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol, 32, May 1970, No.2, p.109.
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or a cartel of small sellers, and it may have to pay exorbitant prices -
much higher than if aid was not tied.^
A further effect of tied loans is a commitment, on the part of
Jordan, to buy items with ’follow up' potential, i.e., Jordan has to
make purchases of costly inputs, for instance, spare parts for machinery
and equipment bought initially from the donors.
However, if consideration is given to the effect of double-tied
loans and the rates of interest paid on them, it may well turn out that
the "real" rate of interest on some loans exceeded the commercial rate
of interest. Furthermore, high prices paid for tied commodities mean
a further need for loans and consequently higher levels of debt and
debt service payments. On the other hand, higher rates of interest on
2debts would increase the pressure on debt service payments.
What evidence is there that Jordan has paid higher prices for the 
commodities procured under tied aid, one may ask? As far as the prices 
paid for specific items of equipment or other commodities procured under 
tied aid are concerned, there is no detailed information on them. The 
reason is that the Jordanian authorities do not ask for bids before 
purchasing commodities in the international market. Had this been 
practiced in Jordan, data on international market quotations could have 
been available, thus allowing us to compare them with quotations from 
the sources of tied goods. So it is difficult to find out how much Jordan 
has been overcharged. Here, one can make use of the available data on the 12
1 See W.A. Lewis, op.cit., p. 141; see also D.T. Lakdawala, "Foreign 
Capital and Economic Development," The Indian Economic Journal. Vol XV, 
Jan. - March, 1968, No. 3, p.338; Dr. I.G. Patel, "How to Give Aid -
A Recipient's Point of View," in Ronald Robinson, op.cit., pp.88-95.
2 See United Nations, Debt Problems of Developing Countries, (New York: 
U.N., 1972), TD/118/supp.6, Rev. 1, pp.3-5.
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experiences of other underdeveloped countries. On prima facie grounds
there is no reason to believe that Jordan's experience is different from
that of other underdeveloped countries.
A quantitative analysis carried out by Dr Mahbub U1 Haq on the
economy of Pakistan, has given facts and figures that strengthen the
theoretical literature on the question of effects of double-tied aid upon
prices of tied commodities.^ By using a sample of 20 projects financed
by tied aid, he found that on average prices for the commodities procured
under tied aid were 51% higher than those on the open World market. It
would not be irrelevant to mention that, as far as Yugoslavia is concerned,
prices of goods imported through suppliers' credit were 20% higher than
2those on free World markets. Besides, UNCTAD studies estimate the direct
cost of tied aid to particular developing countries as follows: 10-15 per
3cent in Iran, 20 per cent in Tunisia and 12.4 per cent in Chile. On the
basis of other studies undertaken by UNCTAD, it was concluded that prices
of items imported under tied aid were at least 10-20 per cent higher than
4what they would have been in the absence of tying.
In view of the above mentioned cases, it seems not beyond doubt that 
there is a degree of overcharging on commodities purchased by the tied 
aid, and this applies no less to Jordan. Here, one should quote Article 100, 
Section 100.2 of Agreement Type B (The U.S. agreement) with Jordan:
"...Prices for Eligible Items which are procured in bulk within the United 
States shall not exceed the market price prevailing in the United States at 1234
1 Mahbub U1 Haq, op.cit., pp. 352-359.
2 Professor I. Kravis and Associates, Yugoslav Experience with Suppliers' 
Credit, (New York: U.N., n.d.), TD/13/C.3/78; see also other studies 
in J. Bhagwati, op.cit., pp. 266-270.
3 UNCTAD, The Costs of Aid-Tying to Recipient Countries, (New York: UNCTAD,
21 Nov. 1967), TD/7/supp. 8.
4 UNCTAD, Problems and Policies of Financing, (New York: U.N., 1968), Vol. IV, 
p.78; see also L. Pearson, op.cit., p.172.
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the time of purchase. The provisions of this Section 100.2,...shall not 
apply to architectural, engineering, management or such professional 
services as A.I.D. may specify in writing." One would not expect prices 
of those American commodities to be lower than those on the free World 
market for the following simple reasons: the knowledge of suppliers in
the United States that aid is tied to the U.S. market, is used by them to 
adopt a monopolistic position that breeds monopolistic prices and over­
charges. The fact that the U.S. specified that, "reasonable prices shall 
normally approximate the lowest competitive p r i c e . . . i n  the U.S., does 
not necessarily mean that prices of tied items would be low, or lower than 
those in World markets. U.S. suppliers could well collude together - a 
possibility which is not unlikely. The United States suppliers treat tied 
commodities in the same way as they treat commodities sold on the American 
domestic market, and, as a result, the F.o.b. prices of tied commodities 
are equal to those charged at home. It is, however, known in business 
that F.o.b. prices for sales overseas tend to be lower than the domestic 
prices. In this sense, tied aid means an extra cost which could be avoided 
had the aid not been tied. It would not be irrelevant to mention that, as 
far as Pakistan is concerned: "the U.S. prices are generally 40-50 per cent
higher than international prices in the case of most items of iron and
2steel procured from the United States." One can also add that there are
two main types of goods, those whose prices are generally quoted and 
publicly known and those whose prices are not. The second category 
normally includes capital goods. Bearing in mind the lack of experience 
in business affairs cn the part of Jordanian officials, there is always a 12
1 Type B Agreement, op.cit., Article 100, Section 100.2.
2 Mahbub U1 Haq, op.cit., p.331; see also J. Bhagwati, op.cit.. pp-252-270.
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possibility of Jordan paying higher prices as a result of the lack of 
information and expertise. One should note that the same provisions, 
i.e., Article 100, make exceptions to price limits on certain commodities 
and professional services, e.g., architectural, engineering...etc. Thus 
prices for these commodities would be higher than those prevailing on 
the U.S. market, and in most cases higher than those on the World market.
Article 100, Section 4 in Agreement Type B says that Jordan should 
buy certain commodities (those estimated to cost more than $5000) from the 
small suppliers in the U.S. market. It is often argued that tied aid is 
considered by donors to be a prop for less efficient producers.^- In fact, 
by accepting the restrictions in Article 100, above, Jordan has given 
away her freedom of selecting offers from low cost suppliers in the 
American market itself.
Another common factor in Jordan - donors loans agreements is the
restrictions of shipment of tied items on only donors’ vessels; this is
2part of the price overcharges resulting from tied aid practices. This
brings us back to U1 Haq's study. He showed that there existed instances
of higher freight charges under United States tied aid. He found that,
with regard to tied aid from the Eximbank, the difference between the
lowest quotations from the United States and the lowest quotations bn
3international bidding was 113%. 123
1 See J.H. Adler, Comments on Dr Haq's paper, op.cit., p. 354; see also 
S.J. Anjaria, Adaptation Used by Recipient Countries to Absorb Tied 
Non-Project Foreign Aid, International Monetary Fund, Exchange and Trade 
Relations Department (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., Oct. 24, 1972), p.5.
2 Agreement Type A (Danish Agreement), op.cit., Article VI; Agreement Type 
B(U.S.A.), op.cit., Article V, Section 5.2; Agreement Type C, op.cit., 
Article 100, Section 100.1.
3 Dr. Mahbub U1 Haq, op.cit., Table 3, p.331; see also J.H. Adler's 
Comments on Dr. Haq's paper, op.cit., p. 354.
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However, there have been several instances where the source of
procurement has been shifted from the high-price market of the creditor
countries to lower price free international ones. Pakistan was capable
of. doing so by threatening to seek finances for projects from other
sources.* As for Jordan, she cannot follow this example, i.e.,
bargaining with donors: firstly the sources of foreign finances at the
disposal of Jordan are limited to few bilateral sources; secondly,
Jordan's delicate political position warrants compliance with certain
donors' terms. Accordingly, diversification in sources of credit and
procurement, though economically desirable may not be politicalfyfeasible.
Thirdly, donors formally insist on limiting tied resources to specific
projects, and to precurements in their own home markets. Fourthly, the
Jordanian government does not normally invite tenders and furthermore,
donors do not encourage calling of tenders. Fifthly, the economic as
well as the administrative leadership in Jordan, have not been aware of
the economic repercussions of tied aid practices.
The third common factor in the three types of double-tied loan
agreements was the clause relating to violations of agreement and default
on debt service payments. Agreements have explicitly postulated that
any case of violation or default will render outstanding debt due 
2immediately. Such restrictions would place Jordan, or any other 
recipient in similar circumstances, in a difficult situation. As development 
is not a very smooth process, fluctuations and interruptions frequently 
occur, and, at certain points, they could be intense and beyond the capacity 12
1 Dr. Mahbub U1 Haq,op.cit., p. 332.
2 Agreement Type A, op.cit., Article XI; Agreement Type B, op.cit.. 
Article 103, Section 103.2; Agreement Type C, op.cit., Article VIII, 
Section B.
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of the economy to control. Still, Jordan would be, according to the 
loans agreements above, liable to be faced with aid suspension and an 
instant demand for meeting due obligations if any violations were to 
occur.
Moreover, conditions are sometimes more stringent. A default 
means not only the default of a particular agreement, but also default 
of any other aid agreement signed between Jordan and any of the donor’s 
agencies.^" So far, we have not come across any such instance.
1 Agreement Type B, op.cit., Article 103, Section 103-2-d.
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PART TWO:
A - FURTHER CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS:
So far we have examined conditions and strings officially 
attached to the loans given to the economy of Jordan. Yet, this 
analysis has not served its full purpose. There were other kinds 
of restrictions and ties in particular loan agreements: some 
agreements have demanded that Jordan keep records of cost of projects 
and maintenance charges incurred during operations.^- It could be 
argued that by giving tied loans with their ancillary conditions, 
donors can be certain that aid "is not dissipated in bribery and 
corruption or spent on useless projects." Conditions conducive
to the fulfilment of those objectives and any supervision of aid 
disbursements, aimed at guaranteeing proper use of funds, are not 
considered, in our view, as an unwarranted violation of Jordan's 
independence. By stating this, we assume that donors are more keen 
on proper utilization of resources than some members of the economic 
and administrative leadership in Jordan. Under this assumption, any 
sound control on the use of funds by donors is ultimately to Jordan's 
economic advantages.
On practical grounds, as far as the situation in Jordan was concerned, 
there had been cases of collaboration between certain donors and some 
members of the economic administration which resulted in the waste of 
resources. No cases of waste of economic resources have yet been 
revealed publicly, in or outside Jordan, so that the reputation and 
integrity of the parties involved may be preserved. Yet, there is 
evidence from remarks made by Jordanian officials, on the one hand, and 12
1 Agreement Type B, op.cit., Article 101, Sections 5, 6 and 7.
2 Juliet Clifford, op.cit., p.161.
officials of donor countries, on the other. Premier Samir Pasha Rifai, 
for instance, spoke of the inefficient utilization of U.S. aid. In 
Hamilton Armstrong's report on Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, submitted to 
the U.S. Senate House, it was reported that "among former Jordanian 
officials with whom I talked were the recent Premier, Samir Pasha Rifai, 
a former minister of economy, a former minister of public works, etc., 
they spoke of delays and inefficiencies which they had noted in Point 4..."  ^
As an Under Secretary in the Ministry of Economy, Mr Hamad Farhan 
complined that: "the U.S. funds were not being spent in Jordan to the best 
effect, specifically that road costs were 4 times as much per mile as they
normally were in Jordan, and that water had been provided by a contractor
2at $3.50 per cubic meter, as much as petroleum." The U.S. Mission
ascribed the causes of high cost of building roads to applying American
3techniques and methods in road-building in Jordan, The two preceding 
statements, nevertheless, refer to inefficient practices and waste of 
resources. The United States1 reply to Mr Hamad Farhan's complaint show 
two points: the technology applied to road-building in Jordan was alien 
to the economy's resources, and an element of increase in road-building 
cost was introduced in the economy, via aid practices.
To cite but a few of the examples of collaboration between donors' aid 
administration and Jordan's economic and administrative leadership regarding 
waste and leakage in foreign aid, one cannot ignore what an American aid 
official had observed during his work in administering U.S, aid in Jordan,^ 
Examples of economic waste, cited in his book, even though it is difficult 
for us to check their validity in Jordanian records, still speak for 
themselves. There were several cases of misuse of aid resources, 1234
1 Hamilton A., op.cit., p.21.
2 Sam Pope Brewer, New York Times, August 26, 1956, quoted in Hamilton F. 
Armstrong, op.cit., p.20.
3 Hamilton F. Armstrong, op.cit., p.20,
4 Thomas S. Loeber, Foreign Aid: Our Tragic Experiment, (Toronto; George 
J. MeLeod Ltd., 1961), pp. 27-73.
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particularly in the agricultural and transport projects under the U.S.
aid programme. In the agricultural sector, some aid resources were
used for the development of private agricultural holdings of Jordanian
officials.^" Besides, there was constant backing of such projects from
donors, despite noticeable misuse of funds. For instance, project code
no. 052 (well-drilling and ground-water development) was a prominent
example, where a 5 million dollar bill was disbursed with "literally
2nothing at all in the field of water resources development."
In the transport sector, where the aid donors overinvested, the
Railway case was an example of a misuse of aid with fictitious appointees
3and padded payrolls. The U.S, Mission also contributed to the waste
of resources in the transport sector when in 1959, "it supplied five
a -
locomotives for it at a cost of $100,000 /piece, in spite of the some 
20 others that could have easily been repaired and put back into service."^ 
Further examples of resource waste and leakage are overpricing of 
contracts, particularly in highway-building. However, figures on leakage 
and waste of foreign funds cannot be given a definite estimate. Still 
Loeber pointed out on one occasion that: "it seems likely to amount to many 
millions per year." On another occasion, he made a more definite
estimate: "if we calculate that two-thirds of all the money stolen from the 
Jordanian government is of American origin, this conclusion is unavoidable." ^
1 Thomas S. Loeber, Foreign Aid: Our Tragic Experiment (Toronto: George J. 
MeLeod Ltd., 1961)^ p.26.
2 Ibid., p.29 and ]4.70.
3 Ibid., p.71.
4 Ibid., p.71; see further examples of misuse of economic resources in road 
construction, ibid., pp.70-73.
5 Ibid., p.72.
6 Ibid., p.73; see the experience of Pakistan with the United States Mission 
in Hamza Alavi and Amir Khusro, op.cit,, pp.62-78; see also the experience 
of India in S. Chandrasekar, American Aid and India*s Economic Development, 
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp.177-205.
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In fact, this official estimate of resource waste adds further strength 
to our findings in Chapter II, i.e., there has been under-recording as 
well as under-stating of aid flow figures to the Jordanian economy.
However, it can be realised that tied aid to Jordan and its ancillary 
conditions did not allow a proper utilization of resources, as was 
alleged by some defenders of tied aid.
Economic leadership, was well as administration, is a vital element 
in any developing country for the harnessing of its economic resources for 
development. As a matter of priority, a good civil service is an 
important part of the infrastructure, for producing several outputs in 
the economy and determining their quality. It is no longer the function 
of civil servants to be confined to the classical assignment of keeping 
law and order. It has extended to the initiation of and participation in 
economic activities that are vital for raising the standards of the 
community. It is not, however, stnprising that economists argue that a 
good civil service is "a prerequisite of rapid growth."^
The following table constructed from information on Jordanian public 
figures, is quite interesting. It shows that of the 14 ministers who were 
at the head of the Ministry of Finance, only two had a B,A. degree in 
economics or business administration. The Ministry of National Economy 
was no better off. Four of the 17 ministers were qualified in economics. 
Bearing in mind that, in Jordan, it is ministers rather than their 
subordinates who take decisions, the situation shows the weakness of the 
economic apparatus. It seems plausible to say that one of the vital elements 
for the harnessing of development effort in Jordan is administrative reform 
that would help put to work a mechanism of selecting civil servants on the 
basis of their merit, ta;her than personal connections.
1 W.A. Lewis, op.cit., pp.97-100; see also discussion on the need for a 
competent civil service in S. Chandrasekar, op.cit., p.199.
TABLE 5.A.
ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP IN JORDAN 
1945-1972
Qualifications
Economic Institutions
Total (Numbers)
Ministry of 
Finance
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Minis try of 
National Economy
1 - University Level
a-B.A. degree in Law 3 4 5 12
b-B.A, degree in Political 
Science - - 1 1
c-B.Sc. degree in. Science 3 1 2 6
d-B.Sc. degree in Engineering - 3 — 3
e-B.Sc. in Medicine - » 1 1
f-B.A. degree in Arabic 1 - — 1
g-B.A. degree in Economics or 
Business 2 2 4 8
2 - Below University Level
a-Diploma in Agriculture 1 1
b-Law 1 2 3
c-General 4 6 1 11
Total (Numbers) 17 16 14 47
Source; Constructed from information on Jordanian personalities in N. Higazi and M. Atalah, Jordanian Personalities, 
(Amman; The National Press, n,d.) (in Arabic),
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Further conditions and ties were also inherent in W. German loan 
agreements. West German loans were tied to both projects and procure­
ments. They put stringent conditions about fund procurements which 
prohibited procurement of funds in the Soviet-administered sector of 
Berlin, or in any country of the Eastern bloc, and gave procurement in 
West Berlin priority over procurement in any other German districts.
They even put prohibitions on services produced by German-sponsored 
projects, i.e., goods purchased from Communist countries must not be 
transported on Hittiah Railway (a German-sponsored railway).^"
There were other conditions officially attached to U.S. loan 
agreements which influenced policies in Jordan by withholding or releasing 
from time to time "letters of commitment", that entitled Jordan 
to purchase on credit from the U.S. market: "to obtain disbursements, 
Borrower may from time to time request A.I.D. to issue letters of 
commitment to one or more banking institutions in the United States 
designated by Borrower and satisfactory to A.I.D., committing A.I.D. to 
reimburse such bank or banks for payments made, through letters of credit 
or otherwise, to borrower...,Banking charges incurred in connection with
letters of commitment and disbursements shall be borne by the Borrower
2and may be financed hereunder."
Besides, there were interferences in the market mechanism. Certain 
U.S. loan agreements put restrictions on the employment of personnel in 
the United States —  financed projects. Appointment of personnel must be 
approved by the A.I.D. Agreement Type B says that the employment of 
personnel shall be "subject to all applicable United States Legislation and 12
1 National Planning Council, "German Aid and Loans as on Dec. 31, 1968." 
unpublished report - in Arabic.
2 Type B Agreement, op.cit., Article IV, Section 4.1.
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such requirements, including security clearances and limitations on the 
employment of third country nationals, as A.I.D. may from time to time 
promulgate or specify."^ This kind of donors' interferences in the 
Labour market tended to affect the allocation of human capital in the 
economy. It could be argued that they retarded best utilization of 
available human resources. Further, by the imposition of U.S. Employment 
Legislation, Jordan's judicial sovereignty was interfered with.
Restrictions on Jordan's freedom of purchase and manoeuvre were laid 
down in commercial loan agreements (Type C). For example, insurance 
proceeds used for repurchases, when an aid-financed item is damaged, should 
cover comparable types of goods from the donor's market. These ties tend 
to limit Jordan's chances to free herself, when the occasion arises, from 
other conditions laid down in such agreements, and,therefore, renders 
Jordan's chances of correcting unfavourable clauses in agreements, a remote 
possibility. Insurance proceeds, after settlement with the creditors in 
full, shall go, "to purchases by the borrower of a new aircraft of
2comparable type manufactured and purchased in the United States..."
Jordan accepted ties which contributed to increasing the actual rate
of interest and, therefore, reducing the real value of the loans. For
example, Jordan is obliged to pay banking charges incurred by the donor in
connection with letters of commitment, as well as commission paid to brokers,
3sales agents of suppliers and allowances to purchasing agents or importers.
Similarly, Type C Agreements obliged Jordan to pay the lenders any charges,
taxes, penalties, out-of-pocket expenses, legal fees or payments incurred
by the lender in connection with the execution, issuance, delivery or
4registration of the agreement. 1234
1 Type B Agreement, op.cit., Article 100, Section 100.7.
2 Type C Agreement, op.cit., Article V, A.5.
3 Ibid., Article IV, Section 4.1 and Article 102, Section 102.2.
4 Ibid., Article V, B.9 and Article X, C and E.
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Also there are some donors, particularly the United States, who 
demand that aid-financed items are marked according to their origin as well 
as advertised through the Jordanian media.^ This restriction, in fact, 
reflects political bias as well as "a taste of nationalism" on the part 
of the donor.
Finally, the frequent emphasis of donors on reserving the full right
of issuing "binding instructions", without regard to the wishes of the
Jordanian government reflects an unequal relationship between donors 
2and recipient. Bearing in mind the small number of the elite
governing Jordan and the relative centralization of command, "binding
instructions" by the donors are bound to make the job of this ruling class
difficult, particularly if such "binding instructions" were conveyed by
3donor’s officials of a lower rank. 123
1 Type B Agreement, op.cit., Article 101, Section 101.3 (on disseminating 
information and identification of the location of any projects financed 
by A.I.D.); see also Type C Agreement, op.cit., Article V, A5 (on 
prohibiting the use of financed aircraft in Communist countries or any 
country defined in Section 620 -If, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
as amended); see Hamza Alavi and Amir Khusro, op.cit., (on the experience 
of Pakistan).
2 Type B Agreement, op.cit., Article 100, Section 100-1, 100-2 and 100-7; 
and Article 102, Section 102.2.
3 See Albert 0. Hirschman and Richard Bird, op.cit., p.13 (discussion of 
similar conditions where a "typical colonial situation" develops between 
donor and recipient as a result of such aid relationship.
B - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
Foreign aid is known to have many dimensions, and the aggregate 
volume tells little about the effect of aid until we know its composition 
and terms. Most of aid received by Jordan was bilateral, and no doubt 
strings are attached to it, which affected both economic and political 
policies of the country.
(i) Economic strings that were attached to the loans offered to Jordan
over the period of our study were mainly of two kinds, i.e., tied to
projects and tied to projects and precurement in the donors' home
markets. Strictly speaking, most loans given to Jordan were double-tied
f gWloans with the exception of/ones given by Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia, the 
World Bank and the United Nations. The latter wereproject-tied loans.
(ii) In trying to find out the effect of restrictions on the utilization 
of loans on the economy, we encountered a difficulty. This difficulty 
concerned the assessment of the effect of the "informal restrictions".
It is owing to the fact that it is difficult to acquire knowledge about 
them, for they were not written in the agreements. Yet, we managed to 
cite an instance of "informal restrictions". The case in point was the 
restriction imposed by the United States. In offering budgetary support 
to Jordan, the United States informally expressed her desire that 
utilization of budgetary support should be for precurement in the U.S. 
market. The Jordanian government compiled a list of commodties which 
could be imported only from the U.S. market. This type of restriction 
would have meant a decrease in the real value of aid particularly £f 
prices of the identifiable items (tied commodities) were higher in the 
U.S. market than in the free world market.
(iii) Turning to the effect of the "formal restrictions" attached to 
the loans received by Jordan, we examined the effect of both project- 
tied loans and the effect of double-tied ones (tied to projects and to 
procurement). Both types of tied loans were given to Jordan, but the 
second type was predominant.
A - The principal effect of project-tied loans was on the allocation 
of resources. The project-tied aid affected the structural changes that 
took place within the Jordanian economy, i.e., the service-producing 
sectors in the economy developed at the expense of the goods-producing 
ones. There appeared to have been two factors which contributed to the 
structural development of the economy. "Structural factors", i.e., 
factors that are inherent in the economy of Jordan itself. A relatively 
low resource endowment and a low technical and administrative know-how, 
created rigidity on the supply side of the goods-producing sectors in 
contrast to that of the services' sectors. On the other hand,
"precipitating factors" are those related to the policies followed by 
the Jordanian government and the donors.
With regard to the effect of donors' policies, it was found that as 
loans were restricted to specific sectors or projects (the services 
sectors), funds were distributed in a manner liable to increase the 
inelasticity of supply of the economy, initially caused by the low level 
of development. Income in the services sectors was generated and demand 
grew for outputs of both the services sectors and the goods-producing ones. 
The demand thus created was not met by domestically-produced commodities 
but by imports. This was due to the fact that the elasticity of supply 
is lower in goods-producing sectors than in services-producing ones, and 
the latter sectors do not produce commodities that can meet the increased
demand.
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A positive correlation co-efficient was found between the share 
of the imports surplus in G.N.P. and the share of the services in gross 
domestic products (+ 0.64), and a negative correlation co-efficient 
between imports surplus and the share of agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing in G.D.P. (-0.69). The negative correlation co-efficient 
points to the effect of the biased investment preferences of donors.
Income derived from the favoured sectors increased and consequently, 
demand for imports rose, while the goods-producing sectors were 
discouraged through both the lack of investment and the inflow of highly 
competitive imports.
To shed fuilher light on the effect of project-tied loans on the 
previously-mentioned structural change in the economy, we observed the 
following: project-tied loans have caused "a price reduction effect", 
as well as an "income effect". Donors’ tied disbursements, which 
covered a large part of the costs of projects in the services sectors, 
have reduced the government's share of the cost (price) in those 
projects, and enabled it to develop more of them. Accordingly, the 
projects affected by price reduction, i.e., services projects, were 
developed at the expense of high-price goods-producing sectors.
B - In order to find out the effect of double-tied loans (the predominant 
kind of tied loans given to Jordan) on the Jordanian economy, it was 
vital to give examples from accessible loan agreements. For this purpose, 
we selected a representative sample of loans agreements. Excerpts from 
the agreements showed three common factors: (i) emphasis was put on tying 
loans to specific projects and to procurement in the donors’ markets.
(ii) imports financed by loans had to be shipped in vessels sailing under 
the donor country flag, (iii) Violations of agreements or default on debt 
by Jordan, would cause the suspension of loan disbursement, and make 
outstanding debt immediately due.
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On the question of double-tying loans, we observed the following: 
Double-tied loans, coupled with the incompetence of the economic 
apparatus in Jordan, has given donors the upper hand in selecting 
projects that fitted their objectives. Accordingly, bearing in mind 
the low level of development, Jordan has by accepting double-tied loans 
substituted the donors’ investment pattern (preferences) for her own.
One effect of the imposition of the donors' investment preferences 
on Jordan was that the selected projects were of high import-content. 
Besides, the policies of donors and those of the leadership in Jordan led 
to the adoption of techniques which tended to be capital-intensive and 
they did not take into consideration Jordan's resources endowment. The 
available data on the distribution of employed labour force show a 
reduction in job opportunities in the goods-producing sectors and an 
increase in open unemployment from 7.3% in 1961 to 14.0% in 1970. 
Furthermore, investment policies were adopted which granted Jordanian 
importers of capital goods the free access to foreign exchange without 
taking into consideration the compatibility of these imports to the 
economy's resources.
In examining the effects of double-tied loans, we encountered the 
problem of the high cost of tied commodities. The lack of detailed data 
on the prices paid for aid-sponsored commodities, and the absence of 
international tenders precludes a quantitative estimate of the extent to 
which Jordan has been overcharged. We drew a parallel between the 
experience of other developing countries and Jordan's, for the terms of 
tied-aid were similar. From the cases studied, it was found that there 
was a degree of overcharging on commodities purchased on tied aid and this 
applied no less to Jordan. Certain donors, such as the U.S.A., have made 
Jordan, through double-tied loans, give away the freedom of selecting 
suppliers in the U.S. market. This confers a monopolistic advantage on
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the U.S. firms. Furthermore, donors such as the U.S., have indulged 
in tied-aid practices for securing demand for their less efficient 
industries. Double-tied aid thus worked, partly, as a vehicle to 
stimulate the demand for their products. Finally, restriction of 
shipment of tied commodities on only donors’ vessels was another factor 
that reduced the real value of the tied aid.
(iv) Further conditions and effects: There were additional strings
and conditions concerning execution and operation of projects financed 
by aid. There would not be an objection to these restrictions as 
unwarranted violations of Jordan’s independence, if they were properly 
used for securing efficiency in aid utilization. What actually 
happened in Jordan was collaboration between certain donors and some 
members of the administration and the economic leadership in Jordan, 
which caused a waste of resources and misutilization of funds.
Certain donors, particularly West Germany and the U.S., had laid 
down in their loan agreements political strings which curtailed Jordan's 
freedom of trade and co-operation with the Eastern bloc countries.
Loan agreements involved certain strings - accepted by Jordan - that 
tended to increase the actual rate of interest and consequently reduce 
the real value of aid. Jordan was burdened with the obligations to 
reimburse to donors charges, taxes, penalties, out-of-pocket expenses, 
legal fees, any other fees or expenses related to the execution, issuance, 
delivery or registration of loan agreements, and banking charges and 
commissions to agents.
There were interferences in the market mechanism. Appointment of 
personnel in the United States-financed projects must be approved by the 
U.S. A.I.D. Mission. This interference in the Labour market tended to 
retard the best utilization of human resources. Furthermore, there was 
an imposition of U.S. employment legislation on Jordan. This restriction 
limited the Jordanian sovereignty.
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CHAPTER VI
PART ONE: JORDANIAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
In the previous chapters, particularly Chapter III, we dealt 
with, among other things, the objectives behind aid to Jordan. It was 
argued that, as Jordan did not represent an economic stake for donors, 
aid had been significantly determined by the geopolitical features of 
Jordan.^" It could be said that the main purpose of aid was not to 
further the economic development of the country. Judging from the 
complex political factors and motives behind aid to Jordan, one can say 
that the rate of growth attained throughout the period under study was 
rather a by-product than a direct effect of foreign aid.
In this chapter, we will try to establish the possible effects of 
aid on the rate of growth, domestic savings, investment and consumption. 
But prior to such investigation, the performance of these variables will 
be examined separately in the first part of this chapter. Thereafter, we 
will try to establish the possible impact of foreign aid on these 
variables.
A “ NATIONAL INCOME
Growth in national income is considered as a significant, though 
not conclusive criterion of economic development. The development of an 
economy entails transformations and shifts in its structure. These 
transformations are affected both by internal and external factors, or 
both, and yet, their positive impacts on the economy depend largely on 
the character of these changes. An economy can be transformed by an 
increase in the size of government services and other service sectors 
(i.e., a swelling in the administration and security sectors) at the
1 See Chapter, I and Chapter III.
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expense of goods-producing ones. Such transformations, one could argue, 
do not necessarily imply an increase in the ability of the domestic 
economy to generate a steady growth in income overtime. During the 
period under consideration, Jordan's Gross National Product increased 
unevenly. Gross Domestic Product, for example, increased by an average 
rate of 9% over 1954-1959, whereas Gross National Income recorded, on 
average, a 9.2% increase per year during the 1960's and 9.7% over 
1954-1972. However, this rate of growth varied from year to year owing 
to fluctuations in agricultural output.
TABLE 6
RATES OF GROWTH IN GROSS NATIONAL INCOME 
1954 - 1972
ANNUAL AND AVERAGE PERCENTAGES
Period Rate of Growth % Period Rate of Growth %
1954 __ 1964 17.0
1955 5.0 1965 12.4
1956 36.6 1966 3.0
1957 2.3 1967 11.0
1958 10.0 1968 -4.2
1959 28.5 1969 18.5
1960 7.0 1970 -5.0
1961 20.3 1971 6.3
1962 3.0 1972 7.0
1963 5.2
Average %
L954-1959 13.7
Average %
1960-69 9.3
Average %
1970-72 2.77
Average %
1954-1972 9.7
Source: (i) For data prior to 1960, see: Porter, R.S. Economic Trends in
Jordan, 1954-1959, (Beirut: Middle East Development Division, 
July 1961).
(ii) For data pertaining to the period 1960-1972, see: Jordan
Department of Statistics, The National Accounts, 1967-1972, 
(Amman: Department of Statistics Press, May 1973).
2 2 2
With a 3% average increase in population, income percapita was thus 
increased by 6.2%. It increased from a level of J.D. 37.7 in 1954 to 
J.D. 102.2 in 1972. If 1954 is taken as a base year, G.N.P. per capita 
was 160.2 and 271.0 in 1960 and 1972 respectively.
If one wants to look into the composition of the economy's 
aggregate value added during the period understudy, one ought to refer to 
the sectoral breakdown of Gross National Income, as it appears in the 
National Income Accounts. However, the increase in aggregate value added 
from a level of J.D.m. 106.0 in 1960 to J.D. 252.0 m. in 1972 was the 
outcome of the following sectoral distribution, as shown in Table 6.A. 
(see p.223)•
A basic structural change was the increasing share of the Service- 
Producing Sectors in the aggregate value added at the expense of the 
material-producing ones.* On the otherhand,the contribution of the 
agricultural sector declined from an average of 21.5% during 1954-59 to 
17.3% over 1970-1972. Bearing in mind the high degree of influence of 
aid-financed government expenditures on the economy, one could argue that 
the aid played a major role in biasing the structure towards the service 
sector. Such structural changes may not imply an increase in the ability 
of the domestic economy to generate a steady growth in income overtime.
B - GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION,:
Maintaining the increase in the levels and rates of growth of both 
gross income and percapita income in the face of high increases in 
population warrants a high rate of investment. Indeed, Jordan's rate of 
capital formation was substantial, for it averaged 16.5% and 17.1% of
1 See a distinquished analysis of this similar economic phenomenon in 
Egypt in Mabro, Robert. The Egyptian Economy, 1952-1972, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 164-192.
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SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF GROSS INCOME 
1954 r 1972
TABLE 6.A .
Sectors Average Percentage Contribution to the Economy's Aggregate Value Added
1954-1959 1960-1969 1970-1972 1960-1972 1954-1972
Agriculture and Forestry 21.5 20.0 17.3 19.4 13.2
Mining and Manufacturing :k11*0 9.7 10.5 9.9 6.8
Construction 3.4 5.2 4.5 5.0 3.4
Transport 12.1 ' 9.8 8.1 9.4 6.4
Trade **20.1 20.8 19.3 20.4 14.0
Electricity and Water 
Supply - 1.0 1.4 1.1 0.7
Banking - 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.1
Ownership of Dwellings 5.1 * 7.4 7.0 7.3 5.0
Public Administration 21.0 16.0 19.2 16.7 11.4
Other Services 6.4 8.8 10.9 9.3 6.4
Average Percentage Contrib­
ution to G.D.P. of: «
a - Service Producing 
Sectors 64.5 64.2 66.5 64.7 64.6
b - Material Producing 
Sectors 35.5 35.8 33.5 35.3 35.4
100.0 i 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix I: 1, 15 and 16. 
*
Including Electricity and Water Supply. *
**Including Trade and Banking Sector*
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G.N.P. over 1960-69 and 1960-1972 respectively.^- It is also worth 
noting, at this point, that construction absorbed, on average, more 
than half of gross investment. (It averaged 63.7% during the 1960's 
and 60.7% over 1960-1972). The largest proportion of investment
was utilized in the construction of roads, port faciltiies 
and non-residential buildings. (See Table 6.B. p.225).
As can be seen from data on percapita income and on domestic 
savings presented in Table 6.C. this high level of capital formation could 
not have possibly been sustained without the substantial inflow of foreign 
aid.
TABLE 6.C.
PERCAPITA G.N.P. AND AVERAGE RATIOS OF GROSS INVESTMENT 
AND DOMESTIC SAVINGS TO GROSS INCOME. 1954 - 1972
'
AVERAGE
PERIODS
PERCENTAGESDURING THE FOLLOWING
•
•
1954-59 1960-69 1970-72 1960-72 1954-72
Ratio of the following to G.N.P:
1 - Gross Domestic Capital Formatior 13.3 16.5 18.9 17.1 15.9
2 - domestic Savings
a - Definition No, 1 -18.0 -4.7 -6.2 -5.0 -9.1**b - Definition No. 2 -8.3 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4 -4.9
Percapita G.N.P. (In J. Dinars) 45.6 85.2 99.3 88.5 74.9
Source: Table No. 1. Appendix IV.
* . . **Domestic Savings = Net investment - (m-X); Domestic Savings *
Total Current Income - Total Current Expenditures. (Total Current 
Income is net of receipts from abroad).
1 See Appendix IV, Table 1; and Table 6.C. below.
TABLE 6.B
( V<v
THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONSTRUCTION TO GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION- 
ANNUAL AND AVERAGE PERCENTAGES
1959 - 1972
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Average
1960-69 1970 1971 1972
Average
1970-72
Non-Residential Buildings 54.6 43 32.8 36.6 45.2 35.7 33.8 28.8 19.1 25.9 18.2 37.3 27.4 17.4 31.0 25.3
Public Construction and 
Works. 34.9 22.8 25.1 34.5 31.6 19.5 32.3 41.2 52.4 36.2 24.7 15.5 20.2 19.6 34.0 24.6
Total 89.5 65.8 57.9 71.1 76.8 55.2 66.1 68.0 71.5 62.1 42.9 52.8 47.6 37.0 65.0 49.9
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts, 1967-1972, (Amman: Department of 
Statistics Press, May 1973).
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This is further substantiated by Table 6.D. It shows the contribution 
of foreign aid to gross domestic investment and the contribution of aid to the 
government to the public fixed capital formation.
As can be gathered from the table, foreign aid, on average, was twice 
the level of investment over the period 1954-1972. Besides, public receipts 
of aid also exceeded public investment. So the inflow of foreign aid 
permitted a rate of investment in excess of the rate of domestic savings.^"
TABLE 6.D.
THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG AGGREGATE FOREIGN AID. GOVERNMENT 
RECEIPTS OF FOREIGN AID AND CAPITAL FORMATION.
1954 - 1972
AVERAGE PERCENTAGES
%Aln Gross Aggregate Govt. Receipts of Foreign Aid
Period Domestic Capital Foreign Aid As % of
Formation As % of Public Fixed Capital Gross Fixed
(G.D.C.F.) G*D.C.F* Formation Capital
Formation
1954 - 1959 23.0 225.0 372.3 139.5
1960 - 1969 20.0 139.3 274.0 106.4
1970 - 1972 16.3 162.3 361.3 135.3
1960 - 1972 9.0 144.6 294.0 113.1
1954 - 1972 14.3 170.0 318.7 121,4
Source: Appendix IV, Table 2.
C - Domestic Savings:
It is commonly acknowledged that data on domestic savings in 
underdeveloped countries is highly unreliable. There is as yet very little 
knowledge about the savings behaviour in those countries. Jordan is no 
exception to this rule.
1 It will be shown later in this chapter that whereas investment 
recorded high rates of increase, domestic savings were negative
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As it was stated earlier, the Jordanian national accounts did not 
provide the time series of domestic savings which could be used for our 
study. Therefore, we were compelled to build our own series from available 
statistics. To do so, we have adopted two approaches which would allow 
us to arrive at a time series for domestic savings. Firstly, we deducted 
from net investment those figures purporting to be the balance on current 
account. (Net investment - (X-M).^ Secondly, as national accounts in 
Jordan allowed for a division of current receipts and expenditures of both 
public and private sectors, it is possible to arrive at domestic savings 
by using the following formula: Domestic savings equal to total current 
receipts of private and public sectors (receipts from abroad are deducted 
from total receipts) minus total current expenditures of private and public 
sectors. Through these two approaches, we arrive at the following figures 
for domestic savings. (See Table 6.E.and.Graph 1, pp. 228-229).
The approaches show that the Jordanian economy was "dissaving" during 
most of the period, as shown in the table. The second approach has enabled 
us to point out the dominant role which the public sector played in making 
the economy dissave.^ 12
1 This approach is similar to those adopted by : (a) Gunnar Myidal, Asian 
Drama - An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, (London : Allen Lane Penguin
Press 1968), Vol. 1, pp. 529-535; (b) Ansur Rahman, "The Welfare Economics of 
Foreign Aid," Pakistan Development Review, Summer 1967; and "Foreign 
Capital and Domestic Savings: A Test of Haavelmo’s Hypothesis with Cross- 
Country Data, "The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.l., 1968, 
pp. 137 - 138; (c) K. B. Griffin and J, L. Enos," Foreign Assistance: 
Objectives and Consequences," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
Vol. 18 and Supplements, 1969-1970, pp. 313-327.
2 An. analysis and interpretations of the possible causes of such negative 
savings are given in the second part of this chapter. There we also 
analyse the connection between domestic savings and foreign aid.
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DOMESTIC SAVINGS, 1954 - 1972 
(IN J. D. MILLIONS)
TABLE 6.E.
Approach 1 Approach 2
Period Domestic Savings Private Savings Public Savings Total 
D. Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4)-<2)+(3)
1954 -7.2 3.80 -6.60 -2.80
1955 -12.7 -0.90 -6.70 -7.60
1956 -3.3 12.10 -8.30 3.80
1957 -14.3 5.80 -10.30 -4.50
1958 -16.9 3.70 -15.20 -11.50
1959 -21.2 -1.66 -11.82 -13.48
1960 -12.4 2.01 -12,46 -10.45
1961 -7.3 8.79 -12.61 — 3.82
1962 -7.5 7.45 - -8.08 -0.63
1963 -16.9 1.17 -13.47 -12.30
1964 -0.1 15.51 -10.72 4.79
1965 -0.2 15.27 -9.77 5.50
1966 -8.5 3.59 -6.79 -3.20
1967 -3.2 21.40 -20.61 0.79
1968 -8.4 18.05 -32.94 -14.89
1969 -1.3 42.77 -40.83 1.94
1970 -8.1 32.87 -37.78 -4.91
1971 -10.4 22.90 -32,18 -9.28
1972 -26.7 29.86 -39.85 -9.99
Average
1954-1972 -9.82 12.87 -17.74 -4.87
Source: Appendix IV, Table 3
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TABLE 6.F
DOMESTIC SAVINGS AS RATIOS TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND TO GROSS DOMESTIC 
CAPITAL FORMATION - AVERAGE PERCENTAGES.
1954 - 1972
Periods
Domestic Savings - 
(Net Investment -
Approach 1 
(X - M)
Domestic Savings - Approach 2 
(Current Income - Current Expenditures)
Domestic Savings As % of Domestic Savings as % 
Of G.D.P.
Domestic Savings as % 
of G.D.C.F._______________
G.D.P. G.D.C.F. Private
Savings
Public
Savings
Total
Savings
Private
Savings
Public
Savings
Total
Savings
Average % 1954-1959 -18.7 -147.1 5.9 -14.6 -8.7 38.7 -112.1 -73.7
Average % 1960-1969 -5.0 -30.1 7.8 -10.4 -2.6 42.8 -58.0 -15.2
Average % 1970-1972 -6.6 -33.9 12.8 -16.3 -3.5 65.2 -83.1 -17.9
Average % 1960-1972 -5.4 -31.0 9.0 -11.8 -2.8 48.0 -63.8 -15.8
Average % 1954-1972 -9.6 -67.6 8.01 -12.7 -4.7 45.1 -79.0 -33.9
Source: Appendix IV, Table 4.
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The persistant disequilibrium in the government budget was, no 
doubt, reflected in the high figures of government dissavings. Actually, 
government dissaving averaged according to approach 11-12.7% and -79.0% 
of G.D.P. and G.D.CJ?. respectively during 1954-1972. Private savings, 
on the other hand, averaged 8.0% and 45.0% during the same period. However, 
the most notable feature (See Table 6.F. p. 229), was that foreign aid 
enabled Jordan to sustain a high rate of investment over the period and that 
the rate of domestic savings did not follow this upward trend in the rate 
of investment. In fact, dissaving was a permenant feature of the period, 
and neither serious fiscal nor monetary corrective measures were taken to 
rectify such bleak performance, which was not even made known to the 
country.
D - AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION:
As can be guessed from the figures of savings,the aggregate 
consumption increased at a rapid rate over the period. As shown-in
the following table, aggregate consumption in 1972 was more than 
four times that of the base year (1954*100), The same also holds
for the components of consumption. However, the public consumption in 
1972 was more than five times the 1954 level. Percapita consumption
was more than twice the 1954 level. The following table,as well as,Graph 
No. 2. shows the behaviour of consumption over the period 1954 - 1972.
(Table 6.G. see p. 23]).
The notable point, as far as consumption is concerned, is that it 
remained at a high level and it in most years exceeded both G.N.P. and 
G.D.P. Table 6.H. shows the behaviour of consumption.
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TABLE 6.G.
INDICES OF CONSUMPTION AND COMPONENTS
1954-1972
1954 = 100
Periods Aggregate Private Public Percapita
Consumption Consumption Consumption Consumption,
1954 100 100 100 100
1955 104 103 107 101
1956 118 117 123 1111957 135 132 144 1231958 157 148 188 138
1959 191 192 186 162
1960 195 195 197 158
1961 221 226 205 176
1962 221 226 212 173
1963 253 257 241 1891964 263 272 236 1891965 296 304 269 2041966 317 330 274 210
1967 347 349 339 233
1968 359 338 428 2341969 392 362 490 242
1970 384 364 452 228
1971 416 403 459 2411972 443 423 510 247
Source: Appendix IV, Table 5
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TABLE 6.H.
RATIOS OF AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES 
TO GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT t 1954 - 1972
AVERAGE PERCENTAGES
PERIODS
AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION AS % OF:
G.N.P. G.D.P
1954-1959 112.0 118.8
1960-1969 102.2 109.4
1970-1972 103.2 109.2
1960-1972 102.4 109.4
1954-1972 105.4 112.3
Source: Appendix IV, Table 6.
The average ratios of aggregate consumption demand to both G.N.P. 
and G.D.P. were 112.0% and 118.8% over the period 1954-1959, respectively. 
They were a little lower in the periods subsequent to the 1950's.
Perhaps it ought to be emphasised at this point that although the level of 
aggregate consumption is significant by itself, its composition is of no 
less importance. The available data in Table 6.1. show the main components 
of aggregate consumption as well as their respective importance in the 
total. The six main components of private consumption included in the 
table constituted on average 86.8% of total private consumption. The six 
components are: Food, transport, clothing and footwear, housing, furniture 
and domestic equipment and expenditures of Jordanians abroad. As private 
consumption was on average 76.3% of aggregate consumption during 1959-1972, 
its components are relevant to the/cliscussion of the consumption performance 
and also to the relationship between consumption and foreign aid.^
1 (a) For a detailed view of the share of components of consumption
expenditures in the total consumption, see Appendix IV, Table 5.
(bl The composition of government expenditures was discussed earlier in 
Chap ter a II. Therefore, we are inclined not to repeat it at this point of our study.
TABLE 6.1
MAIN COMPONENTS OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
1959 - 1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Private
Consump­
tion
(1)
Main Components of Private Consumption Ratios of Main Components of Private
C o n s u m p t i o n  to T o t a l  Private C o n s umption
Private 'Food 
Consump-Food
(2)
Trans­
port
(3)
Clothing,
Textile
and
Footwear
(4)
Housing
(5)
Furniture 
and Domest­
ic Equipment
(6)
Expend-
itures
of
Jordan­
ians
Abroad
(7)
Column
* | i .
Column
3 - 1o
Column
* § i
Column
S S 1
Column
« 1 »
Column tion to Total 
Consump­
tion
Expendit­
ures
1959 87.1 49.4 i 8.9 8.9 6.6 3.8 1.9 56.7 10.2 10.2 7.6 4.4 2.2 43.9
1960 88.5 48.3 9.3 8.6 7.5 3.6 2.2 54.6 10.5 9.7 8.5 4.1 2.5 41.8
1961 102.8 59.7 9.8 9.8 8.4 3.6 2.4 58.1 9.5 9.5 8.2 3.5 2.4 45.6
1962 102.4 56.0 10.7 ‘9.6 9.0 4.3 3.4 54.7 10.4 9.1 8.8 4.2 3.3 42.6
1963 116.8 60.6 12.0 11.5 9.9 6.0 3.2 51.9 10.3 9.8 8.4 5.1 2.7 40.4
1964 123.5 62.9 14.9 11.7 9.9 6.0 3.6 50.9 12.1 9.5 8.0 4.8 2.9 40.3
1965 138.0 71.4 12.5 14.9 10.7 6.9 4.3 51.7 9.0 10.9 7.7 5.0 3.1 40.8
1966 149.6 71.8 13.2 15.6 10.8 8.3 5.2 48.0 8.8 10.4 7.2 5.5 3.5 38.3
1967 158.6 88.0 16.5 12.0 11.3 5.0 5.3 55.5 10.4 7.6 7.1 3.1 3.3 42.9
1968 153.4 73.4 14.6 12.4 11.6 5.4 7.0 47.8 9.5 8.1 7.6 3.5 4.6 34.6
1969 164.5 80.4 16.0 15.6 12.1 7.9 8.0 48.9 9.6 9.5 7.4 4.8 4.9 34.7
1970 165.1 83.5 15.6 13.0 12.8 9.5 9.4 50.6 9.4 7.9 7.8 5.8 5.7 36.8
1971 183.0 88.0 16.0 13.9 13.7 9.0 7.7 48.1 8.7 7.6 7.5 4.9 4.2 35.8
1972 192.0 93.0 16.5 14.5 14.2 10.0 8.5 48.4 8.6 7.5 7.4 5.2 4.4 35.5
Average
1959-72 137.5 70.4 13.3 12.3 10.6 6.4 5.2 51.9 9.8 9.1 7.8 4.6 3.6 39.6
Source: Appendix IV, Table 7.
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As can be gathered from Table 6.1 and from Graph No. 3, expenditure 
on food constituted by far the largest part of both total private 
consumption and aggregate consumption expenditures, (they averaged 51.9% 
and 39.6% respectively over 1954-1972). The qualitative pattern of 
consumption behaviour of the average family in Jordan tends to be in line 
with Engel’s Law. Poor families spend their income largely on the 
necessities of life, but as income increases, they move from the basic 
necessities to dearer and better food. In percentage terms, the relative 
importance of food expenditures declines as income increases. What actually 
happened in Jordan was that food imports represented on average approximat­
ely 35.2% and 27.3% of both imports of consumer goods and total imports 
respectively over 1954-1972.^ In a way, this further strengthens our 
previous findings with respect to the sectoral distribution of foreign 
aid and its failure to provide the agricultural sector with a fair proportion 
of total available foreign resources. As a result, the agricultural sector rem­
a i n e d  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  and thus incapable of satisfying the increasing demand 
for food,
It can also be seen from Table 7 ,  Appendix i y  that when income increased
in Jordan, expenditures on items of high import - content, not to mention
their relative luxuriousness, approximately doubled over the observed
period. Notable amongst those were the expenditures on private cars,
spare-parts and consequently a "followup”demand for repairs, fuel and other
2imported auxiliaries. 12
1 See Appendix IV, Table 14.
2 See the "Transport" item in Table 7, Appendix IV; see it also in Graph No. 3.
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Private expenditures on furniture and household equipment also 
reflect an expanding demand for imported consumer durables such as radio 
and television sets of a wide variety, refrigerators, cooling systems, 
metal and plastic household equipments, furniture and varieties of 
electrical appliances. On the other hand, private expenditures on 
clothing, textile and footwear represented 9.1% of total private 
consumption. Needless to say, the large volume of ready-made imported 
clothes and luxury fabrics implied a decrease in the protection accorded 
to infant industries. Besides, these imports drained the foreign 
exchange obtained from exports of goods and services.
Finally, housing and expenses of Jordanians abroad represent the 
two other 'main items of private expenditures.
With regard to the composition of public consumption discussed in 
earlier chapters, defence and the maintenance of internal security 
absorbed by far the largest proportion of government expenditures over 
the period 1950-1972 and the preceeding periods. It absorbed more than 
half of total public expenditure.*
We do not want to give the impression, however, that rising consump­
tion percapita in Jordan and in low percapita income countries is an 
objectionable target. It was only when we had examined the composition 
and rate of increase of consumption, the negative domestic savings and 
the high ratio of foreign savings in domestic capital formation, that the 
real objection was made. In other words, the desirability of enhancing 
the rate and level of consumption in Jordan, or in any less-developed 
country, is beyond objection, provided that increases in inccme are
rationally devided between consumption and savings, on one hand, and
2between different income groups, on the other. 12
1 See Chapter II, Table 2.H as well as the section related to sectoral 
distribution of government expenditures.
2 Unfortunately, data or comprehensive studies on the distribution of 
income or wealth in Jordan are not available nor any other data on 
the actual consumption behaviour of different income groups in the 
economy.
In the later part of this chapter, we examine the possible impact 
of foreign aid on growth, investment, domestic savings and consumption.
PART TWO: THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID FLOW ON SELECTIVE MACRO- 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
A - A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION:
The pioneer literature on the impact of foreign aid on the 
economic growth and savings of recipient countries,was-in favour 
of aid. It was maintained that aid contributes to the development 
of recipient economies. Relying on the Harrod-Domar model, 
economists tended to the view that the rate of growth in recipient 
countries is enhanced by the aid they acquire. If the rate of growth 
of a certain country is 'r*, the proportion of income saved and 
invested is 'S', the capital output ratio is *C' and the aid 
received is 'f1, then the rate of growth ’r’ is given by the 
following equation: r = (S + f)/C. Hence, foreign aid supplements
domestic savings and fills the gap between what the country saves 
domestically and what savings ratio is required to attain a certain 
planned rate of growth.
Some modifications and additions on earlier models were made by 
subsequent literature.. Accordingly, development is considered to be 
hampered not only by the low ratio of savings or investment to 
national income but also by the capacity of the economy to translate 
production into foreign exchange necessary for acquiring imports 
(viz., foreign exchange gap). In other words, development could not 
only be retarded or enhanced by investment (or savings) but also by 
the capacity of an economy to import.
Problems may, therefore, arise because of inadequate supplies of 
certain foreign commodities, in particular imported capital goods. 
Thus foreign aid (or foreign savings) is considered by this school of
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thought as good as domestic savings though under certain conditions 
it is valued higher than domestic savings, as it supplements the 
economy's foreign exchange reserves.
Notwithstanding the several modifications on earlier models, 
almost all share the view that foreign resources can supplement the 
inadequate domestic savings, fill the foreign exchange gap and 
therefore,significantly contribute to the economic growth of recipient
v • 1countries.
The above ideas on aid and growth were hotly debated, and critics 
tended to take the opposite view. The theoretical literature of those 
who reject the idea that aid contributes to growth is focussed on the 
negative effects of aid on savings, growth and other macro-economic 
variables and on its social and political repercussions. We are 
inclined to say that foreign aid can be utilized for enhancing the 
economic and social development of recipient countries. '
Colin Clark's study of population and growth - a study representing
one type of rejectionist literature - shows that savings decrease when
2capital flow is higher and vice versa. Md. Rahman used statistical . 
evidence to support his view that domestic savings is inversely related 
to foreign aid flow.. By running a least square regression of the savings 
ratio to G.N.P. on the ratio of capital inflow to G.N.P. for 31 
developing countries for the year 1962, he obtained the following 12
1 The H.B. Chenery and A. Strout model is a prominent study and 
representative of this school of thought. See H.B. Chenery and A. 
Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," American 
Economic Review, Sept. 1966, pp.679-733.
2 C. Clark, Population, Growth and Land Use, (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1967), p.267.
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estimates:1
S(t) (Domestic Savings) = a + b H(t) (captial inflow) 
Y(t) GNP Y(t) GNP
S(t) = 0.1427 - 0.2473 H(t)
Y(t) Y (t)
A similar statistical exercise was carried out by K. Griffin and 
J. Enos. They examined the effect of foreign aid by using cross- 
sectoral studies of several countries as well as time series for 
single ones. With regard to their cross-sectoral study of 32 countries 
over the period 1962-1964, the following relationship between domestic 
and foreign savings was found, (savings were deflated by G.N.P.):
S(d) (Gross Domestic Savings) = 11.2-0.73 Sf (Foreign savings) 
Y GNP (0.11)' Y GNP
R2 - 0.54
The negative relationship between domestic savings and aid was
interpreted as follows: an extra dollar aid increases consumption by
275 cents and investment by only 25. When performing similar tests
6 mfor thirteen American and Middle East/ countries and a single test for
3Columbia, they came up with similar results.
Rahman, Md.A."Foreign Capital and Ebmestic Savings: a Test of 
Haavelmo’s Hypothesis with Gross-Country ¡Oata, "The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. L, 1968, pp. 137-138.
Griffin, K.B. and Enos, J.L. "Foreign Assistance: Objectives and 
Consequences," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 18 and 
Supplements, 1969-1970, pp. 313-327; see also Griffin, K.B. "Coffee 
and Economic Development of Columbia," Bulletin of the Oxford University 
Institute of Economics and Statistics, May 1968, pp. 109-110; and 
Underdevelopment in Spanish America, an Interpretation, (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969), Chapter III.
The regression equation for the American and Middle Eastern countries
was;
was:
Sd * 16.1-0.82 Sf ; R =0.71; As for Columbia, the equation 
YY 
Sd 
GDP 21.50-0.84
Sf_
GDP 0.43; Ibid., pp.321-322.
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The findings of negative relationship between domestic savings
and foreign aid were not confined to Rahman and Griffin-Enos Studies.
Thomas E. Weisskopf and Nathaniel Leff studied the same relationships
for a sample of 44 developing countries over the period 1953-1966.
Weisskopf identified the behavioural savings function for those
countries as related not only to income but also to capital inflow.^-
S (Domestic savings) ■ a + 0.183 Y (GDP) - 0.227 F (Net foreign capital
(t=65.9) (t*5.3)
inflow) + 0.176 E (Exports). This exercise has supported the
(t=4.6)
hypothesis that the impact of foreign aid flow on 'ex ante’ domestic
savings in the examined developing countries is significantly negative
2and approximately 23% of aid substitutes for domestic savings.
As for N. Leff, he ran a regression for Brazil for the period 
1940-1960 where domestic savings were found to be determined by the level 
of income in the previous year (Yt-1) and the current volume of net
3foreign capital inflow (NFCI^). The relationships were as follows:
DS = 1.78 + 0.1545 Yt-1 - 0.1560 NFCI , R2 - 0.839 
(0.02) (0.33) 123
1 T.E. Weisskopf, "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic 
Savings in Underdeveloped Countires, " Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 2, No. 1, Feb. 1972, p.25.
2 Ibid., p.37; He also examined the previously cited relationship with
respect to the Israeli economy and found the following:
S ■ 88.3 + 0.125Y - 0.886F + 0.621E, R^ * 0.999. All the parameters 
were significant at the 5% level. See a paper by Weisskopf, T.E. which 
was prepared for the Second World Congress of the Econometric Society, 
Cambridge, England, Sept. 1970: "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow 
on Domestic Savings in Underdeveloped Countries." Quotedby K.B. Griffin, 
"Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences: Comments," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 20, No.l, Oct. 1971, p,157.
3 N.H. Leff, "Marginal Savings Rates in the Development Process: the 
Brazilian Experience," Economic Journal, 78, 1968, pp. 610-623.
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Other writers observed similar results, but their interpretation 
was different. The negative association between savings and capital 
inflow was regarded as an indicator of inefficient transformation of 
aid flows into increased investment.^"
Tests were also carried out on the impact of aid on the overall 
rate of growth by several writers and the results were sometimes 
positive and sometimes negative. Proponents of aid found that aid 
could be utilized by recipient countries as a basis for a significant 
acceleration of investment and growth. They regarded it as being 
capable not only to accelerate the rate of investment during the "take 
off" period, but to supply, or facilitate the creation of, the basic 
prerequisites for the transition to self-sustained growth. Those 
prerequisites are: skills, adoption of modern technology, development 
of institutions and changes in the composition of output and employment.
According to aid supporters, the rate of growth of any economy 
receiving aid would rise by the amount of aid multiplied by the capital 
output ratio. In the absence of aid, the rate of growth would be equal 12
1 H.B. Chenery and N.G. Carter, "Foreign Assistance and Development 
Performance, 1960-1970," The American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No.2, 
May 1973, pp. 459-468; See also the following works on the negative 
relationship between domestic savings and foreign aid: (a) H.B. Chenery 
and P. Eckstein, "Development Alternatives for Latin America," Journal 
of Political Economy, July/Aug. 1970, pp. 975—-976 and Table A-2, 
Appendix; (b) H.B. Chenery with H. Elkington and C. Sims, "A Uniform 
Analysis of Development Patterns," Economic Development Report,Nos. 148 
and 158, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; and 
"Targets for Development," Economic Development Report, No.153; (c)
Kaj Areskong, External Borrowing: Its Role in Economic Development, 
(Praeger Publishers, 1969); (d) K.B. Griffin, "Foreign Capital,
Domestic Savings and Economic Development," Bulletin of Oxford 
University Institute of Economics and Statistics, May 1970; and (e) 
see Professor Henry C. Wallich discussing the case of Puerto Rico in 
J.H. Adler, Capital Movements and Economic Development, (New York:
St. Martin's Press, inc., 1967), p.237.
2 H.B. Chenery and A.M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Develop­
ment," The American Economic Review, Vol. LVI, No.4, Part 1, Sept. 
1966, pp.679-733.
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to only the proportion of a country's income saved multiplied by the
incremental capital-output ratio.^ When the relationship between economic
growth and foreign aid was examined for several underdeveloped countries,
the regression co-efficient for aid, as an independent variable, was
positive and high. This, however, supports the hypothesis that foreign
2aid flows are correlated with economic growth.
We are inclined to say that foreign aid can contribute to the 
socio-economic development of recipient countries. Whether this actually 
occurs is something related to the manner of utilization of foreign and 
domestic resources. If they are utilized in a manner which makes them 
contribute towards increasing output, domestic savings then aid enables 
the economy to sustain a steady growth. However, when aid is solely or 
predominantly used to finance the current expenditure of the government, it 
etnnot be said to contribute to the development of the economy.
Those who held the opposite view about aid, claim that the tests 
and studies carried out on aid to recipient countries show no support 
for the view that aid encourages growth. Examination of the rates of 
growth of G.N.P. and the levels of foreign aid showed cases of no close 
association between the two variables. Other cases showed negative 
relationships between them. When regressing the average rate of growth
of G.N.P. on aid as a proportion of G.N.P., K. Griffin found the
• • > - . - ■ A. 2  'following: Y - 4.8 + 0.18 ^  > R = 0*33. However, when the relationship 
between the rate of growth in percapita G.N.P.-with one year lag - and 12
1 See R. J. Ball, "Capital Imports and Economic Development: Paradoxy 
or Orthodoxy?," Kyklos, Vol. XV, 1962, pp. 610-621; see also H.B. 
Chenery and A. Strout, op. cit. , pp. 679-733.
2 See the following works pertinent to this issue: (a) H.C. Chenery and
P. Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 966-1006; (b) Sherman Robinson, "Sources
of Growth in Less Developed Countries: A Cross-Section Study,
"Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXXV, Aug. 1971, pp. 391-408;
(c) G.F. Papanek, "The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on 
Savings and Growth in Less Developed Countries," Economic Journal,
No. 327, September, 1972; and "Aid, Foreign Private Investment, Saving 
and Growth in Less Developed Countries," Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 81, No. 1. Jan./Feb. 1973, pp.120-130; (d) H.B. Chenery and 
N.G. Carter, op. cit., pp. 459-468.
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foreign aid was investigated, the result was negative:2 1Qt+  ^ = 12.5 - 0.047 A^, R ■; 0.62. Similar tests were also
2carried out by other writers and they gave similar negative associations. .
B - TESTING THE FOREIGN AID IMPACT.
At this juncture, we shall attempt to find out, by providing 
quantitative evidence, the relationship between the inflow of foreign aid 
to Jordan, domestic savings, and growth in income. Besides, the association 
between Consumption, Gross Domestic Capital Formation (G.D.C.F.) and foreign 
aid flow will also be examined. Our approach to such exercise depends on 
the following:
We give importance to the fact that, in order to judge the real 
contribution of foreign aid to the economy of Jordan, we should consider 
its effects on domestic savings. At the sametime, we also recognise 
the fact that the change in domestic savings signifies and manifests the 
degree to which the Jordanian economy has made serious efforts towards 
domestic development and growth. Of course, we do not overlook or deny 
the several other effects of foreign aid on the economy yet a positive 
impact by aid on domestic savings lies in the fact that it gives the 
development process an endogenous character. It lays the foundation for 
the process of a sustained domestic development. A development that will *2
1 K.B.. Griffin and J. L. Enos, "Foreign Assistance: Objectives and
Consequences," op.cit., p. 318.
2. Replying on Griffin-Enos paper, Mikellman preferred aid figures deflated 
by imports rather than by G.N.P. as Griffin did. His analysis resulted 
also in a negative association between rate of growth of income and 
foreign aid. See K. B. Griffin and J. L. Enos, "Foreign Assistance: 
Objectives and Consequences: Comments," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol. 20# No. 1. October, 1971, pp. 144-147.
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mainly depend on domestic resources.
Foreign aid flows are identified in the same manner as those in 
previous chapters, viz., the actual disbursements of aid. On the other 
hand we also take into account other definitions of aid.adopted by 
certain writers. By doing this, we hope to throw further light on the 
findings
We relied on the time series approach as data on annual aid
disbursements were constructed in the earlier chapters of our study;
the data on foreign aid and other macro-economic variables are pertaining
2to the period 1954-1972. The definitions used for domestic savings are 
the same as used earlier, viz., (1) domestic savings as a remainder 
from deducting net investment from the balance on current account.
(2) Domestic savings as a remainder from deducting total current 
expenditures from total current receipts.
We will try to test the hypothesis that*(a) the level of domestic 
savings in Jordan is related not only to the level of national income, 
but also to the level of foreign aid$ (b) the level of consumption in 
Jordan is related not only to the level of disposable income but also 
to the volume of foreign aid; and (c) Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
(G.D.C.F.) has not only been associated with income but also with foreign 
aid. 12
1 Md. Rahman, K. B. Griffin and J. Enos, M. Kellman, E. Weisskopf and 
N, H. Leff used the balances on current account as synonymous with 
aid flows.
2 The year 1954 was taken as a starting year in the time series because 
National Accounts in Jordan were not available in the periods preceeding 
this year.
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TABLE 6.J.
SUMMARY TABLE ON THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID FLOW ON DOMESTIC 
SAVINGS. GROWTH IN INCOME. INVESTMENT AND CONSUMPTION.
Formula
Foreign Aid Flow 
Definition
Definition of 1
Domestic
Savings
ntercepc egression Co-efficients of Explanatory 
Variables R2 D.W.
T. Value«
Time
Series
or
Cross
Country
Years
a
v i V2 V 3 V V 5 V6 V 7 r '
A - With regard to the 
impact of foreign aid 
On Domestic Savings; 
a.l Dg ■ a+bY^+cA^+dX^
Imports of Goods 
and ServicesMinus 
Exports of Goods 
and Services 
(Current Balance) 
(M-X)
Current Expend­
itures Hinua 
Current Receipt 
(Public and 
Private Sectors
8.73 3.148
(0.08)
-0.61 
CO.17)
-o.o:
(0.39
0.49 1.76 1.85 3.55 0.133
Time
Series
(T.S.)
19 Si- 
1972
a.2 Dfit • a*b A t 
^  V t
Deficit on 
Current Account 
(M-X)
Net Investment 
Minus Defict 
on Current
17.32 -1.08
(0.13)
0.77« 1.32 7.7 T.S. 1954-1972
D,
**3 — - » a+b A t
Y t
Actual Disburse­
ments
Net Investment 
Minus Deficit 
on Current 
Account#
8.87 . -0.77
(0.31) 0.26 1.8 2.47
T.S.
1954-
1972
i
3 -  With regard t d t h e  
inpact of foreign 
Aid on growth in 
income:
bel ZA C . D . P e -
a+b c + 
G.D.P
e i S _
C.D.P.
Actual Disburse­
ments
Current Exp­
enditures 
Minus Current 
Receipts -0.59 0.82
(0.44)
0.53
(0.54
•
3.17 2.1 1.8 0.9Ì
•
T.S. 1954-
1972
. 0.85 0.62 T.S. 1954-
1972
b.2 2AG.D.P. -
\a+b — S- ♦ 
G.D.P.
c ^ t
C.D.P.
Actual Disburse­
ments
Net Investment 
Minus (M-X) 2.5 ■0.32
;0.38)
0.38
(0.61)
3.04 2.37
2.0  ^T ‘S * 1954-1972b.3 YPrt+* a+b Actual Disburse­
ments ’■
18.8 0.37
0.18) v.; 7.21 2.6
h *A Yt - a+b A t
' ?or
Deficit on 
Current Account
Actual Disburse­
ments ■
- . . V '
155.2 •1.38
0.43) -, .* 3.37 0.45
3.17 T.S. 19 Si- 
1972
• b.5 I A C . J . P . .  
j r a+b D.S.
1 C.D.P.
/ -•— - if Grami »  L s a s r  •».
' G.D.P. G.D.P.
Esoeditures on Education ♦
Current Expend­
itures Minus 
Current Receipt
65.3
. ■:
-  gp-*-
0.15
;0.54)
0.72
0.67)
3.3
1.48)
-7.3
(7.68)t 3‘*jd.48)
-3.4
(1.49)
1.18
[1.85
1.18
:i.84
1.8!
(0.9
1.95
<&6Q
3.68
0.68
1.95
1.9
0.24 1.0 2.1' 0.94 2.3 0,6 2.0 *
T.S. 1954-
1972
C.D.P.
Exports ♦ V.A.Manuf
C.D.P. G.D.P. 
♦ V.A.Agricul.
i
i
G.D.P.
0.25 1.11 2.28 0.91 2.27 0.64 3.01 T.S. 1954-
1972b.6 % A G.D.P.- a+b D.S. +
C.D.P.
b  Grants ( Loans ( 
G.D.P. G.D.P.
Exp.on Educ.
G.D.P.
Exports t V.A.Manuf. 
C.D.P. C.D.P.
* V.A.Agriculture
C,. D. P .
Actual Disburse­
ments.
t
Net Investment 
Minus
( M - X )
61.59 -0.10
10.37)
-0 .7:
(0.65)
-3.4
(1.48)
-6.8
(7.47;
b.7 2 A  C.D.P. - 
a+b D.S. +
C.D.P.
c A 
G.D.P.
Actual Disburse­
ments
Current Expend­
itures Minus 
Current Receipt
— 0.54 >.815
'0.44)
0.53
(0.54)
0.17 2.1 .. 1.8 0.98 T.S. 1954-
1972
C -  With regard to the
impact of foreign aid 
on Gross Domestic 
Capital Formation 
(G.D.C.F.):
C.l GDCFt-a+bAt_1+
c A CD?.
Actual Disburse­
ments -13.5 1.16
;0.09)
0.42
(0.09)
0.92 1.96 / 12.0 4.0 T.S. 1954-1972
D  —  With regard to the
impact of foreign aid 
on Aggregate Consump­
tion:
d.l C t- a+b A t
Actual Disburse­
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In trying to assess the impact of foreign aid on growth in income, 
we adopted both an aggregative and a disaggregative approach to aid. 
Foreign aid was thus disaggregated into its basic components viz., 
unrequited transfers and loans. Finally, our approach in testing the 
impact of aid on savings, growth and other macro-economic variables 
tends to differ from the previously discussed approaches in two main 
respects: (1) we used time series whereas others tended to rely mainly 
on the defective cross-country analysis; (2) we used actual foreign aid 
disbursements besides other definitions of aid. Thus we tried to 
maintain a close-to-reality picture as well as a double check on the 
outcomes.
C - THE RESULTS
I Having assessed the impact of foreign aid on domestic savings, we 
obtained the following results:See Table 6.J. p.24b)-
(a) The regression results show that domestic savings in Jordan are
related not only to the level of income but also to the volume of 
foreign aid (or the net inflow of foreign aid). ;
(b) The impact of foreign aid on domestic savings (in both definitions) 
was negative. Domestic savings were inversely associated with aid flow. 
(Equations a.3 and a.l in Table 6.J. p. ¿4-6.)
(c) When both domestic savings and aid flows were deflated by income, 
the impact of aid on savings was negative and .highly significant. 
(Equation a.2. Table 6.J).
II As far as the impact of foreign aid on growth in income is 
concerned, we obtained the following results:
The response of the rate of growth in income to a unit change in the 
level of foreign aid (aggregated) was positive but insignificant.
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(Equations b.l and b.2., Table 6.J.);
When foreign aid was disaggregated and some other variables were 
added to the equation, the association between the rate of growth in 
income and aid components was different. On the one hand, the response 
to a unit change in unrequited transfers as well as to a unit change 
in loans was nagative. On the other hand, the regression coefficient 
was significant only in the case of loans,*
The response of percapita income to a unit increase in aid flow was 
negative and highly., significant. At the same time, the impact of aid 
on the rate of growth in percapita income was also negative and 
significant. (Equations b.3. and b.4 in Table 6.J.);
The rate of growth in national income was substantially and positively 
associated with the growth in the value added in agriculture (Equations 
b.5. and b.6. in Table 6.J.);
The impact of foreign aid to the public sector Ci.e. Public unrequited 
transfers and loans) on the rate of growth in income was positive but 
insignificant. (Equation b .7. in Table 6.J.).
Ill The impact of foreign aid on Gross Domestic Capital Formation (G.D.C.F.); 
To test the hypothesis that foreign aid to Jordan can contribute 
significantly to investment, a regression was run taking G.D.C.F. as the 
dependent variable. From the estimated equations, we obtained the 
following: G.D.C.F. in Jordan appeared to have been related to not
only to the level of national income but also the level of foreign aid;
In almost all the equations used, the impact of foreign aid on G.D.C.F. 
was positive and significant. Furthermore, it transpired that when 
foreign aid was lagged by one year, it contributed to investment by an 
amount greater than itself. In turn, this finding gave support to the
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above hypothesis. (Equation c.l in Table 6.J.); rfhen certain 
explanatory variables were added (imports for instance), the result was 
that G.D.C.F. appeared to have had a high positive and significant marginal 
response to a unit change in imports. The regression co-efficient for 
imports was even higher than that of both gross national income and A  
in gross domestic income, changes in the levels of gross domestic 
income have had significant impact on G.D.C.F.
IV As to the impact of foreign aid on aggregate consumption, we 
obtained the following results: (a) the marginal response of aggregate 
consumption to changes in levels of foreign aid was positive and very 
significant. (Equations d.l., d.2. and d,3 in Table 6.J.); (b) the impact 
on consumption of disposable income, lagged by one year, was positive and 
very significant, (Equation D.4. in Table 6.J.)
The previous tests came up with results showing a positive but 
insignificant impact of foreign aid on the rateof growth in income and a 
negative impact on domestic savings. On the otherhand, G.D.C.F. and 
consumption were positively and significantly associated with foreign aid.
It is worth noting, at this stage, that criticism was made by a 
few writers on the accounting convention whereby, figures for domestic 
savings were drived. Gustav Papanek, for instance, tested the relationship 
between foreign aid and domestic savings and arrived at negative 
association between the two variables. For him, this negative statistical 
relationship could be ascribed, in part, to the accounting convention, 
i.e.,calculating domestic savings as the remainder from substracting foreign 
aid flow from investment. He claimed that this accounting convention is 
quite appropriate to the extent that foreign aid is either (a) used for 
investment or (b) a claim on past or future savings. If aid were used for 
supplementing investment in the recipient country, then, he argued, one 
would need to substract aid from total investment to arrive at a figure
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representing the contribution of domestic savings to capital formation. 
Furthermore, if aid were used for consumption, one would obtain inappropriate 
results by following conventional procedures. In spite of this, Papanek 
finally admitted the fact that statistics on domestic savings is deficient 
in developing countries even when more sophisticated calculations are used,
In fact, he used the conventional approach in his studies of the relation­
ship between foreign aid and development.1 2
However, despite the partial effect of the above-mentioned accounting 
convention on the definition of savings, our calculation of domestic 
savings was based on two approaches viz,, firstly, the remainder from 
deducting the deficit on current account from investment, and secondly, 
the difference between current income and current expenditures of both 
private and public sectors. Using the second approach as a check on 
the first, we obtained similar results.
D - INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS:
The possible means whereby foreign aid to Jordan could have 
negatively affected domestic savings, thereby positively favouring consump­
tion, are as follows:
Regarding the composition of foreign aid to Jordan, we found that
unrequited transfers constituted an average of 91,4% of the total aid
2flow, whereas the remainder took the form of loans. As the destination 
of such transfers was the government budget, they constituted an integral 
part of the public revenues (income) out of which expenditures were financed.
1 Gustav Papanek, "The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on 
Savings and Growth in Less Developed Coutnries," Economic Journal. 
Vol. 822, September, 1972, pp, 934-950. “----
2 See Chapter II, Table 2.C.
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Earlier, we gave statistical data on the use of the funds available to 
the government. It showed that the economy, and particularly the public 
sector, was suffering from an irrational allocation of funds both at the 
aggregate and the sectoral levels, i.e., allocation of revenues between 
current and development expenditures and of resources in the different 
sectors in the economy, respectively. At the aggregate level, we found 
that current public expenditures consitituted 79% of the aggregate budget 
expenditures, therefore leaving only 21% for development expenditure.
At the sectoral level, we found an irrational scale of priorities.
Defence and the maintenance of internal security absorbed by far 
the largest proportion, infact more than half, of government expenditures 
over the period 1950-1972. (It averaged 54.44%).
Expenditure on "Fiscal administration" alone was the third in terms 
of its share in total government outlays (it averaged 12%). "Social 
services"sector, on the other hand, ranked fourth (11%). So, national 
security, social services and fiscal administration, on average, absorbed 
more than three quarters of aggregate government expenditure. At the 
same time, the vital material producing sector got a mere 1.5% of the 
total. Needless to say, at the moment, those expenditures generate income 
and high proportion of it tended to go to consumption.1
The flow of such foreign transfers to the government budget altered 
the composition of government expenditures in that it enabled the 
government to finance a large current expenditure. Furthermore, there was 
a constant expansion of current public consumption. Most of the government 
expenditure went towards the maintenance of a large bureaucracy and army.
1 See Chapter II for a discussion of the 
expenditures over the period 1950-1972* 
chapter. *
sectoral distribution of government 
see also Table 2.H, in the same
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TABLE 6.K.
INDICES OF SALARIES', WAGES AND ALLOWANCES IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 1951-1972 (CHAIN INDICES)
Period
1 2 3 = 1+2 4 5 6=3+4+5
Salaries and 
Allowances
Salaries anc 
Allowances 
of Army and 
Public Secui
Salaries, 
Wages and 
Allowances
•ity
Pension 
and Comp- 
fsatory 
Payments
[Aggregate
total
; Army Public
Security
1951 67 216 88 353 100 126
1952 456 100 333 90 102 234
1953 109 98 108 131 111 111
1954 100 102 101 116 103 103
1955 102 104 102 119 148 106
1956 146 115 143 107. 141 135
1957 ' 94 114 95 126 106 101
1958 129 ' 174 133 111 108 128
1959 108 108 108 112 203 110
1960 102 101 102 105 207 104
1961 102 101 102 113 153 105
1962 102 101 102 111 135 105
1963 112 106 112 114 115 113
1964 98 100 98 105 127 101
1965 101 115 103 109 109 105
1966 77 73 76 84 86 78
1967 168 158 167 168 76 161
1968 146 100 14C 85 120 124
1969 118 115. 118 141 119 122
1970 80 116 83 129 102 94
1971 102 67 102 93 134 100.
1972. 116 112 119 103 95 Ill .
Source: Appendix IV, Table 7
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The table above shows a high rate of increase of each item in 
relation to its position in the previous year. The increase in salaries, 
wages and allowances was particularly significant in the case of those of 
civil servants. Remunerations of army and public security personnel 
increased at an average rate of around 18.7% during 1950-1972. On the 
other hand, civil servants' remunerations recorded an average increase 
of 21.3% over the same period. In absolute terms, the sum total of salaries, 
wages and allowances in 1972 was more than twenty times the 1950 level.1
Viewing foreign aid as part of its regular disposable income, the 
Jordanian government through its policies maintained a high level of
consumption. Deficit was a more or less permanent feature of the government 
budget.
At the same time, and as was explained earlier, foreign transfers 
via the government budget generated incomes for the public employees 
most of which was spent on consumption.
One cannot overlook, at this stage, the other factors which gave 
strength and momentum to the savings behaviour of the public sector.
Regarding the composition of government revenues, we found: Firstly . 
foreign revenues exceeded their domestic counterpart, almost during the 
whole period of our study. Secondly,the government maintained a tax 
revenue system alien to any self-help policy. The government tax policy 
did not put amongst its aims the mobilization of domestic resources and
1 For a detailed figure on wages, salaries and allowances in the nublie 
sector, see Appendix IV, Table 8. "
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the gradual decrease of dependence on foreign financing.
Indirect taxes constituted an average of 89.9% and 58.8% of both 
tax revenues and domestic revenues respectively in 1946-1972. The ratio 
of tax revenues to both G.D.P. and G.N.P. was low and remained relatively 
stable. The ratio of direct taxes to G.N.P. was very low and even 
negligible. Above all, the ratio of domestic revenues to total revenue 
was low and did not show any increasing trend.^
Thirdly, the utilization of domestic resources through the 
introduction of new taxes, the reform of existing tax laws or the 
improvement of the tax administration, was handicapped by the influence 
of pressure groups in the system.
Taxation is potentially an appropriate tool for increasing domestic 
savings and investment out of domestic resources. The obstacles in 
Jordan to the use of such tool and the lack of desire,on the part of the 
governement, to tackle such obstacles, were contributing factors towards 
the dissaving taking place in the public sector. However, in circumstances 
where foreign savings could be drawn upon with some degree of accessibility — 
which was occurring in Jordan — an atmosphere of dependence and a lack 
of readiness for change would prevail. Hence, a persistent dependence 
on foreign savings for financing government expenditures and investment.1 2
Fourthly, the inflow of foreign aid (to the government budget) on a 
regular basis had some distinctive effects: ' An inflated government
budget created a built-in inflexibility whereby it was difficult to reduce 
government expenditures (current and development) without adverse socio-
1 See analysis of the revenue and expenditure sides of the government
budget in the first chapter.
2 See Appendix IV, Table 9, on the connection between foreign aid to the 
public sector and government budget components.
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economic results. As aid was given mainly for political objectives,
it created within the Jordanian public sector an atmosphere of laxity 
in which policies needed for reshaping the source and use of resources 
were shelved and even blocked. Actually, opportunities existed for 
introducing tax reforms in Jordan, yet they were not taken up for the 
same reasons as above. During my term of work with the Central Bank 
of Jordan,I participated in several efforts to introduce some change in 
the prevailing tax structure. Emphasis was laid on the improvement of 
tax administration as well as the introduction of new taxes. Reforming 
income tax and introducing inheritance and capital gains taxes were 
amongst the top priority measures. Studies were carried out and 
recommendations were submitted but they did not go further than recogn­
ition of receipt. At certain times, even this response was withheld.
Immediately after the September 1970 Civil Sjtrife in Jordan, I 
submitted a proposal of economic reform. A parallel was drawn with 
the experience of Nigeria after her Civil War. Amongst the displayed 
facts, attention was drawn to the large funds tied to land and land 
speculation, the high percentage of property income in total income and 
the meagre contribution and management of direct taxation. The draft was 
submitted to the authorities in the Central Bank and I received their 
remarks and notes that were saturated with exclamation marks labelling 
the tax reform proposals.
Further, a study was carried out by the Department of Economic 
Research in the Central Bank (March 1971) on the inheritance tax wherein 
the introduction of such a tax was proposed. The usual reply was given 
and a political row took place in Parliament. A further attempt was made 
by researchers in the Bank; the same tax was proposed and a recommendation 
sent to the Ministry of Finance accompanied by a proposed Law, It
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suffered the fate, i.e., negligence and blockage.
N o t  on l y  foreign aid h e l p e d  c r e a t i n g  an i n f l e x i b i l i t y  in the 
g o v e r n m e n t - b u d g e t ,  b u t  also - . .
it helped the public sector to sustain tremendous increases in government 
expenditures. At the same time, it enabled the government to tolerate 
a tax system whereby tax revenues were not only kept stable but also 
reduced at certain periods. For instance, public expenditures in 1972 
were hundred times higher than in 1950. At the same time, the share 
of tax revenues in total domestic revenues was reduced appreciably in 
the years 1954, 1956, 1957, 1962, 1964, 1967, 1969 and 1971.1
Fifthly, lack of real progress towards an ultimate peace in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict coupled with intermittent eruptions of wars and 
internal instability, burdened the government with an extraordinary 
defense and other current expenditures besides losses in domestic revenues.
It is worth noting that the public sector was the largest employer 
in the economy of Jordan, expenditures were encouraged by the inflow of 
foreign aid, and finally, current expenditures consistituted by far the 
largest proportion in total government expenditures. To the recipients 
of such current expenditures - normally consumers with high propensities 
to consume - they formed an integral part of their disposable income, 
whereupon a substantial percentage of it went to consumption.2
1 See Appendix II, Table 5 on government revenues and expenditures- see 
also(Appendix IV Table 8 on the reductions in the ratios of domestic 
revenues to total government expenditures.
2 When regressing consumption expenditures on G.N.P., we found the 
propensity to consume m  Jordan tg be close to unity. C = 10.9 + 0.966 G.N.P
r w r - o r .  a * . R = ° - 98» Ti value = 38.6: (6.29)D.W. - 2.0. As for the marginal propensity to consume, the slope from 
regressing change in consumption C C) on change in G.M P. I § n | ) 
indicated a marginal propensity higher than the a v e r a g e s  -llid.i.n
*** r 2= o.50; T.value - 3,7; D.W » 2.9(0-29)
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A precipitating factor that lead to such an increase in total 
consumption was the adoption of liberal trade and foreign exchange 
policies by the government. Those policies were intended to satisfy 
the political and economic motives of aid donors. It is worth noting, 
as well as recalling, that foreign aid to Jordan was mainly destined to 
the public sector. Thus the new foreign exchange was added to the 
economy's stock of foreign reserves. On the other hand, the adoption 
and implementation of a liberal trade policy was made possible by the 
availability of such foreign exchange.* 1
A quick glance at the composition of private consumption, the 
proliferating business in imported luxuries in Jordan and the functional 
classification of imported commodities will give evidence, suggesting 
the causes behind the tremendous increases in private consumption at the 
expense of savings and investment.
The following table brings to light the ratio of consumption goods 
to that of total goods as well as it shows the degree to which the domestic 
economy met total demand for consumption. Firstly, imports of consumer 
goods, on average, constituted 60.6% of total imported goods over 1958- 
1972. Imports of capital goods, on the other hand, were stable as they 
averaged 30.7% over 1958-1969. In the subsequent phase, i.e,, 1970-1972, 
those imports dropped to reach an average of 28.4%.
However, the overall average share of capital goods was reduced from
an average of 30.7% in 1958-1969 to 30,0% in 1958-1972, Secondly, the
performance of the domestic economy in terms of its share in satisfying
consumption demand could also be easily seen from the table. It is shown
that imports of consumer goods retained, on average, their share in total
consumption demand and thus maintained a high average of about 39% over
1958-1972 ___________________________________________
1 See Appendix IV, Table 9, Foreign Trade deficits and the relationship between Foreign aid and trade are shown in this table.
Thus private consumption was increased as a result of public expenditure.
/Vmcs
TABLE 6.L
THE FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF IMPORTS, RELATIVE SHARE OF COMPONENTS AND 
RATIO OF IMPORTED CONSUMER GOODS TO TOTAL CONSUMPTION, 1958-1972. (i)
(RATIOS AND AVERAGES)
The Following 
Items as % of 
Total Imports
PERIODS
1958 1959 L960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Average
1958/
1969
Average
1970/
1972
Average
1958/
1972
Imports of
Consumption
Goods 68.8 67.7 56.7 65.9 61.2 64.6 64.9 61.7 61.9 53.8 51.1 51.2 58.3 58.0 63.8 66,6 60.4 60.6
Imports of
Capital
Goods 26.5 24.8 25.2 23.6 27.9 29.3 27.2 31.4 30.0 36.4 40.5 37.6 33.4 27.8 25.5 30.7 28.4 30.0
Imports of 
Raw Materials 7.6 7.4 8.2 10.5 11.0 6.1 7.8 7.0 8.4 9.8 8.3 11.2 8.3 14.2 10.7 8.7 11.2 9.4
Ratio of Imports 
of Consumer 
Goods to Total 
Consumption 
Expenditures 39.5 38.5 40.8 35.6 39.4 40.8 36.4 36.4 40.9 31.1 42.9 46.9 39.6 37.8 38.5 39.1 38.6 39.0
Source: (i) Data pertaining to the period 1958-1970 are from: Jordan Department of Statistics, Flow of Goods
in the Jordanian Economy, (Imports), (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, April 1970).
(ii) Data pertaining to the period 1971-1972 are from an unpublished report - Department of Statistics, 
(In Arabic).
(iii) Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts, 1967-1972, (Amman: Department of Statistics 
Press, May 1973).
I
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It seems rather necessary, at this stage, to recall a point 
previously examined in Part 1 of this chapter, i.e., private consumption 
expenditures on items of high import and luxury content approximately 
doubled over 1954-1972.
Actually, this acceleration in private consumption demand coiiild 
not be financed without adverse repercussions on domestic savings and 
investment. It can be also said that this high increase in demand for 
consumption could not have been met by imports, had the resources 
(Foreign as well as domestic) been allocated more favourably towards 
goods-producing sectors in the economy.
The above analysis shows that the feeble point in this respect was 
not due to only the acceleration of aggregate consumption. It was 
also due to the failure of domestic savings to help capital formation 
leaving, however, to foreign aid the job of continually bridging the 
gap between investment and savings.
The sources from which Specialized Credit Institutions in Jordan 
were obtaining funds for conducting their credit operations and the 
operation rules of these institutions were not conducive to savings in 
the private sector. Besides, they were not also conducive to savings 
on the part of the other credit beneficiaries, (i.e., the sectors 
dependent upon those Specialized Credit Institutions). In the first 
place, those institutions were established either by the government 
or through joint co-operation with aid donors. Their funds were thus 
acquired from the government budget and from aid agencies taking, 
however, the form of repayable loans or outright grants.1 The acquiation
There were five Specialized Credit Institutions during our period of 
study, namely: The Industrial Development Bank (1957 - ), The 
Agricultural Credit Corporation (1960 - ), The Municipal and
Village Loans Fund (1957 - ), The Housing Agency (1966 - ) and
The Jordan Co-operative Organization (1967 - ).
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of government funds (originally from foreign savings) by those institutions, 
coupled with finance from foreign sources, stopped them from seriously 
attempting to look for domestic funds either within the sectors they 
served or in other sectors of the economy, (e.g., through floating bonds 
in the market).
Further adverse repercussions occurred as a result of policies 
conducted by the above-mentioned institutions. One would not only 
expect the savings intentions of those institutions to be negatively 
affected, but also the savings intentions of the private sector 
dependent upon such a source of finance. A prominent persisting 
phenomenon was the recurrence of a lack of enforcement of credit settle­
ments by such institutions as well as a lack of proper vetting of the 
credit-candidate projects, both of which have created a sense of 
laxity and dependence on the part of the benefited sectors.*
The Agricultural Credit Corporation (A.C.C.), an important 
specialized credit institution dealing with agriculture, is, in this 
respect, a prominent case which demands close examination. The laxity 
in collecting accumulated overdue debts through, postponments and
sometimes, exemptions resulted in the ratio of unsettled overdue debt
2to total debt averaging almost 50% during 1960-1971. In fact, this
situation could have easily limited this institution’s functioning
capacity, had foreign resources not been available. Foreign funds
constituted a percentage ranging from 83.7% to 93% of the corporation’s 
, 3 'total funds. 123
1 It was commonly apprehended in Jordan that most credit approval and 
extention decisions by such institutions were largely dependent on 
personnel connections more than on the merits and the economic feasibility 
of credit-candidate projects.
2 Barkawi, N.W. The Agricultural Specialized Credit Institutions in Jordan,
(Amman: Central Bank, 1974), p. 41.^  (In Arabic). , . ,
3 Ibid., p. 26.
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A study carried out by the Central Bank of Jordan calculated the 
cost to the Agricultural Credit Corporation of each unit of credit (Dinar) 
given to borrowers and found that it involved a high degree of concession. 
Whereas the share of each unit of credit in the total adminstrative costs 
averaged 8 Piasters (8% as the J. Dinar equals 100 Piasters), the average 
interest charged on money lent was 6%. On the other hand, such costs 
could have been much less, had the Corporation reduced its administrative 
costs. (They averaged 74.4% of the total operational costs of the 
Corporation over 1964-1971).^
However, the availability to the Corporation of foreign savings as 
the main source of financing, inhibited the mobilization of the domestic 
financial resources. Firstly, the Corporation was. made not to observe
basic articles of its law, which authorised it to float its own bonds
..............  2 -  *  •for raising funds. Secondly, the Corporation, like other similar
Corporations and institutions in the economy, did not even bother to
draw on resources accumulated with/banking institutions, (The Central
3Bank, for instance). Earlier we said that the availability of foreign 
savings to the specialized credit institutions, could be expected to have 
effects on savings in the sectors benefiting from them. Their intentions 
to save may have been negatively affected in view of the following:
1 Barkawi, N. op. cit., pp. 35-36
2 Article 5, section 3 oi the Corporation's Law No. 12 of 1963 
authorrses raising domestic funds through such channels.
3 Article 40 of the Central Bank's Law No. 23 of 1971 authorises the 
bank and makes its resources accessible to the needy specialized 
credit institutions. TheA.C.C. eventually did not L e  such
privilege nor did it rely on domestic Commercial Banks
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(a) resources put at the disposal of borrowers at 
lower rate of interest than those prevailing in the economy;.(b) the 
relaxation in the vetting process of credit-candidate projects and 
(c) the laxity in deferring part or the whole of obligations due and, 
at certain times, outright exemptions from obligations.
1 Technically, the A,. C. C-. Law provides guidlines and vetting rules, yet 
practice does absolutely diverge from the Law guidlines.
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E - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION;
1 - During the period 1954-1972, .Gross National Product (G.N.P.) and 
percapita income attained rates of growth averaging 9.7% and 6.7% respect­
ively.
2 - A basic structural change was the increasing share of the service - 
producing sectors in the country’s total income. It averaged 64.6% over 
1954-1972.
3 - Gross Domestic Capital Formation (G.D.C.F.) maintained a high, rate 
of growth as well as high ratios to G.N.P. It recorded an average of 17% 
of G.N.P. over 1960-1972. Investment in construction absorbed more than
one half of total fixed capital formation. It averaged 60,7% over 1960-1972, 
Roads, Port facilities and non-residential buildings were the main 
beneficiaries.
4 High rates of growth in income and high rates of investment far exceed­
ing domestic savings would not have been possible without the inflow of 
foreign aid. Foreign aid, on average, was twice the level of investment 
over the period 1954-1972.
5 - The figures of domestic savings calculated by two different approaches, 
showed that the e c o n o m y  d i s s a v e d  during the period of study. The most 
notable feature was that foreign aid enabled Jordan to sustain high rates
of investment, whereas domestic savings did not. follow this spurt in 
investment.
6 -  Aggregate consumption increased at a very high rate during the period. 
The 1972 level was approximately four times the 1954 level, ' Percapita 
consumption was also double the 1954 level. # The following points are to 
be noted with respect*to the behaviour of consumption in Jordan: (a) 
Consumption was at a level which exceeded both G.N.P. and G.D.P. during the
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period; (b) Private expenditures on consumption constituted an average 
of 76.3% of aggregate consumption over 1954-1972; (c) Food consumption
expenditures constituted an average of 51.9% and 39.6% of both private 
consumption expenditures and aggregate consumption expenditures respectively 
over 1954-1972. It was also found that private consumption expenditures on 
items of high import-content with a "follow up" demand on their imported 
auxiliaries, doubled over the period under observation. This qualitative 
pattern of consumption behaviour was in line with Eagle’s Law; (d) public 
consumption was characterised by the dominance of defence and security 
expenditures. They averaged more than one.half of total public 
expenditures.
7 - With regard to the impact of foreign aid flow on domestic savings,
the following results were obtained: (a) The regression results suggested 
that domestic savings in Jordan were related not only to the level of 
income but also/§fie level of foreign aid; (b) the impact.^f foreign aid 
on domestic savings was negative.
8 - With regard to the impact of foreign aid on growth, the following 
results were obtained: There was a positive, though insignificant, impact 
of foreign aid on the rate of growth in income. When foreign aid was 
disaggregated, the regression equations suggested a negative response of 
the rate of growth to a unit change in either unrequited transfers or loans. 
The regression co-efficient was significant as far as loans were concerned.
The response of percapita income to a unit change in foreign aid was 
negative andhigfiLysignificant. The rate of growth in income was substantially 
and positively associated with the growth in the value added in agriculture. 
Finally, the impact of foreign aid to the public.sector on the rate of growth 
in income was positive but insignificant.
9 - With regard to the impact of foreign aid on Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation (G.D.C.F.), the following results were obtained: G.D.C.F. is
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related not only to the level of income, but also the level of foreign 
aid. The impact of foreign aid (using both current and lagged figures) 
on G.D.C.F. was positive andhigHy significant. G.D.C.F. showed a positive 
and significant response to changes in imports.
10 - As to the impact on aggregate consumption, the following results 
were obtained: The marginal response of aggregate consumption to changes 
in foreign aid was positive and very significant. The impact of disposable 
income, lagged by one year, on consumption was positive and very 
significant.
11 - The possible ways whereby aid cpuld Kaye affected domestic savings 
were the following:
With, an average, 91.4% pf fpreign aid in outright grants to the
: i
government, the government was able to maintain an irrational allocation 
of funds, at the aggregate level as well as at the sectoral level.
Firstly, current public expenditures averaged 79.0% of aggregate expenditures 
Secondly, an irrational allocation of funds occurred at the sectoral level; 
national security, social services and fiscal administration, on the 
average, absorbed more than three quarters of aggregate government outlays. 
On one hand, these expenditures were a part of the total consumption, and 
on the other, they were apt to generate income for recipients, supplement 
their disposable income and a large proportion of it went to consumption.
The flow of foreign unrequited transfers to the government budget 
altered the composition of govermn.ent expenditure. Furthermore, there 
was a constant expansion of current public consumption. Most of the 
government expenditure went towards the maintenance of a large bureaucracy 
and army. When foreign transfers were considered by the government as 
part of its regular disposable income, the government increased its 
consumption demand, and deficit in the government budget was the outcome 
(government dissaving).
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The factors that gave momentum to such dissaving in the public 
sector were found to be closely related to the inflow of foreign aid.
In circumstances, such as those prevailing in Jordan, where foreign
savings could be drawn upon with some degree of certainty, an
atmosphere of dependence and lack of readiness to utilize domestic resources
(.taxes in particular) prevailed. The obstacles to the use of taxes
as appropriate tools for increasing domestic savings and investment, and
lack of desire, ontfce part of the government to tackle these obstacles,
all contributed to the dissaving taking place in the public sector.
Lack of real progress towards an ultimate peace in the Middle East, 
coupled with intermittent'eruptions of wars and civil strife, burdened 
the government with extraordinary consumption expenditures besides' losses 
iii domestic revenues.
' Foreign aid generated income, the government budget, in sector^
*
of the economy whose propensities to consume were already high, thus giving 
a further boost to consumption. A precipitating factor was the adoption 
of a liberal trade policy which was made possible, in the first place, by 
the availability of foreign exchange, (mainly from foreign aid.).
Private consumption, fed by income generated through aid, escalated
f
and spilled over into imported goods. The consumption component of such 
imports constituted ari average of 61.3%, over 1958-1972. Furthermore, 
imports of consumer goods were able to maintain their high share in the 
aggregate consumption expenditures. (They averaged 39.0% over 1950-1972). 
As far as Jordan is concerned, the accelerated increase in private 
consumption could not be- financed without adverse repercussions on 
domestic savings and investment.
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The acquisition of government funds by the specialized credit 
institutions, coupled with direct finance from foreign sources, stopped 
them from seriously attempting to create domestic self-generated resources 
(savings). Their policies towards the sectors they served contributed 
to the fact that the savings behaviour of both these institutions and 
the private sector were negatively affected. This situation was 
aggravated by a lack of readiness or competence to float their own bonds 
on the market as well as by easy access to foreign funds,
12 - The inflow of foreign aid to Jordan (to the government budget) on a 
regular basis created an inflated government budget with a built- in 
inflexibility, i.e., the government expenditures were difficult to reduce 
without tremendous negative socio-economic repercussions. It also 
cr e a t e d  within the public sector a sense of laxity'whereby policies
needed for reshaping the source atid use of resources were shelved, and
«*
even blocked. Actually, opportunities existed for introducing tax reform 
in Jordan, yet they were not taken advantage of because of the existence 
of resources from foreign aid.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the preceeding chapters, we reviewed the developments in the 
basic sectors; the magnitude of foreign aid to Jordan were shown, and we " 
also analysed their composition and effects on the economy. In this 
chapter, we review the main points developed in the previous-analyses, 
and reach some conclusion about the magnitude, oorfposition and effects 
of foreign aid to Jordan.
A _ the developments in the basic sectors
There was an upward trend in the country’s total income.The volume 
of Gross National Product (G.N.P.) rose from about J.D. 99.1 million in 
1959 to J.D. 252.4 million in 1972, an average yearly increase of 10 per 
cent over the whole period. In percapita terms, gross national income 
grew from about J.D. 60.4 to almost J.D. 102.2, over the same period.
The value added in all the sectors grew. However, the fifties witnessed 
a significant structural development which saw an increase in the share of 
the service sector in the G.N.P. The increase in the share of the service 
sector is significant from the point of the future development of the 
economy in that this sector does not produce internationally traded goods.
The agricultural sector made the largest contribution to G.N.P. 
and provided a livelihood for a large proportion of the population. Yet
v
it failed to bridge the country's food gap. Agricultural production was 
characterised by underutilization of land, manpower and export potential 
and by heavy dependence on dry farming. Besides, credit to this sector 
was disproportionately low. The above characteristics of the agricultural 
sector had caused fluctuations in its output and low productivity. Had 
there been heavy investment in irrigation and agricultural land, this would 
have increased productivity in agticulture and thus improved the economy’s
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overall performance.
Though the industrial sector (mining and manufacturing) was virtually 
non-existent before the fifties, later it became important. Shortages of 
finance of managerial and technical know-how, of raw materials as weli as 
the narrowness of the domestic market;,were the constrainants which hampered 
the development of this sector. The import-substitution policy had several 
effects, prominent among them were low-quality and high prices of industrial 
goods. Besides, the liberal trade policy encouraged imports and inhibited 
the production of inputs similar to those imported from abroad.
There was no drastic change’in the fiscal sector- over the period 
under.study. There was a constant budget deficit which increased during 
the 1950 s and after. Government current expenditure took the biggest 
share of total expenditure, and the defence component constituted more 
than half of this total. As domestic revenues financed only a small 
proprtion of total expenditure, foreign aid became the usual source of 
government revenue. Strictly speaking, Jordan’s domestic- revenues mostly 
came from a regressive tax system in which, indirect taxes (mostly customs 
duties) figured prominently. Furthermore, no serious attempts were made,, 
on the part of the government, to tap domestic sources of revenues.
In the trade sector, we found that the inability of the goods- 
producing sectors to meet increasing domestic demand lead to increases in 
imports. Thus a liberal trade policy had to be adopted. Exports, on the
other hand, were not increased enough to counter the increase in the volume 
of imports; therefore, a deficit on the visible account of the balance of 
payments persisted and this was covered by foreign aid. in the late fifties 
new foreign exchange sources, other than foreign aid and exports, became 
important as balancing factors in the balance of payment accounts namely: 
remittances from Jordanians working abroad and income from tourism. However,
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bearing in mind the high degree of uncertainty that accompanied the receipts 
from those sources of foreign exchange, the Jordanian balance of payments 
in turn, was hostage to exogenous factors. On the whole, the foreign 
trade sector appeared to have undergone few changes, and few efforts 
were made to curtail imports and improve their composition, or increase 
exports and to rectify the economy's trade deficits,
; /
B - MAGNITUDES, COMPOSITION AND SOURCES OF FOREIGN AID'
Data on foreign aid to Jordan is not readily available. What we 
have done is to collate and combine data from diverse sources in order to' 
arrive at the magnitude of foreign aid to Jordan. In the process, we 
faced several problems related to recording and classification of data. 
Discrepancies were found in the data on foreign aid collected by two 
main governmental agencies, i.e., the Central Bank of Jordan and the 
Ministry of Finance. Further discrepancies were found between data 
appearing in government sources and those provided by donors. Our task 
was to identify such discrepancies and give as clear a picture as possible 
of the aid flow to Jordan. As for the types of foreign aid which went 
unrecorded, we found that grants, particularly those in kind, were the 
main source of discrepancy. Aid-in-kind was prone to misrecording owing 
to the fact that it did not impose a financial liability on the economy. 
Secondly, the process of valuation itself involves errors. It can be 
said, in this respect that the errors that stemmed from the process of 
valuation could be avoided by drawing clear procedures and guidelines and 
putting competent officials in charge of such procedures. As for the 
misrecording of foreign aid that passes through commerical banks and 
money exchangers, it is the Central Bank's duty to devise strict regulations 
that would allow for clear registration »of aid flows, ;
As far as the magnitudes of foreign aid are concerned, Jordan received 
an amount totalling J.D. 681.5 million over the 48 years under study
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(1924-25/1972-73), of which J.D. 608.0 million was in the form of 
unrequited transfers and the remaining J.D. 73.5 million in the form 
of loans. Over the period 1950-1972, grants averaged 91,4% of total 
foreign aid, while loans were only 8.6%. The latter steadily increased 
in relative importance (it averaged 12% over 1960-1972). Budget support 
has always been the most significant in terms of its ratio to both the 
total aid flow and to total unrequited transfers. Clt averaged 58.4% 
and 63.9% respectively over the period 1950-1972), The significance 
of these ratios lies in the fact that the biggest proportion of foreign 
aid did not impose great financial obligations on the Jordanian economy. 
However, when we compared the respective position of unrequited transfers 
to Jordan and other aid-receiving Middle Eastern and Asian countries, 
we found that Jordan’s position was unique: in terms of the ratio of 
grants received to exports earnings, imports and Gross Domestic Product, 
Jordan was among the first three., Further, Jordan ranked second in 
receiving unrequited transfers in relation to the size of heV population.
The number of countries and institutions from which Jordan received
foreign aid was limited: approximately seven countries and few international 
organizations. Aid from bilateral sources was, on average, 78.4% of the 
total over 1950-1972 and this source became more important over the later 
period (82.5% over 1960-1972), Most of the total aid received was from 
Western Countries. They were the source of more than half of the total 
aid during the period under study. Aid from the United States alone 
accounted for three quarters of total Western aid. The second largest 
source was the oil-rich Arab couhtries. The reasons for the preponderance 
of Western donors were political.
In short, with Jordan largely owing her creation and stability to 
Western countries, particularly Britain and the United States of America
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her options in looking for diverse sources of foreign aid were limited.
By being made to constantly rely on Western aid, Jordan has been forced 
to impose upon herself certain political obligations and to discriminate 
among foreign aid donors. On the other hand, she did not take into 
consideration the effects that accompny such, kind of foreign aid, for 
example, discontinuity was one aspect of bilateralism .. which 
characterised aid relationship between Jordan and donors. The other 
aspect was that strings were attached to this kind of aid. It can thus 
be said that so long as the security of the state dictates reliance on 
the above-mentioned sources of foreign aid, then it becomes clear that 
Jordan's options are limited. Therefore, she should rely more on her 
domestic resources. Besides, she should attempt to persuade her traditional 
aid donors to make the utilization of foreign aid close to the development 
needs of the economy.
C - THE OBJECTIVES OF AID DONORS
Foreign aid to Jordan was concomitant with the creation of the State, 
in which international politics played a major role. Political motives 
behind foreign aid to the country over-shadowed other interests. In the 
first place, the country itself does not represent an economic stake for 
donors and her importance has been a function of geopolitical factors. 
Jordan is a moderate Middle Eastern state. She is located amid progressive 
Arab states and moderate oil - rich ones. Further, she is separating 
Israel from other Arab countries and representing a key to the Arab - 
Israeli conflict. For all these factors, Jordan has attracted a constant 
flow of Western economic and political support. It can thus be seen that 
aid was given to Jordan more for the fulfilment of political obligations 
than for the economic development of the country.
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D - TERMS OF FOREIGN AID
It was mentioned earlier that grants offered to Jordan by donors 
were, on average, 91.4% of total aid over the period 1950-1972. Loans 
were only 8.6% though they steadily increased in relative importance 
overthe 1960's and early 1970's. Loans, like grants, constitute an inflow 
of capital to Jordan. In this sense, the economic analysis of loans is 
not different from that of grants. However, in the case of loans, an 
additional factor has to be taken into consideration: Loans, unlike 
grants, generate, after a time lag an outflow of capital in the form of 
repayments of the principal plus interest. Total accumulated debts of 
the country have steadily increased over the years. It increased from 
J.D. 10.8 million in 1960 to about J.D. 64.5 million in 1972.
The financial terms of loans, judged from their principal indices, 
viz., interest rate, grace period, gestation period and repayable 
currency, have greatly varied. Interest rates varied from nil on loans 
from the United Kingdom,,Saudi Arabia and Denmark to 7.5% on commercial 
loans. Grace period varied from 10 years on loans from the International 
Development Association (I.D.A.) and some of the American ones to very 
low, and even nil, on some commercial loans. As for maturity dates, they 
ranged from 4 years on some commercial loans to 50 years on I.D.A. loans. 
Repayments were in.hard currencies. In terms of the above indices, the 
terms of I.D.A. loans were the easiest, followed in order of easiness by 
those of the United States and the United Kingdom,
In order to show the degree of concessions in loans and to compare 
the financial terms on which loans were given to Jordan, we calculated the 
'^rant element", i.e., the difference between the face value of a loan and 
present value of all future debt service payments. The results showed that 
most of loans given to Jordan, with the exception of the commercial loans,
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involved a significant degree of concession. Again the I.D.A. loans 
appeared to have had the highest grant delement (78.0%), followed directly 
by British loans (60.0%). Loans from the U.S. ranked fifth.
What could be gathered from the discussion of terms of loans is 
that in"financial terms" most of the borrowing by Jordan has been 
worthwhile. The terms of the I.D.A. loans were the easiest, and Jordan 
must, if further borrowing were needed, acquire more from I.D.A. and other 
multilateral sources. The qualification ’in financial terms" is important 
because the conclusion, at least in the case of particular loans, may well 
be different when the "cost of procurement ties" is taken into 
consideration.
The indices of the debt service capacity of the economy of Jordan 
had shown that the debt service ratio, i.e., ratio of debt service 
payments to Gross National Product (G.N.P.) and Gross Domestic Product 
(G.D.P.), was low. The outstanding debt to G.N.P. ratio was also low. 
However, as a substantial proportion of the output produced in the economy 
of Jordan is composed of commodities, which cannot be sold internationally, 
and as debt service payments must be paid in foreign exchange, the debt 
servicing capacity of the Jordanian economy, judged from the previous 
two indices underestimated the burden of foreign debt, or the economy's 
capacity to fulfil its debt obligations.
It should be noted that Jordan has used her foreign aid receipts 
to service her debts. In this respect, one can conclude that the Jordanian 
economy was not burdened with debt payments, and, consequently, the economy 
can afford to keep on acquiring more debt. This conclusion can only be 
valid if it is assumed that Jordan will keep on receiving preferential 
treatment from aid donors.
As far as Jordan's potential burden of debt service payments is 
concerned, one must not overlook the fact that one of the improtant
determinants of debt service capacity is the country’s ability to 
selectively control its total imports. A rough indicator of the economy’s 
ability to do so could be the ratio of imported consumer goods (other than 
food) to the total importables. As far as Jordan is concerned, the ratio 
of imported consumer goods to total imports had averaged 53.0%, over the 
period 1960-1972. Therefore, one can conclude that Jordan is potentially 
capable of drastically cutting her import bill. However, it should be noted 
that Jordan will still have a balance of payments deficit even if no 
consumer goods are imported.
Fürther, in assessing the "potential" burden of debt and debt 
service payments, the following factors should be kept in mind. Export 
earnings cover only a small proportion of total imports (16.8% over 1960- 
1972) and most of imports are financed by foreign aid. Besides, export 
receipts were the only stable source of foreign exchange. However, as 
Jordan is not of economic interest but of political importance to aid 
donors, a change in the political factors in the Middle East may well 
mean a decrease in the political importance of Jordan and a consequent 
decrease in foreign aid. If an unfavourable turn in political events 
is assumed probable, then it cannot be argued that debt service payments 
will pose no problem to the economy.
K - THE SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AID AND HOW IT CORRESPONDS 
WITH THE NEEDS OF THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY.
As indicated earlier in our study, foreign aid to Jordan was given 
partly as unrequited transfers and partly as loans. As far as the 
distribution of unrequited transfers is concerned, we pointed out earlier 
that the relevant figures are not available. Lacking something better, 
we used the distribution of government expenditures as the indicator of 
the distribution of the aid given in the form of budgetary support. To 
start with, three quarters (78.8% of the total government expenditure-over
1950-1972) of government expenditure.was recurrent expenditure. On the 
other hand, development expenditure averaged 21.2% of the total. Over 
the period 1950-1972, more than half of the government expenditure 
(54.4%) went to defence and the maintenance of internal security, and 
practically very little was devoted to economic development. One could, 
with ample justification, conclude that most of aid in the form of 
unrequited transfers went towards maintaining the high level of 
expenditure on defence. Therefore, aid in this form was not geared towards 
economic development.
Concerning the distribution of loans, government departments and 
agencies which deal with foreign aid do not compile or publish data on 
the sectoral distribution of loans to Jordan. The available data were 
merely confined to the titles of projects. Needless to say, these titles 
were at most times vague and confusing. Further, loans were made in the 
national currencies of creditors. However, we converted them into a 
common denominator viz., U.S. dollars and constructed a general table 
of resource distribution out of the individual tables.
When we consider the economic background of the Jordanian economy,
(e.g: under investment in goods-producing sectors such as agriculture, 
industry and other sectors which are capable of earning foreign exchange, 
lack of technical and managerial know-how), one would expect that the 
authorities allocate more of available resources (domestic and foreign) 
to those vital sectors. The contrary, in fact, occurred. There was a 
biased distribution of Imns towards non-goods-producing sectors and this 
did not allow the country to solve its pressing problems. Transport and 
health between themselves absorbed more than 70.0% of loans. By and large, 
these sectors do not directly contribute to the exports earnings of the 
economy. On the other hand, there was a relative neglect of goods-producing
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sectors as well as housing and education. In addition, sectors which 
are potentially capable of earning foreign exchange particularly tourism, 
were also neglected in terms of loan distribution.
Foreign aid was given to cover the country’s budget deficits, the 
deficits on the visible accounts of the balance of payments (financing 
of imports) and the consumption needs of the economy. Therefore, it can 
be said that the distribution of foreign aid (use of resources) was not 
compatible with the needs and the scale of priorities of the Jordanian 
economy. Hence, the capacity of the Jordanian economy to fulfil its 
debt obligations was not improved. Besides, Jordan had little say in 
the allocation of foreign resources owing to the fact that donors, 
themselves, normally specify the allocation of such resources.
F - THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN AID
We have said earlier that foreign aid to Jordan was tied to projects 
and to procurements in the donors’ home market. It is, partly, with this 
background that the effects of foreign aid could be traced. To begin with, 
the overall effect was on the structural development of the economy. There 
appeared to have been two factors which contributed to the structural 
development of the economy, in the sense that there was a bias towards the 
services-producing sectors, "structual factors", i.e., factors which are 
inherent in the economy of Jordan itself viz., a relatively low resource 
endowment and low technical and administrative know-how, have created 
rigidity in the supply side of the goods-producing sectors in contrast to 
that of the services’sectors. On the other hand, "precipitating factors" 
were the policies followed both at home and by donors.
Donors had used tied aid effectively in shaping the pattern of 
development of the Jordanian economy. Tying of aid had caused resources 
to be distributed in a manner liable to increase the,rigidity of the economy 
initially caused by the low level of development. The services sectors,
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favoured by donors, developed and income was also generated. The created 
demand was not met by domestically - produced commodities but by 
imports owing to the fact that the elasticity of supply of the goods - 
producing sectors was low and the services-producing sectors did not 
produce commodities that could meet the increased demand. One could say, 
in this respect, that tied aid, coupled with the incompetence of the 
Jordanian economic apparatus, gave donor countries freedom in selecting 
projects that fitted their objectives. Accordingly, as far as the 
utilization of tied aid was concerned, by accepting this type of aid,
Jordan did substitute the donors' investment preferences for her own.
The effects of the imposition of the donors' investment preferences on 
Jordan were that undue priority was given to some of the social and 
economic infrastructural projects; the selected projects were of 
high import-content; and the techniques adopted in the selected projects 
were capital-intensive and the choice of techniques did not take into 
consideration Jordan's resource endowment. No doubt investment policies 
adopted by Jordan, e.g., the liberal trade policy, the investment policy, 
foreign exchange policy, had contributed to the latter results.
Another effect of tied aid was the prices paid for aid-financed 
commodities were higher than those in the World market. It is the 
absence of international tenders and the lack of detailed information on 
the prices and qualities of aid-sponsored commodities that precluded a 
quantitative estimate of the extent to which Jordan has been overcharged. 
Yet there were three things which shed light on such price overcharges: 
Firstly, certain donors, such as the United States, had caused Jordan, 
through aid agreements, to give away the freedom of selecting suppliers in 
the U.S. market. This implied monopolistic prices. Secondly, some aid 
agreements encouraged suppliers in donor countries to act together and
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collusion cannot be discounted in such circumstances. Further, certain 
aid agreements have treated price charges at home on a par with those of 
tied commodities. It is, however, known in business that F.o.h. prices 
for sales overseas tend to be less than the domestic prices. Equating 
F.o.b. prices for overseas sales with domestic ones results in overcharging, 
which Jdrdan could have avoided had funds been free. Thirdly, the 
literature we reviewed on the quantification of the overcharges paid by 
several developing countries as a result of tied-aid practices in the past, 
had pointed to the same, i.e., there is a degree of overcharging on 
commodities purchased by the tied funds. If one adds to the above- 
mentioned points the charges Jordan was obliged to pay for agreements with 
donor countries, i.e., commissions, fees and expenses related to the 
execution, issuance, delivery or registration and banking charges, then it 
becomes clear that ties and strings attached to aid agreements - accepted 
by Jordan - reduced the real value of the foreign aid offered.
However, there are other effects of tied aid. The restrictions 
which render Jordan's outstanding debt instantly due if there were any 
default, denied the economy of Jordan the flexibility necessary for a 
smooth process of development.
There were other conditions laid down in aid agreements. Some of 
these conditions were political like the clauses which inhibited Jordan's 
freedom of trade with other countries (e.g. Eastern block countries) and 
those clauses which demanded dissemination of information about aid- 
financed projects. These restrictions, in fact, reflected a desire on 
the part of donors to further their political image. Finally, conditions 
such as the issuing of "binding instruction" and the imposition of the 
U.S. employment legislation, hardly considered Jordan as an equal partner 
besides interferring with Jordanian judicial sovereignty.
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From the performance of the Jordanian economy over the period 
under study, we realized that gross national income (G.N.P.) and 
percapita income attained rates of growth averaging 10% and 7%, 
respectively. Gross domestic capital formation maintained a high rate 
of growth as well as a high ratio to G.N.P. It recorded an average of 
17% of G.N.P. over the period 1960-1972. The figures of domestic savings 
calculated by two distinctive approaches, demonstrated negative savings 
in the economy during the period under study. In contrast, aggregate 
consumption was escalating and maintained a level which exceeded both 
G.N.P. and G.D.P. during most of the period under consideration. However, 
high rates of income and investment, far exceeding domestic savings, 
would not have been possible without the inflow of foreign aid. Similarly, 
high levels of consumption would not have been possible without aid.
We tried to assess the impact of foreign aid on certain macro- 
economic variables, particularly domestic savings. We gave importance 
to the fact that, in order to judge the real contribution of foreign aid 
to the Jordanian economy, we should consider its effects on domestic 
savings. Changes in domestic savings signify the degree to which the 
Jordanian economy has made serious efforts towards development. Of course, 
we do not overlook or deny the several other effects of foreign aid on 
the economy.
Regression results show that domestic savings in Jordan are related 
not only to the level of income but also to the volume of foreign aid. 
Beisdes, domestic savings are inversely associated with foreign aid. As 
for the impact of aid on consumption and investment, the results show 
positive and significant impacts. On the other hand, the response of the 
rate of growth in income to a unit change in the level of foreign aid 
is positive but insignificant.
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The possible ways whereby foreign aid affected domestic savings 
are the following: With, on average, 91.4% of foreign aid in outright 
grants to the public sector, the government budget was able to maintain 
an irrational allocation of funds. Current public expenditures averaged 
79% of total expenditures. National security, social services and fiscal 
administration, on average, absorbed more than three quarters of total 
government expenditures. On one hand, such expenditures were consumption 
expenditures, and on the other, they were apt to generate incomes for 
recipients, supplement their disposable income and large proportion of 
it tended to go to consumption. When such foreign grants were considered 
by the government as part of its regular disposable income, the government 
increased its current expenditures (consumption expenditure). Consequently, 
the government budget was in deficit. (Government dissaving). The factors 
which gave momentum to such dissaving in the public sector were found to 
be closely related to the inflow of foreign aid. In circumstances such as 
those prevailing in Jordan, where foreign aid could be drawn upon with 
some degree of ease, an atmosphere of dependence and lack of readiness to 
utilize domestic resources (taxes in particular) prevailed. In other words, 
foreign aid created within the public sector a sense of laxity and 
policies needed for reshaping the source and use of resources were shelved, 
and even blocked. Actually, opportunities existed for introducing tax 
reform in Jordan, yet they were not taken advantage of because of the 
dependence on foreign aid.
Private consumption, fed by income generated through aid, escalated; 
and was extended to imported goods. A precipitating factor was the adoption 
of a liberal trade policy whose survival was made possible, in the first 
place, by the availability of foreign exchange (mainly from foreign aid).
2 8 1
Imported consumption goods constituted, on average, 61.3% of total imports, 
over 1958-1972. Further, imports of consumption goods were able to 
maintain their high share in total consumption expenditures. They averaged 
39.0% over 1950-1972. As far as Jordan is concerned, it can be realized 
that the accelerated increase in private consumption could not be financed 
without adverse repercussions on domestic savings and investment.
One should also mention the fact that the acquisition of government funds 
by the Specialized Credit Institutions, coupled with direct finance from 
foreign sources, stopped those institutions from seriously attempting to 
create self-generated resources (savings). Furthermore, their policies 
towards the sectors they served, i.e., easy credit, laxity in collecting 
accumulated overdue debts,postponement and sometimes cancellation of debts, 
contributed to the fact that the saving behaviour of both these institutions 
and the private sector were negatively affected. This situation was 
aggravated by a lack of readiness or competence to float their own bonds on 
the market as well as by easy access to foreign funds.
In summary, Jordan had received a large volumne of foreign aid.
Large in relation to the country's macro-economic variables. Jordan was 
also among the first fiiree aid-receiving countries in terms of the ratio 
of grants received to exports earnings, imports and gross domestic product.
In addition, among the aid-receiving countries we examined, Jordan ranked 
second in receiving grants in relation to her population.
What is stricking in the aid given to Jordan is the overwhelming 
size of the unrequited transfers particularly budget support. They 
were given because of the geo-political importance of the country.
But one should not forget that the share of repayable loans in the 
total flow of aid is steadily increasing. The Jordanian authorities 
should be aware of this trend as receipt of loans involves an accumulation 
of financial obligation on the economy. Attention must be given to 
both the terms of such loans as well as to their utilization within the 
economy.
There is no doubt that foreign aid to Jordan had contributed to 
the rate of growth attained over the period under consideration. Jordan 
was made capable of financing her deficits on visible accounts, as well as 
government budget deficits. She was able to maintain high levels of 
expenditures on defence and security with minimum strain on domestic 
resources. Further, investment and consumption expenditures were 
supplemented by the inflow of foreign aid. Yet, the increase in output
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attained by Jordan was derived more from services sectors than from 
goods producing sectors. The services sectors do not produce saleable 
commodities which would finance future growth. So the development in 
the economy with this service-sector base had a shaky foundation.
Investment was mainly financed by foreign aid. Domestic resources 
were not made to contribute to investment expenditures. Moreover, 
foreign aid had created a sense of laxity in the economy and policies 
needed for reshaping the source and use of resources were shelved, 
and even blocked (particularly tax reform). It can also be said that 
the composition and the rate of increase in consumption expenditures - 
made possible by foreign aid - was objectionable. Consumption of imported 
luxury items was increasing at a high rate at the expense of savings and 
investment.
Foreign aid, however, did not provide a long-term solution to the 
economic problems of Jordan, besides it inhibited the utilization of
domestic resources.
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TABLE I
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST 
195$ ~ 1959.
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS 1
Gross Domestic 
Product at Pactor 
Costs (G.P.D.)
Agriculture And 
Forestry
Mining, Manufact­
uring & Electricity
Construction Tr«msP°rt 
1 :
Trad« and Banking Owne
Due]
rship of 
lings
Public Adminis 
and Defence
tration Seivices
Value
Absolute
Increase
Z
Increase Value
1
Absolute
Increase
X
Increase !Value
Absolute Z
Increase Value
Absolute
Increase
X
increase !Value
Absolute
Increase
Z
Increase Value
Absolute
Increase
z
Increase Value
Absolute
Increase
X
increase Value
Absolute
Increase
%
Increase Value
Absolute
Increase
Z
Increase
195$ $7.7 14.2 4.2 1.2 - - 4.4 i - 9.3 - - 2.3 - - 9.1 - - 3.0 - -
1955 $3.0 -$.7 -10.0 6.2 -8.0
•
-56.3 5.2 1.0 24.0 1.5 0.3 25.0 5.3 Ì l.i 25.0 9.3 - - 2.3 - - 9.7 0.6 7.0 3.3 0.3 10.0
1956 61.$ 18.$0 $3.0 19.0 12.8 206.5 6.3 1.1 21.2 1.7 0.2 13.3 6.8 •’ 1.3 24.0 10.5 1.2 13.0 2.9 0.6 26.0 11.5 1.8 19.0 2.7 -0.6 -18.2
1957 61.9 0.50 1.0 12.8 -6.2 -33.0 6.8 0.5 8.0 1.9 0.2 12.0 8.3 1,5 22.1 12.0 1.5 14.3 3.1 0.2 7.0 13.3 1.8 16.0 3.7 1.0 37.0
1958 69.1 7.2 12.0 12.9 0.1 1.0 7.6 0.8 12.0 2.4 0.5 26.3 9.0 0.7 8.4 14.4 2.4 20.0 3.3 0.2 6.5 15.6 2.3 17.3 3.9 0.2 5.4
1959 73.3 $.2 6.1 10.5 -2.4 -19.0 7.9 0.3 4.0 3.7 1.3 54.2 9.7 0.7 8.0 16.2 1.8 13.0 4.2 0.9 27.3 16.1 0.5 3.2 6.0 2.1 54.0
Average 59.$ $.3 9.0 13.0 -0.6 16.5 6.3 0.6 12.0 2.1 0.4 22.0 7.3 0.9 15.0 12.0 1.2 10.1 3.0 0.3 11.1 13.0 1.2 10.4 4.0 0.5 15.0
Source: R.S. Porter, Economic Trends in Jordanf 1954-1959. fBeirut: Middle East Development Division, July 1961)
3oi
.TABLE 2.
TOTAL RESOURCES A N D  THEIR USE CAT fHRRFNT PPTfgg) 
1954 - 1972
19SA
IN MIL 
’ 1956
LIONS CF J0RDA1 
1-1957-,
U A N  DI NARS
09.58_________ 1959__________I960---------- 1-1961___ IQ**) 1Q6A 1965 1966 1967 1968 1963 1970 -9U_________ 1972____
Value Z Value Z ! Value z Value t Value X Value X Value X Value <r Value z Value X Value Z Value % Value z Value Z V a lue X Value z Value | Z Value X Value X
Gross Domestic Product 51.3 72.2 47.3 63.8 66.6 71.8 67.4 67.5 75.2 67.3 93.53 68.3 98.30 67.6 ji20O4 ,2.0 118.90 69.7 129.06 67.9 148.95 72.4 167.61 72.5 170.63 69.0 194.71 75.4 il86.91 67.3 219.69 57.0 209.86 J70.0 223.42 70.6 239.50 70.3
Imports of Goods & Services 19.8 27.8 26.8 36.2 26.2 28.2 32.4 32.5 36.7 32.7 43.37 31.7 47.05 32.4 -i6l5.?_28.0 51.80 30.3 61.06 37.1 56.65 27.6 63.55 97.5 76.60 31.0 63.68 ¡4.6 j  90.98 32.7 108.69 33.0 89.89 tJO.O 93.01 29.4 101.01 29.7
Total Resources 71.10 100 74.10 100 92.80 100 99.80 100 [Til. 90 100 136.90 100 145.35 100 J66.75 m n 170.70 100 190.12 100 205.60 100 231.16 LOO 247.23 100 258.39 100 1277.89 100 100 T99.7T 100 316.43 TOST 340.51 Tea “
Uses of Resources 
Consumption 59.1 83.1 61.7 81.7 69.7 75.1 79.3 79.9 92.8 83.0 112.6 82.2 115.5 79.5 130.9 78.5
"61.6
131.4 77.0 L49.8 78.8 155.8 75.8 174.8 75.6 187.71 75.7 205.0 79.3(2 12 .01 76.3
231.6 70.5 227.1 75.8 245.9 77.7 262.0 77.0
Private ¿5.6 63.8 47.1 63.6 52.9 57.0 60.1 60.2 67.1 60.0 87.1 63.6 88.5 60.9 102.8 '102.4 60.C 16.8 61.4 123.5 60.1 138.0 59.7 149.6 60.5 158.6 8174153'4 T O " t w t t " JoTTI 165.1 35.1 183.0 57.8 192.0 56.4 “Public 13.7 19.3 14.6 18.1 16.8 18.1 19.7 19,7 25,7 23.0 25.5 18.6 27.0 18.6 —  16.9 29.0 17.0 33.0 17.4 32.3 15.7 36.8 15.9 37.5 15.2 46.4 17.9 58.6 Tl.l! 67 .1 t e r n 62.0 2o.7 62.9 T O T T O T O  ”Gross Capital Formation 5.9 8.3 6.1 8 .2 13.7 14.8 9.3 9.3 8.2 7.3 12.6 9.2 17.1 11.8 r ^ . o  i n H 20.2 ll.fi 20.0 10.5 25.3 12.3 27.8 12.0 2 8 . 1 a .  4 ¿5.6 10 .6  3 7 . 5 T3.j .'l9.6 r i o T 13.4 49.8 h r r r 44.1 13.0Exports of Goods & Service 6.1 8.6 7.3 8.1 9.4 10.1 10.7 10.7 9.9 3.8 11.8 8.6 12.8 8.8 17.0 10.2 19.1 11.2 20.3 10.7 24.6 12.0 28.5 \2 .3 32.1 13.0 27.. 7 10 .7 28 .3 10".2! '32.3 1 9.8 J2.2 10.? 26.9 34.2 " T O  “Annual Rate of Increase 
in Investment 3.4 L24.6 -32.1 -12.0 53.7 35.7 n . i 6.3 -1.0 26.5 10.0 1.1 -8.9 46,5 71.7 -37.7 0.2 -11.4
Annual Rate of Increase 
in Imports 2.6 -2.2 23.7 13.3 18.3 8.5 -l.i 11.2 18.0 -7.2 12.2 20.4 -16.B 43.0 19.5 -17.2 3.3 8.6
Annual Rate of Increase 
in Consumption 4.4 13.0 14.5 16.3 21.3 2.5 13.3 0.4 • 14.0 4.0 12.3 7.0 9.6 3.4 9.2 -2.0 8.3 6.5
Rate of Charge in Total 
Svailable Resources 4.2 25.2 7.5 12.1 22.3 6.2 14.7
— _ 2.4
11.4 8.1 12.4 6.9 4.5 7.6 18.2 -8.7 5.6 7.6
Source: (i) R.S. Porter, Economic Trends in Jordan, 1954-1959 ¿(Beirut : Middle East Development Division, July 1961)
(For data related to the period 1954-58)
(ii) Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts. 1959-1966» (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, n.d.); 
and 1967-1972, (Amman: Dept* of Staticts Press, May 1973), (For data related to the period 1959 - 1972)«
TABLE 3
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
1927 - 1959-
IN THOUSANDS OF TONS
1927 1932 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 L946 1947 1949 1950 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Wheat 35 42 113 85 168.4 171 71 113 100 93.6 112.2 90 37 139 106 225.2 99.7 230.1 79.4 242.5 219.8 65.6 103.5
Barley 12 10 53 45 98.3 58 31 51 55 40.2 53.3 37 8 56 41.4 92.5 42.9 L04.0 25.5 96.2 80.6 16.8 26.0
Tobacco 0.1 0.04 0.03 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 3.1 12.8 200.0 194.4 1.0 0.6
Other Field 
Crops 7 9.4 28 24.3 33.7 35.2 13.6 21.5 30.4 30.5 35.4 27 12.3 31.9 30.6 58.1 44.7 35.6
Tomatoes 52.1 48.0 52.2 65.4 74.4 126.1
Other Veget­
ables 6 170.0 347.6 L52.9 71.1 92.5 136.0 117.0 284.9
Olives 10.5 10.0 2.2 10.4 1.5 10.6 14.2 62.4 49.2 61.4 12.0 71.5 14.0 52.4 11.2
Grapes 22.5 20.5 19.2 26.5 15.2 24.7 24.0 ' 48.8 41.0 52.0 31.5 37.0 47.0 42.6 54.1
Citrus Fruit 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.1 5.8
Water Melons
Other Fruits
Source: (i) A. Konikoff, o£. cit., for data on field crops covering the years 1927, 1932 and 1937 - 1943. Data on grapes and olives production 
for the years 1937 - 1943 and data on tobacco production for the years 1937 - 1942 are also derived from this source.
(ii) U. S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Data Book, Near East and Independent Africa, (Washington, D.C.Î1952),
OIR, No. 5531 (Revised), Table 8, p.81. Covers data on wheat, barley and tobacco production for the years 1946 - 1950. 'father vegetables'! For 1946/1950
(iii) Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background information, op. cit.,(Covers Wheat, 
barley and tobacco production for the years 1943 - 1945 and other field crops for the years 1944 - 1945). ;
(iv) Human Relations Area Files, Jordan: Country Survey Series, (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files,1957), Table 20, p.131. |
(Covers data on wheat, other field crops, Barley, grapes, Fruits and vegetables, tobacco and olives, for the years 1952 - ¡1954;
The item "other vegetables" of the years 1952 - 1953 includes fruits and vegetables. j
(v) Jordan Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, Several Years). They cover agricultural 
production for the years 1954 - 1959.
* The item "other vegetables" of the years 1954 - 1959 includes eggplant, cauliflowers, cabbages, cucumber and melons only. .
* Empty spaces denote lack of information. !
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TABLE 4
POPULATION GROWTH. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
AND TREND IN PERCAPITA INCOME,1954 - 1972.
VALUES IN J.D. MILLIONS - POPULATION IN NUMBERS
Time
Expenditures 
on National 
Product
No. of 
Population
Percapita
Income
(in J. Dinars)
Percapita 
Income 
1954 = 100 Time
Expenditures 
on Gross 
National Product
No. of 
Population
Percapita
Income
(in Jordanian 
Dinars)
Percapita 
Income 
1954 = 100
1954 52.4 1,390,000 37.7 100 1965 180.54 1,950,000 92.6 246
1955 49.8 1,440,000 34.6 92 1966 185.78 2,010,000 92.4 245
1956 68.5 1,480,000 46.3 123 1967 205.95 2,080,000 99.0 263
1957 70.1 1,527,000 45.8 121 1958 197.28 2,150,000 91.8 244
1958 77.1 1,580,000 48.8 129 1969 233.72 2,230,000 104.8 278
1959 99.13 1,636,000 60.4 160 1970 222.5 2,310,000 • 96.3 255
1960 105.69 1,690,000 62.5 166 1971 236.59 2,380,000 99.4 - 264
1961 127.14 1,710,000 74.3 197 1972 252.36 2,470,000 102.2 271
1962 130.83 1,770,000 73.9 196
1963 137,62 1,820,000 75.6 201
! 1964 160.62 1,880,000 85.4 227
i/t
Source: (i) United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, (New York: U.N., 1960). s
(ii) I.M.F., International Financial Statistics, (Washington, D.C4 I.M.F., n.d.), Supplement to 1972
TABLE 5
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES AND 
EXPENDITURES ON NATIONAL SECURITY 1924-25/1972-73
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN;DINARS
Time
Total
Govern­
ment
Expend­
itures
(1)
Total
Govern­
ment
Revenues
(2)
Defence
And
Security
Expendit­
ures
(3)
Ratio 
3 to 1
Ratio
of
3 to 2
Defence 
Expend­
itures 
1924 - 
100 Time
Total
Govern­
ment
Expend­
itures
(1)
Total
Govern­
ment
Revenues
(2)
Defence
and
Security
Expendit­
ures
(3)
Ratio
of
3 to 1
Ratio
of
3 to 2
Defence 
Expend­
itures 
1950 - 
100
Total 
Govern­
ment 
Expend- 
Time itures 
(1)
Total
Govern­
ment
Revenue!
(2)
Defence
and
Security 
■ Expend­
itures
(3)
Ratio
of
3 to 1
Ratio
of
3 to 2
1924-25
to
1933-34 0.321 0.321 0.129 40.2 40.2 100 1950 9.14 9.29 4.290 47.0 46.2 100 1962 37.62 38.85 18.720 50.0 48.2
1.934-35 0.369 0.3^8 0.142 38.5 38.0 110.1 1951 13.79 12.66 5.860 42.5 46.3 137.0 1963 39.34 36.36 19.110 49.0 53.0
L935-36 0.381 0.396 0.147 38.6 37.0 114.0 1952 13.43 13.46 8.980 67.0 67.0 209.3 1964 43.63 46.21 21.610 50.0 47.0
11936-37 0.435 0.419 0.156 36.0 37.2 121.0 1953 15.46 15.94 9.010 58.3 57.0 210.0 1965 46.99 44.59 22.213 47.3 50.0
|l937-38 0.463 0.459 0.161 35.0 35.1 125.0 1954 16.56 17.67 9.520 57.5 54.0 222.0 1966 38.61 35.36 17.120 44.3 48.4
¡1938-39 0.775 0.743 0.195 25.2 26.2 151.2 1955 17.63 18.86 9.680 55.0 51.3 226.0 1967 68.15 70.42 28.557 42.0 41.0
if 9 39-40 0.866 0.844 0.274 32.0 32.5 212.4 1956 21.32 21.20 10.630 50.0 50.1 248.0 1968 80.52 71.91 39.463 49.0 55.0
1940-41 1.227 1.199 0.381 31.1 32.0 295.3 1957 23.86 25.52 13.540 57.0 53.1 316.0 1969 88.41 76.38 46.165 52.2 60.4
1941-42 1.346 1.284 0.815 61.0 63.5 632.0 1958 29.34 30.60 13.420 46.0 44.0 313.0 1970 80.71 68.38 38.214 47.3 56.0
1942-43 1.736 1.693 1.271 73.2 75.1 985.3 1959 30.82 31.76 16.730 54.3 53.0 390.0 1971 81.54 78.57 39.122 48.0 50.0
i.943-44 2.620 2.613 1.870 71.3 72.0 L450.0 1960 32.84 31.90 18.060 55.0 57.0 421.0 1972 99.63 87.96 45.071 45.0 51.21 '
! 1961 33.09 33.58 18.430 56.0 55.0 430.0
Source: (i) A Konikoff, op. cit., p. 97.(covers the period 1924-1943)
(ii) Ministry of Finance, Annual Report, (Amman: n. pub., Relevant Years) (They cover the period 1949/50 - 1972)
(iii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Several Issues. They cover defense expenditures for
the period 1964-1972. *
* 1966 (fiscal year) equals 9 months.
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TABLE 6
THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
-------------------------------------- 1948 -  v m  —
------------- - - ---------- ---------------------- “ IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Time
Total
Revenues
Domestic
Revenues
Ratio of 
Domestic 
Revenues 
to Total 
Revenues
Foreign 
Revenue s 
(Receipts)
Ratio of 
Foreign 
Revenues 
to Total 
Revenues
Tax
Revenues
Direct
Taxes
Indirect
Taxes
Ratio of 
Direct 
Taxes to 
Tax
Revenues
Ratio of 
Indirect 
Taxes to 
Tax
Revenues
Total
Expend­
itures
Recurring
Expendit­
ures
Ratio of 
Recurring 
Expendit­
ures to 
Total Exp- 
itures
Devel­
opment
Expend
itures
Ratio of 
Development 
Expenditures 
to Total 
Expenditures
Deficit
or
Surplus Time
1948 
1 94Q
4.79
6.83
2 .72
3.33
36.1 
49.0
2.07
3.50
43.22
51.24
2.112
2.281
0.353
O.i'86
1.759
1.795
16.7
21.3
83.3
78.7
4.43
6.88
• 0.360-0.50
1948- 49
1949- 50
12.8
18.0
19.5
15.7 
14.3 
18.0
19.8 
15.2
0.15
-1.13
0.03
0.48
1.11
1.23
-0.12
1.66
1.26
0.94
1950- 51
1951- 52
1952- 53
1953- 54
1954- 55
1955- 56
1956- 57
1957- 58
1958- 59
1959- 60
1950
1951
1952- 53
1953- 54
1954- 55
1955- 56
1956- 57
1957- 58
1958- 59
1959- 60
9.29
12.66
13.46
15.94
17.67
18.86
21.20
25.52
30.60
31.76
4.39
5.46
5.35
5.74
7.49
7.98
8.68
19.20
10.88
13.35
47.3.
35.4 
39.7
36.0
42.4 
42.3 
40.9 
75.2
35.5
42.0
4.90
7.20
8.11
10.20
10.18
10.88
12.52
6.32
19.72
18.41
53.00
57.00
ro.3
64.0
57.6
57.7
59.1
24.8 
64.5 
58.0
2.990
3.322
3.42
3.71
4.78
5.64 
5.69 
6.98 
7.73
9.64
0.539
0.629
0.74
0.68
0.84
0.86
1.09
1.16
1.04
1.24
2.451
2.693
2.68
3.03
3.94
4.78
4.60
5.82
6.69
8.40
18.0
18.9 
21.6
18.3
17.6
15.2
19.2
16.6
13.4
12.9
82.0
81.1
78.4
81.7
82.4
84.8
80.8
83.4 
86.6 
87.1
9.14
13.79
13.43
15.46
16.56
17.63
21.32
23.86
29.34
30.82
11.71
12.68
13.33
14.87
18.26
19.56
23.52
26.02
87.2 
82.0 
80.5
84.3
85.7 
82.0 
80.2
84.8
1.72
2.78
3.23
2.76
3.07
4.30
5.82
4.80
18.2
14.9
20.2
15.6 
21.0 
23.8
26.7 
34.6 
29.0 
26.2
-0.94
0.49
1.23
-2.98
2.58
-2.40
-3.25
2.27
-8.60
-12.03
1960- 61
1961- 62
1962- 63
1963- 64
1964- 65
1965- 66
1966
1967
1968
1969
1960- 61
1961- 62
1962- 63
1963- 64
1964- 65
1965- 66
1966
1967
1968
1969
31.90
33.58 
8.85
36.36 
46.21
44.59
35.36 
70.42 
71.92 
76.38
13.84
14.68
21,11
19.38
23.83
26.73
23.31
25.50
26.27
32.52
43.4 
43.7
54.3
53.3 
51.6
59.9
65.9 
36.2
36.5
42.6
18.06
18.90
17.74
16.98
22.38
17.86 
12.05 
44.92 
45.65
43.86
56.6
56.3
45.7
46.7
48.4
40.1
34.1
63.8
63.5 
57.4
10.58
11.48
12.73
14.23
15.89
20.52
17.93
18.27
19.09
22.99
1.30
1.52
1.79
2.01
2.02
2.51
1.96
2.16
1.82
2.28
9.28
9.96
10.94
12.22
13.87
18.01
15.97
16.11
17.27
20.71
12.3
13.2
14.1
14.1
12.7
12.2 
10.9
11.8 
9.5 
9.9
87.7
86.8
85.9
85.9 
87.3 
87.8
89.1
88.2 
90.5 
90.1
32.84
33.09
37.62 
39.34
43.63 
46.99 
38.61 
68.15 
80.52 
88.41
26.86
28.15
30.02
33.19 
34.46 
35.81 
28.31 
44.59
57.19 
65.23
81.8
85.1
79.8 
84.4
79.0
76.2
73.3
65.4
71.0
73.8
5.98
4.94
7.60
6.15
9.17
11.18
10.30
23.56
23.33
23.18
26.9
25.5
29.3
-12.33
-2.97
-11.67
1970
1971
1972
1970
1971
1972
68.38
78.57
87.96
30.26
36.10
38.50
44.2
45.9
43.8
38.12
42.47
49.46
55.8
54.1
56.2
21.46
23.59
28.31
2.49
2.93
3.43
18.97
20.66
24.88
11.6
12.4
12.1
88.4
87.6
87.9
80.71
81.54
99.63
59.03
60.71
70.47
73.1
74.5
70.7
21.68 
20.83 
29.16
Source: (i) I.M.F. International Financial Statistics, (Washington, D.C.: International Monetory Fund, n.d.), Supplement to 1972.' 
(Covers data on Government Revenue and Expenditures for the Period 1948 - 1951. _
(ii) Ministry of Finance, Annual Report, (Amman, several issues). (Covers Data on Expenditures and RevenuesJor the^years
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TABLE 7
GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
1930 - 1946 & 1950 - 1972
IN THOUSANDS OF 1..Ps. IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Year
Sover-
nment
Reven­
ues
Gover­
nment
Expend­
itures
Balance Year
Gover­
nment
Reven­
ues
Gover­
nment
Expend­
itures
Balance Year
Gover­
nment
Reven­
ues
Gover­
nment
Expend­
itures
Balance Year
Gover­
nment
Reven­
ues
Gover­
nment
Expend­
itures
Balance
1930-31 367 350 +17 1939-40 844 866 -22 1950 9,290 9,140 150 1960 31,900 32,840 940
1931-32 338 345 -7 1940-41 1,199 L.227 -28 1951 12,660 13,790 -1,130 1961 33,580 33,090 490
1932-33 355 341 +14 1941-42 1,284 1,346 -62 1952 13,460 13,430 30 1962 38,850 37,620 1,230
1933-34 381 375 +6 1942-43 1,693 1,736 -43 1953 15,940 15,460 480 1963 36,360 39,340 -2,980
1934-35 378 369 +9 1943-44 2,613 2,620 -7 1954 17,670 16,560 1,110 1964 46,210 43,630 2,580
1935-36 396 381 15 1946-47 1,126 1,126 - 1955 18,860 17,630 1,230 1965 44,590 46,990 -2,400
1936-37 419 435 -16 1956 21,200 21,320 -120 1966 35,360 38,610 -3,250
1937-38 459 463 -4.0 1957 25,520 23,860 1,660 1967 70,420 68,150 2,270
1938-39 743 775 -32 1958 30,600 29,340 1,260 1968 71,910 80,520 -8,610
1959 31,760 30,820 940 1969 76,380 88,410 -12,030
1970 68,380 80,710 -12,330
1971 78,570 81,540 -2,970
1972 87,960 99,630 -11,670
Source: (i) Congress of the U.S., House of Representative, Committee on foreign Affairs, Background Information, op.cit.,
p.76 (covering data for the years 1930 - 1932 and 1946 - 1947)
(ii) A. Konikoff, op. cit., p.95 (covering data for the years 1934/35 - 1943 - 1944)
(iii) Other figures are based on Table 5, Appendix I.
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TABLE 8
GROWTH IN DOMESTIC AND TOTAL REVENUES AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
TO GROSS NATIONAL INCOME •
I
PI:rcentages and a'/ERAGE PERCENTAG1z s
1950 ' 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 , 
_ _____
Average,
Percent.
IncreaseQ950-J.959
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 AveragePercent»
Increase
1970 1971 1972 AveragePercent.
i§56ea-e1972
Increase in 
Domestic Revenues 31.8 24.4 -2.0 7.3 30.5 6.5 8.8 121.2 -43.3 22.7- | 20.8 3.7 6.1 43.8 -8.2 23.0 12.2 -12.8 9.4 3.0 23.8 10.4 -7.0 19.3 6.6 6.3
of Increase 
in Total 
Revenues 36.0 36.3 6.3 18.4 10.9 6.7 12.4 20.4 20.0
Ì
3.8 17.1 0.4 5.3 15.7 -6.4 27.1 -3.5 -20.7 99.2 2.1 6.2 12.5 -10.5 15.0 12.0 5.5
Ratio of the 
Following to 
G.N.P:
(a) Domestic 
Revenues 14.3 16.0 12.7 27.4 14.0
(
13.5 j 16.3 13.1 11.5 16.1 14.1 15.0 15.0 16.1 12.4 13.3 14.0 14.1 14,0 15.3 15.3 15.0
fb) Tax 
Revenues - - - 9.1 11.3 8.3 10.0 10.0 9.7 6.0 10.0 9.0 9.7 10.3 10.0 11.4 10.0 8.9 9.7 10.0 10.0 9.6 10.0 11.2 10.3
Source: Based on Table 1 and Table 6» Appendix I
TABLE 9
THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC REVENUES 
1924 - 25 to 1972 - 73
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
1924-25
to
1933 T“■ 34 1934 - 35 1935 - 36 1936 - 37 1937 - 38 1938 - 39 1939 - 40 1940 - 41 1941 - 42 1942 - 43
Value Z Value Z Value 1 Z Value % Value Z Value Z Value Z Value Z Value Z Value Z
* Total Domestic 
Revenues 232 100 276 100 314 L00 288 100 358 100 339 100 379 100 389 100 433 100 448 100
a) Indirect Taxes 
of which: 91 39.2 131 *7.5 142 *5.2 170 59.0 168 47.0 172 51.0 191 50.4 187 48.1 215 50.0 213 47.5
Customs and 
Excise
b) Direct Taxes 
of which: 120 51 ¡7 113 41.0 141 45.0 89 31.0 149 42.0 133 39.2 149 39.3 156 40.1 164 38.0 176 39.3
Income tax i
Propa-ty tax
2 Other Revenues 21 9.1 32 12.0 32 10.2 29 10.1 41 11.5 34 10.0 39 10.3 47 12.1 55 12.7 58 13.0
1943 - 44 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57
 ^Total Domestic 
Revenues 646 100 2,720 100 3,330 100 4,390 100 5,460 100 5,350 100 5,740 100 7,490 L00 7,980 100 8,680 100
a) Indirect Taxes 
of which: 315 49.0 2,680 50.1 3,030 53.0 3,940 53.0 4,780 60.0 4,600 53.0
Customs and 
Excise
b) Direct Taxes 
of which: 213 33.0 740 14.0 680 L2.0 840 11.2 860 11.0 1,090 13.0
Income tax
Property tax
2 Other Revenues 118
1957 -
18.3
5958 (1958 -
r
1959 - 60 ¡I960 - 61 1961 - 62
'
1962 - 63 1963 - 64 1964 - 65 1965 - 66 1966
^ Total Domestic 
■ - Revenues 19,200 100 10,880 100 13.35C 100 13,840
!i
100 14,680 100 21,lie 100 19,380 100 23,830 100 26,730 100 29,993 100
ft) Indirect Taxes 
of which: 5,820 30.3 6.69C 61.5 8.40C 63.0 9.28C 67.1 9,960 68.0 10.94C 52.0 12,220 63.1 13,872 58.2 18,011 67.4 22,536 75.1
Customes and 
Excise 8,571 36.0 12,454 47.0 14,767 49.2
b) Direct Taxes 
of which 1,160 6.Ç 1.04C 10.0 1,240 9.3 1,30C 9.4 1,520 10.4 1,790 8.5 2,010 10.4 2,020 8.5 2,510 9.4 2,588 9.0
Income Tax 1,301 5.5 1,800 7.0 2,150 7.2
Property Tax 496 2.1 512 2.0 223 1 . 0
2 Other Revenues
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
^ Total Domestic 
Revenues 25,500 100 26,270 100 32,520 100 30,260 100 36,100 100 38,500 100
a) Indirect Taxes 
of which: 16,115 63.2 17,270 65.7 20,715 64.0 18,965 63. C20,757 57.5 24,393 63.^
Customes and 
Excise 13,253 52.0 14,362 55.0 16,734 51.5 14,197 47.C14,438 40.0 17,167 45.C
•
b) Direct Taxes 
of which: 2,160 8.5 1,802 7.0 2,280 7.0 2,490 8.2 2,930 8.1 3,340 9.C *
Income Tax 2,055 8.1 1,778 7.0 2,239 7.0 2,471 8.2 2,845 8.0 3,143 8.2
Property Tax 102 0.4 ' 45 0.2 38 0 . 1 23 0 . 1 83 0.2 190 0.5
2 Other Revenues 7,176 27.3 9,528 29.2 8,800 29. C12,415 34.4 10,774 28.C ■
Source: (i) A. Konikoff, op. citi,, p.96 (covers data on domestic revenues, direct and indirect taxes and other revenues for the
years 1924 - 1943).
(ii) Jordan Ministry of Finance, Annual Report, (Amman: n. pub., Pelevant years). They cover data on domestic revenues, 
direct and indirect taxes for the years 1952 - 1963.
(iii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly statistical Bulletin, Several issues. They cover data on domestic revenues, indirect 
taxes, income taxes, property tax and other revenues for the years 1964 ~ 1972.
* Fiscal year 1966 equals 9 months. 1965 figures were multiplied by a quarter and added to 1966 figures to arrive at.
a 12 month figures for 1966.
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TABLE 10
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY 1936-1972
Values in L.p . millions - Index 1936 = 100 In millions of Jordanian Dinars - Index 1950 - 100
Time
IMPORTS
Absolut
•
e
Z
EXPORTS
Absolut«j
X
DEFICIT
Absolute
%
Percent 
age of 
Exports 
to Imp­
orts
Time
IMPORTS
Absolut e
Z
EXPORTS
Absolute
Z
DEFICIT
Absolute
Z
Percent­
age of 
Exports 
to Imp­
orts
1936 0.800 100 0.230 100 -0.570 100 28.8 1950 13.48 100 1.95 100 11.53 100 14.3
1937 1.050 131 0.526 229 -0.524 92 50.1 1951 16.18 120 2.00 103 14.18 123 12.4
1938 1.229 153 0.565 246 -0.664 116 46.0 1952 17.15 127 2.11 108 15.04 130 12.3
1939 1.295 162 0.580 252 -0.715 125 44.8 1953 18.21 135 2.66 136 15.55 135 14.6
1940 1.672 209 0.845 •367 -0.827 145 50.5 1954 18.59 138 3.05 156 15.54 135 16.4
1941 2.373 297 0.949 413 -1.425 250 40.0 1955 25.26 187 3.54 181 21.72 188 14.0
1942 2.083 260 1.039 452 -1.044 183 50.0 1956 24.61 183 5.11 262 19.50 169 20.8
1943 2.292 287 2.338 1017 +0.046 8 102.0 1957 29.76 221 5.48 . 281 24.28 211 18.4
1944 2.986 373 1.792 779 -1.194 209 60.0 1958 33.92 252 3.43 176 30.49- 264 10« 1
1945 4.680 585 2.83 1230 -1.850 324 60.5 1959 39.26 291 3.35 172 35.91 311 8.5
1946 8.12 1015 2.69 1170 -5.430 953 33.1 1960 41.43 307 3.95 203 37.48 352 9.5
1947 9.53 1191 0.89 387 -8.640 1516 9.3 1961 40.93 304 5.27 270 35.66 309 12.9
1948 11.55 1443 2.63 1143 -8.920 1565 22.8 1962 43.51 323 5.92 304 37.59 226 13.6
1949 13.12 1640 3.41 1483 -9.710 1704 26.0 1963 53.63 398 6.56 336 47.07 408 12.21964 49.40 366 8.73 448 40.67 353 17.7
1965 55.80 414 9.91 508. 45.89 398 17.8
1966 67.30 499 10.40 533 56.90 493 15.5
1967 54.20 402 11.33 581 42.87 372 21.0
1968 57.30 425 14.26 731 43.04 373 24.9
1969 67.54 501 14.75 756 52.79 458 21.8
1970 65.53 486 12.17 624 53.36 463 18.6
1971 76.19 565 11.44 587 64.75 562 15.0
1972 94.88 727 17.01 872 77.87 675 18.0
Source: (i)
( i i )
(iii)
C iv)
U. Nations, Year Book of International Trade Statistics, (New York: U.N., 1954) (covering the years 1936 and 
1945-1949).
A. Konikoff, 0£. cit., p.65 (covering the years 1937-1944).
International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Year Book, (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., n.d.) vols. 8 and 12. 
(covering the period 1950—1959)•
Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 12, December 1969; Vol. 9, No. 8, August 1973 
(covering the period 1960—1972).
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TABLE 11
BALANCE OF TRADED GOODS AND SERVICES 1950 - 1972
....... IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
T im e Balance of Services Balance Change in Change in Change in Deficit
to Balance of Trade Deficit Services Balance on Balance of goods
Goods and Service 3
Goods Services Goods and Absolute Absolute Absolute
Services Z Value % Value % Value %
1950 -11.53 0.83 -10.70 7 1.82 19 - - - -
1951 -14.18 0.83 -13.35 6 2.65 23 - — 2 • 65 25
1952 -15.04 1.23 -13.81 8 ' 0.86 6 0.40 48 0.46 3
1953 -15.55 1.56 -13.99 10 0.51 3 0.33 27 0*18 1
1954 -15.54 2.66 -12.88 17 -0.01 “ 1.10 71 — 1*11 -8
1955 -21.72 3.17 -18.55 15 6.18 40 0.51 19 5.67 44
1956 -19.50 3.05 -16.45 16 -2.22 10 -0.12 -4 -2.10 -11
1957 -24.28 1.06 -23.22 4 4.78 25 -1.99 -65 6.77 41
1958 -30.49 5.68 -24.81 19 6.21 26 4.62 436 1.59 7
1959 -35.91 2.66 -33.25 7 5.42 18 -3.02 -53 8.44 34
1960 -37.48 8.66 -28.8 23 1.57 4 6.00 226 -4.43 -13
1961 -35.66 10.13 -25.5 28 -1.82 -5 1.47 17 -3.29 -11
1962 -37.59 10.73 -26.9 29 1.93 5 0.60 6 1.33 5
1963 -47.07 10.89 -36.1 23 9.48 25 0.16 i 9.32 35
1964 -40.60 16.20 -24.4 40 -6.47 -14 5.31 49 — 11.78 -33
1965 -45.90 19.00 -26.9 41 5.30 13 2.80 17 2.50 10
1966 -56.90 21.40 -35.5 38 11.00 24 2.40 13 8.60 32
1967 -42.90 15.10 -27.8 35 -14.00 -25 -6.30 -29 -7.70 -22
1968 -43.00 -1.40 -44.4 -3 0.10 -0.2-16 5 -109.0 16.60 60.0
1969 -52.79 -10.28 -63.07 -19.5 9.79 22.8 -8.88 -634.0 18.87 42.0
1970 -53.36 6.78 -46.58 12.7 0.57 1.2 17.06 166.0 -16.49 -26.1
1971 -64.75 6.58 -58.17 10.2 11.39 21.3 -0.2 -3.0 11.6 24.9
1972 -77.87 8.88 -68.99 11.4 13.12 20.3 2.3 35.0 10.8 18.6
Sources (i) I.M.F., Balance of Payments Yearbook, (Washington, D.c.: I.M.F. n.d.)Vol. 8. theyear's 1950 - 1954); and Voi. 127for data related to 1955 - 1959; and Vols 
to 1960 - 1966; and Vols. 21 and 23,for data related to 1966 - 1968.
(It covers data related to 
16 and 21,for data related
, Vols. 5, 6 and 9. They cover data related to the(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly, Statistical Bulletin 
period 1969 - 1972.
TABLE 12
TRADE BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES 
1952 - 1961
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 ! 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolut Ì Absolute
Value Z Value % Value Z Value Z Value Z Value % Value % Value % Value Z /alue
17.3 ion 18.4 100 19.8 100 27.1 100 27.8 100 30.5 100 34.0 100 40.3 100 43.0 100 42.0
5.8 6.4 5.5 7.0 8.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 -l.3-.4_
of which: Wheat «*••m 3.8
'
2.3 2.4 1.3 2.9. 1.7 1.7__ .4,,5,
3.2 _ 3.7.... 4.2 . 4..7.- 4.8
Manufactured 16.2 17.0 . 18.4 23.3 24.4
Ratio of food 
imports to
34 35 28 25 29 33 ?2 30 31
Ratio of Wheat 
and Wheat Flour 
Imports to
40 38 24 41 21 17 31 32 _ J 4
Ratio of Wheat 
Imports to
13 13 7 11 6 6
■
10 9 10
Ratio of Raw Mat­
erial Imports to 12 12 12 12 11
Ratio of manufact­
ured Imports to 
Aggregate imports 58 56 54 58— 57
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (New York: W.N. Relevant years).
* These figures were attained by deducting the tobacco equivalent from "Food, Beverages and Tobacco", (1952-1960). Zì
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TABLE 13
EXPORTS OF PHOSPHATE AND THEIR RELATIVE 
IMPORTANCE. 1943 - 1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Time
Exports
of
Phosphate
(1)
Domestic
Exports
(2)
Ratio of 
1 : 2 Time
Exports
of
Phosphate
(3)
Domestic
Exports
(4)
Ratio of 
3 : 4
1943 0.017 2.34 -0.7 1960 1.31 3.95 33.2
1952 0.030 2.11 1.4 1961 1.55 5.27 29.4
1953 0.050 ■ 2.66 1.9 1962 1.46 5.92 25.0
1954 0.050 3.05 1.6 1963 1.46 6.56 22.3
1955 0.600 3.54 17.0 1964 2.36 8.73 27.0
1956 0.690 5.11 13.5 1965 2.43 9.91 25.0
1957 0.920 5.48 17.0 1966 3.13 10.40 30.1
1958 0.98 3.43 28.6 1967 3.48 11.33 31.0
1959 1.02 3.35 30.4 1968 4.21 14.26 30.0 .
1969 3.57 14.75 24.2
1970 2.24 12.17 18.4
1971 2.24 11.44 20.0
1972 3.50 17.01 21.0
Source: (i)
(ü)
(iii)
(iv)
( v )
A. Konikoff, Trans-Jordan - An Economic Survey, (Jerusalem:
Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 
1946), Table XVI, p.112. (Covers exports and phosphate exports, 
during the period 1943).
I.M.F.j Balance of Payments Year Book, (Washington D. CijIMF, n.d), 
Vols. 8 and 12. (They cover domestic exports during the period 
1950 - 1959).
I.M.F., International Financial Statistics, (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetory Fund, n.d.), supplement to 1972, p.215.
(It covers phosphate exports over the period 1952 - 1971).
Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly, Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 5,
No. 12, December 1969; and Vol. 9, No. 8, August 1973.
(They cover data on domestic exports over the period 1960 - 1972). 
Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, (Amman: Central Bank, 1972), 
Table 8, p. 18. (It covers data on exports of phosphate during 
the year 1972).
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TABLE 14
TRAVEL ACCOUNT 1950-1972
— - ----- — IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAÏJ DINARS
Time Receipts Payments
[ndex 1959 » 100 Ratio of Tourism Receipts To
Balance Receipts Payments, Balance Exports
Deficit 
on Visible 
Trade
Gold and 
Foreign 
Exchange • 
Reserves
1950 0.88 0.83 0.05 31 43 5 45 8
1951 1.08 0.98 0.10 38. 51 11 54 8
1952 1.29 1.17 0.12 45 61 13 61 9 10.0
1953 1.68 1.32 0.36 59 68 39 63 11 11.3
1954 2.21 1.33 0.88 78 69 96 72 14 12.7
1955 2.45 1.13 1.32 86 59 144 69 11 11.4
1956 1.49 0.90 0.59 52 47 64 29 8 6.0
1957 1.22 1.68 -0.46 43 87 -50 22 5 4.5
1958 1.22 1.61 -0.39 43 83 -42 36 4 4.0
1959 2.85 1.93 0.92 100 100 100 85 8 9.4
Average
1960 -
1959 1.64 1.29 0.35 53.6 8.6 7.0
1960 3.23 2.22 1.01 113 115 110 82 9 10.5
1961 4.34 2.44 1.90 152 126 207 82 12 12.6
1962 5.05 3.42 1.63 177 177 177 85 13 12.3
1963 6.00 3.20 2.80 211 166 304 91 13 17.1
1964 8.00 3.60 4.40 281 187 521 91 20 15.1
1965 9.80 4.30 5.50 344 223 598 99 21 16.1
1966 11.30 5.20 6.10 396 269 663 109 20 16.6
1967 6.80 5.30 1.50 239 275 163 60 16 7.3
1968 4.60 7.00 -2.40 161 363 -260 32 11 4.2
1969 4.53 7.98 "3.45 159.0 413 -375 31 9 4.6
Average
1960 -
1969 6.37 4.47 2.00 76.2 14.4 11.6
1970 4.22 9.35 -5.13 148.0 484 -558 35 8 4.3
1971 3.10 7.71 -4.61 109.0 399 -501 27 5 3.3
1972 3.39 8.41 -5.02 119.0 436 -546 20 4 3.4
Average
1970 -
1972 3.57 8.49 -5.00 27.3 5.7 3.7
Source: (i) ? o r  ¿ata on foreign exchange and gold reserves: (a) I.M.F., I.F.S.,
(Washington, D.C.: I.M.F.) , Supplement to 1963/64. It covers data 
for 1952-1962; (b) I.M.F., I.F.S., (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., March 
1970), Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 188-189. It covers data for 1963-1968;
(c) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 9, No.10* 
October 1973, Table No. 3. It covers data for the years 1968-1972.
(ii) For data on the Travel Account: (a) I.M.F.,Balance of Payments Year
Book, (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., n.d.), Vol. 8. It covers data for, 
the years 1950 - 1954; and Vol. 12, for data related to the years 
1955-59; and Vols. 16 and 21* for data related to the years 1960-1966; 
and Vols. 21 and 23^for data related to the years 1966-1968.
(b) Central Bank of Jordan, Ninth Annual Report, (Amman: Central Bank, 
1972). It covers data for the years 1968-1972.
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TABLE 15
INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EACH SECTOR TO 
CPP. 1960 - 1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDAN DINARS
1960 1961 1962 1963 ^1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971* 1972**
z X Z X X X X X X X % X X '
1 Agriculture, Forestry and Livestock. 14.62 16.3 25.30 22.8 20.90 19.2 22.08 18.8 34.14 25.2 34.11 22.6 27.65 18.5 38.74 •21.9 27.53 16.3 36.34 18.3 28.66 15.1 37.81 ia.7 39.00 18.0
2 Manufacturing and Mining. 6.89 7.7 8.83 8.0 8.06 7.4 10.62 9.0 12.53 9.2 16.22 10.7 17.27 11.5 17.50 9.9 20.05 11.9 23.12 11.6 19.77 10.4 20.56 10.1 24.00 11.1
3 Construction. 4.50 5.0 4.50 4.1 6.15 5.7 6.12 5.2 5.45 4.0 7.87 5.2 9.28 6.2 8.69 4.9 9.83 5.8 10.89 5.5 7.79 4.1 7.50 3.7 11.50 5.3
4 Electricity and Water Supply. 0.69 0.8 0.67 0.6 0.74 0.7 0.93 0.8 1.03 0.8 1.68 1.1 2.26 1.5 1.78 1.0 2.27 1.4 2.09 1.1 2.35 1.2 2.73 1.3 2.90 1.3
5 Transportation» 11.12 12.4 12.64 11.4 12.53 11.5 12.77 10.8 12.03 8.9 12.60 8.4 14.42 9.6 14.84 8.4 14.55 8.6 16.01 8.1 15.91 8.4 16.20 8.0 17.00 7.8
6 Wholesale and Retail Trade* 19.57 21.9 24.28 21.9 23.63 21.8 26.43 22.5 28.01 20.7 31.43 20.8 28.92 19.3 39.08 22.1 29.07 17.3 38.36 19.3 38.00 20.0 39.00 19.3 40.60 18.7
7 Banking and Finance. 0.87 1.0 1.27 1.1 1.46 1.3 1.35 1.1 1.51 1.1 2.11 1.4 2.77 1.9 3.40 1.9 2.97 1.8 4.20 2.1 4.19 2.2 3.37 1.7 4.60 2.1
8 Ownership of Dwellings* 7.13 8.0 8.01 7.2 8.58 7.9 9.39 8.0 9.93 7.3 10.69 7.1 11.20 7.5 11.90 6.7 12.33 7.3 12.78 6.5 13.61 7.2 14.41 7.1 14.80 6.8
9 Public Administration and Defence. 15.79 17.7 16.74 15.1 17.06 15.7 17.61 15.0 19.70 14.5 21.41 14.2 22.03 14.7 26.01 14.7 33.25 19.7 36.28 18.3 37.94 20.1 39.00 19.3 39.50 18.2
10 Services. 8.26 9.2 8.63 7.8 9.51 8.8 10.37 8.8 11.19 8.3 12.83 8.5 13.94 9.3 15.17 8.5 16.64 9.9 18.27 9.2 21.34 11.3 22.00* 10.8 23.10 10.7
GDP at Factor Cost. 89.44 100 L10.87 100 108.62 100 117.67 100 135.52 LOO L50.95 100 149.74 LOO 177.11 100 .68.49 100 198.34 100 189.56 100 202.58 LOO ?I7.00 100
*  Indirect Taxes 8.86 9.27 10.28 11.39 13.43 16.66 20.89 17.60 18.42 21.35 1 20.30 20.84 22.50
» GDP at Market Prices 98.30 120.14 118.90 129.06 148.95 L67.61 171.63 L94.71 L86.91 219.69 209.86 223.42 239.50
+ Net Factor Income From Abroad 7.39 7.00 11.93 8.56 11.67 12.93 15.15 11.24 10.37 14.03 12.64 13.17 12.86
» GNP at Market Prices i05.69 127.14 130.83 137.62
r~— - ------
*160.62 L80.54 185.78 205.95 L97.28 233.72 222.50 236.59 252.36
Percentage contribution of Material 
Producing Sector to GDP (Sectors 1-4) 29.9 35.4 33.0 33.8
■------------
■ 39.2 39.7 37.7 37.7 35.4 36.5 30.9 33.86 35.7
Percentage Contribution of Services 
Producing Sector to GDP (Sectors 5-10 70.1 64.6 67.0 66.2 60.8 60.3 62.3 62.3 64.6 63.5 69.1 66.14 64.3
t Gross Domestic product 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 LOO
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Income Accounts, 
(Amman: Department of Statistics Press, May 1973).
* Preliminary.
** Preliminary estimates.
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TABLE 16
INDUSTRIAL OftlCIS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
1S<59 - 1972
ïear Gross Domestic Agriculture Mining and
Product at and Manufact-
Const ruction Transpc>rt
Ownership of Public Administration Electricity Banking and
Factor Costs Forestry u n n g Trade Dwellings >nd Defe nee Services & Water Supply Finance Year
Value Z Value Z Z share Value z Z share Value z Z share Value Z Z share Value Z 1 Z share z Z share Value X Z share Value Z Z Share % Z Share Value z Z Share
Increase Increase in GDP ncrease in GDP [ncrease In GDP Increase in GDP Increase Iin GDP Value Increase in GDP Increase in GDP Increase in GDP Increase in GDP Increase in GDP
1959 85.17 15.08 _ 18.0 6.23 7.3 4.66 5.5 10.70 12.6 18.01 M 121.0 6.30 __ 7.4 14.95 - 17.6 7.78 _ 9.1 0.66 0.8 0.80 0.9 1959
I960 89.44 5.0 14.62 -3.1 16.3 6.89 11.0 7.7 4.50 -3.4 5.0 11.12 4.0 12.4 19.57 9.0 !21.9 7.13 13.2 8.10 15.79 6.0 17.7 8.26 6.2 9.2 0.69 5.0 0.8 0.87 9.0 1.0 1960
1961 L10.87 24.0 25.30 73.0 22.8 8.83 28.2 8.0 4.50 4.1 12.64 14.0 11.4 24.28 24.0 .21.9 8.01 12.3 7.2 16.74 6.0 15.1 8.63 4.5 7.8 0.67 -3.0 0.6 1.27 46.0 1.1 1961
1962 108.62 -2.0 20.90 -17.4 19.2 8.06 -9.0 7.4 6.15 37.0 5.7 12.53 -0.9 11.5 23.63 -3.0 121.8 8.58 7.1 7.9 17.06 2.0 15.7 9.51 10.2 8.8 0.74 10.4 0.7 1.46 15.0 1.3 1962
1963 117.67 8.3 22.08 6.0 18.8 10.62 32.0 9.0 6.12 -0.5 5.2 12.77 2.0 10.8 26.43 12.0 22.5 9.39 9.4 8.Q 17.61 3.2 15.0 10.37 9.0 8.8 0.93 26.0 0.8 1.35 -8.0 1.1 1963
1964 135.52 15.2 34.14 55.0 25.2 12.53 18.0 9.2 5.45 -11.0 4.0 12.03 -6.0 8.9 28.01 6.0 !20.7 9.93 6.0 7.3 19.70 12.0 14.5 11.19 8.0 8.3 1.03 11.0 0.8 1.51 12.0 1.1 1964
1965 150.59 11.4 34.11 -0.1 22.6 16.22 29.4 10.7 7.87 44.4 5.2 12.60 5.0 8.4 31.43 12.2 20.8 10.69 8.0 7.1 21.41 9.0 14.2 12.83 15.0 8.5 1.68 63.1 1.1 2.11 40.0 1.4 1965
1966 149.74 -0.8 27.65 -19.0 18.5 17.27 6.5 11.5 9.28 18.0 6.2 14.42 14.4 9.6 28.92 -8.0 ! 19.3 11.20 5.0 7.5 22.03 3.0 14.7 14.10 10.0 9.3 2.10 25.0 1.5 2.77 31.3 1.9 1966
1967 177.11 18.3 38.74 40.1 21.9 17.50 1.3 9.9 8.69 -6.4 4.9 14.84 3.0 8.4 39.08 35.1 22.1 11.90 6.3 6.7 26.01 18.1 14.7 15.17 8.0 8.5 1.78 -15.2 1.0 3.40 23.0 1.9 1967
1968 168.49 -5.0 27.53 -29.0 16.3 20.05 15.0 11.9 9.83 13.0 5.8 14.55 -2.0 8.6 29.07 ■26.0 17.3 12.33 4.0 7.3 33.25 28.0 19.7 16.64 10.0 9.9 2.27 28.0 1.4 2.97 -13.0 1.8 1968
1969 198.34 18.0 36.34 32.0 18.3 23.12 15.3 11.6 10.89 11.0 5.5 16.01 10.0 8.1 38.36 32.0 19.3 12.78 4.0 • 6.5 36.28 9.1 18.3 18.27 10.0 9.2 2.09 -8.0 1.1 4.20 41.4 2.1 1969
1970 189.56 -4.4 28.66 -21.1 15.1 19.77 H4.5 10.4 7.79 -28.5 4.1 15.91 -0.6 8.4 38.00 -1.0 20.0 13.61 6.5 7.2 37.94 5.0 20.1 21.34 17.0 11.3 2.35 12.4 1.2 4.19 -0.2 2.2 1970
1971 202.58 7.0 37.81 32.0 18.7 20.56 4.0 10.1 7.50 -4.0 3.7 16.20 2.0 8.0 39.00 3.0 1 19.3 14.41 6.0 7.1 39.00 3.0 19.3 22.00 3.1 10.8 2.73 16.2 1.3 3.37 -20.0 1.7 1971
1972 217.00 7.1 39.00 3.1 18.0 24.00 17.0 li.i 11.50 53.3 5.3 17.00 5.0 7.8 40.60 4.1 ; 18.7 14.80 3.0 6.8 39.50 1.3 18.2 23.10 5.0 10.7 2.90 6.2 1.3 4.60 36.5 2.1 1972
Aver­
age 150.10 7.3 11.0 19.3 11.0 10.0 9.0 5.0 4.0 10.0 7.1 20.5 6.5 7.3 8.0 17.0 8.3 9.3 13.0 1.0 15.2 •> ft
Aver-
1966 value 
as Z of
1959 175 .8 183 3 277.2 199.1 134.8 160.6 147.4 181.2 31Ä.9 3a a 3
1969 value
as Z of
1960 221 .8 248.6 335.6 242.0 143.9 196.0 179.2 230.0 221.2 309 0
1972 value
as Z of
1967 122 .5 100.7 137.1 132.3 114.6 103.9 ■ —
124.4 151.9 152.3 163.0 135.3
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts, 1967 - 1969 / 
(Amman: Department of Statistics Press, August 1971); and 1967-1972# 
(Amman: Department of Statistics, May 1973).
TABLE 17
IMPORTS BY ECONOMIC FUNCTION 1964-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Absolute
Value %
Absolute
Value %
Absolute
Value Z
Absolute
Value Z
Absolute
Value Z
Absolute
Value %
Absolute
Value Z
Absolute
Value Z
Absolute
Value Z
Aggregate
Imports. 50.348 100 56.052 100 68.211 100 55.048 100 57.492 100 67.752 100 65.882 100 76.627 100 95.310 100
Consumer Goods« 25.253 50 27.206 49 31.333 46 23.870 43 27.606 48 33.887 50.C33.025 50.133.441 43.6 46.287 48.6
Food Stuffs. 14.241 28 14.974 27 18.202 27 14.097 26 16.238 28 18.093 26.7 18.884 28.721.465 28.1 27.600 29.0
Current
Consumer Goods. 9,098 18 10.208 18 10.785 16 7.889 14 9.264 16 12.297 18.1 9.789 14.9 7.288 9.5 12.811 13.4
Durable Consu- 
umer Goods. 1.914 4 2.024 4 2.346 3 1.884 3 2.104 4 3.497 5.2 4.352 6.7 4.688 6.1 5.876 6.2
Raw Materials 9.582 19 11.750 21 14.696 22 13.722 25 12.213 21 14.593 21.5 L5.144 23.013.612 17.8 18.772 19.7
Oil & Fuel. 2.753 5 3.243 6 3.425 5 2.987 5 3.217 5 3.814 5.6 3.748 5.6 4.445 5.7 4.585 4.8
Other. 6.829 14 8.507 15 11.271 17 10.735 20 8.996 16 10.779 16.0 LI.396 17.3 9.167 12.0 14.187 14.9
Capital Goods. 12,605 25 12.569 22 15.100 22 14.774 27 13.922 24 15.239 22.4 L3.375 20.3 17.614 23.0 18.626 19.5
Machinery and
Transport
Equipment» 6.486 13 3.990 7 6.046 9 5.730 10 4.714 8 4.886 7.2 5.566 8.5 11i245 14.6 7.770 8.2
Other Machin­
ery and 
Equipment • 5^081 10 7.094 12 7.215 10 6.925 13 7.840 14 8.712 12.8 5.787 8.8 4.873 6.4 8.841 9.2
Other. 1.038 2 1.485 3 1.839 3 2.119 4 1.368 2 1.641 2.3 2.022 3.0 1.496 2.0 2.015 2.1
Miscellaneous• 2.908 6 4.527 8 7.082 jio 2.682 5 3.751 7 4.033 6.0 4.338 6.5 11.960 15.7 11.625 12.2
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 12 , December 1969; Vol.9, No.8 , August 1973.
Note: Percentages may not add to total. -
t/.
£
3 18
• TABLE 18
LABOUR FORCE AND SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT
IN NUMBERS OF PERCENTAGES
Sector East Bank West Bank Total
Percentage 
Employment 
in Each Sector
Agriculture. 72,952 64,805 137,757 35.3
Mining. 4,770 4,416 9,186 10.9
Manufacturing 17,508 15,238 32,746 ^
Construction. 22,203 17,956 40,159 10.3
. (1) Utilities. 925 647 1,572 0.4
Commerce. 17,452 13,904 31,356 8.0
Transport
and
Communicat­
ions. 7,624 4,275 11,899 3.0
Services. 28,685 24,840 53,525 13.7
Other. 45,722 26,056 71,778 18.4
Total, 217,841 172,137 389,978 100
Source: (i) Jordan Department of Statistics, First Census of Population 
and Housing, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, May 1964), 
Vol. 2.
(ii) Jordan Department of Statistics, Some Economic Indicators, 
(Amman: Department of Statistics Press, December 1968),
(1) They include Electricity, Gas, Water and Sanitary Services,
TABLE 19
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURAL CROPS
1960 - 1972
Relative Importance of Agricultural Crops 
1960 - 1972
Agricultural Production 
1960 - 1972
Percentages In 000's of Metric Tons
fears
Relative Importance of the Following 
to Total Agricultural Production
Relative Importance of the Following 
to Total Fieldcrops Production
¡Relative Importance of 
Tomato to Total Veget­
able Production
Field
Crops
Veget­
ables Fruits Total
Change
percentage)
Field Crops Vegetables Fruits Wheat Barley Other Fieldcrops Tomato
1960 11.5 70.2 18.3 66.8 20.4 12.8 39.0 65.3 398.5 103.8 567.7 —
1961 21.6 52.7 25.7 62.3 27.8 9.9 40.1 222.0 532.9 261.7 1016.6 79.1
1962 20.8 59.3 19.9 64.5 20.6 14.9 34.2 173.5 494.5 165.4 833.4 -18.0
1963 13.6 50.0 36.4 67.1 20.4 12.5 51.4 113.0 417.1 303.4 833.5 -
1964 33.9 34.2 31.9 65.7 21.7 12.6 50.3 448.7 452.9 421.6 1323.2 58.5
1965 35.2 34.0 30.8 63.5 21.7 14.8 44.6 437.6 423.0 384.0 1244.6 -5.9
1966 18.5 51.0 30.5 67.7 15.3 17.0 43.5 149.4 411.2 245.5 806.1 -53.2
Î967 42.3 44.0 13.7 66.3 18.3 15.3 64.1 186.5 193.7 60.3 440.5 -45.4
1968 33.2 45.3 21.5 73.1 15.4 11.3 71.7 130.0 177.6 84.3 391.9 -11.0
1969 39.1 36.8 24.1 68.3 18.3 13.4 68.4 233.1 219.2 143.3 595.6 52.0
Avezage 27.0 47.8 25.3 66.5 20.0 13.5 50.7
1970 18.8 54.2 27.0 77.0 7.2 15.8 66.2 72.1 207.6 103.6 383.3 -35.6
1971 42.4 41.9 20.8 73.1 11.4 15.5 60.4 230.2 226.8 119.9 576.9 50.5
1972 41.4 36.2 22.5 75.0 12.1 12.9 62.0 281.7 246.1 152.9 680.7 18.0
Average
70 - 72 34.2 44.1 23.4 75.0 10.2 14.7 62.9
Source: (i) Jordan Ministry of Agriculture, Unpublished Reports (in Arabic). It covered data related to the period 1960 - 1966.
(ii) Jordan Department of Statistics, Agricultural Sample,(Amman: Department of Statistics Press, 1967). (in Arabic); and 1968; and 
1971. Prom 1967 onwards, figures are pertaining to production in the East Bank only.
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TABLE 20
t
CLASSIFICATION OF LAND ACCORDING TO THE TYPE
OF PRODUCTS
IN THOUSANDS OF DUNUMS ....
West Ba 
1966
nk East Bank 
1966
East Bank 
1967
East Bank 
1968
Total Absolute % Absolute % Absolute
Percent­
age of 
Total 
Cultiva­
ted Area
Absolute
Percent­
age of 
Total 
Cultiva­
ted Area
Trees 696.1 553.5 7 9 . 5 142.6 ¡0.5 162.4 5.3 226.0 5.9
Veget­
ables 380.3 140.8 3 7 . 0 239.5 >3.0 223.1 7.3 303.5 8.0
Field
Crops 3686.7 700.8 19.0 2985.9 31.0 2663.5 87.4 3271.2 86.1
*
Total
Culti­
vated
Area 4763.1 1395.1 29.3 3368.0 70.7 3049.0 100 3800.7 100
Fallow
land 1673.7 459.4' 1214.4 1160.1 1420.9
Uncult­
ivated
land 580.2 137.5.
26.5
442.7
73.5
432.6 292.3
Total 
Agric­
ultur­
al land 7017.2 1991.9 5025.1 4641.7 5513.9
Percent­
age of 
Total 
Cultiv­
ated 
land to
agriculur 
al land 67.9 70.0 67.0 65.7 69.0’
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, Agricultural Sample, (Amman: Dep­
artment of Statistics Press, 1966); and 1967; and 1968 (in Arabic).
* Total cultivable area equals the sum of areas planted by trees, vegetables 
and field crops.
TABLE 31
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CREDIT 
OUTSTANDING OF COMMERICAL BANKS 
1960 ~ 1972
Sources Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Vol. 5, No. 12, December 1969jand Vol. No. 8, August 1973*i
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INTEREST RATES ON DEPOSITS AND CREDIT IN THE 
BANKING SECTOR AND FOR TREASURY BILLS - 
AS OF HAY 31st, 1973«
TABLE 22
Interest Rates 
(Percentages)>
Central Bank of Jordan- 5.00 Bank rate.5.00 Interest rate on advances.4.00 Interest rate on three months' 
time deposits.3.00 Interest rate on deposits subject 
to notice.
Commercial Banks. 6.50 - 9.00 Overdrafts.6.50 - 9.00 Bills discounted«
1.00 - 4.00 Sight deposits«
2.00 - 6.00 Saving and time deposits.
Specialized Credit
Institutions.
Agricultural Credit
Corporation. 8.40 Short-term loans.6.00 Medium and long-term loans.
Industrial Develop-
ment Bank. 8.00 Medium and long-term loans.
Housing Corporation 5.00 Long term loans.
Jordan Co-op«Organ-
ization. 6.00 Loans of any duration for 
Co-operatives.
Municipal and Village
8.00 Loans of any duration for Persons.
Loan fund. 5.50 Municipality loans for 10 years.
4.00 Village loans for 15 years.
Jordan Treasury Bills. 4.91 Three months maturity.
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Unpublished Data. (In Arabic)
TABLE 23
LIQUIDITY AND LIQUIDITY RATIOS OF COMMERICAL BANKS 
1961 - 1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDIAN DINARS
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
"ash, Balances with the 
Central Bank and 
Foreign Exchange 17.08 21.50 13.40 27.06 19.98 22.09 23.74 23.77 23.04 24.25 28.07 38.74
Cash 1.0 1.19 1.36 1.27 1.13 1.55 1.50 1.76 1.85 1.98 1.59 1.91
Balances with Cental Bank - - - 0.34 7.8 13.28 16.94 15.69 12.58 12.86 14.86 17.27
Holdings of Treasury Bills - - - - - - - 3.77 3.34 8.55 16.17
Foreign Exchange 16.08 20.31 12.04 25.45 10.05 7.26 5.30 6.32 4.84 6.07 3.07 3.39
*Total Deposits 30.92 39.09 34.26 49.47 44.10 52.84 53.39 54.18 57.40 57.67 59.15 72.89
Demand Deposits 17.36 19.20 21.36 23.55 24.50 30.94 31.59 30.80 32.44 30.79 30.43
.
39.44
**Time Deposits 13.56 19.89 12.90 22.61 15.67 17.76 18.17 19.50 20.18 21.01 21.38 23.90
Savings Deposits, 
of which: . . 3.31 3.94 4.14 3.64 3.89 4.78 5.87 7.34 9.55
Government and semi- 
Govemment Deposits | . _ (4.37) (5.21) (8.82) (7.42) (7.51) (8.74) (6.11) (6.21)
Liquidity Ratios;
Cash, Balances with the 
Central Bank and 
Foreign Exchange as Per­
centage of Demand 
Deposits 98.4 112.0 62.7 114.9 77.5 71.4 75.2 77.2 71.0 78.7 92.2 98.2
As percentage of Total 
Deposits 55.2 55.0 39.1 54.7 43.0 41.8 4'4.5 43.9 40.1 42.0 47.1 53.1
Balances with Central 
Bank A& percentage of 
Total Deposits 0.69 17.7 25.0 31.7 29.0 21.9 22.3 24.9 23.7
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, relevant years.
Rotes: * Including government deposits and those of non-residents,
** This item includes Savings deposits for the years 1961 - 1963.
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TABLE 24
3 2 .  if
GROWTH IN INCOME AND THE VALUE ADDED IN INDUSTRY 
1959 - 1972
IN MILL IONS OF JORDAN DINARS
Industrial Ratio of Percentage Percentage g .d .p . PercentagjRatio ofG.N.P. Production 2 to 1 Increase Increase »t Current Increase 2 toYear (1) (2) in 2 in 1 Prices in G.D.P. G.D.P.
1959 99.13 6.23 6.3 "" — — 85.17 •Mi 7.3
1960 105.69 6.89 7.0 11.0 7-0 89.44 5.0 7.7
1961 127.14 8.83 7.0 28.16 20.3 110.87 24.0 8.0
1962 130.83 8.06 6.2 -8.72 3.0 108.62 -2.0 7.4
1963 137.62 10.62 8.0 31.76 5.2 117.67 8.3 9.0
1964 160.62 12.53 8.0 17.98 17.0 135.53 15.2 9.2
1965 180.54 16.22 9.0 29.45 12.4 150.95 11.4 10.7
1966 185.78 17.27 9.3 6.47 3.0 149.74 -0.8 11.5
1967 205.95 17.50 8.5 1.33 11.0 177.11 18.3 9.9
1968 197.28 20.05 10.2 14.57 -4.2 168.49 -5.0 11.9
1969 233.72 23.12 10.0 15.31 18.5 198.34 18.0 11.6
1970 222.50 19.77 9.0 -14.49 -5.0 189.56 -4.4 10.4
1971 236.59 20.56 9.0 4.00 6.3 202.58 7.0 10.1
1972 252.36 24.00 9.5 16.73 7.0 217.00 7.1 11.1
Average
1960-69 166.5 14.11 8.32 14.73 9.3 140.68 9.24 9.69
Average
1959-72 248.27 15.1 8.4 12.2 7.25 150.10 7.3 10.0
Average
1959-65 134.51 10.0 7.4 16.0 9.27 114.03 8.8 8.5
Average
1966-72 219.17 20.2 9.2 9.0 5.23 186.12 5.7 11.0
Average
1970-72 237.31 21.44 9.17 2.08 2.77 203.05 3.23 10.53
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, National Accounts and Imput-Output Analysis. 
1959 - 1967, (Amman: n. pub. n.d.); and 1967 - 1972, (Amman: Department of 
Statistics Press, May 1973).
TABLE 25
!
INDICES OF ECONOMIC SECTORS CONTRIBUTION TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
AT FACTOR COST AND AT CURRENT PRICES. 1959 - 100
Sector 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1. Agriculture 100 96.9 167.8 138.6 146.4 226.4 226.2 183.4 256.8 182.5 240.9 190.0 250.7 258.6
2. Mining and 
Manufacturing 100 110.6 141.7 129.4 170.5 201.1 260.4 277.2 280.8 321.8 371.1 317.3 330.0 385.2
3. Construction 100 96.6 96.6 132.0 131.3 117.0 268.9 199.1 186.4 210.9 233.6 167.1 160.9 246.7
4. Electricity 
and Water 
Supply
100 104.5 101.5 112.1 140.9 156.1 254.5 318.2 269.6 343.9 316.6
|
356.0 413.6 439.3
5. Transport 100 104.0 118.1 117.1 119.3 112.4 117.8 134.7 138.7 136.0 149.6 148.7 151.4 158.9
6. Trade 100 108.7 134.8 131.2 146.7 155.5 174.5 160.5 216.9 161.4 ¡212.9j 210.9 216.5 225.4
7. Banking 100 108.8 158.8 182.5 168.8 188.8 263.8 346.2 425.0 371.3 525.0 523.8 421.2 575.0
8. Ownership of 
Dwellings 100 113.2 127.1 136.2 149.0 157.6 170.0 177.7 188.9 195.7 202.9 216.0 228.7 234.9
9. Public Admin­
istration and 
Defence 100 105.6 112.0 114.1 117.7 131.8 143.2 147.3 173.9 222.4 242.6 253.7 260.8 264.2
10.Other Services 100 106.2 111.0 122.2 133.2 143.8 165.0 181.2 194.9 213.8 234.8 274.2 282.7 296.9
Total Material 
Producing Sectors 
(1-4) 100 100.3 147.6 134.6 149.2 100.0 225.0 212.0 250.5 224.1 272.0 220.7 257.6 290.6
Total Services 
Producing Sectors 
(5-10) 100 107.2 122.3 124.3 133.1 140.7 155.6 159.3 188.5 185.8 215.0 223.4 228.2 238.4
Gross Domestic 
Product at Factor 
cost LOO 1L05.0 130.2 L27.5 138.1 159.1 177.2 175.8 207.9 197.8 232.8 222.5 237.8 254.7
Source: Jordan Department^of Statistics, The National Accounts, 1967-1969, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, • 
August, 1971); and 1967-1972, (Amman; Department of Statistics“Press, May 1973).
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TABLE 26
PRODUCTION AND THE INDEX NUMBER OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES 
1960 - 1972
Products Unit 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Phosphate
Cement
000tons 361.9 422.5 681.0 614.4 603.9 842.4 1000.8 123 TO 1161.9 1087.3 938.9 640.0 709.0>CKX)tons 164.8 223.1
118.0
235.3 285.3 307.8 341.0 375.3 289.2 375.6 480.4 377.6 418.9 661.3
Petroleum
products
000
tons 153.0 205.0 227.3 262.3 430.4 392.6 392.9 464.1 445.8 556.7 605.1
Sole leath­
er & wool
000
tons 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 399.3 373.7 276.8 397.4 661.6
Upper
leather
000 
sq. f. 1266.0 1817.0 2354.2 1670.8 1678.0 1687.0 L302.0 3887.6 2174.9
Detergents j000s 2.9 2.5 3.2 2.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.31 1.71 2.6C 2.53
Liquid Bat­
teries
000
Batt. 60.0 45.6 59.6 66.9 66.8 40.0 36.4
Cigarettes tons 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.62 1.80 1.62 1.54
Spirit and
Alcoholic
drinks
000
litre 1021.3 1117.3 1063.3 1171.5 1314.3 1944.0 2321.0 1911.0 2188.6 2192.0 ¡162.0 2396.1 2421.0
Paper tons 2.1 2.74 2.70 2.11 2.75
Electricity mil . KWH 135.7 155.9 177.0 96.6 104.5 122.7 120.0 133.7 158.0
Iron £00 tons 14.4 26.6 24.1 9.2 30.2
Textiles 0(j0 160.7 370.3 442.9 486.2 512.0 478-0 748.1 744.1
Fodder ~1000~ ¡tons 12.5 21.5 25.6 34.2 44.2
Pharmaceut—000
litre
—
63.1 60.1 104.7 154.0 190.2
Other
igrqdiiçts tons 28.0 30.9 43.1 40.1 60.0
production 
index of
¡principal 
¡industries 
1966 - 100 91.1 92.7 110.8 95.9 113.7 139.1
Change in 
Index 1.6 18.1 -14.9 17.8 25.4
Source: (i) Central Bank of Jordan, First Annual Report, 1964-65,(Arman: The Co-operative Printing Press Workers
Society, n.d.) (Covering data for the years 1960-1963).
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 5. No. 12, Dec. 1969. (Covering data for 
the years 1964-1967).
(iii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 10, October 1973. (Covering data 
for the years 1968-1972).
Nate: (a)From May 1967 onwards, figures do not include the West Bank.
(b)The Index is weighted by 1970 prices and quantities. Pharmaceutical products are not included in the index.
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TABLE 27
SERVICES ACCOUNT (BALANCE OF SERVICES) 
1950 - 1957
i IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Time 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Receipts 2.06 2.22 2.86 3.33 4.51 4.94 5.07 8.08 ' 8.39 6.03
Payments 1.23 1.39 1.63 1.77 1.85 1.77 2.02 7.02 2.71 3.37
Balance
(Net services) 0.83 0.83 1.23 1.56 2.66 3.17 3.05 1.06 5.68 2.66
Time 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Receipts 13.06 15.28 17.97 18.61 23.90 27.30 31.20 25.50 22.90 31.26
Payments 4.40 5.15 7.24 7.72 7.70 8.30 9.80 10.40 24.30 42.09
Balance 8.66 10.13 10.73 10.89 16.20 19.00 21.40 15.10 -1.40 -10.83
Time 1970 1971 1972
Receipts 31.29 25.73 30.02
Payments 25.06 20.22 23.19
Balance 6.23 5.51 6.83 I
Source: (i) International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., n.d.),
Vol. 8. It covers the period 1950-1954; and Vol. 12,for the period 1955-1959; and Vol. 16,for 
the period 1960-1963} and Vol. 21,for the period 1964-1968.
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Ninth Annual Report, (Amman: Central Bank, 1972). It covers the period 
1969-1972.
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
1952-1972
TABLE 28
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Gold Holdings Foreign Exchange Holdings
Period IMF Gold I
Tranch
Position
Central
Bank
Sub-total Commercial
Banks
Central
Bank*
Sub-total Total Percentage 
change of 
total
1952 0.04 0.04 4.21 8.76 12.97 13.01
1953 0.04 — 0.04 5.49 9.32 14.81 14.85 14.1
1954 0.04 — 0.04 5.39 12.00 17.39 17.43 17.4
1955 0.04 ' __ 0.04 8.49 12.93 21.42 21.46 23.1
1956 0.04 _ 0.04 8.36 16.78 25.14 25.18 17.3
1957 0.04 — 0.04 11.17 15.63 26.80 26.84 6.6 •
1958 0.04 — 0.04 14.40 16.33 30.73 30.77 14.6
1959 0.04 - ■ 0.04 14.28 15.98 30.26 30.30 -1.5
Average
1952-59 0.04 0.04 7.2 10.8 18.0 18.0 — 11*5_________
1960 0.17 0.17 14.27 16.40 30.67 30.84 1.8
1961 0.33 0.33 16.08 17.97 34.05 34.38 11.5
1962 0.48 ■ — 0.48 20.31 20.23 40.54 41.02 19.3
1963 0.64 __ 0.64 12.04 22.38 34.42 35.06 -14.5
1964 0.89 • -- 0.89 24.73 27.31 52.04 52.93 51.0
1965 0.96 1.22 2.18 10.05 48.72 58.77 60.95 15.2
1966 1.07 1.22 2.29 7.26 58.67 65.93 68.22 12.0
1967 1.11 1.22 2.33 5.30 85.94 91.24 93.57 37.2
1968 1.43 10.57 12.00 6.32 91.01 97.33 109.33 16.8
1969 1.43 ' 10.58 12.00 4.84 82.65 87.49 99.49 -9.0
Average
1960-69 0.85 5.0 3.33 _L2*1____ 59.2___ 6 2 * 6 — -14*3_______
1970 2.06 9.95 12.01 6.07 80.03 86.10 98.11 -1.4
1971 2.06 9.98 12.04 3.07 77.80 80.87 92.90 -5.3
1972 2.24 10.81 13.05 3.39 48.26 87.65 100.70 8.4
Average
1970-72
. 2.12 
_ 10.2 12.4 4.2 68.7 84.9 . ■ ■91.2______1*0
(i) I.M.F., International Financial Statistics, (Washington, D,C.,* I.M.F.,
n.d.), Supplement to 1963-1964, p.138. It covers data for the 
period 1952 - 1962.
(ii) I.M.F., International Financial Statistics, (Washington, D.C./I.M.FV 
March 19701 Vol. 23, No.3, pp. 188-189. It covers data for the period 
1963 - 1968.
(iii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Vol.9 , No. 8, 
August 1973. If covers data for the period 1969-1972.
TABLE 29
INCOMINGS FROM JORDANIANS WORKING ABROAD 
1960 - 1972
Year Incomings
(Receipts)
IN MILLK 
Change 
Previous
DNS OF 
Dver 
Year
JORDANIAN D 
Index
1960 - 100
INARS ~  --------------
IRatio of Incomings (Receipts) From 
Jordanians Working Abroad tnAbsolute
Value 7 . Exports balance Of visible Trade
1960 6.24 m— _ 100 158.0 17.0 •
1961 5.25 -0.99 -16.0 84 100.0 15.0
1962 6.20 0.95 18.1 99 105.0 16.5
1963 6.17 -0.03 -0.5 99 94.0 13.1
1964 8.01 1.84 30.0 128 92.0 20.0
1965 9.28 1.27 16.0 149 94.0 20.2
1966 10.57 1.29 14.0 169 102.0 18.6
1967 6.55 -4.02 -38.0 105 58.0 15.3
1968 4.10 -2.45 -37.0 66 29.0 9.5
1969 6.92 2.82 69.0 111 47.0 13.1
1970 5.54 -1.38 -20.0 89 45.5 10.4
1971 4.97 -0.57 -10.0 80 43.4 7.7
1972 7.41 2.44 49.0 119 43.6 9.5
Source:
Note:
(i) International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 
(Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., n.d.), Vol, 16. It covers data 
for the period 1960 - 1963.
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 5, 
No. 12, December 1969; and Vol. 9, No. 8, August 1973. They 
cover the period 1964 - 1972.* .Data on Incomings from Jordanians working abroad were not available before 1960.
TABLE 30
.1 • If
AGGREGATE DEMAND AND SUPPLY 1960 - 1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Aggregate Demand Aggregate Supply
Domestic Demand Foreign
Demand
Domes­
tic
Foreign
Consumption Investment Total
Export 
of Goods 
S service
Aggregate
Demand
Domestic to
Aggregate
[■percentage)
GDP at 
Market 
prices
Imports 
of goods 
& services
Aggregate
Demand
Domestic to
Aggregate
percentage)
L960 115.47 17.09 132.56 12.79 145.35 91.2 98.3 47.05 145.35 67.6
1961 130.88 18.92 149.8 16.95 166.75 89.8 120.14 46.61 166.75 72.0
1962 131.4 20.22 151.62 19.08 170.7 88.8 118.9 51.80 170.7 69.7
L963 149.86 20.0 169.86 20.26 190.12 89.3 129.06 61.06 190.12 67.9
1964 155.74 25.29 181.03 24.57 205.6 88.1 148.95 56.65 205.6 72.4
1965 174.83 27.79 202.62 28.54 231.16 87.7 167.61 63.55 231.16 72.5
1966 188.65 26.39 215.04 32.06 247.1 87.0 170.5 76.6 247.1 69.0
1967 204.91 25.82 230.73 27.66 258.39 89.3 194.71 63.68 258.39 75.4
1968 211.97 37.65 249.62 28.27 277.89 89.8 186.91 90.98 277.89 67.3
1969 229.0 64.94 293.94 32.26 328.38 90.2 217.51 108.69 326.2 66.7
1970 226.97 40.45 267.42 32.33 299.75 89.2 209.86 89.89 299.75 70.0
1971* 245.88 49.77 295.65 20.78 316.43 93.4 223.42 93.01 316.43 70.6
1972* 261.75 44.61 306.36 34.15 340.51 90.0 239.5 101.01 340.51 70.3
Source: (i) Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, (Amman: Central Bank, 1971).
(ii) Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, (Amman: Central Bank, 1972).
* ,  ,  ,Note: preliminary estimates.
3ÎO
TABLE 31
EXPORTS OF GOODS BY COMMODITY GROUP 
1950-1959
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 Average
Grow th 
per Annum 
(Percent)
Percentage 
of Total
1. Phosphate n.a. 10 30 50 50 600 690 920 980 1,020 483.3 158.4 18.0
2. Fruits n.a. 80 90 130 130 400 720 830 480 460 368.9 35.0 14.0
3. Other Goods 1,420 760 720 1,060 1,400 940 1,730 1,110 620 660 1042.0 1.0 40.0 .
4. Vegetables 110 180 440 660 850 680 1,240 1,440 1,060 960 762.0 33.0 29.0
5. Total Goods 1,530 1,530 1,030 1,900 2,430 2,620 4,380 4-300 3,140 3,100 2571.0 11.3 100
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, Relevant years).
Note: Export figures differ from those appeared in the I.M.F. and the U. Nations Statistics. Reconciliation of
data, sometimes, is not feasible.
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3 1 5 . 1
2 7 5 . 6
1 2 7 . 0
22.6KO.O
r
T o t a l  F l o w  o f  A i d
P e r e q u i  t e d  
T r a n s f e r s  1*2«4»5__
8 9 . 1
6 1 9 0 . 5
3 5 0 0 . 0
9 4 4 8 . 0
1 2 8 8 5 . 0
1 3 9 8 6 . 0
1 6 2 1 3 . 0
1 6 1 1 5 . 0
1 3 9 4 8 . 0
1 9 2 3 2 . 0
1 5 7 6 6 . 0
2 4 1 6 1 . 0
2 4 2 0 6 . 0
2 4 2 4 1 . 0
2 5 2 6 5 . 0  
2 2 6 6 9 . 3
2 2 8 6 3 . 0
2 2 7 2 9 . 0
2 3 9 8 9 . 0
10211.0
4 7 5 0 9 . 0
4 6 7 6 3 . 0
4 3 2 9 7 . 0
4 1 0 7 4 . 0
4 0 0 6 7 . 0
5 3 6 0 5 . 0
6 0 8 , 0 2 1 , 9 0 0
L o a n s
3 * 6
1000.0
1 5 0 0 . 0
2100.0
2 8 7 0 . 0
9 9 6 . 7
5 0 0 . 0
1 8 1 5 . 1
7 7 5 . 6
1 3 1 6 . 5
1 9 3 2 . 6
7 1 7 9 . 0
2 6 1 5 . 6
3 5 8 9 . 9
6 7 9 1 . 9
5 4 1 4 . 0
4 7 8 0 . 7
3 1 5 5 . 1
3 0 7 6 . 8
2 1 0 4 . 9
7 3 , 5 1 4 , 5 0 0
A g g r e g a t e  A i d  F l o w  
1 * 2 * 4 * 5 * 3 * 6
P e r i o d
1 9 2 4 - 2 5  t o
8 9 . 1 1 9 3 3 - 3 4
1 9 3 4 - 3 5  t o
6 1 9 0 . 5 1 9 4 8 - 4 9
4 5 0 0 . 0 1 9 4 9 - 5 0
9 4 4 8 . 0 1 9 5 0 - 5 1
1 2 8 8 5 . 0 1 9 5 1 - 5 2
1 5 4 8 6 . 0 1 9 5 2 - 5 3
1 8 3 1 3 . 0 1 9 5 3 - 5 4
1 8 9 8 5 . 0 1 9 5 4 - 5 5
1 3 9 4 8 . 0 1 9 5 5 - 5 6
1 9 2 3 2 . 0 1 9 5 6 - 5 7
1 5 7 6 6 . 0 1 9 5 7 - 5 8
2 5 1 5 7 . 0 1 9 5 8 - 5 9
2 4 7 0 6 . 0 1 9 5 9 - 6 0
2 6 0 5 6 . 1 1 9 6 0 - 6 1
2 6 0 4 0 . 6 1 9 6 1 - 6 2
2 3 9 8 5 . 8 1 9 6 2 - 6 3
2 4 7 9 5 . 6 1 9 6 3 - 6 4
2 9 9 0 8 . 0 1 9 6 4 - 6 5
2 6 6 0 4 . 5 1 9 6 5 - 6 6
2 1 8 0 0 . 9 1 9 6 6 - 6 7
5 4 3 0 0 . 9 1 9 6 7 - 6 8
5 2 1 7 7 . 0 1 9 6 8 - 6 9
4 6 0 7 7 . 7 1 9 6 9 - 7 0
4 4 2 2 9 . 1 1 9 7 0 - 7 1
5 3 1 4 3 . 0 1 9 7 1 - 7 2
6 5 7 0 9 . 9 1 9 7 2 - 7 )
6 8 1 , 5 3 6 , 4 0 0
'
TABLE 2
AGGREGATE AID FLOW AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF COMPONENTS OF UNREQUITED TRANSFERS (1924-24/1972-73)
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Aggregate Aid Flow 
to Jordan (values)
Aggregate Aid Flow to 
Jordan (percentages)
Private Flow of 
of Unrequited 
Transfers as Z 
of Aggregate 
Unrequited 
Transfers 
Z
U.N.R.W.A. 
Transfers as 
Z of Aggregate 
Unrequited 
Transfers
Z
Technical &
Economic
Assistance
as Z of
Aggregate
Unrequited
Transfers
Budget .
Support
as Z of
Aggregat
Unrequcd
Transfers
Budget Support 
as Z of 
Aggregate Aid 
Flow
Unrequited
Transfer Loans Total
Unrequited 
Transfer 
Z
Loans
Z
Total
Z
1924-25 to
1933-34 89.1 - 89.1 100.0 - 100.0 - - - -
1934-35 to
19481-49 6190.5 - 6190.5 100.0 - 100.0 - - - - •
1949 3500.0 1000.0 4500.0 77.77 22.23 100.0 - - - ■ -
1950 9448.0 9448.0 100.0 - 100.0 16.51 31.64 - 51.84 100
1951 12885.0 - 12885.0 100.0 - 100.0 18.04 26.07 - 55.87 55.8
1952 13986.0 1500.0 15486.0 90.31 . 9.69 100.0 16.53 31.17 52.29 47.2
1953 16213.0 2100.0 18313.0 88.53 11.47 100.0 14.61 29.97 52.65 46.6
1954 16115.0 2870.0 18985.0 84.88 15.12 100.0 10.32 34.12 3.3 52.24 44.3
1955 13948.0 - 13948.0 100.0 - 100.0 - . 33.40 2.4 64.21 64.2
1956 19232.0 - 19232.0 100.0 - 100.0 19.94 23.08 . - 56.97 56.9
1957 15766.0 - 15766.0 100.0 . -■ 100.0 30.95 31.07 6.3 31.71 31.7
1958 24161.0 996.7 25157.7 96.03 3.97 100.0 3.42 19.65 9.1 67.83 65.1
1959 24206.0 500.0 24706.0 97.97 2.03 100.0 3.72 22.30 6.1 67.87 66.5
I960 24241.0 1815.1 26056.1 93.03 6.97 100.0 5.74 21.82 4.6 67.80 63.0
1961 25265.0 775.0 26040.6 97.02 2.98 lo o .o 6.79 20.38 7.8 64.98 63.0
1962 . 22669.3 1316.5 23985.8 94.51 5.49 100.0 7.51 23.20 4.5 64.79 61.2
»963 22863.0 1932.6 24795.6 92.20 7.80 100.0 7.29 24.10 7.4 61.24 56.4
1964 22729.0 7179.0 29908.0 75.99 24.01 100.0 8.58 23.62 7.6 60.19 45.7
1965 23989.0 2615.0 26604.6 90.16 9.84 100.0 11.28 25.05 10.2 53.50 48.2
1966 18211.0 3589.9 21800.9 83.53 16.47 lo o .o 14.87 30.86 10.7 43.53 36.3
1967 247509.0 6791.9 54300.9 87.49 12.51 100.0 4.64 10.10 5.0 79.20 31.1
1968 46763.0 5414.0 52177.0 89.62 10.38 100.0 2.99 11.76 0.7 84.57 75.7
1969 43297.0 4780.7 48077.7 90.05 9.95 100.0 3.57 7.78 .1.9 86.73 78.1
1970 41074.0 3155.1 44229.1 92.86 7.14 100.0 2.77 10.98 5.7 80.51 74.7
1971 40067.0 13076.8 53143.8 75.39 24.61 100.0 2.79 8.88 l.l 87.17 65.7
1972 53605.0 12104.9 65709.9 81.57 18.43 100.0 4.34 12.72 0.8 82.08 66.9
Average Z 95.8 13.4 28.2 4.3 * 55.35 57.831950-1959
Average Z 89.5 10.5 8.9 24.1 7.5 59.43 53.41960-1966
Average Z * 86.2 13.8 3.6 10.4 2.5 83.38 65.361967-1972
Average Z 88.0 12.0 6.4 17.8 5.2 70.48 58.921960-1972
Average Z 91.4 9.5 22.4 4.9 63.90 58.441950-1972
Sources Appendix II Teble No, U  
* Average 1953-1959.
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TABLE 3
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE UK AID TO JORDAN 
1924-1925/1972-1973
IN PERCENTAGES
Period
Components of United Kingdom 
Aid to Jordan as Z of Com­
ponents of Aggregate Aid Flow
UK Aid to Central 
Government as Z 
of Total Govern­
ment Receipts of 
Foreign Aid
UK Budget Support 
as Z of Total 
Budget Support
UK unre­
quited 
Transfers 
to Aggre­
gate Unre­
quited 
Transfers
UK Loans 
as Z of 
Aggregate 
Loans
Total UK 
Aid as Z 
of Aggre­
gate Aid
1924-25 to
1933-34 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1934-35 to 
1948-49 100.0 ». 100.0 100.0 100.0
1949 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1950 51.84 51.84 100.0 100.0
1951 55.87 - 55.87 100.0 100.0
1952 52.29 100.0 56.91 100.0 100.0
1953 52.65 100.0 58.08 95.97 100.0
1954 52.24 100.0 59.46 95.50 100.0
1955 64.21 - 64.21 96.43 100.0
1956 56.97 . - 56.97 100.0 100.0
1957 - - - ' -
1958 19.77 100.0 22.95 29.49 29.15
1959 8.13 100.0 9.99 13.42 11.99
1960 8.85 27.54 10.15 13.88 13.05
1961 12.7 64.46 14.24 19.62 19.54
1962 8.06 53.17 10.54 14.97 12.45
1963 6.56 36.22 8.87 12.50 10.7\
1964 6.59 9.75 7.35 9.80 10.96
1965 5.83 26.76 7.89 11.74 10.90
1966 7.13 6.96 7.10 11.50 16.39
1967 3.08 10.82 4.05 4.99 2.54
1968 « 15.27 1.58 1.82 -
1969 - 26.20 2.60 2.91 -
1970 - 8.30 0.59 0.69 •
1971 - 13.52 3.32 4.17 -
1972 ...... . . . . 11.32 2.08 2.45 ' •
Average Z 
1949-1956 60.75 100.0 62.91 98.48 100.0
Average Z 
1958-1966 16.91 47.20 11.00 15.21 15.01
Average Z 14.23 2.371967-1972 "■ 2.84 •
Average Z
32.12 9.441960-1966 7.96 13.43 13.42
Average Z
23.86 6.181960-1972 ....8.54...... ... *
Source : Table 1^  Appendix XI•
TABLE 3a
BUDGET SUPPORT 
1924-25/1972-73
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period BudgetSupport Period
Budget
Support Period
Budget
Support
1924-25 to 
1933-34 89 1950-51 4898 1967-68 38037
1934-35 101 1951-52 7200 1968-69 39550
1935-36 82 1952-53 7314 1969-70 37553
1936-37 131 1953-54 8537 1970-71 33070
1937-38 101 1954-55 8420 1971-72 34928
1938-39 404 1955-56 8957 1972-73 44001
1939-40 465 1956-57 10957
1940-41 809 1957-58 5000
1941-42 850 1958-59 16389
1942-43 1245 1959-60 16430
1943-44 1967 1960-61 16436
1944-45 17 1961-62 16419
1945-46 18 1962-63 14689
1946-47 n.a. 1963-64 14003
1947-48 n.a. 1964-65 13682
1948-49 n.a. 1965-66 12836
1949-50 3500 *1966-67 7929
TOTAL (in Jordanian Dinars) 427,014,600
Source: Appendix II, Table No 1.
Notes: (a) Until 1966, Jordan fiscal year starts on April 1st and ends on December 
31st; from 1967, Jordan fiscal year starts on January 1st and ends on 
December 31st.
(b) Budget support figures prior to 1944 were reflected in Palestinian Pounds. 
(A Palestinian Pound equals to one Jordanian Diner.) From 1944 till 1948 
figures were in Sterling which also equivalent to the Jordanian Dinar.
(c) Budget support data for the period 1943-1948 are low and reflect a degree 
of underestimation. (These figures were supplied to us by the Ministry 
of Overseas^ Information Department - England.) *
* For nine months only (April 1st - December 31st)
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T A B L E  4
A G G R E G A T E  P R I V A T E  A N D  P U B L I C  U N R E Q U I T E D  T R A N S F E R S  
A S  S  O F  K E Y  E C O N O M I C  V A R I A B L E S  T N  S E L E C T E D  M I D D L E  E A S T E R N  C O U N T R I E S
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 2
I N  M I L L I O N S  O F  U . S .  D O L L A R S
I 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2
u m b e r E c o n o m i c
V a r i a b l e s
V a l u e Z V a l u e Z V a l u e Z V a l u e Z V a l u e Z V a l u e Z 7 a l u e Z
1 E x p o r t s 1 1 6 8 4 . 5 1 8 3 7 5 . 0 4 0 3 8 1 . 5 4 1 3 2 2 . 9 3 4 3 3 4 . 7 3 2 3 1 5 . 6 9 5 . 8 1 9 9 . 7
2 I m p o r t s 1 2 0 6 2 . 8 1 4 3 4 7 . 2 1 6 1 9 4 . 8 1 9 0 6 9 . 7 1 8 4 6 1 . 8 2 1 5 4 7 . 0 2 7 3 . 7 7 0 . 0
3 U n r e q u i t e d
T r a n s f e r s 7 5 . 3 1 0 0 6 7 . 5 1 0 0 1 5 2 . 6 L O O 1 3 2 . 4 1 0 0 1 1 3 . 8 1 0 0 1 0 1 . 0 1 0 0 1 9 1 . 3 1 0 0
4 G D P 2 7 5 2 7 . 4 3 6 2 1 8 . 6 5 2 4 2 9 . 1 6 0 9 2 1 . 7 5 9 8 1 9 . 0 6 2 5 . 8 1 6 . 1 6 7 0 . 6 2 8 . 5
5 p o p u l a t i o n 1.69 4 4 . 6 1 . 8 2 3 7 . 1 2 4 5 7 0 . 9 8 2 . 2 3 5 9 . 4 2 . 3 1 4 9 . 3 2 . 3 8 4 2 . 4 2 . 4 7 7 7 . 4
6 E x p o r t s 5 6 8 2 . 1 1 5 2 2 - 6 2 2 4 0 . 8 7 4 5 3 9 . 7 7 6 2 4 0 . 4 7 8 9 3 5 . 4 .
7 I m p o r t s 6 6 8 1 . 8 9 1 7 • 6 6 6 3 8 . 1 6 3 7 4 6 . 5 7 6 5 3 9 . 2 8 9 0 3 1 . 3 • •
8 U n r e q u i t e d
T r a n s f e r s 1 2 1 0 0 - 1 . 2 5 4 L O O 2 9 6 1 0 0 3 0 8 1 0 0 2 7 9 1 0 0
9 G D P 3 3 4 8 0 . 4 4 3 4 0 - 6 1 9 9 4 . 1 6 8 3 1 4 . 3 7 1 4 5 4 . 3 • - - •
1 0 P o p u l a t i o n 2 6 . 6 0 . 4 5 2 8 . 0 • ” 3 1 . 7 8 . 0 1 3 2 5 9 . U 3 3 . 3 3 9 . 2 4 3 4 . 1 3 a . i ; 3 4 . 8 •
I L 1 3 3 1 U . l 1 6 2 6 1 3 . 7 1 7 6 0 1 0 . 0 1 8 3 5 1 2 . 7 2 0 2 6  ‘ 1 1 . 5 2 0 6 1 1 3 . 0 _
1 2 I m p o r t s 2 3 0 3 6 . 4 2 4 7 7 9 . 0 2 5 6 9 6 . 9 2 2 1 4 1 0 . 5 2 1 2 5 1 1 . 0 2 4 2 1 1 1 . 2 2 3 5 0 1 2 . 0
1 3 U n r e q u i t e d
1 4 8 1 0 0 2 2 3 1 0 0 1 7 6 1 0 0 2 3 3 1 0 0 2 3 3 1 0 0 2 7 0 1 0 0 2 8 4 1 0 0
G D P 3 1 6 0 0 0 . 5 4 1 9 2 2 0 . 5 4 4 1 2 9 0 . 4 4 9 0 8 7 0 . 5 5 4 7 3 1 0 . 4 - - - •
1 5 P o p u l a t i o n 4 2 9 0  3 4 4 6 3 . 4 0 . 4 8 5 1 1 . 2 0 . 3 4 5 2 4 0 . 4 4 5 3 7 . 1 0 . 4 3 S S 0 . 4 0 . 4 ! 5 6 3 . 5 0 . 5 0
1 6 E x p o r t s 2 1 7 1 4 3 . 3 3 5 2 9 6 . 6 6 3 9 6 8 . 0 7 2 9 6 3 . 0 7 7 6 6 3 . 6 9 5 7 8 3 . 4 2 3 2 8 4 5 . 4IT I m p o r t s 5 0 3 6 1 . 8 6 7 2 5 0 . 6 1 1 2 1 3 8 . 7 1 3 3 1 3 4 . 5 1 4 5 1 4 4 . 7 1 8 0 8 4 4 . 1 1 8 9 7 5 5 . 7
1 8 U n r e q u i t e d
3 1 1 1 0 0 3 4 0 1 0 0 4 3 4  • 1 0 0 4 5 9 1 0 0 6 4 9 1 0 0 7 9 8 1 0 0 1 0 5 6 1 0 0
1 9 G D P 1 9 8 6 1 5 . 7 2 5 2 8 1 3 . 4 4 0 4 3 1 0 . 7 4 6 6 1 9 . 8 5 4 8 4 1 1 . 8 6 2 9 7 1 2 . 7 7 0 7 7 1 4 . 9
2 0 P o p u l a t i o n 2 . 1 1 1 4 7 . 4 2 . 3 8 1 4 2 . 9 2 . 7 4 1 5 8 . 4 2 . 8 2 1 6 2 . 8 2 . 9 1 2 2 3 . 0 3 . 0 1 2 6 5 . 1 3 . 0 8 3 . 3 . 0
2 0 3 6 5 . 0 2 9 0 7 2 . 4 4 6 7 5 1 . 8 5 5 3 5 0 . 3 6 4 2 5 3 . 6 6 6 2 6 9 . 2 8 7 0 6 5 . 5
2 2 I m p o r t s 7 0 1 1 8 . 8 8 0 3 2 6 . 2 1 3 8 3 1 7 . 4 1 5 9 3 1 7 . 5 1 8 5 6 1 7 . 6 2 0 9 6 2 1 . 9 2 3 4 5 2 4 . 3
2 3 U n r e q u i t e d
1 3 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 4 2 1 0 0 2 7 8 1 0 0 3 4 4 1 0 0 4 5 8 1 0 0 5 7 0 1 0 0
3 4 8 0 3 . 8 4 6 4 7 4 . 5 7 6 6 3 3 . 2 8 6 0 3 3 . 2 9 6 2 0 3 . 6 1 0 7 1 7 4 . 3 1 2 2 8 7 4 . 6
2 5 p o p u l a t i o n 8 . 4 1 5 . 7 1 8 . 4 8 2 4 . 7 6 8 . 7 4 2 7 . 6 9 8 . 7 7 3 1 . 7 0 8 . 7 9 3 9 . 1 4 8 . 8 5 5 1 . 7 : 8 . 9 5 6 3 . 6 9
2 6
2 7
E x p o r t s
I m p o r t s
1 6 0 2 8 . 8 1 5 9 . 2 1 9 . 5 2 7 5 . 8 1 4 . 5 3 0 3 . 5 1 3 , 2 3 1 2 . 5 1 2 . 2 3 9 4 . 8 9 . 1 5 6 3 . 8 5 . 9
1 8 4 . 4 2 4 . 9 1 9 5 . 2 1 5 . 9 2 3 8 . 5 1 6 . 8 2 9 1 . 7 1 3 . 7 3 3 4 . 2 1 1 . 4 3 7 5 . 0 9 . 6 4 6 2 . 9 7 . 1
2 8 U n r e q u i t e d
4 6 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 4 0 L O O 4 0 1 0 0  * 3 8 1 0 0 3 6 1 0 0 3 3 1 0 0
2 9
3 0
G D P -
P o p u l a t i o n
7 9 6 5 . 8 9 5 6 3 . 2 1 1 1 0 3 . 6 1 2 6 3 3 . 2 1 3 5 0 2 . 7 1 6 0 9 2 . 2 2 1 1 7 1 . 6
4 . 0 9 1 1 . 2 9 4 . 1 7 7 . 4 3 4 . 9 2 8 . 1 3 5 . 0 3 7 . 9 5 5 . 1 4 7 . 3 9 5 . 2 4 6 . 8 7 5 . 3 8 6 . 1 3
E x p o r t s 3 5 4 2 . 2 3 6 4 3 . 4 4 5 1 1 0 . 4 4 8 5 1 4 . 2 4 8 8 1 S . 0 4 9 8 2 1 . 9 8 5 8  * IS.9
3 2 I m p o r t s 4 1 3 1 . 9 4 4 6 2 . 9 5 5 2 8 . 5 5 6 0 1 2 . 3 6 3 4 1 0 . 7 6 9 3 1 5 . 6 7 0 * 1 9 . 3
3 3 U n r e q u i t e d
8 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 4 7 L O O 6 9 1 0 0 7 3 1 0 0 1 0 9 1 0 0 1 3 6 loo
1 7 9 6 0 . 4 2 3 4 4 0 . 6 3 0 2 6 1.6 3 1 4 6 2 . 2 3 3 5 2 2 . 2 3 6 6 8 3 . 0 3 9 8 2 3 . 4
3 5 P o p u l a t i o n 1 1 . 6 0 . 6 9 1 2 . 7 1 . 0 2 1 4 , 6 3 . 2 2 1 5 . 1 4 . 5 7 1 5 . 5 4 . 7 1 1 5 . 2 7 . 1 7 1 5 . 1 8 . 6 1
3 6 3 9 3 3 4 . 1 4 1 7 6 6 . 7 7 2 0 3 7 . 6 6 8 2 2 5 . 8 7 2 3 1 6 . 5 6 6 6 2 7 . 2 3 5 4 5 4 . 9
3 7 I m p o r t s 6 5 4 2 0 . 5 8 8 9 3 1 . 3 9 9 6 2 7 . 2 1 0 3 5 1 7 . 0 1 1 5 1 1 0 . 3 9 1 7 1 9 . 7 5 7 8 3 0 . 1
3 f t U n r e q u i t e d
1 3 4 1 0 0 2 7 8 . 0 0 2 7 1 . 0 0 1 7 6 1 0 0 1 1 9 L O O 1 8 1 1 0 0 1 7 4 1 0 0
7 7 1 0 1 . 7 9 2 7 4 3 . 0 1 4 9 8 1 1 . 8 1 6 2 5 3 l . l 1 6 2 5 4 0 . 7 1 0 4 7 9 1 . 7 4 6 4 5 3 . 6
4 0 P o p u l a t i o n 9 2 . 7 1 . 4 5 9 8 . 6 2 . 8 2 1 0 9 . 5 2 . 4 7 1 1 1 . 8 1 . 5 7 1 1 4 . 2 1 . 0 4 1 1 6 . 6 1 . 5 2 5 6 . 1 3 . 1 0
E x p o r t s
I m p o r t s
3 2 2 2 8 . 3 3 6 8 2 1 . 2 4 9 6 1 4 . 1 5 3 7 6.6 5 8 9 1 0 . 5 6 7 7 1 5 . 1 8 8 2 6 . 3
4 2 4 6 8 1 9 . 4 6 9 1 1 1 . 3 7 6 a 9 . 2 8 0 1 5 . 7 9 4 8 6 . 5 1 1 7 1 8 . 7 1 5 5 8 3 . 6
4 3 U n r e q u i t e d
9 1 1 0 0 7 8 1 0 0 7 0 0 0 4 6 L O O 6 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 5 6 too
5 6 9 8 1.6 7 6 9 3 1 . 0 1 2 0 1 9 0.6 1 3 3 6 1 0 . 3 1 2 1 3 8 0 . 5 1 1 8 1 6 0 . 9 1 6 3 6 4 l.Sl
4 5 P o p u l a t i o n 2 7 . 5 3 . 3 1 2 9 . 7 2 . 6 3 3 3 . 5 2 . 0 9 3 4 . 4 1 . 3 4 3 5 . 2 1 . 7 6 3 6 . 2 2 . 8 2 3 7 . 0
I  J o r d a n
E g y p t
I n d i »
P a k i s —
Turkey
S o u r e s t  < i )
( i i )
N o t e » »  ( a )
(b)<n>
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  Y e a r b o o k  o f  N a t i o n a l  A c c o u n t »  S t a t i s t i c » »  1 9 7 2  ( N e w  Y o r k :  U . N . ,  1 9 7 4 ) ,  v o l ,  I I I .
I k e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M o n e t a r y  F u n d ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S r a t i a ' t i c i  ( I P S ) .  ( W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C . f  n . d . ) ,  s u p p l e m e n t  t e  1 9 7 2 |
e n d  O c t o b e r  1 9 7 4 »
T h e  p e r c e n t a g e *  o n  t h i s  t a b l e  r e f l e c t  u n r e q u i t e d  t r a n s f e r *  i n  e a c h  y e a r  a s  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e a c h  y e a r ' s  e x p o r t s ,  i m p o r t s  a n d  g r o s s  
d o m e s t i c  i n c o m e .
I t e m *  5 ,  1 0 ,  1 ) ,  2 0 ,  2 5 ,  3 0 ,  3 5 ,  4 0  a n d  4 5  r e p r e s e n t  u n r e q u i t e d  t r e n e f e r a  p e r  c a p i t a .
T h e  m a c r o - e c o n o m i c  v a r i a b l e s  r e l e v a n t  t o  J o r d a n  a n d  a p p e a r e d  o n  t h i s  t a b l o  m a y  d i f f e r  f r o m  t h e i r  c o u n t e r p a r t s  a p p e a r e d  e l s e v h e r e  
I n  t h i s  t h e s i s .  C o n v e n i e n c e  i n  c o n s t r u c t i n g  t h i s  t a b l e  h a a  d i c t a t e d  r e l i a n c e  o n  s u c h  f i g u r e s .
r ..VEi • r - 1- - ■-f"'rhi Uftwt
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T A B L E  3
S E C T O R A L  D I S T R T 1 ^ i C ) S  p p  p p y r E R S M E K T  E X P E  j p f T U R E S  ( A C T U A L  F I G U R E S )  
1 9 5 0 - 5 3 / 1 9 7 2 - F 3
X »  T H O U S A N D S  O F  J O R D A N  A V I A N  D I N A R S
P e r i o d P u b l i c
A d m i n i ­
s t r a t i o n
, w
D e f e n c e
( A r m y )
S e c u r i t y  4i n d  I n t e r n a 1  A f f a i r e I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l
A f f a i r e
F i s c a l
A d m i n i ­
s t r a t i o n
< c >
E c o n o m i c  S e r v i c e s S o c i a l S e r v i c e s C u l t u r e  6
I n f o r m a t i o n
S e r v i c e *
« )
C o m m u n i c a t i o n  0  T r a n s p o r t  
S e r v i c e sP u b l i c
S e c u r i t y
O t h e r
( b ) T o t a l
M i n i s t r y  o f
N a t i o n a l
E c o n o m y
N a t i o n a l
P l a n n i n g
C o u n c i l
P u b l i c
W o r k s
M i n i s t r y
o f
A g r i c u l t u r e
T h e
R e g i o n a l
C o r p o r a t i o n
O t h e r
i d )
T o t a l
E d u c a ­
t i o n H s e l t h
S o c i a l
A f f a i r e
O t h e r s
( e ) T o t a l M i n i s t r y  o f  
C o m m u n i -
M i n i s t r y  o f  
T r a n s p o r t
1 9 5 0 1 5 8 5 4 5 1 6 0 2 7 6 6 7 8 1 0 3
1 9 5 1 1 8 4 7 9 3 2 1 3 7 0 1 4 9 1 5 1 9 1 1 7 7 2 0 7 5 2 9 3 7 4 9 3 - • ¡ < 1 0 0 9 7 0 6 8 . 8 0 2 9 4 0 4 7 9 •
1 9 5 2 1 2 5 7 7 1 9 1 3 3 7 1 3 4 1 4 7 1 1 0 3 1 6 8 6 5 0 8 5 4 6 5 4 1 2 6 - Í  1 4 1 6 9 8 2 4 5 2 1 4 1 8 4 4 8 1 5 2 1 1 0
1 9 5 3 1 3 2 8 9 5 1 1 2 3 2 1 4 0 1 3 7 2 1 1 3 1 8 4 2 4 7 0 6 5 7 4 1 8 3 - ' 1 3 1 4 8 0 2 9 1 1 6 7 2 0 2 3 5 0 1 5 5 1 2 1 •1 9 5 4 1 6 6 8 9 5 1 1 2 6 5 3 0 4 1 5 6 9 1 4 4 1 8 6 6 1 6 1 2 3 6 6 0 9 3 3 4 1 4 2 2 0 9 3 5 7 2 1 3 3 1 _ 6 0 1 5 2 1 6 7
1 9 5 5 2 0 4 9 3 5 5 1 2 7 5 3 2 1 1 5 9 6 1 5 3 2 9 1 3 0 3 8 1 4 3 2 9 - 3 8 2 5 1 3 9 9 1 3 6 3 1 2 S . 1 4 7 9 8 3 3 2 5
1 9 5 6 2 9 8 1 2 1 8 7 1 3 5 5 3 6 8 1 7 2 3 1 9 6 3 5 1 6 9 8 7 2 4 3 2 4 - 2 6 2 4 1 1 9 1 4 0 2 1 3 6 2 1 7 3 1 8 1 3 7 7
1 9 5 7 2 3 4 1 1 7 8 1 1 6 8 3 3 4 1 2 0 2 4 2 4 1 l u b e 1 2 1 9 7 6 8 1 0 3 7 4 - 3 2 0 3 1 3 6 8 4 7 2 1 4 8 2 5 2 0 1 3 1 2 1 4 5 3
1 9 5 8 2 9 3 1 4 6 6 9 2 0 7 2 4 0 1 2 4 7 3 2 4 1 1 4 2 8 6 2 1 2 4 9 3 5 4 - > 4 5 0 2 1 6 3 1 5 7 1 1 7 5 1 3 2 4 4 0 1 1 2 4 6 1 »
1 9 5 9 3 1 4 1 5 8 2 2 2 2 3 8 4 1 6 2 6 5 4 2 6 7 1 3 4 0 5 0 1 3 8 3 6 2 7 - 6 1 1 0 2 4 1 2 7 0 4 2 1 0 1 4 3 3 4 0 1 7 6 7 2 2 _
1 9 6 0 3 2 3 1 6 1 5 5 2 2 7 0 3 9 9 2 6 6 9 2 8 8 1 3 3 3 0 5 7 9 8 5 8 0 • 3 9 4 7 3 5 2 S 1 2 1 6 1 3 2 1 5 1 5 4 3 5 5 3 3 1 8 1 91 9 6 1 3 3 8 1 6 4 2 0 2 2 9 1 4 0 6 2 6 9 7 3 5 3 1 4 2 5 0 4 9 2 0 4 3 1 -  - '  I - ' • 4 0 0 2 2 6 6 0 2 0 4 6 2 2 6 1 4 4 9 4 6 3 2 6 7 3 7
1 9 6 2 3 6 1 1 6 8 0 5 2 3 0 9 4 4 4 2 7 5 3 5 3 8 2 2 2 7 2 6 1 4 2 3 5 1 0 - 6 9 0 5 3 7 1 2 8 1 7 1 0 4 7 2 2 5 1 4 4 1 0 3 3 1 0 7 4 0
1 9 6 3 3 6 1 1 8 5 6 9 2 4 5 2 5 0 9 2 9 5 6  . 6 1 9 2 9 7 3 2 4 8 1 5 7 1 6 1 3 6 7 2 7 3 5 0 3 2 6 1 1 1 6 7 1 9 9 4 7 4 6 7 4 3 8 9 1 0 2 5
1 9 6 4 3 8 4 1 8 5 7 0 2 4 6 2 5 4 9 3 0 1 1 6 5 4 3 3 5 7 1 3 2 9 5 9 6 114 7 6 5 6 5 S 3 3 4 8 7  1 1 3 4 1 2 1 8 5 4 5 1 0 0 6 4 1 9 7 0
1 9 6 5 4 8 6 1 8 7 7 0 2 8 4 3 5 5 3 3 3 9 6 6 5 6 1 6 4 3 5 3 7 1 4 2 2 6 6 2 3 0 6 4 6 0 6 5 5 1 3 7 2 5 1 3 1 4 3 0 3 5 8 5 4 0 0 6 3 6 9 3 9  : -
1 9 6 6 * 3 5 7 1 * 3 7 4 2 2 2 4 5 1 9 2 7 4 3 6 0 6 6 1 5 1 8 5 1 9 4 3 7 5 4 7 0 5 1 6 9 2 1 0 4 2 0 4 2 3 4 1 5 6 4 3 3 8 7 4 6 2 1 0 7 4 2 1 4 7 9 6 6
1 9 6 7 4 5 4 2 4 1 6 5 3 2 6 0 1 1 2 3 4 3 8 3 7 7 1 3 7 9 2 1 5 6 6 6 4 8 8 0 5 2 0 9 2 8 9 4 2 3 5 5 8  d 1 6 2 8 2 7 2 2 0 2 5 6 6 0 7 9 5 1 2 4 2 7 4
1 9 6 0 6 0 2 3 5 1 6 5 3 2 4 9 9 9 0 4 2 3 9 8 7 1 5 5 3 0 3 0 7 9 8 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 5 2 2 3 3 4 1 5 2 4 8 3 2 9 4 3 2 1 7 3 8 0 3 6 1 1 0 3 1 5 2 0 1 2 2
1 9 6 9 6 1 6 4 1 4 7 1 3 7 3 2 9 5 9 4 6 9 1 9 6 4 4 5 8 0 4 4 0 9 1 0 1 9 4 5 6 2 2 8 0 1 2 8 4 7 5 2 9 8  ! 3 2 9 9 3 3 3 6 6 8 0 9 6 1 5 2 9 1 5 1 6 2 2 9
1 9 7 0 6 2 8 3 3 0 7 0 4 3 6 4 7 7 6 5 1 4 0 9 9 8 1 1 9 5 4 5 9 2 7 2 5 1 0 4 4 2 5 3 3 1 8 9 , 1 3 7 3 1 5 9 3 8 2 4 2 9 2 8 3 6 6 8 7 1 6 1 8 8 7 1 3 7 7 1 3 4
1 9 7 1 7 6 0 3 3 7 8 0 4 3 1 1 7 9 5 5 1 0 6 1 0 6 7 4 0 9 8 2 6 3 9 1 0 8 7 i  1 2 5 9 5  ‘ , 6 8 0 0  t 2 6 6 2 3 0 6 4 4 9 1 0 2 1 7 1 7 1 3 1 5 5 1 6 1 2
1 9 7 2 1 0 0 5 3 9 2 5 0 4 8 7 0 9 5 2 5 8 2 2 1 2 5 3 2 9 8 7 1 8 8 0 1 1 5 7 1 4 0 0  I 2509 1 0 0 2 2  . . 6 3 8 3  ¡ 2 4 6 4 2 7 9 2 6 5 9 3 9 1 1 6 9 9 1 2 2 5 1 1 6B Ò 9 6 2 3 1 1 1 3 7 6 2 1 0 6
- s —  ...
2 4 8 2 1 7 3 9 0 ' 6 5 7 8 2 3 9 0 3 4 9 3 4 4 9 6 6 1 2 0 1 9 1 5 3 8 1 6 8
T o t a l  G o v e r n m e n t  E x p e n d í t u r « «
(g)
11
1 6
1 8
2 735
4 1
4 5
8 4
8 9
1 0 3
9 4
1 3 7
1 6 6
1 4 5
1 6 0
3 5 1
2 8 6
2 4 0
3 5 7
3 2 7
3 1 2
9 9 3
C e n t r a l  B a n k  o f  J o r d a n ,  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h ,  T h e  F i s c a l  |  f
a n d  M o n e t r a r y  D i v i s i o n ,  ( u n p u b l i s h e d  d a t a  i n  A r a b i c ) .  j  .‘  V  £
( a )  T h i s  i t e m  i n c l u d e s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o f  t h e  R o y a l  C o u r t ,  H o u s e s  o f  P a r l i  a m e n t ,  T h e  C a b i n e t ,  A u d i t  C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  C o m m i s s i o n .  1  .  *
( b )  T h i s  i t e m  i n c l u d e s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o f  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  I n t e r i o r ,  J u s t i c  e ,  S h a r i ' a  D e p a r t m e n t .  I .
< * >  I M *  f * * *  * ■ “ » < * « •  e x p e n d i t u r e «  o f  t h e  M i n i a t r y  o f  F i n a n c e  a n d  C u t  c n ,  t h e  B u d g e t  D e p a r t m e n t ,  I n c o m e  T a x  D e p a r t m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  | k S u r v e y ! .  '  '
i i * *  - t e B  * n c l u ‘) e *  « p e n d i t u r e «  o f  t n e  M i n i s t r y  o f  M u n i c i p a l  a n d  V .  l l a g e  A f f a i r s ,  T h a  N a t u r a l  R e s o u r c e s  A u t h o r i t y ,  T h e  S c i e n t i f i c  R a s e «  |  B o a r d  T h a  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t e t i a t i e e  a n d  S u n u l v
( e )  T h i s  i c e .  i n c l u d e s  e x p e n d i t u r e «  o f  t h e  Y o u t h  C e r e  O r g a n n a t i o n ,  t h a  D r i n k i n g  M a t e r  A u t h o r i t y  e n d  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  R e c o n s t r u c t i o n .  <  L  ™  t a t i . t i e .  a n d  S u p p l y
( f )  T h i s  i t e m  i n c l u d e s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o n  T . V .  e n d  B r o a d c a s t i n g ,  T o u r i s m  a n d  A n t i q u i t i e s ,  D i r e c t o r a t e  o f  P r e s s  a n d  P u b l i c a t i o n s ,  a n d  e x p e n d ! t t  1  o f  t h „  M l „ i . t r y  o f  C u l t u r .  a n d  I n f o n a a t i o n
, ( , )  T h u  i t e m  i n c l u d e s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o f  t h e  T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n  C o r p o r a t u ' r  a n d  C i v i l  A v i a t i o n .  ,  . i  1  - T * . "  , * “  m r o r n s a t l o n .
*  n i n e  m o n t h «  o n l y .
■\.iJ!V
C a p a r m e n e .
T o t a l R e c u r r i n g
E x p e n d i t u r e
>9
121
1 3 7
1 6 5
3 5 2
4 1 2
4 9 4
5 0 6
8 0 4
9 0 8
0 4 0
0 3 4
1 1 6 2
1 1 3 6
1 0 8 4
1 7 0 5
1 6 6 7
1 9 2 0
1 9 0 5
1 0 6 8
2 5 2 0
1 6 5 3
2 6 9 9
44 ,  7 1 5 7
’  1 1 7 9 5  
i  U 7 1 0  
1 2 6 1 0  
*  1 3 3 3 4  
V  J  1 4 8 7 2  
.  1 8 2 5 8  
J  1 9 5 5 8  
2 3 5 2 3  
: 2 5 9 0 4
2 6 8 6 2  
■¡ 2 8 0 4 5  
1  2 9 9 2 6  
?  3 3 1 9 3  
■ 3 4 4 5 7  
?  3 5 8 1 0  
i 2 8 2 4 0  
4 4 6 5 1
* 5 7 1 8 6
*  6 5 2 3 1  
;  5 9 0 2 8  
I  6 0 7 0 6
s 70311
;
‘ 4
D e v e l o p m e n t
E x p e n d i t u r e
1 9 8 5
1 9 9 5
1 7 2 3
2 7 8 1
3 2 2 6
2 7 6 1
3 0 6 3
4 3 0 0
5 8 2 0
4 7 9 7
5 9 8 0
4 9 3 7
7 5 9 9
6 1 5 4
9 1 6 6
1 1 1 7 8
1 0 3 6 0
2 3 4 9 6
2 3 3 3 4
2 3 1 7 0
2 1 6 7 3
2 2 4 3 9
3 5 5 6 3
P e r i o d
T o t a l
9 1 4 2
1 3 7 9 0
1 3 4 3 3
1 5 3 9 1
1 6 5 6 0
1 7 6 3 3
2 1 3 2 1
2 3 8 5 8
2 9 3 4 3
3 0 7 0 1
3 2 8 4 2
3 2 9 8 2
3 7 5 2 5
3 9 3 4 7
4 3 6 2 3
4 6 9 8 8
3 8 6 0 0
6 8 1 4 7
8 0 5 2 0
8 8 4 0 1
8 0 7 0 7
8 3 1 4 5
1 0 5 8 7 4
1 9 5 0
1 9 5 1
1 9 5 2
1 9 5 3
1 9 5 4
1 9 5 5
1 9 5 6
1 9 5 7
1 9 5 8
1 9 5 9
1 9 6 0
1 9 6 1
1 9 6 2
1 9 6 3
1 9 6 4
1 9 6 5
1 9 6 6
1 9 6 7
1 9 6 8
1 9 6 9
1 9 7 0
1 9 7 1
1 9 7 2
T A B L E  5 . e
S E C T O R A L  D I S T R I B U T I O N  0 ?  G O V E R N M E N T  E X P E N D I T U R E S  A N D  
R E L A T I V E  W E I G H T  O F  B A S I C  C O M P O N E N T S  
( P E R C E N T A G E S )
1 9 5 0 - 1 9 7 2
P e r i o d P u b l i c
A d m i n i ­
s t r a t i o n
D e f e n c e
( A r m y )
S e c u r i t y  6  I n t e r n a l  
A f f a i r s
I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l
A f f a i r s
F i s c a l
A d m i n i ­
s t r a t i o n
E c o n o m i c  S e r v i c e s
M i n i s t r y  
o f  N a t i o ­
n a l
E c o n o m y
N a t i o n a l
P l a n n i n g
C o u n c i l
P u b l i c
W o r k s
M i n i s t r y  o f  
A g r i c u l t u r e
T h e
R e g i o n a l
C o r p o r ­
a t i o n
O t h e rP u b l i c
S e c u r i t y
O t h e r T o t a l
1 9 5 0 1 . 7 2  ' 5 9 . 6 2 6 . 5 8 0 . 8 3 7 . 4 1 1 . 1 2 7 . 8 7 0 . 0 7 5 . 7 6 4 . 0 9 1 . 0 11 9 5 1 1 . 3 3 5 7 . 5 1 9 . 9 3 1 . 0 8 1 1 . 0 1 0 . 8 4 1 2 . 2 2 0 . 3 6 6 . 1 9 4 . 7 4 S * ? «
1 9 5 2 0 . 9 3 5 7 . 4 6 9 . 9 5 0 . 9 9 1 0 . 9 5 0 . 7 6 1 3 . 7 1 0 . 0 2 5 . 2 5 4 . 2 7 1 . 3 6 O f t ?1 9 5 3 0 . 8 5 5 8 . 1 5 8 . 0 0 0 . 9 0 8 . 9 1 0 . 7 3 1 2 . 1 2 0 . 1 0 8 . 0 3 3 . 9 5 2 , 1 7
1 9 5 4 1 . 0 0 5 4 . 0 5 7 . 6 3 1 . 8 3 9 . 4 7 0 . 8 6 7 . 8 6 0 . 1 7 7 . 8 6 4 . 9 1 1 . 9 8
1 9 5 5 1 . 1 5 5 3 . 0 5 7 . 2 3 1 . 8 2 9 . 0 5 0 . 8 6 7 . 2 4 0 . 1 9 9 . 6 2 4 . 1 0 1 . 8 3
1 9 5 C 1 . 3 9 5 7 . 1 5 6 . 3 5 1 . 7 2 8 . 0 6 0 . 9 1 5 . 0 9 0 . 0 5 9 . 2 6 3 . 7 9 1 . 7 5
1 9 5 7 0 . 9 8 4 9 . 3 7 7 . 0 5 1 . 4 2 8 . 4 8 1 . 0 1 6 . 4 5 0 . 0 5 1 1 . 9 9 5 . 2 3 1 . 4 8
1 9 5 6 0 . 9 9 4 9 . 9 9 7 . 0 6 1 . 3 6 8 . 4 2 0 . 8 2 4 . 2 0 0 . 0 4 1 3 . 8 0 4 . 7 1 2 . 1 3
1 9 5 9 1 . 0 2 5 1 . 5 3 7 . 2 8 1 . 3 5 6 . 6 4 0 . 8 6 4 . 2 8 0 . 0 4 1 0 . 7 6 2 . 5 9 1 . 8 8 —I 9 6 0 0 . 9 8 4 9 . 1 9 6 . 9 1 1 . 2 1 8 . 1 2 0 . 8 7 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 7 . 6 2 2 . 8 0 1 . 3 1
1 9 6 1 1 . 0 2 4 9 . 7 8 6 . 9 4 1 . 2 3 8 . 1 7 1 . 0 7 7 . 7 4 0 . 0 6 8 . 2 6 4 . 3 1 1 . 5 4
1 9 6 2 0 . 9 6 4 4 . 7 8 6 . 1 5 1 . 1 8 7 . 3 3 1 . 4 3 9 . 3 0 0 . 1 0 7 . 9 2 6 . 6 1 1 . 5 2 1 . 6 31 9 6 3 0 . 9 1 4 7 . 1 9 6 . 2 3 1 . 2 8 7 . 5 1 1 . 5 7 8 . 6 7 0 . 9 9 8 . 5 3 3 . 3 7 1 . 5 11 9 6 4 0 . 8 8 4 2 . 5 6 5 . 6 4 1 . 2 5 6 . 9 0 1 . 4 9 1 6 . 8 0 0 . 3 7 8 . 1 0 3 . 2 5 1 . 5 11 9 6 5 1 . 0 3 3 9 . 9 4 6 . 0 5 1 . 1 7 7 . 2 2 1 . 3 9 9 . 7 9 0 . 1 2 1 1 . 0 3 4 . 1 3 1 . 6 01 9 6 6 0 . 9 2 3 6 . 9 7 5 . 7 6 1 . 3 4 7 . 1 0 1 . 5 6 6 . 9 5 0 . 1 0 9 . 8 2 4 . 0 5 1 . 6 71 9 6 7 0 . 6 6 3 5 . 4 6 4 . 7 8 1 . 6 4 6 . 4 3 1 . 1 3 2 0 . 4 9 0 . 1 7 8 . 1 1 4 . 5 1 1 . 1 81 9 6 8 0 . 7 4 4 3 . 6 7 4 . 0 3 1 . 2 2 5 . 2 6 1 . 0 8 1 8 . 8 5 0 . 1 2 5 . 6 8 5 . 4 7 1 . 2 61 9 6 9 0 . 6 9 4 6 . 9 1 4 . 2 2 1 . 0 8 5 . 3 0 1 . 0 9 1 6 . 3 5 0 . 1 3 6 . 1 7 3 . 0 8 1 . 1 8 2 . 8 61 9 7 0 0 . 7 7 4 0 . 9 7 5 . 4 0 0 . 9 6 6 . 3 6 1 . 2 3 1 7 . 1 3 0 . 1 2 5 . 0 7 3 . 2 6 1 . 3 4 3 . 1 9 2 . 5 91 9 7 1 0 . 9 2 4 0 . 6 2 5 . 1 8 0 . 9 5 6 . 1 4 1 . 2 8 2 3 . 6 4 0 . 2 3 3 . 5 9 2 . 2 6 1 . 3 9 1 . 6 9 2 . 8 71 9 7 2 0 . 9 4 3 7 . 0 7 4 . 5 9 0 . 8 9 5 . 4 9 1 . 1 8 2 5 . 2 8 0 . 3 9 8 . 2 1 2 . 1 8 1 . 2 9 1 . 9 8 2 . 3 4
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S o c i a l  S e r v i e «
SocialAffair*
0.13
0.14
0.20
0.75
0.77
0.69
0.73
0.71
0.700.68
0.68
0.53
0.55
0.69
0.71
0.70
0.47
0,41
0.32
0.37
0.33
0.32
8.77
0.02
0.17
O.Ol
0.11
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.15
0.52
0.10
0.08
0.07
0.55
0.31
0.32
T o t a l
10.28 
, 3.48 
3.72 
3.90 
6.93 
9.81 
9.44 
10.22 
11.38 
14.18
15.05
12.44
12.45 
12.96 
12.37 
13.21 
14.66 
11.79
10.05 
9.85
12.65
11.29
9.12
Cul tue«
A  I n f o r -  
« a c i ó n
0.04
0.37
0.40
0.33
0.50
0.45
0.56
0.46
0.59
1.07
0.99
0.93
1.03 
1.62 
1.45 
1.57 
2.OS 
1.61
1.89 
2.13 
2.12
2.04
1.90
Communication 6 Trantport Survie««
Mini* try 
of Com­
munica­
tion
0.86
0.79
0.90
1.08
1.96
2.13 
2.12 
1.93
2.46
2.66
2.24
2.24 
2.73
2.46 
2.15
3.14 
3.21 
2.23 
1.88 l.SS 
1.92
1.47 
1.45
M in istry  
of Tran­
sport
0.14
0.19
0.17
0.28
0.15
0.79
0.13
0.15
other I Total
0.070.11
0.11
0.16
0.19
0.19
0.18
0.28
0.28
0.31
0.28
0.36
0.42
0.33
0.34
0.90
0.41
0.29
0.40
0.40
0.37
0.93
0.86
0.87
1.01
1.20
2.12
2.33
2.31 
2.12 
2.74 
2.9S 
2.55 
2.52 
3.09 
2.88 
2.48 
3.62
4.31 
2.82 
2.46 
2.11 
3.12 
1.98 
2.54
Total Government Expenditure«
Recurring
76.26
85.53
87.17
81.93
80.51
84.34 
85.63
81.97 
60.16 
84.37 
81.79 
85.03 
79.72
84.35
78.98 
76.21 
73.16
65.52 
71.02 
73.78 
73.13 
73.01 
66.51
Development
21.71
14.46 
12.82 
18.06 
19.48 
15.65 
14.36 
18.02
19.83 
15.62 
18.20
14.96 
20.24 
15.64 
21.01 
23.78
26.83
34.47
28.97 
26.21 
26.86
26.98 
33.58
Period
100
100100
100100
100100
100100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100100100
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
TABLE 6
B I L A T E R A L '  A S P  M U L T I L A T E R A L  A I D  F L O U  T O  J O R D A N  A N D  T H E  I P  R E L A T I V E  I M P O R T A N C E  
1 9 2 4 - 2 5 / 1 9 7 2 / 7 3
V A L U E S  I t J . D .  T H O U S A N D S
A g g r e g a t e  P l o w  o f  A i d  t o B i l a t e r a l  A i d  F l o w M u l t i l a t e r a l  A i d  F l o w C o m p o n e n t e  o f  B i l a t e r a l  A i d C o m p o n e n t s o f  M u l t i -
P e r i o d J o r d a n a s  I  o f  C o m p o n e n t e  o f l a t e r a l  A i d  a s  2  o f
U n r e q u i t e d L o e n e T o t a l U n r e q u i t e d L o e n e T o t a l
U n r e q u i t e c L o e n e T o t a l A g g r e g a t e  A i d C o m p o n e n t s  o f  A g e r e - P e r i o dT r a n s f é r é T r a n s f e r s T r a n s f e r s U n r e q u i t e d L o a n s T o t a l g a t e  A i dT r a n s f e r s U n r e q u i t e d
T r a n s f e r s L o a n s T o t a l
1 9 2 6 - 2 5  t o 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 9 2 4 - 2 5  t o1 9 3 3 - 3 6 8 9 . 1 “ 8 9 . 1 8 9 . 1 - 8 9 . 1 — — — 1 9 3 3 - 3 4
1 9 3 4 - 3 5  t o  
1 9 4 8 - 4 9 6 1 9 0 . S . 6 1 9 0 . 5 6 1 9 0 . 5 6 1 9 0 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
1 9 3 4 - 3 5  t o
1 9 4 9 3 5 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 0 . 0 4 5 0 0 . 0 3 5 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 0 . 0 4 5 0 0 . 0 • • - - 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 . • 1 9 4 9
1 9 5 0 9 4 4 8 . 0 - 9 4 4 8 . 0 6 4 5 8 . 0 - 6 4 5 8 . 0 2 9 9 0 . 0 - 2 9 9 0 . 0 ■  6 8 . 3 5 • 6 8 . 3 5 3 1 . 6 5 3 1 . 6 5 1 9 5 0
1 9 5 1 1 2 8 8 5 . 0 - 1 2 8 8 5 . 0 9 5 2 5 . 0 - 9 5 2 5 . 0 3 3 6 0 . 0 - 3 3 6 0 . 0 7 3 . 9 2 - 7 3 . 9 2 2 6 . 0 8 . . 2 6 . 0 8 1 9 5 1
1 9 5 2 1 3 9 8 6 . 0 1 5 0 0 . 0 1 5 4 8 6 . 0 9 6 2 6 . 0 1 5 0 0 . 0 1 1 1 2 6 . 0 4 3 6 0 . 0 • 4 3 6 0 . 0 6 8 . 8 2 1 0 0 . 0 7 1 . 6 4 3 1 . 1 8 2 8 . 1 6 1 9 5 2
1 9 5 3 1 6 2 1 3 . 0 2 1 0 0 . 0 1 8 3 1 3 . 0 1 1 3 5 3 . 0 2 1 0 0 . 0 1 3 4 5 3 . 0 4 8 6 0 . 0 4 8 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 2 1 0 0 . 0 7 3 . 4 6 2 9 . 9 8 * . 2 6 . 5 4 1 9 5 3
1 9 5 4 1 6 1 1 5 . 0 2 8 7 0 . 0 1 8 9 8 5 . 0 1 0 6 1 5 . 0 2 8 7 0 . 0 1 3 4 8 5 . 0 5 5 0 0 . 0 . 5 5 0 0 . 0 6 5 . 8 7 1 0 0 . 0 7 1 . 0 2 3 4 . 1 3 • 2 8 . 9 8 1 9 5 4
1 9 5 5 1 3 9 4 8 . 0 - 1 3 9 4 8 . 0 9 2 8 8 . 0 - 9 2 8 8 . 0 4 6 6 0 . 0 - 4 6 6 0 . 0 6 6 . 5 9 - 6 6 . 5 9 3 3 . 4 1 3 3 . 4 1 1 9 5 5
1 9 5 6 1 9 2 3 2 . 0 - 1 9 2 3 2 . 0 1 4 7 9 2 . 0 - 1 4 7 9 2 . 0 4 4 4 0 . 0 • 4 4 4 0 . 0 7 6 . 9 1 - 7 6 . 9 1 2 3 . 0 9 • 2 3 . 0 9 1 9 5 6
» 9 5 7 1 5 7 6 6 . 0 - 1 5 7 6 6 . 0 1 0 8 6 6 . 0 - 1 0 8 6 6 . 0 4 9 0 0 . 0  . - 4 9 0 0 . 0 6 8 . 9 2 - » 8 . 9 2 3 1 . 0 8 _ 3 1 . 0 8 1 9 5 7
1 9 5 8  . 2 4 1 6 1 . 0 9 9 6 . 7 2 5 1 5 7 . 7 1 9 4 1 1 . 0 9 9 6 . 7 2 0 4 0 7 , 7 4 7 5 0 . 0 • 4 7 5 0 . 0 8 0 . 3 4 1 0 0 . 0 8 1 . 1 1 1 9 . 6 6 _ 1 8 . 8 9 1 9 5 81 9 5 9 2 4 2 0 6 . 0 5 0 0 . 0 2 4 7 0 6 . 0 1 8 8 0 6 . 0 5 0 0 . 0 1 9 3 0 6 . 0 5 4 0 0 . 0 - 5 4 0 0 . 0 7 7 . 6 9 1 0 0 . 0 7 8 . 1 4 2 2 . 3 1 2 1 . 8 6 1 9 5 9
1 9 6 0 2 4 2 6 1 . 0 1 8 1 5 . 1 2 6 0 5 6 . 1 1 8 9 5 1 . 0 1 8 1 5 . 1 2 0 7 6 6 . 1 5 2 9 0 . 0 - 5 2 9 0 . 0 7 8 . 1 7 1 0 0 . 0 7 9 . 6 9 2 1 . 8 3 2 0 . 3 1 1 9 6 0
l ? 6 1 2 5 2 6 5 . 0 7 7 5 . 0 2 6 0 4 0 . 6 2 0 1 1 5 . 0 7 7 5 . 0 2 0 8 9 0 . 0 5 1 5 0 . 0 • 5 1 5 0 . 0 7 9 . 6 1 1 0 0 . 0 8 0 . 2 2 2 0 . 3 9 1 9 . 7 8 1 9 6 1
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TABLE 7
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. AID TO JORDAN
1953-1972
IN PERCENTAGES
Period
Components of U.S. Aid 
Plow to Jordan as Z of 
Components of Aggregate 
Aid Flow
U.S. Aid to 
Government as 
Z of Total 
Government
U.S. Budget 
Support as 
Z of Total 
Budget
U.S. Technical 
& Economic Assis­
tance as Z of 
Total Technical
UE. Unre­
quited 
Transfers 
as Z of 
Aggregate 
Unrequited 
Transfers
US. Loans 
as Z of 
Aggre­
gate 
Loans
Total
Z
Foreign Aid Assistance
1953 2.75 - 2.43 4.02 100
1954 3.29 “ 2.7 4.49 - 100
1955 2.37 * 2.37 3.56 - 100
1956 - * - - - -
1957 6.25 - 6.25 16.47 - 100
1958 57.14 - 54.87 70.51 70.85 100
1959 65.83 - 64.49 86.58 88.01 100
. 1960 63.58 17.36 60.36 80.87 86.94 100
1961 60.11 35.59 59.38 80.37 80.46 100
1962 61.21 9.72 58.38 82.14 87.55 100
1963 61.79 1.19 57.07 80.30 89.29 96.61
1964 60.84 1.95 46.70 61.61 89.04 95.48
1965 55.64 - 50.16 74.62 89.09 78.48
1966 83.81 . 7.88 37.89 . 61.32 83.60 ... . . 69.04 .....
Average Z 
1953-1966 41.75 8.2* 35.93 50.49 84.97** 88.54
Average Z 
1958-1966 63.32 8.19* 54.36 75.36 84.97 93.29
1967 14.52 17.80 14.93 18.4 16.11 41.13
1968 4.84 17.88 6.19 7.14 4.93 100.0
1969 1.89 21.13 3.80 4.25 *■ 99.39
1970 0.65 24.00 2.31 2.73 11,30
' 1971 42.79 48.39 44.16 41.51 48.60 36.82
1972 40.18 23.60 . . 37.12 .... 42.63...... . 47.93 . . 98.24 . . ...
Average Z
74.461960-1966 63.85 8.19 52.9 86.56 91.37
Average Z
19.441967-1972 17.48 25.46 18.08 19.59 64.48
Average Z
16.49 36.80 49.071960-1972 42.45 55.66 78.96
Average Z
17.42*** 30.581953-1972 34.47 43.5 58.83****. . . 81.32....
Source: Appendix II, Table No 1.
Notes: * Average 1960-1966.
~ ** Average 1958—1966.
*** Average 1960-1972. 
**** Average 1958-1972.
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TABLE 8
UNREQUITED TRANSFERS TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
FROM THREE MAJOR DONORS - A COMPARISON 
1950-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period United Kingdom The U.S.A. Arab Countries*
Balance 
of Pay­
ments
Budget Balance 
of Pay­
ments
Budget Balance 
of Pay­
ments
Budget
1950 2.360 4.900 m
1951 • 3.550 7.200 - - ■ “ -
1952 4.600 7.300 0.490 - - -
1953 6.430 8.500 0.970 0.446 - -
1954 5.870 8.400 1.250 0.531 - -
1955 8.040 9.000 2.730 0.331 “ -
1956 7.820 11.000 0.470 - 0. 850 -
1957 1.100 - 6.730 0.986 3. 510 5.000
1958 0.570 4.800 16.320 13.805 1.500 •
1959 2.420 2.000 17.320 15.935 - -
1960 2.000 2.100 18.200 15.413 -
1961 2.400 3.200 17.100 15.188 - -
1962 1.500 1.800 16.700 13.876 - -
1963 1.500 1.500 15.500 14.128 - -
1964 1.500 1.500 15.000 13.829 4.500 -
1965 1.400 1.400 12.000 13.347 7.300 0.474
1966 1.300 1.300 13.400 7.978 9.500 0.569
1967 1.500 1.464 7.600 6.896 37.600 31.969
1968 - - 1.200 2.262 46.300 37.601
1969 - - 1.230 0.819 39 .110 37.553
1970 - - 1.380 0.266 33 .070 35.142
1971 - - 12.820 17.145 19.100 18.231
1972 - 35.950 21.536 23.190 22.911
Total 55.860 87.158 214.360 174.717 225 .530 189.450
Differences 31.298 39.643 36.08
Sources 1 - Balance of Payments data are from: (a) I.M.F., Balance of Payments Yearbook.
ORiCU,, voIs• 8,12,15,16,17 and 21.
(b) Central Bank of Jordan, Jordan Balance of 
Payments, op.cit., several issues.(1969- ' 
1972)
2-Budget figures are derived from: (a) Jordan Ministry of Finance, Annual Report.
op.cit,. several issues,(1999-19633 ' —
. (b) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical
Bulletin, op.cit.. vols,.15,9 and 10.
* Includes budget support and technical assistance from the Arab countries and the Arab 
League.
rTABLE 9
TOTAL UNREQUITED TRANSFERS ACCORDING TO SOURCE
' IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Private
Unrequited
Transfers
Government Unrequited Transfers from :
The U.K. UNRWA &
UN Agencies
The U.S. 
Govern­
ment
Arab
Countries
Other
Sources
Total
Official
Transfers
Grand
Total
Value . Value Value Value Value Value Value
1950 1.56 2.36 3.00 — - 5.36 6.92
1951 2.03 3.55 3.36 - - - 6.91 8.94
1952 2.30 4.60 4.36 0.49 - - 9.45 11.75
1953 2.34 6.43 4.86 0.97 - - 12.26 14.60
1954 1.65 5.87 5.50 1.25 - - 12.62 14.27
1955 - 8.04 4.66 2.73 - - 15.43 15.43
1956 3.81 7.82 5.47 0.47 0.85 0.57 15.18 18.99
1957 4.85 1.10 4.90 6.73 3.51 0.64 16.88 21.73
1958 0.77 0.57 4.75 16.32 1.50 - 23.14 23.91
1959 0.89 2.42 5.40 17.32 - - 25.14 26.03
1960 1.39 2.00 5.29 18.20 - - 25.49 26.88
1961 1.7 2.4 5.1 17.1 - - 24.6 26.3
1962 1.7 1.5 5.3 16.7 - - 23.5 25.2
1963 1.6 1.5 5.5 15.5 - - 22.5 24.1
1964 1.9 1.5 5.4 15.0 4.5 0.20 26.6 28.5
1965 2.7 1.4 6.0 12.0 7.30 0.10 26.8 29.5
1966 2.7 1.3 5.6 13.4 9.5 1.60 31.4 34.1
1967 2.3 1.5 4.8 7.6 37.6 0.10 51.6 53.9
1968 1.4 - 5.5 1.2 46.3 0.10 53.1 54.5
1969 1.55 - 3.37 1.23 39.11 0.04 43.75 45.3
1970 1.14 - 4.51 1.38 33.07 0.12 39.08 40.22
1971 1.12 - 3.56 12.82 19.1 - 35.48 36.6
1972 2.33 6.82 35.95 23.19 — 65.96 68.29
Total 43.73 55.86 113.01 214.36 225.53 3.47 612.23 655.96
Source: (i) I.M.F., Balance of Payments Yearbook, op.cit., vols. 8,12,15,16,17 and 21.
(ii) Central Bank o i  Jordan, Jordan Balance of Payments, op.cit.. 1969-1972.
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AID FLOW FROM ARAB COUNTRIES
TABLE XO
1957-1972
IN
oV)Ooo JORDANIAN DINARS
Period
Unrequited Transfers Loans Total 
Ai ab Aid
Arab Aid to 
Cent r  al
Budget
Support
Technical 
& Economic 
Assistance
Total
(1 )
Loans to 
Central 
Govern­
ment
Govern­
ment
Guaran­
teed
Loans
Total
( 2 )
Flow to
Jordan
1+2-3
Government 
(Unrequited 
Transfers + 
Loans)
1957 5 0 0 0 .0 - 5 0 0 0 .0 - - - . 5 0 0 0 .0 5 0 0 0 .0
1958 - - - • - - - -
1959 • - - “ - - - -
1960 - - - 1 0 0 0 .0 - 1 0 0 0 .0 1 0 0 0 .0 1 0 0 0 .0
1961 - - - -  ' - - -
1962 •k - - 2 3 8 .8 ■ - 2 3 8 .8 2 3 8 .8 2 3 8 .8
1963 - - 5 8 5 .4 - 5 8 5 .4 5 8 5 .4 5 8 5 .4
1964 - - - 5 4 8 7 .8 - 5 4 8 7 .8 5 4 8 7 .8 5 4 8 7 .8
1965 - 4 7 4 .0 4 7 4 .0 9 1 8 .8 - 9 1 8 .8 1 3 9 2 .8 1 3 9 2 .8
1966 - 5 6 9 .0 5 6 9 .0 2 5 4 7 .2 - 2 5 4 7 .2 3 1 1 6 .2 3 1 1 6 .2
1967 309 47 .0 1 0 2 2 .0 3 1 9 6 9 .0 5 3 6 .9 - 5 3 6 .9 3 25 05 .9 3 2 5 0 5 .9
1968 3 7 6 0 1 .0 - 3 7 6 0 1 .0 172 6 .4 0 - 1 72 6 .4 0 3 93 27 .4 3 9 3 2 7 .4
1969 3 75 53 .0 - 3 7 5 5 3 .0 2 0 6 3 .2 0 2 0 6 3 .2 0 3 96 16 .2 3 9 6 1 6 .2
1970 3 30 70 .0 2 0 7 2 .0 3 5 1 4 2 .0 7 7 7 .9 0 - 7 7 7 .9 0 3 59 19 .9 3 5 9 1 9 .9
1971 1 79 52 .0 2 7 9 .0 182 31 .0 6 1 8 .9 0 - 6 1 8 .9 0 1 88 4 9 .9 1 8849 .9
1972 2 2911 .0 - 2 2 9 1 1 .0 6 5 4 .5 - . 6 5 4 .5 2 35 6 5 .5 2 3 5 6 5 .5
Total
(in
Jordan­
ian Din­
ars) L85,03 4 ,0 00 4,416,000 189,450,000 17,155,7X3 - 1 7 ,1 5 5 ,7 0 0 206,605,800 2 0 6 ,6 0 5 ,8 0 0
Source: Appendix 11^ Table No 1.
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A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST 
OF APPROVED SMALL SCALE PROJECTS 
(UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN JORDAN)
TABLE 11
Project Symbol Project Title Executing Agency
J0R/1968/006 Télécommunications Improvement/Experts and 
Fellowships ITU
J0R/1968/009 Nurse Education/Experts and Bllowships WHO
J0R/1969/006 Building Material Laboratory/Expert UN/OTC
JOR/1969/008 Mechanical Engineering/Fellowships UNIDO
J0R/1969/009 Fire Fighting/Fellowship ICAO
J0R/1969/010 Input-Output/Fel1owship UN/OTC
J0R/1969/011 Public Administration/Fellowship UN/OTC
J0R/1969/013 Cost Accounting/Fellowship UN/OTC
J0R/1969/016 Educational T.V. Expert 4 Equipment UNESCO
J0R/1969/018 Agrometeorology/Fellowship WMO
J0R/1970/002 Dam Cons truetion/Expert and Fellowships PAO
J0R/1971/004 Inland Fisheries Development Projects FAO
J0R/1971/006 Range Management/Fellowship FA0
JO R/l9717007 Agricultural Statistics/Expert and Fellowship FAO
JOR/1971/008 Poultry Feeding/Expert and Fellowship FAO
J0R/1971/009 Soil Réclamation/Fellowship FAO
J0R/1971/010 Industrial Estate/Expert UNIDO
J0R/1971/011 Industrial Banking Techniques/Fellowships UNIDO
J0R/1971/012 National Development Planning/Fellowship UN/OTC
JOR/1971/014 Income Tax Assessment/Expert UN/OTC
JOR/1971/015 Unit for Radioisotopes in Medicine/Expert 
and Equipment
IAEA
J0R/1971/016 Programming 4 System Analysis/Fellowships UN/OTC
J0R/1971/017 Manpower Survey 4 Statistics/Fellowship UN/OTC
JOR/1971/018 Civil Aviation/Fellowship ICAO
J0R/1971/019 Aqaba Port Development/Expert and Equipment IMCO
J0R/1971/020 Road and Bridges Survey/Fellowship UN/OTC
JOR/1971/021 Design 4 Printing Information Booklets/ Fellowships
UNESCO
.»
J0R/1971/022 Accounting/Fellowship UN/OTC
JOR/1971/023 Consumer Cooperatives/Fellowship ILO
J0R/1971/024 Cus toms/Fe1lowship s UN/OTC
J0R/1971/026 Economic Planning/Fellowship UN/OTC
JOR/1971/027 Road Transport Costing/Fellowship UN/OTC
J0R/1971/028 Pre-Vocational Training/Expert ILO
JOR/1971/029 Electrical Engineering/Fellowship ICAO
J0R/1971/030 Mass Communication/Fellowship UNESCO
JOR/1971/031 Social Work/Fellowship UN/OTC
J0R/1971/033 Management Development/Expert ILO
JOR/1971/035 Economic Planning Assistance/Experts and 
Consultants
UN/OTC
J0R/1972/001 Fellowship in Forest Management FAO
J0R/1972/002 Fellowships in Social Communications UNESCO
JOR/1972/003 Transport Development/Fellowship UN/OTC
JOR/1972/004 Industrial Quality Control/Fellowship UNIDO
JOR/1972/005 Industrial Engineering/Fellowship UNIDO
J0R/1972/007 Training of Statisticians in National UN/OTC
Accounts 4 Trade Statistics/Fellowship
JOR/1972/008 Accountancy/Fellowship UN/OTC
J0R/1972/009 Computer Programming/Fellowship UN/OTC
Coat'd
TABLE 11 cont’d
Project Symbol Project Title Executing Agency
J0R/1972/010 Budget &  System Analysis/Fellowships UN/OTC
J0R/1972/011 Fellowships in Civil Aviation ICAO
J0R/1972/012 Fellowships in Accountancy UN/OTC
J0R/1972/013 Fellowships in Fire Fighting ICAO
JOR/1972/014 Nautical Administration/Fellowship IMCO
JOR/1972/015 Educational Adminstration & Teachers Training 
Development/Fellowships
UNESCO
J0R/1972/016 Aeronautical Meteorology/Fellowship WHO
J0R/1972/018 Railway Maintenance/Fellowships UN/OTC
J0R/1972/019 Fellowship in Irrigation FAO
JOR/1972/020 Fellowship in Pesticides FAO
J0R/1972/021 Saving Funds/Fellowship UPU
J0R/1972/022 . Public Finance/Fellowship UN/OTC
JOR/1972/023 Agricultural Statistics/Fellowship FAO
JOR/1972/024 Accountancy/Fellowship UN/OTC
JOR/1972/025 Pasture and Animal Feeding/Fellow3hip FAO
J0R/1972/026 Economic Planning/Fellowships UN/OTC
J0R/1972/027 School Building Material/Fellowship UN/OTC
J0R/1972/028 Fellowships in Public Administration UN/OTC
J0R/1972/029 Agricultural Credit/Fellowship FAO
JOR/1972/030 Design of Analog &  Digital Circuits/Fellowships UN/OTC
J0R/1972/031 System Analysis/Fellowship UN/OTC
J0R/1972/032 Aerial Photography/Fellowship UN/OTC
Source: United Nations, The United Nations Development Progranirte Irt Jordan,
on.cit.. Nov. 1973.
Note: A small scale project is a project for which UNDP Contribution does not
exceed 100,000 U.S. dollars. These projects include experts, equipment, 
short-term consultants and fellowships. The estimated costs of all 
small-scale projects - including seven approved projects in 1973 - amount 
to approximately $1,300,000. .
Kev to abbreviations in Table 11:
ITU International Telecommunication Union
WHO World Health Organisation
UNOTC United Nations Office for Technical Cooperation
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
UNESCO United Nations Educational and Scientific Organisation
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IMCO International Maritime Consultative Organisation
ILO International Labour Organisation
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441,771 97,453 98.332 553,638 144,211 147,671 261,753 738,300 171,936
» ■** *»>>
2,270,477 140,110 112,040 5,214,881 24,838 67,474 654,465 664,636 148,476
809,792
4,940,302 418.986 386,555 9,465,856 523,501 742,194 1,798,575 3,939,936
1,184,112 , *22.147 ,
IN JORDANIAN DINARS
Studi-Arabi*
' 4 ^ V  i n t e r e s t Disbursed Principal
2.791
1,561
Î "1 W
f  893 
6,844 
11,964 
1 5 , 3 3 7  
19,664 
2 ! . 7 9 9  
2 1 , 3 7 3  
24,651 
29.440
153,039
The Export-Import 8ank
1,500,000
1,499,400
,499,400
501,200
337,143
>,357,143
Th* C. Itoh 6 Co. 
(Japan)
2,921,581
265,379
3,186,960
141,061
185,239
875,259
54,988
164,967
219,952
26,394
69,285
95,679 3,100,000
Denmark Other Foreign Conner 
banks
c i* l
*
Interest Disbursed Principal Interest Disbursed Principal IrfttC fy
- - - - - - -
. - - - - - - v *
. - - - - - - *
. - - - - - -
. - - - - - •
. - - - • “ * - •
• . - “ - ' " *
. - - - - - '
- - - . - - - *
„ - - - - - •
. - - - - - •
» - • • ■ - - - •
„ . - - - * *
. - - - - -
_ . - - - - •
» _ - - - - •
• - - - • *
_ _ - - - * •
250,000 - 4,013 - - - • / **
250,000 19,092 - - •
250,000 - 104,537 “ • " ■* «
237,767 - «17,297 - - *
237,905 - 205,861 38,910 - 2,964,286 425,672
180,384
231,250 62,750 15,921 40,649 321,428
939,896 1*4.11*
1,456,922 62,750 556,721 79,559 - 3,285,714 1,365,568
345,499
■ • î«.
° th* r  Sou 
«•H-r. fee* Including British Oversea* Engineering Ce.
Total Debt
Service
Outstanding 
Debt (Disburse 
nino*
Principal)
Duttcanding
Debt
(Accumulate* 
figures).
Period
Ot«burted Principal Interest Disbursed Principal Interest Disbursed Principa Interest in terest plus Principal
- - . • - 1 ,000,000 1,000.000 i  .ooo.ood 1949
_ • 1 __ _ - 1,000,000 1950
- _ - 1 ,000,000 1951
- _ _ 1,500,000 . - 1,500,000 • 2,500,000 1952
- . . . 2,100,000 * 2,200,000 4,600,000 195)
- . 2,870,000 • • 287,000 7,470,000 1954
1 . _ • ■ - • 7,470,000 19SS
1 • - 7,470,000 1958
- _ _ - - 7,470,000 1957
„ ' . • . 996,666 _ _ 996,464 8,466,666 1958
. . - . 500,000 « - 500,000 8,966,666 >959
.. - . . . 1,815.095 - 4.513 4,51) 1,815,095 10,781,761 1960
• - . - 775,639 16,153 18,805 34,958 759.486 11,541,247 1961
- - - - . - 1,316,375 33,714 20,358 34,072 1,282,861 12,824,108 1962
- - - . - 1,932,650 95,680 93,358 189,038 1,836.970 17,661,078 1963
- . « . • . 7,179,041 550,986 110.722 461,708 6,628,055 21,289,133 1964
- - - _ - - 2,615,646 186,574 109,929 296,503
2,429,472 23,718,205 1965
- . • _ . 3,589,859 418,706 137,897 556,604 3,171,15) 26,889,351 1966
, - - - - -■ . 6,791,864 632,261 248,920 881,181
6,159,603 33,048,941 1967
. - - - - . 5,413,976 635,095 320,035 955.130 4,778,881 37,827,8*2 1968
- - • - - - - 4,780,763 1,083,825 407,535 491,160 3,697,143 11,524,985 1969
- - - _ . 3,135,034 1,260 529 374,782 1,635,311 1,894,505 13,419,490 1970
1,430,000 - 8,036 - - - 3,076,800 1,767,463 799,373 2,567,036 11,309,137 54,728,627 1971
i,,83.000 - 1,377 112,336 112,336 - 2,104,900 1,324,240 841,196
3,163,436 9,780,660 >4,509,287 1972
1,413,091 - 9,413 112,336 112,336 3,514,510 >,005,226 .487,424 11,392,650 64,509,287
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TABLE 2
DEBT OUTSTANDING, DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS AND ANNUAL RATES 0? GROWTH OF SELECTED VARIABLES
1960-1972
Period
Debt Out- 
s tanding 
(Accumu­
lated 
Figures) 
(in J.D. 
millions)
Debt Service 
(Interest 
plus Principal) 
(In Jordanian 
Dinars)
ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF SELECTED VARIABLES
Debt Out- 
s tanding 
2
Debt
Service
GNP, Exports of 
Goods and 
Services
per capita 
income
Gold and
Foreign
Reserves
1960 10.8 4513 20 7.0 8.4 _
1961 11.5 34958 6 674.6 20.3 32.8 18.2 11.4
1962 12.8 54072 11 54.6 3.0 12.3 0.9 19.4
1963 14.7 189038 15 249.6 5.2 6.2 1.3 -14.5
1964 21.3 ■ 661708 45 250.0 17.0 21.1 11.8 50.9
1965 23.7 296503 11 - 55.1 12.4 15.8 8.4 15.1
1966 26.9 556604 14 87.7 3.0 12.6 - 1.7 11.9
1967 33.0 881181 23 58.3 11.0 -13.7 12.4 37.1
1968 37.8 955130 14 8.3 " 4*2 2.1 - 6.9 16.8
1969 41.5 491160 10 - 48.5 18.5 14.1 12.4 - 9.0
1970 43.4 1635311 5 232.9 - 5.0 - 0.3 - 8.6 - 1.3
1971 54.7 2567036 26 56.9 6.3 -35.4 4.2 - 5.3
1972 64.5 3165436 18 23.3 7.0 64.4 2.1 8.3
Aver­
age
1960-
1972 132.7 7.81 10.8 4.5* 11.7*
Source: Appendix III 7 Table No-1. 
* Averages for 1961-1972
Q
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DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS, DEBT SERVICE RATIO,
AND DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS AS RATIO TO GNP, GDP AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
1960-1972
TABLE 3
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Average1960-1972
1 Debt Service Pay 
ments (in J. 
Dinars) 4513 34958 54072 189038 661708 296503 556604 881181 955130 491160 1635311 2567036 3165436 884050
la Interest (in
J. Dinars) 4513 18805 20358 93358 110722 109929 137898 248920 320035 407535 374782 799373 8^ ,1196 268263
lb Principal (in 
J. Dinars) * 16153 33714 95680 550986 186574 418706 632261 635095 1083265 1260529 1767663 232,4240
34.2
750436*
2 Exports of Goods 
& Services (in 
J.D. millions) 12.8 17.0 19.1 20.3 24.6 28.5 32.1 27.7 28.3 32.3 32.2 20.8 25.4
3 Gross National 
Product , GNP(in 
J.D. millions) 105.69 127.14 130.83 137.62 160.62 180.54 183.78 205.95 197.28 233.72 222.5 236.59 252.36 182.8
4 Debt Service 
Ratio (1/2)(Z) 0.0352 0.2056 0.2830 0.9312 2.6896 1 £>403 1.7339 3.18D 33750 1.5206 5.0786 123415 9.2556 3.2
5 Ratio of Debt 
Service to GNP 
(Z) 0,004 0.03 0.04 0.14 0,41 0.16 0.30 0.43 0.48 0.21 0.73 1.10 1.25 0.41
6 Ratio of Debt 
Service to 
Foreign 
Resources (1) Cd) 146 0.1016 0.1318 0.5391 10501 0.4864 0.8158 0.9417 0373( 0.4936 13668 2.7632 3.1434 1.017
7 Ratio of Debt 
Service to 
GDP (Z) 0.005 0.032 0.050 0.161 0.489 0.197 0.372 0.498 0.567 0.248 0.863 1.257 1.459 0.500
8 Ratio of Im­
portable Con­
sumption Coods 
to Total Imports 69.0 67.4 63.5 61.3 50.0 49.0 46 .0 43.0 48.0 50-0 50.1 43.6 78.6 55.3
Source: (i) Appendix III, Table No.l.
(ii) Appendix I, Tables 2 and 15. 
(iii) Table l.AZ (Chapter 1)
Note: ‘Average 1961-1972.
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TABLE 4
TUTORE DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS 
1973-2021
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Debt Service Payments Period Debt Service Payments Period Debt Service Payments
Principal Interest Total Principal Interest Total Principal Interest Total
1973 3466 1276 4742 1990 2694 416 3110 2007 249 21 270
1974 3906 1286 5192 1991 2701 367 3068 2003 249 . 19 268
1975 3840 1235 . 5076 1992 2677 318 2996 2009 249 17 266
1976 3874 1186 5060 .1993 2537 273 2809 2010 249 15 264
1977 4693 1183 5875 1994 2019 242 2261 2011 240 13 254
1978 4173 1093 5271 1995 1990 199 2188 2012 232 12 243
1979 3764 1023 4787 1996 1469 167 1636 2013 232 10 242
1980 3160 900 4060 1997 884 137 1021 2014 168 8 ’ 176
1981 2542 858 3400 1998 854 119 973 2015 168 7 175
1982 2748 815 3563 1999 830 100 930 2016 168 6 173
1983 2759 765 3524 2000 801 84 884 2017 150 5 155
1984 2714 714 3428 2001 713 69 782 2018 133 4 136
1985 2719 666 3385 2002 565 56 621 2019 133 3 135
1986 2682 618 3300 2003 417 47 465 2020 133 2 134
1987 2807 568 3375 2004 249 27 276 2021 98 1 98
1988 2749 516 3265 2005 249 25 274
1989 2714 465 3179 2006 249 23 272
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, Fiscal and Monetary Division. (Unpublished Data - in Arabic.)
Notes: (a) Figures were reflected in donors' currencies. We converted them into Jordanian dinars using the parity rate
between those currencies and S.D.Rs on December 1971 as published by the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, op.cit., vol. xxv, no. 12, December 1972.
(b) Figures may not add to totals, due to rounding.
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TABLE 5
LOANS FROM THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (A.I.D.) - DOLLAR-LOANS
1966-1972
| THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS
; Number
Contractual
Date
Amount 
(pOOTs 
of U.S.$>
Project Title Actual Disburs ements
1966 1967 1968 L969 1970 L971 1972 Grand Total
1 30.9.1965 1640 Damiah - North Shunah Road (H.003)« 127 494 240
i
| 533 -(i4o; — — 1254
2 29.6i1966 1250 Bethlehem - Jerusalem Road (H.005). 84 376 73 608 8 - 1149
3 14.7.1966 6300 Telecommunication Improvement Project (H.006)» - 54 23 47 16 4422 4562
4 17.1.1967 1082 Improvements on Jerusalem Airport (H.008)* 477 606 1083
Total 10272 . 211 1401 942 1188
*(-116: 4422 8048
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data (In Arabic).
* Repayments
UitfiUj
TABLE 5.1
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY SURPLUS LOANS - PAID IN LOCAL CURRENCY 
' 1966-1972
THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Number
Contractual
Date
Amount 
000's of 
Jordan Dinars Project Title
Actural Disbursements
Grand TotalL966 1967 1968 L969 L970 1971 1972
1 9.5.1966 208 Finance to Government Developmental Budget- 208 ' _ - « — - 208
2 19.10.1966 102 Improvements on Jerusalem Airport. - 102 - - - - - 102
3 9.5&19.5.1966 113 Telecommunication Improvement Project. - - 3 - - 50 60 113
4 19.10.1966 160 A loan to the Agricultural Credit Corporatioi - - 75 68 17 - 160
5 19.10.1966 150 A loan to the Co-operative'Organization* - - 36 114 - - 150
6 19.10.1966 38 Feasibility Study Financing. - - - - - 38 - 38
7 19.10.1966 65 Improvements of Touristic Facilities. - - - 40 25 - 65
8 19.10.1966 35 Improvements of Touristic Facilities. - - - 8 25 - 2 35
9 19.10.1966 75 A loan to the Housing Corporation. - - - - 50 - 25 75
10 19.10.1966 268 Funds for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. - - - - - 268 - 268
11 19.10.1966 100 A loan to the Village and Municipalities Func — - 10 42 44 4 100
Total 1314 208 102 3 129 339 442 91 1314
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data (In Arabic).
■h
se
TABLE 5.2
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY SUBPLUS LOAMS - PAID IH Ü.S. DOLLARS 
1967-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS .
Humber Contractual
Date
Amount 
(pOO's of 
US %)
Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand Total
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
i 25.8.1966
l.a II 168 Expansion of Ajloun Teachers' Training
Institute* 168 - - - - -* 168 .
l.b I* 154 Extension of Water Supply Networks in
Municipalities and Villages* 154 - - - - - 154
l.c 103 Financing Feasibility Studies- •103 ■ - - - - 103
l.d « 196 Building Roads in Rural Areas* 196 - - - •* - 196
1 .e « 56 Financing Expansion in Eggs Production* 56 - - - , - - 56
i.f 92 Financing purchases of computer tapes • 92 - - - - - 92
i.g 642 Financing Building a Ceiling for Amman Stream* 642 - - - - . - 642
l.h 219 A  loan to the Indus trial Development Bank 219 - - - . ** - 219
l.i H 66 Others (difference Between Selling and
purchasing Prices-of Commodity aid)* 66 - * - - - 66
2 4.4.1968
2.a " 70 Developing irrigated farms* 70 - - - - 70
2.b tt 55 Afforestation and Preservation of Waterfalls
in Wadi Ziglab* - 55 - - - - • 55
2.c It 335 Developing Irrigation in Higherl'ands* 335 - - - 335
2.d 168 Developing Nurseries for Fruit-bearing Trees* - 168 - - - - 168
2.« It 59 East Ghor Irrigation Networks* — 59 - - - - 59
2.f H 112 Expanding Trees Nurseries (Forest Trees)* - 112 - - - - 112
2.g If 53 Extension of Water Supplv Networks in ' - 53 - - - - 53
Municipalities and Villages.
2,h 279 Soil Conservation in Wadi Shoab and Rafrain* 279 - - - — 279
2.i It 419 Funds for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction» - 419 - - - - 4192. j tt 200 A  loan to the Industrial Development Bank# - 200 - - - - 200
2.k M 7 Widening and Maintenance of Mafrag - - 7 • - - 7
Ramtha Junction*
3 21.4.1969
3.a 577 Funds for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction* - 577 - - - 577
3.b » 362 Financing of Building a Ceiling for Amman
Stream » — - 362 — - - 362
3.c N 139 Amman Drinking Water Project • - - 139 - - - 139
3.d N 129 Maintenance of Raatha-Mafrag Junction* - - 129 - - - 129
3.« ft 63 Others (difference between selling and
purchasing prices of commodity aid). - * 63 - * - 63
9 20.8.1970
4.« it 815 Compensations of Governaent Budget Contri-
butions ia the Joint Fund for Rehabilitation
and Recons true tion • - ’ - 815 - - 815
4.b « 212 Telecooaunication Project* - “ 212 - - 212
4*c M 29 Improvements in Irrigated Farming. - - - 29 - - 29
4.d N 42 Improvements in Higherland Farming. - - - 42 - - 42
4.« N 42 East Ghor Irrigation Networks* - - - 42 - - 42
5. , ,4.0 tai
17-2.1972
m i
Telecomaunication Projects*
1696 1757 1270 1140 - m i m i
Source: Dace were collected f r a  the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Econoeuc reeearcht unpublished data, (in Arabic)
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TABLE 5.3
LOANS FROM BRITAIN: THE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS LOAN (£12.9ml
1949-1966
THOUSANDS OF STERLING POUNDS
Number Contractual
Date
Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand
Total1949 1952 1953 1954 195?
1 21.11.1949 335 Agriculture . 335 335
l.a I I 320 Damiah-Arda-Kreameh-
Shunnah Road . 320 320
l.b 1» 100 Madaba-Karak Road. 100 100
l.c I I 135 Construction of
villages for refu-
gees • 135 135
l.d »1 110 Miscellaneous . 110 n o
2 17.4.1952 100 Agaba Port. 100 100
2.a I I 350 Agaba-Amman Road • 350 350
2.b I I 227 Other roads . 227 227
2.c I I 100 Jerusalem Airport . 100 100
2.d I f 150 Irrigation Schemes. 150 150
2.e I f 200 Financial Support
to the Jordan Con-
struction Bank • 200 200
2.f I I 80 Railroads • 80 80
2.g I t 190 Improving conditions
in frontier villages. 190 190
2.h I I 103 Miscellaneous• 103 103
3 2.3.1953 340 Rural Development
Loans . 340 340
3.a I I 160 Jerusalem Airport. 160 160
4 5.11.1953 327 Rural Development
Loans. 327 327
4.a I I 36 Co-operative
Societies . 36 36
4.b I t 45 Jerusalem Airport. 45 45
4.c •1 98 Amman Airport. 98 98
4.d I I 180 Cereals Silos . 180 180
A.e I I 105 Amman-Karak-Tafilah
Road . 105 105
4.f I I 482 Other Roads• 482 482
4.g I t 327 Miscellaneous. 327 327
5 16.12.1954 277 Loans for Agri-
cultural Develop-
ment in Frontier
Villages. 277 277
5.a I I 82 Co-operative
Societies. 82 82
S.b I I 60 Cereals Silos. 60 60
5.c I I 160 Karak-Tafilah Road. 160 160
5.d I I 200 Railway Roads* 200 200
5 .e I I 475 Other Roads. 475 475
5.f I I 200 Agaba Airport • 200 200
5.g I t 160 Jerusalem Airport. 160 160
5.h I I 136 Amman Airport . 136 136
6 20.12.1954 310 Rural DevelopmentLoans. 310 310
I I 700 The Desert Road . 700 700
6.b I I 110 Jerusalem Airport . 110 n o
7 26.3.1958 270 Rural DevelopmentLoans < 27C 270
7.a I I 152 Amman & Jerusalem
Airports . 152 152
7.b I I 78 The Desert Road. 7f 78
8 7.5.1958 100 Amman & Jerusalem
Airports.  . IOC 100
8.a I t 530 The Desert Road
and Agaba Port.
«
53C 530
357
TABLE 5.3 cont'd 1
THOUSANDS OF STERLING POUNDS
Number Contractual Amount Project Title Actual Disbursement GrandDate ' 959 I960 1961 1962 1963 Total
9 11.6.1959 35 Amman & JerusalemAirports, 35 359.a II 465 The Desert Road* 465 465
1 0 4.5.1960 500 The Desert Road, 500 500
1 1 17.7.1961 375 The Desert Road. 375 375
1 1 .a II 75 Water Exploration
in Jerusalem. 75 7 5
1 1 .b It 30 Agricultural
Co-operatives. 30 30
1 1 .c rr 2 0 AgriculturalMarketing. 2 0 2 0
1 2 25.5.1962 2 0 0 The Desert Road, 2 0 0 2 0 0
1 2 .a 1» 40 West of Jordan
Water Projects . 40 40
1 2 . b II 60 Wadi Zarga & HasaWater Projects, 60 60
1 2 .c It 25 Water ProjectsExperts* 25 25
1 2 .d II 1 0 0 Olive Oil MarketingProject, 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 2 . e If 45 Engineering Studies, 45 45
1 2 . f 11 2 0 Improving DomesticCow Breeds. 2 0 2 0
1 2 .g II 35 Amman Airport Ex-pansion Studies* 35 35
1 2 .h 11 65 Wadi Arabs RoadStudies* 65 65
1 2 . i 11 17 Azraq Water Supply. 17 17
1 2 . j If 48 Drilling UndergroundWater in Hasa. 48 48
1 2 .k II 5 Improvements inJerusalem Airport* 5 5
1 2 . 1
ft 40 North Zarga Valley
Water Survey . 40 40
13 27.4.1963 265 The Desert Road. 265 265
13. a II 35 Nablus Water Project. 35 35
13.b It 25 McDonald -South-Water Project* 25 25
13. c II 69 McDonald -South-Water. 69 69
13. d 1« 34 Water Project (REX & Co-} 34 34
13 .e II 1 1 Kafrain,Shdab & #Ziglab Dams. 1 1 1 1
13.f II 9 Water' Projects. 9 9
13.g If 9 Jericho Water Project* 9 9
13 .h If 27 Ziglab Dam . 27 27
13.i If 15 Wadi Araba Water. 15 15
13. j 11 16 West Bank Hydro-Studies 16 16
13.k If 1 2 Drilling UndergroundWater in Wadi Dhuleil. 1 2 1 2
13.1 II 1 2 Kafrain & Shcfab Dams. 1 2 1 2
13. m II 72 Ghor Elsafi-Agaba Road. 72 72
13 .n II 25 Expansions in AmmanAirport. 25 25
13.0 II 35 Equipment for AmmanAirport. 35 35
13 .p II 4 Jerusalem Airport* 4 4
1 3 .q 11 25 Industrial Co-operativeSocieties • 25 25
3 5 9
TABLE 5.3 cont'd A
THOUSANDS OF STERLING POUNDS
Number Contractual
Date
Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand
Total
1964 1965 1966
14 31.8.1964 262 Water studies &Surveys - 262 262
14. a II 30 Ziglab Dam. 30 30
14.b It 264 Kafrain & Shoab Dams* 264 264
14.c It 12 Minerals Explorations
Mobile Unit. 12 12
14.d II 10 Wadi Mojeb Soil Survey. 10 10
14. e II 20 Equipment for Amman' Airport. 20 20
14.f It 50 Establishing and Equip-ping a Veterinary Centre. 50 50
14.g It 32 Equipping a F.A.O.sponsored Dry Farming
Project. 32 32
14 .h It 15 Support to Co-operativeSocieties. 15 15
14.i It 5 Agricultural Survey. 5 5
15 8.6.1965 357 Water Projects. 357 . 357
1V  * II 20 The Desert Road. 20 20
is. b II 159 Ziglab, Kafrain & Shoab
Dams • 159 159
15.c II 15 Equipment for AmmanAirport* 15 15
15. d II 60 Agricultural Survey. 60 60
15*e II 12 Expanding Amman AirportStudy. 12 12
15. f II 20 Establishing VeterinaryCentres . 20 20
1^.9 II 57 Jordan Electrification
Project. 57 57
Total of Consolidated 
Financial Obligations 
Loan (A) 1949-1966 
(Project No. 1 through 
No. 15)
Actual Disbursements (000s of Sterling Pounds)
1949 1952 1953 1954 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
1000 1500 2100 2870 1130 500 500 500 700 700 700 700 T
Grand
Total
12900
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of 
Economic Research, unpublished data, (in Arabic).
TABLE 5.4
LOANS FROM BRITAIN - THE 300,000 POUND LOAN
1966-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF STERLING POUNDS
Number Contractual
Date
Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand
Total1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
16 25.7.1965 100 Wadi Dhuleil Irrigation
/ Project 100 100
16.a It 106 Irbid Electricity
Project 106 106
16.b ft 20 Ziglab Dam 20 20
16. c »1 9 Establishment of
Veterinary Centres 9 9
16.d 11 23 Irrigation Works 23 23
16.e II 542 Kafrain & Shuaib Dams 250 292 542
Total 800 250 550 800
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data, (in Arabic),
UiuiU3
TABLE 5.5
LOANS FROM BRITAIN - THE 900,000 POUND LOAN
1966-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF STERLING POUNDS
Number Contractual
Date
Amount Project Title 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Grand
Total
17 9.8.1967 224 WadiDhuleil Irrigation Project 10 214 224
17,a II 40 Wadi Mojeb Study 40 40
17.b II 20 Water Project? - Natural Resources 
Authority 17 3 20
17,e II 4 Wadi ziglab Irrigation Project 4 4
17,4 It 257 Kafrain & Shuaib Dams 114 143 257
I7,e II 107 Amman Air Port Lighting System 107 107
. 17,f II 7 Rark-Hasa Irrigation Projects 7 7
17.g II 195 Irbid Electricity Project 195 195
17.h II 30 Minerals Exploration in Wadi Khalid 30 30
17.i M 6 Dry Farming . 6 6
17 . j II 10 Consultation Expenditure (Agaba Air 
Port 10 10
Total
-
900 185 715 900
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data, (ih Arabic),
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TABLE 5.6
LOANS FROM BRITAIH - THE 7,690,000 POUND LOAM (THE BRITISH DEVELOPMENT LOAN)
1967-1972
a IN THOUSANDS OF STERLING POUNDS .
Number Contractual Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand
Date 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total
18 1.4.1968 679 Kafrain and Shuaib Dams 200 419 60 679
18.a tt 42 Wadi Mojeb Study 25 17 42
18. b M 1195 Agaba Air Port 25 300 150 550 170 1195
18.c II 243 Karak - Hasa Irri­
gation Scheme 160 40 43 243
18. d II 364 Irbid Electricity 
Project (Stage 1) 312 25 27 364
18. e ir 9 Amman Air Port 9 9
18.f it 179 Wadi Dhuleil Irri­
gation Scheme 97 30 45 7 179
18.g ii 13 Wadi Dhuleil Agri­
cultural Station 13 13
18.h •t 290 Tele communi ca t ion 
Project 140 50 100 290
18.i if 40 Communication Equipment 40 40
18.j it 1700 Amman Electricity Project 1100 600 1700
18.k it 300 Irbid Electricity 
(Stage 2) 100 200 300
18.1 •i 100 Supplying Water to the 
University and Amman 
Hospital 100 100
18. m H 50 A loan to the Cooperative 
Organisation 50 50
18. n tl 200 Irbid Electricity (Stage 
3) 200 200
18.o X 70 Supplying Water to Yajoz
i
70 70
Total 5474 250 1467 305 2012 1440 5474
Source; Data vere collected froa the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research».unpublished data» 
(in Arabic}.
m
TABLE 5.7
LOANS FROM WEST GERMANY
1962-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF D. MARKS
Number
Contractua
Date
1
Amount Project Title
Actual Disbursements Grand
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
20.2.1962
17.9.1965
14.3.1967
16.10.1968
27.10.1970
21.10.1970
11.6.1972
11.6.1972
16.11.1972
15120
7750
18500
73965
1100
18500
3000
60000
2400
Expansions in Agaba Port (Project No.35)
Expansions in Agaba Port (Project No.186)
Expansions in Agaba Port (Project No.348)
Hittia-Agaba Rail Road (Project No.A.423)
Electricity Generator for Agaba Port
(Project No.543)
Equipments for Hussein Medical City (No.559 
Funds for the Industrial Development Bank 
Hittia-Agaba Rail Road (Project No.B.403) 
Expansions in Agaba Port (Project No.773)
2801 
) "
6872 3547 573 1327
1064 2246
2849
3490
13514
127
1327
289
797
702
5
102
10
5115
1
21
6
t135200
582
11210
15120
7750
18500
35509
592
16325
'f
f
Total 00335 >801 6872 3547 573 2391 5095 17004 1743 1499 5232 47039 93796 >
Source: Data were collected from The Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data (In Arabic) w<N
TABLE 5.8
LOANS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (I.D.A.)
1962-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS
Contractual Actual Disbursements Grand
Number Date Amount Project Title 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total
1 22.12.1961 1500 Amman Drinking Water Project (No.18) — 38 91 420 129 821 1 .. _ 1500
2 12.12.1963 2516 Water Projects (No.43) - - 131 922 283 1018 162 - - - - 2516
3 12.12.1963 3000 Agriculture Project-stage one (No.44) - — 1276 1307 417 - - - - - - 3000
4 9.5. 1967 3000 Agriculture Project (No.103) - - - - - 265 851 545 399 357 583 3000
5 28.6.1971 6000 Amman-Zerga Highway (No.262) - - - - - - - - - 124 1685 1809
6 6.4.1972 5400 Educational Projects (No.285) «■» *“
' j
Total 21416 - 38 1498 2649 829 2104 1014 545 399 481 2268 • f11825 ;4f
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data (In Arabic).
u>o>
TABLE 5.9
LOANS FROM SAUDI-ARABIA
1962-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS
Number
Contractual
Date Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Srand Total
1 13.6.1966 15000 Agaba-Maan-Saudi Arabia Borders- 
Zerga-Azrag Road. - - - - 4200 - 4198 4198 1404 1000 15000
Total 15000 - - - - - 4200 - 4198 4198 1404 1000 - 15000
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data (In Arabic).
O * .■ -F
TABLE 5.10
LOANS FROM C. IT OH and Co. (JAPAN)
1962-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS
Number
Contractual
Date
Amount 
000's of 
U.S.$
Project Title Actual Disbursements Girand.
Total1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 11967 1968 L969 1970 L 9 71 1972
1 28.8.1969 2451 Financing of a Ground Sattelite 
Station. - - - - - - - - 2451 - 2451
Total 2451 • - - - - - -
i
2451 - - 2451
Source Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data (In Arabic)
lu<nui
TABLE 5.11
LOANS FROM KUWAIT (KUWAITI GOVERNMENT LOANS)
1960-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF KUWAITI DINARS
Number Contractual Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total
1 18.7.1960 420 A  loan to the Industrial 
Development Bank. 400 - 20 - - - - - - - - » 420
2 II 620 A  loan to the
Municipalities Fund. . 600 - 20 - ' - - - - ' - - - - - 620
3 18.A.1964 5000 Government Budget 
Support - - - - 5000 - - - - - - - - 5000
Total 6040 1000 - 40 - 5000 - - - - - - - 6040
Sources Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data, (in Arabic).
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TABLE 5,12
LOANS FROM THE KUWAITI FUND FOR ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THOUSANDS OE KUWAITI DINARS
Number Contractual
Date
Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand
Total
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1 3.4.1962 3000 Phosphate Project - - 199 585 59 785 934 367 60 - - - 11 3000
2 II 240 Jerusalem Electricity
Project • • • 240 — — • . 240
3 II 175 Jerusalem Hotel - - - - 149 26 - - - - - - 175
4 II 85 Jordan Hotel - - - - 28 26 31 - - - - - 85
5 II 1900 Yarmouk Project - - - - 39 80 87 139 167 564 277 262 207 1822
6 14.3.1972 4600 Zarga-Dam Project - - - - - - « “ - - - 386 386
Total 10000 - - 199 585 487 919 1047 537 227 564 277 262 604 5708
Source; Data were collected fro« the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data, (in Arabic).
Uio.
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TABLE 5,13
LOANS FROM DENMARK 
1966-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF D. KRONERS
Number Contractual
Date
Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand
Total1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1 28.6.1966 12000 Financing Slaughter­
houses & Refrigerators 
in Amman and Irbid
- 84 401 2195 4353 4323 335 11691
Total 12000 - 84 401 2195 4353 4323 335 11691
Source: Data were collected from The Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data, (in Arabic).
tuooo
ILOANS FROM ENI-IMPEX (FRENCH-BELGIAN CO.)
TABLE 5.14
IN THOUSANDS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Number Contractual
Date
Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand
Total
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1 8.4.1967 3100 Amman Grand Hospital - 3100 - - - - - 3100
Total 3100 3100 3100
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Researcht unpublished data,
(in Arabic). OJova
ILOANS FROM THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK AND BOEING COMPANY
1966-1972
TABLE 5.15
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS '
Number Contractual
Date
Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand 
To tal
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1 9.7.1970 9200 Financing the purchase 
of Boeing Aircraft 
(707)
- - - - - 8180 743 8923
Total 9200 - ' - - - - 8180 743 8923
Source; Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data,
(in Arabic). OJ
TABLE 5.16
LOANS FROM FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BANKS
1966-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS
Number Contractual Amount Project Title Actual Disbursements Grand 
' Total
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1 9.7.1970 9200 Financing the purchase 
of Boeing Aircraft 
(707)
- - - - - 8300 900 9200
Total c 9200 - - - - - 8300 900 9200
Ui
t í
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research, unpublished data, (in Arabic).
3 7 5
TABLE 6
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. DOLLAR LOANS AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL 
U.S. LOANS (LOCAL CURRENCY LOANS AND DOLLAR LOANS)
1966-1972
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS
Sectors AmountsActually
Disbursed
Percentages Percentage
Distribution of Total 
U.S. Loans
1 Agriculture & Irrigation
1247 8.0 11.0(I)
l.a Irrigation. 632 4.1 3.3
l.b Dams •
l.c Other agricultural
615activities 3.9 7.7
2 Transport (II) 3818 24.5 21.3
2.a Roads 2735 17.5 14.19
2.b Ports 4 Air Ports 1083 7.0 7.10
2.c Equipment & Studies —
3 Electricity 4 Water Supply 346 2.23 1.8
(III)
3.a Electricity -
3 ,b Water Supply 346 2.23 1.8
4 Mining 4 Manufacturing (IV) 419 2.68 2.17
4.a Mining •* •
4,b Manufacturing 419 2.68 2.17
5 Construction 4 Housing (V) 1004 6.44 6.30
6  Communication (VI) 6446 41.36 35.1
7 Social Welfare (VII) 1811 11.62 13.3
8 Education (VIII) 168 1.10 2.32
9 Other (IX) 324 2.07 6.71
Total 15583 100.00 , 100.00
Source: Based on the following tables in Appendix III: 5, 5.1 and Table 5.2.
Notes : (I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
(V)
(VI)
(VII)
(VIII)
(IX)
Building agricultural roads; expanding egg production; developing 
production of irrigated lands; aforestation and developing plant nurseries* 
developing dry land production; East Ghor irrigation networks; soil *
conservation.
Building roads; improvements on Jerusalem Airport.
Extensions of water supply^networks in municipalities and villages* 
improvements on Amman's drinking water. ’
Funds for the Industrial Development Bank.
Building a ceiling for Amman Stream.
Jordan telecommunications improvement projects.
Finance for rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Expansion of Ajloun Teachers Training Institute.
Feasibility studies; purchasing computer magnetic tapes; difference between 
purchasing and selling prices of commodity aid.
TABLE 6.1
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF BRITISH LOANS
IN THOUSANDS OF STERLING POUNDS AND U.S. DOLLAR EQUIVALENT
Sectors Amounts Actually Disbursed Percentages
000s of £ U.S. $
1 Agriculture 4 Irrigation (I) 5887 14329 29.0
l.a Irrigation 1147 2792 5.7
1 .b Dams
l.c Other agricultural
2001 4870 10.0
activities 2739 6667 13.3
2 Transport (II). 8637 21023 43.0
2.a Roads
2.b Ports 4 Airport
5769
2776
14042 28.8
Facilities 6757 13.7
2 ,b| Equipment 4 Other Studies 92 224 0.5.
3 Electricity 4 Water Supply (III) 4043 9841 20.0
3.a Electricity 2922 7112 14.5
3.b Water Supply 1121 2729 5.5
4 Mining & Manufacturing (IV) 
4. a Mining
67
42
163
102
0.3
0.2
4.b Manufacturing 25 61 0,1
5 Construction & Housing (V) 380 925 2,0
6 Communication (VI) 330 803 2.0
7 Social Welfare (VII) 190 462 0.9
8 Others 540 1314 2,7
9 Total 20,074 48,860 100.0
Appendix III^ Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 & 5,6.
( I )
(II)
(III)
(IV)
(V)
(VI)
(VII)
Small irrigation projects; funds for general agricultural development; 
funds for Agricultural Co-operatives; agricultural marketing, drilling 
and pumping of underground water; Ziglab, Shoab and Kafrain Dams; Soil 
surveys; developing dry farming; agricultural census; cereals silos; 
veterinary equipment.
Amman-Agaba road; building roads; building, equipping and expanding 
facilities at Jerusalem Airport, Amman Airport and Agaba port.
Jordan Electrification Project; Amman 4 Irbid Electricity Projects; 
water explorations and hydro-studies; extending water supply networks; 
Azrag water supply network project.
Financial support for Industrial Co-operatives.
Funds for building villages for rehabilitating frontier inhabitants; 
financial support for the Jordan Construction Bank; engineering studies. 
Telephone 6 Wireless Communication Projects.
General development in frontier villages.
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TABLE 7
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OE LOANS FROM A.I.D (PAID IN LOCAL CURRKNCYt
Source: Appendix III, Table 5.1.
No tes: (I)
(ID
(HI)
(IV)
(V)
(VI)
(VII)
Loans to the Agricultural Credit Corporation and the Cooperative Organisation.
Improvements in Jerusalem Airport.
Loan to the Housing Corporation.
Jordan Telecommuncations Improvement Projects.
Funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
Improvements of touristic facilities.
Loan to the Village & Municipalities Fund; funds for 
development budget; financing feasibility studies. the government
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TABLE 8
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS FROM KUWAIT 
KUWAITI GOVERNMENT AND THE KUWAITI FUND FOR ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THOUSANDS OF KUIiAITI DINARS AND U.S. DOLLAR EQUIVALENT
Sector Actual Disbursements Percentage
000's of
K. Dinars U.S. $
1 Agriculture & Irrigation 2208 (6271$) 19.0
Dams (I) 2208 (6271$) 19.0.
2 Transport - ( - )
3 Electricity S Water
Supply 240 (682$) 2.0
3a) Electricity (II) 240 (682$)3b) Water Supply - ( - )
4 Mining & Manufacturing 3420 (9713$) 29.0
4a) Mining (III) 3000 (8520$) 2* 54b) Manufacturing (IV) 420 (1193$) 3.5
5 Tourism (V) 260 (738$) 2.2
6 Other 5620 (15961$) 47.8
7 Total 11748 (33365$)
-
100.0
Source: Appendix III, Tables 5.11 and 5.12.
Notes (I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
(V)
Funds for Yarmouk Project and Zarka Dam. 
Jerusalem Electricity.
Settling debt extended by the American Loan Fund to the 
Phosphate Co., covering costs of technical studies, and 
supplementing the Phosphate Company’s capital.
Loan to the Industrial Development Bank.
Jordan Hotel and Jerusalem Hotel (Intercontinental).
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TABLE 9
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS FROM WEST GERMANY
1 9 6 2 - 1 9 7 2
IN THOUSANDS OF D. MARKS AND U.S. DOLLAR EQUIVALENT
Sectors Amounts Actually Disbursed Percentages
000's of 
D-Marks U.S. $
1 Agriculture &
Irrigation «• *
2 Transport • 76879 274074 82.0
2a)Ports S Air- 
Port
Facilities
(I) 41370 147484 44.0
2b)Roads (II) 35509 126590 38.0
3 Electricity S 
Water Supply 2110(III) 592 0.6
3a)Electricity 592 2110 0.6
4 Mining & Manu-
facturing “
5 Construction A
Housing
6 Communication — **
7 Social Welfare - - -
8 Health (IV) 16325 58199 17.4
9 Others - - -
10 Total 93796 339383 100.0
Source: Appendix HI, Table 5.7.
t
Notea: (I) Tor expanding Agaba Port. ■
(II) Hittiah - Agaba Rail Road.
(Ill) Electricity generator for Agaba Port,
(IV) Equipment for Hussein Medical City.
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SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (IDA)
1961-1972
TABLE 10
IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS
Sectors Actual
Disbursements Percentages
1 Agriculture & Irrigation (I) 6000 50.7la)0ther agricultural activities 6000 50.7
2 Transport (II) 1809 15.32a)Roads 1809 15.3
3 Electricity & Water Supply (III) 4016 34.03a)Electricity - -
3b)Water Supply 4016 34.0
4 Mining and Manufacturing - -
5 Construction and Housing - -
6 Communication - -
7 Social Welfare - -
8 Education -
Total 11825 100.0
Source: Appendix III, Table No#5»8«
Notes: (I) Funds extended to the Agricultural Credit Corporation for financing
— ---- farmers and covering expenses of hiring foreign experts.
(II) Funds for Amman-Zerga highway; purchasing equipments for building and' 
maintaining roads, and to cover cost of a study for controlling 
traffic within Amman Municipality.
(Ill) Finance extended to Amman Municipality for developing water facilities, 
increasing the supply of water in Amman and installing drinking water 
distribution networks.
TABLE 11
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OP LOANS FROM SAUDI-ARABIA, DENMARK, C.ITOH AND CO., 
ENI-IMPEX, EXPORT AND IMPORT BANK AND OTHER COMMERCIAL BANKS
Sector (a)Saudi-Arabia
(b)
Denmark
(c)
C.ITOH & Co • y
(d)
ENI-IMPEX
(e)
Export-Import 
Bank & 
Boeing Co.
(f)
Commercial
Banks
000s of 
U.S. $ Z
000s 
of D. 
Kroners
X
000s of 
U.S. $ z
000s of 
J.Dinars Z
000s of 
U.S. $ Z
000s of 
U.S. $ Z
1 Agriculture & 
Irrigation. - « - - - — - _ _ _ _
2 Transport- 15000 100 - - - - - - 8923 100 '9200 100
2a Ports & Air­
port Facili­
ties. . 8923' 100 9200 100
2b Roads. 15000 100 - - - - - - - - - -
3 Electricity & 
Water Supply. - - - - - - - - - - - -
4 Mining & Manu­
facturing* - - - - ' - - - - - - - -
5 Construction & 
Housing. - - - - - - - - - - - -
6 Communication. - - - - 2451 100 - - ■ - - - -
7 Social Welfare. - - - - - - - - - - - - «
8 Education. - - - - - - - - - - - -
9 Health. - — - — 3100
(8680)
100 •* — - -
10 Other. — •• 11691
(76985)
100 — — • — —
11 Total. 15000 100 11691
(76585)
100 2451 100 3100
(8680)
100 8923 100 9200 100
Source: Appendix III, Tables: 5.9, 5.13, 5.10, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16.
Notes : (a) For financing a road connecting Agaba-Ma'an-Saudi-Arabia borders A Zarka Azrag road.
(b) For financing equipment and refrigerators for Anman and Irbid Municipalities.
(c) Financing a Ground Sattelite Station; (d) Annan Grand Hospital; (e) Financing purchases of Boeing Aircraft, 
(f) Figures between brackets are in D.S. dollars.
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TABLE.12
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT IN 
THE EAST BANK
IN THO JSANDS OF WOR 
1961 Popula
KERS
tion Census 1970 Establishment Survey
Nunbers in 
000's
X Numbers in 
000' s X
I Total number of population 901 1668
II Labour force: 218 100 350 inna) Total number of employment 202 92.7 301 PA Ab) Seeking work 16 7.3 49
ÖO .u
14.0III Sectoral distribution:
a) Agriculture 73 33.4 115 32.9b) Mining 4 Quarrying 5 2.3 3 0.9c) Manufacturing 17 7.7 21 6.0d) Electricity 1 0.5 1 0.3e) Construction
f) Wholesale 4 Retail Trade,
22 10.1 7 2.0
Restaurants 4 Hotels 17 7.7 23 6.6g) Transport, storage and
communication 8 3.6 11 3.1h) Financial Institutions,
Insurance and Real Estate
and Business Services
i) Community, social and
4 1.1
personal services 29 13.3 34
j) Not specified (inc- 9  *7
luding armed forces) 31 14.1 82 23.4
IV Percentage of Labour Force to
total number of population 24.2 21.0
Source: (I)
(II)
Jordan Department of Statistics, Establishment Survev 1970. fAmman. 
Department of Statistics Press, n.d.) ---- —  *
Jordan Department of Statistics, First Census cf Population and Housin« 
(Amman: Department of Statistics Press, May 1964), v o l . 2 . ---------—
ional Pi a n n i  n »  P / v m i 1 ------» ■» * » •(III) The National Planning Council, unpublished data i k  ArabU.
Notes: The number of the labour force, 
labour and the "not identified" 
• estimates.
lauourers wmt., cne agricultural
item in the Establishment Survey of 1970 were
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APPENDIX Illa
A three-agreement sample representing various loan agreements between 
Jordan and donors - some excerpts.
1. TYPE A AGREEMENT - Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom 
of Denmark and the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan on 
a Danish Government loan to Jordan, June 20, 1966.
The striking points in this agreement are the following:-
(a) "The Borrower will repay the loan in Danish Kroners or any 
other convertable currencies acceptable to Denmark National Bank..."^
(b) "The Borrower will use proceeds of the loan to finance imports 
(including transport charges from Denmark to Jordan) of Danish capital
goods „ ( 2 )
(c) Jordan should abide by the Articles of the Agreement whereby any 
violations (default, for example) whether occurred in payment under 
this Agreement or any other Borrower - Lender Agreements, the Lender, 
after sixty days notice, and "at his option, may declare the principal 
of the loan then outstanding to be due and payable immediately..."^
TYPE B AGREEMENT - Agreement between the United States Mission in 
Jordan and the Government of Jordan - A.I.D. Loan No. 278-H-003,
Jordan: Damiya Junction - North Shouna Road reconstruction, September, 
1965.
(a) Article V Section 5.2 "Borrower shall ensure that at least
fifty percent (50%) of the gross tonnage of all goods ....  financed
hereunder which shall be transported on ocean vessels shall be 
transported on privately owned United States flag commerical vessels... 
No goods may be financed hereunder which shall be transported on any
(1) Type A agreement, op. cit ., Article V .
(2) Ibid., Article VI, in the annex of this agreement, the imported 
Danish machinery and equipment was specified for usage in a 
slaughter house, diaries, a compost plant, fishing industry, cold 
storage and food processing.
(3) Ibid., Article XI
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ocean vessels (a) which A.I.D. by written notice to Borrower, has 
designated as ineligible to carry A.I.D. financed goods....."
(b) Article 100 - Section 100-1: "except as A.I.D. may otherwise 
agree in writing, all imported Eligible Items, including transportation 
service and marine insurance on imported Eligible Items, shall have
therrsource and origin in the United States .....  All other goods
and services, except transportation services, obtained for the project 
shall have theirsource and origin in the borrower Country or Countries
included in Code 899 of the A.I.D. Georgraphic Code Book....  A.I.D.
may issue binding interpretations of this section 100-1 from time to
^  ^ ; Iftime..
(c) Article 100 - section 100-2: "... no more than reasonable
prices shall be paid for any Eligible Items..... " The provisions
of the Section 100-2, other than the requirement that the price must 
be reasonable, shall not apply to architectural, engineering, manage­
ment or such other professional services as A.I.D. may specify in 
writing."
(d) Article 100 - Section 100-4: "In order that United States small 
business shall have the opportunity to participate in furnishing 
imported Eligible Items, borrower, at such time as A.I.D. may specify 
prior to ordering or contracting for any imported Eligible Items 
estimated to cost more than the equivalent of five thousand United 
States dollars ($5000), shall cause to be received by A.I.D. such 
information concerning imported Eligible Items as A.I.D. may require."
(e) Article 100 - Section 100-5: "....  Borrower shall insure, or
cause to be insured, all imported goods financed under the Loan ... 
such insurance.... shall be payable in United States dollars'."
(f) Article 100 - Section 100-7: "Employment of Personnel to 
perform services under Contracts financed hereunder, in whole or in 
part, shall be subject to all applicable United States Legislations
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and such requirements, including security clearances and limitations 
on the employment of third country nationals, as A.I.D. may from time 
to time promulgate or specify ...."
(g) Article 101 - Section 101-2: "All Eligible Items shall be
used exclusively for the Project. This restriction shall apply 
only until such time as such goods can no longer be usefully employed 
for the project or the project facilities, provided that no goods 
financed hereunder shall be exported from the Borrower Country without 
the prior approval of A.I.D. and provided further that no Eligible 
Item shall at any time be used to promote or assist any project or 
activity associated with or financed by any country..... "
(h) Article 101 - Section 101-3: "Borrower shall co-operate 
with the United States Government in its efforts to disseminate 
information concerning the Loan and the Project and shall comply 
with such reasonable instructions with respect thereto or with
respect to the marking of goods .....  or the identification of any
project job site as A.I.D. may issue from time to timeJ"
(i) Article 102 - Section 102-2: "A.I.D. from time to time may
issue binding instructions concerning the eligibility for financing 
hereunder of commissions, including brokerage commissions and 
commissions paid to sales agents of suppliers, and allowances to 
purchasing agent or importers,"
3. TYPE C AGREEMENT - Agreement between the Royal Jordanian Airlines, 
Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, the Boeing Company 
and Export-Import Bank of the United States.
(a) Article Section A.5: No Aircraft the purchase of which
is financed, in whole or in part, by Eximbank under this Agreement 
(i) is principally for use in a Communist Country (as defined in 
Section 620 - (f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended)
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or (ii) is to be used principally in any nation (A) which engages 
in armed Conflict, declared or otherwise, with armed forces of the 
United States or (B) which furnishes by direct governmental action ... 
goods, supplies, military assistance, or advisors to any nation 
described in Clause (A) above,''
(b) Article V - Section 5.3: "....the aggregate of the amount
of all-risk ground and flight hull insurance on the aircraft .... 
shall in no event be less than one hundred percent (100%) of the 
aggregate principal amount of this Credit and the Bank Credit at
the time outstanding .... The proceeds of all insurance required
hereunder shall be, in the event of total loss or destruction of the 
property insured, apply at the option of the Borrower either (x)
to the unpaid balances of the loans by Eximbank and the Exporter 
and after this has been satisfied in full to the unpaid balances of 
the loans made by the Bank; or (y) to the purchase by the Borrower 
of a new aircraft of comparable type manufactured and purchased in 
the United States......."
(c) Article V - C.3: "The Borrower shall not sell, lease, convey,
transfer or otherwise dispose of the aircraft...... "
(d) Article X - A: "The items financed in whole or in part under 
this Agreement and which have been or will be exported by ocean vessels, 
have been or will be transported from the United States in vessels of
United States registry.....  if a waiver is obtained, the cost of
ocean freight for shipments on vessels of other than United States 
registry shall not be eligible for financing under this Agreement."
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TABLE PACE
TABLE 1
RATIOS OF INVESTMENT AND DOMESTIC SAVINGS 
TO GROSS NATIONAL INCOME. 1954 - 1972
r
Period
RATIO OF THE FOLLOWING TO GROSS NATIONAL INCOME (GNP) 
1954 - 1972
Percapita
G.N.P.
(In Jordanian 
Dinars)Gross DomesticCapital
Formation
Domestic Savings
. *Definition 1 Definition 2*
1954 11.0 -13.7 -5.3 37.7
1955 12.0 -25.5 -15.3 34.6
1956 20.0 -4.8 5.5 46.3
1957 13.0 -20.4 -6.4 ' 45.8
1953 11.0 -21.9 -14.9 48.8
1959 13.0 -21.4 -13.6 60.4
1960 16.2 -11.7 -9.9 62.5
1961 14.9 -5.7 -3.0 74.3
1962 15.5 -5.7 -0.5 73.9
1963 14.5 -12.3 -8.9 75.6
1964 15.7 -0.1 3.0 85.4
1965 15.4 •"0.1 3.0 92.6
1966 14.1 -4.6 -1.7 92.4
1967’ 12.4 -1.6 0.4 99.0
1963 19.0 -4.3 -7.4 91.8
1969 27.6 -0.6 0.8 104.8
1970 13.0 -3.6 -2.2 96.3
1971 21.1 ’ -4.4 -3.9 99.4
1972 17.5 '-10.6 -4.0 102.2
Source: (i) Derived from data presented in the Jordanian National Accounts of
1967-1972. See Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts, 
■ 1967-1972. (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, May 1973).
(ii) For data relevant to the period prior to 1959, we relied on R.S. Porter, 
Economic Trends in Jordan, 1954-1959. (Beirut: Middle East
Development Division, July 1961).
Note: Domestic Savings ■». Net Investment - (X - M)
**DomeStic Savings - Total Current Income - Total Current Expenditures.
TABLE 2
AGGREGATE AID AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH CERTAIN KEY VARIABLES
1954-1972
Years
Government 
Receipts of 
Foreign Aid
Government Receipts of 
Foreign Aid as Percent of Aggregate
ASëregate Aid 
of
Flow as percentage Aggregate 
Unrequited 
Transfers 
to Jordan
Aggregate unrequited 
Transfers as Percent of
Gross
Fixed
Capital
Formation
foblic
Fixed
Capital
formation
Aggregate 
Expendit­
ures on 
Consumption
Public 
expendit­
ures on 
Consumption
Flow to 
Jordan
Expenditures 
on G.N.P.
Expend­
itures
on
G.D.P.
Aggreg- 
ate Exp­
enditures on 
Consumption
Aggregate
Capital
Formation
Popul­
ation
Expenditures 
on G.N.P.
Expenditures 
on G.D.P.
1954 11.637 242 465 20 85 18.993 ’ 36 37 32 396 13.66 16.123 30 31
1955 9.921 124 367 16 68 13.864 28 29 22 173 9.63 13.864 28 29
1956 10.540 132 390 15 63 18.815 27 28 27 235 12.71 18.815 27 28
1957 7.229 87 233 9 37 17.009 24 25 21 205 11.12 17.009 24 25
1958 16.182 148 405 17 63 22.009 29 29 24 202 13.93 21.012 27 28
1959 18.689 104 374 17 73 25.000 25 27 22 139 15.24 24.376 25 26
1960 18.895 107 420 16 70 25.813 24 26 22 147 15.27 24.327 23 25
1961 18.938 111 344 14 67 26.092 21 22 20 153 15.26 25.056 20 21J 1962 17.395 79 215 13 60 24.523 19 21 19 111 13.85 23.342 18 20
1963 17.420 87 242 12 53 24.646 18 19 16 123 13.54 22.868 17 18
1964 21.234 113 354 14 66 28.665 18 19 18 152 15.25 22.798 14 15
1965 19.027 79 183 11 52 27.780 15 17 16 116 14.25 24.023 13 14
1966 17.945 65 144 10 48 26.264 14 15 14 95 13.07 22.029 12 13
1967 44.097 166 294 22 95 54.301 26 28 26 204 26.11 47.509 23 24
1968 45.258 147 283 21 77 52.177 26 28 25 170 24.27 46.763 24 25
1969 43.053 110 259 19 64 48.078 21 22 21 122 21.56 43.297 19 20
1970 37.497 137 395 17 61 44.229 20 21 19 161 19.15 41.074 18 20
1971 42.372 127 368 17 67 53.144 22 24 22 159 22.33 40.067 17 18
1972 55.845 142 321 21 80 65.710 26 27 25 167 26.60 53.605 21 22
¡Average Z
¡1965-59 139.5 372.3 15.7 64.8 28.2 29.2 24.7 225.0 12.72 26.8 27.8
Average Z
¡1960-66 91.6 271.7 12.9 59.4 18.4 19.9 17.9 128.1 14.36 16.7 18.0
*Werage Z
1967-72 138.2 320.0 19.5 74.0 23.5 25.0 23.0 163.8 23.34 20.3 21.5
GWerage Z
¡1960-72 113.1 294.0 15.9 66.2 20.8 22.2 20.2 144.6 18.50 18.4 19.6
'Average Z
¡1954-72 121.4 318.7 15.8 65.7 23.1 24.4 21.6 170.0 16.67 21.1 22.2
Source: (i) Figures on G.N.P., G.D.P. and investment were from: (a) Date relevant to the period prior to 1959 were from R.S. Porter,
Economic Trends in Jordan, 1954-1959, (Beirut: Middle East Development Division, July 1961); (b) Data relevant to the period 
1960—1972 were from Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts, 1967—1972, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, Kay 1973),
(ii) Appendix II, Table No. 1.
(iii) The International Monetary Fund, I.F.S., (Washington, D.C.:, I.M.F., n.d.). Supplement to 1972
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TABLE 3
3 3 7
DOMESTIC SAVINGS 
1954-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
*Approach 1 A*Approach 2
Period Domestic Savings Domestic Savings
(1)
Private Savings 
(2)
Public Savings 
(3)
Total D.
Savings
(4)"(2)+(3)
1954 -7.2 3.8 -6.60 -2.80
1955 -12.7 -0.90 -6.70 -7.60
1956 -3.3 12.10 -8.30 3.80
1957 . -14.3 5.80 -10.30 -4.50
1958 -16.9 3.70 -15.20 -11.50
1959 -21.2 -1.66 -11.82 -13.48
1960 -12.4 2.01 -12.46 -10.45
1961 -7.3 8.79 -12.61 -3.82
1962 -7.5 7.45 -8.08 -0.63
1963 -16.9 1.17 -13.47 -12.30
1964 -0.1 . 15.51 -10.72 4.79
1965 -0.2 15.27 -9.77 5.50
1966 -8.5 3.59 -6.79 -3.2
1967 -3.2 2i.4 -20.61 0.79
1968 -8.4 18.05 -32.94 -14.89
1969 -1.3 42.77 -40.83 1.94
1970 -8.1 32.87 -37.78 -4.91
1971 -10.4 22.90 -32.18 -9.28
1972 -26.7 29.86 -39.85 -9.99
Average
1954-1972 -9.82 12.87 -17.74 -4.87
Source: (i) Data pertaining to the period 1954-1958 are from R.S. Porter,
Economic Trends in Jordan, 1954-1959, (Beirut: Middle East 
Development Divison, July 1961),
(ii) Data pertaining to the period 1959-1972 are from Jordan Department of 
Statistics, The National Accounts, 1967-1972, (Amman: Department of 
Statistics Press,May 1973).
Note: * Domestic Savings - Net Investment - (X-M)
** Domestic Savings - Total Current Income - Total Current Expenditures
(Both public and private sectors). Total incomes are net of current transfers 
from abroad.
TABLE 4
DOMESTIC SAVINGS (APPROACHES 1 AND 2) AS RATIOS TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
AND TO GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION 
1954-1972
Periods
Domestic Savings 
(Net Investment -
- Approach 1 
(X-M)).
Domestic Savings - Approach 2 (Current Income - Current Expenditures)
Domestic Savings As percentage of [Domestic Savings as Percentage of GDP Domestic Savings as percentage of Gross D.C. Formation
Gross Domestic Product ?ross Domestic 
Capital Formation
[Private
¡Savings
Public
Savings
Total Domestic 
Savings
Private
Savings
Public
Savings
Total Domestic 
Savings
1954 -14,0 -122.0 7.4 -12.9 -5.5 64.4 -111.9 -47.5
1955 -26.8 -208.2 -2.0 -14.2 -16.1 -14.8 -109.8 -124.6
1956 -5.0 -24.1 18.2 -12.5 5.7 88.3 -60.6 27.7
1957 -21.2 -153.8 8.6 -15.3 -6.7 62.4 -110.8 -48.4
1958 -22.5 -206.1 5.0 -20.2 -15.2 45.1 -185.4 -140.3
1959 -22.7 -168.3 -1.8 -12.6 -14.4 -13.2 -93.8 -107.0
I960 -12.6 -72.5 2.0 -12.7 -10.7 11.8 -72.9 -61.1
1961 -6.1 -38.4 7.3 • -10.5 -3.2 46.3 -66.4 -20.1
1962 -6.3 -37.1 6.3 -6.8 -0.5 36.9 -40.0 -3.1
1963 -13.1 -84.5 1.0 -10.4 -9.4 5.9 -67.4 -61.5
1964 -0.1 -0.4 ! 10.4 -7.2 3.2 61.3 -42.4 18.9
1965 -0.1 -0.7 9.0 -5.8 3.2 54.9 -35.1 19.8
1966 -5.0 '30.2 2.1 -4.0 ' -1.9 12.8 -24.2 -11.4
1967 -1.6 '12.5 11.0 -10.6 0.4 83.6 -80.5 3.1
1968 -4.5 -22.4 9.7 -17.6 -8.0 48.1 -87.8 -39.7
1969 -0.6 -2.0 19.5 -18.6 0.9 66.4 -63.4 3.0
1970 -3.9 '20.2 15.7 18.0 -2.3 ____ 82.0 -94.2
-12.2
1971 -4.7 -20.9 10.3 -14.4 -4.1 46.0 -64.6 -18.6
1972 -11.1 - 60.5 12.5 -16.6 -4.1 67.7 -90.4 -22.7
Sources (i) Appendix IV, Table 3.
(ii) For data pertaining to periods prior to 1959 we relied on K.S. Porter. Economic Trends in Jordan. 1954-1959. 
(Beirut: Kiddle East Development Division, July 1961).
(jjj) data pertaining to subsequent periods^we relied on Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts,
1967-1972, (Aaman: Department of Statistics Press, Hay 1973),
8S
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TABLE 5
AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE AND ITS COMPONENTS
1954-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Periods
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE'
*Per Capita 
Consumption
COMPONENTS OF CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 
PERCENT.OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION
AS
Total
Private
Consumption
Public
Consumption
Aggregate
Consumption
Private
Consumption (1)
Public
Consumption (2) (3)=l+2
1954 45.4 13.7 59.1 42.5 76.8 23.2 100
1955 47.1 14.6 61.7 42.8 76.3 23.7 100
1956 52.9 16.8 69.7 47.1 75.9 24.1 100
1957 60.1 19.7 79.8 52.2 75.3 24.7 100
1958 67.1 25.7 92.8 58.7 72.3 27.7 100
1959 87.1 25.5 112.6 68.7 77.4 22.6 100
1960 88.5 27.0 115.5 67.0 76.6 23.4 100
1961 102.8 28.1 130.9 74.7 78.5 21.5 100
1962 102.4 29.0 131.4 73.5 77.9 22.1 100
1963 116.8 33.0 149.8 80.5 78.0 22.0 100
1964 123.5 32.3 155.8 80.5 79.3 20.7. 100
1965 138.0 36.8 174.8 86.7 78.9 21.1 100
1966 149.6 37.5 187.1 89.1 80.0 20.0 100
1967 158.6 46.4 205.1 99.0 77.3 22.6 100
1968 153.4 58.6 212.0 99.4 72.4 27.6 100
1969 164.5 67.1 231.6 102.9 71.0 29.0 100
1970 165.1 62.0 227.1 96.8 72.7 27.3 100
1971 183.0 62.9 245.9 102.5 74.4 25.6 100 •
1972 192.0 70.0 262.0 104.9 73.3 26.7 100
Source: (i) For data pertaining to the period 1954-1958 see R.S. Porter, Economic Trends in Jordan, 1954-1959,
(Beirut: Middle East Development Division, July 1961).
(ii) For data pertaining to the period 1959-1972 see Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts, 
1967-1972, (Amman: Department of Statistics Press, Kay 1973).
*Note: In Jordanian Dinars.
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TABLE 6
RATIOS OF AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES TO:
A - GROSS NATIONAL INCOME 
B - GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME 
1954-1972
PERCENTAGES
Aggregate Consumption as Percentage of
Periods Gross National Income Gross Domestic Income
1954 112.8 115.2
1955 123.9 130.4
1956 101.8 104.7
1957 99.6 118.4
1958 120.4 123.4
1959 113.6 120.4
1960 109.2 117.5
1961 102.9 109.0
1962 100.4 110.0
1963 108.8 116.0
1964 97.0 104.6
1965 96.8 103.3
1966 100.6 109.7
1967 99.5 105.3
1968 107.4 113.4.
1969 . 99.1 105.4
1970 102.0N 108.2
1971 103.9 110.0
1972 103.8 109.4
Source (i) Table No. 2, Appendix I.
( i i )  Table No. 15, Appendix I»
(iii) Table No. 5 ,  Appendix IV.
TABLE 7
THE COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES
1959-1972
_ IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Period Private Public Aggreg- Ratio Ratio Main Components of Private Consumption Ratios of Main Components of Private
Consulti- Consum-ate of Pf Consumption to Total Private Consumptionption ption Cons unt- I Food Trans- Clothing| Housing Furnit- Expend- Coloumn Co loumn Coloumn Coloumi Coloumn Colounr Coloumn
ption 1 to ¡ 2  to port Textile ure and ituresof 6 Î  1 7  f t 1 T 1 9 z  1 10 I- 1 11 « 1 6 i  3
L and Domestic Jordan-3 i3 Footwear Equip- ians
(3) = *)' (5) - ment Abroad
(1) (2) (1+2) 1 - 3' (2/3) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
1959 87.1 25.5 112.6 77-. 4 22.6 49.39 8.92 8.92 6.62 3.79 1.93 56.7 10.2 10.2 7.6 4.4 2.2 43.9
1960 88.5 27.0 115.5 76.6 23.4 48.32 9.30 8.59 7.48 3.61 2.22 54.6 10.5 9.7 8.5 4.1 2.5 41.8
1961 102.8 28.1 130.9 78.5 21.5 59.69 9.75 9.81 8.41 3.63 2.44 58.1 9.5 9.5 8.2 3.5 2.4 45.6
1962 102.4 29.0 131.4 77.9 22.1 56.0410.69 9.58 9.00 4.29 3.42 54.7 10.4 9.1 8.8 4.2 3.3 42.6
1963 116.8 33.0 149.8 78.0 22.0 60.5/12.04 11.5 9.86 5.98 3.20 51.9 10.3 9.8 8.4 5.1 2.7 40.4
1964 123.5 32.3 155.8 79.3 20.7 62.8514.9 11.71 9.93 5.93 3.63 50.9 12.1 9.5 8.0 4.8 2.9 40.3
1965 138.0 36.8 174.8 78.9 21.1 71.3612.45 14.9 10.69 6.94 4.29 51.7 9.0 LO.9 7.7 5.0 3.1 40.8
1966 149.6 37.5 187.1 80.0 20.0 71.7513.15 15.6 10.8 8.27 5.23 48.0 8.8 LO.4 7.2 5.5 3.5 38.3
1967 158.6 ¡46.4 205.1 77.3 22.6 88.0^16.54 12.02 11.26 4.99 5.29 55.5 10.4 7.6 7.1 3.1 3.3 42.9
1968 153.4 58.6 ¡212.0 72.4 2 16 73.35¡14.62 12.35 11.63 5.36 7.0 47.8 9.5 8.1 7.6 3.5 4.6 34.6
1969 164.5 67.1 231.6 71.0 29.0 80.3815.96 15.57 12.10 7.86 7.98 48.9 9.6 9.5 7.4 4.8 4.9 34.7
1970 165.1 62.0 227.1 72.7 27.3 83.50¡15.6 12.98 12.8 9.5 9.35 50.6 9.4 7.9 7.8 5.8 5.7 36.8
1971 183.0 62.9 245.9 74.4 25.6 88.0 L6.0 13.9 13.7 9.0 7.71 48.1 8.7 7.6 7.5 4.9 4.2 35.8
1972 192.0 70.0 262 73.3 26.6 93.0 16.5 14.45 14.2 10.0 8.5 48.4 8.6 7.5 7 . U 5.2 4.4 35.5
Average
1959-72 137.5 44.0 181.5 76.3 23.7 ------ 170.4 13.3 12.3 10.6 6.4 |5.2 51.9 9.8 9.1 7.8 4.6 3.6 39.6
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics, The National Accounts, 1967-1972, (Amman: Department of Statistics PressT'Mav 1973) ~
TABLE 8
SALARIES, WAGES AND ALLOWANCES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
1950-1972
IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Salaries and Salaries and Total Salaries, Wages Pension and Aggregate Total
Period Allowances Allowances 3 = 1+2 and Allowances Compensatory 6 - 3 + 4 + 5(Public^S^curity) (Defence) (2] • (4) Payments (5)
1950 0.400 - 2.443 2.843 0.475 0.054 3.372
1951 0-865 1.635 2.500 1.678 0.054 4.232
1952 0.863 7.458 8.321 1.518 0.055 9.894
1953 0.852 8.118 8.970 1.986 0.061 11.017
1954 0.868 8.151 9.019 2.308 0.063 11.390
1955 0.906 8.301 9.207 2.751 0.093 12.051
1956 1.043 12.131 13.174 2.948 0.131 16.253
1957 1.188 11.380 12.568 3.725 0.139 16.432
1958 2.073 14.669 16.742 4.149 0.150 21.041
1959 2.230 15.822 18.060 4.684 0.305 23.049
1960 2.270 16.155 18.425 4.914 0.631 23.970
1961 2.291 16.415 17.706 5.537 0.964 25.207
1962 2.309 16.805 19.114 6.169 1.302 26.585
1963 2.452 18.965 21.417 7.039 1.500 29.956
1964 2.462 18.570 21.032 7.423 1.907 30.362
1965 2.843 18.070 21.613 8.060 2.070 31.743
1966 2.063 14.374 16.437 6.739 1.781 24.957
1967 3.260 24.165 27.425 11.314 1.357 40.096
1968 3.249 35.168 38.417 9.621 1.626 49.664
1969 3.732 41.471 45.203 13.526 1.937 60.666
1970 4.334 33.070 37.404 17.401 1.985 56.790
1971 4.223 33.780 38.003 16.143 2.661 56.812
1972 4.725 39.250 43.975 16.555 2.529 63.059
Grand
Total 51.509 417.066 468.575 156.668 87.038 648.598
Source: Data were collected from the Central Bank of Jordan, Department of Economic Research - The Fiscal Division 
and the Domestic Economy and Development Division¿(unpublished data, in Arabic).
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THE CONNEXION BETWEEN FOREIGN AID RECEIPTS TO 
PUBLIC SECTOR AND GOVERNMENT BUDGET COMPONENTS
TABLE 9
1950-1972
GOVERUMENT RECEIPTS OF FOREIGN AID AS PERCENTAGE OF:
Period
Total
Government
Revenues
Total
Government 
Expend!t” 
ures
Government 
Recurring 
Expend!t— 
ures
Defence and 
Security 
Expendit­
ures
Develop­
ment
Expendit­
ures
Domestic Revenues 
as Percentage of 
Total Government 
Expenditures.
1950 52.74 53.58 68.40 83.58 31.60 48.0
1951 56.88 52.21 61.06 80.17 38.94 40.0
1952 62.20 65.62 75.26 97.82 24.74 40.0
1953 65.86 71.68 87.40 116.41 12.60 37.1
1954 61.19 71.38 88.67 122.11 11.33 45.3
1955 53.77 52.68 62.46 87.37 37.54 45.3
1956 55.80 51.39 60.00 80.92 40.00 40.7
1957 23.76 25.08 30.60 44.60 69.40 80.5
1958 64.27 66.73 83.24 117.03 16.76 37.1
1959 57.95 59.71 70.73 101.91 29.27 43.3
1960 57.93 58.03 70.95 103.41 29.05 42.1
1961 56.28 57.10 67.12 100.94 32.88 44.4
1962 44.45 44.90 56.27 88.40 43.73 56.1
1963 47.58 44.72 53.01 83.70 46.99 49.3
1964 48.50 51.45 65.14 103.86 34.86 54.6
1965 40.08 38.06 49.94 80.52 50.06 56.9
1966 ‘ 36.62 34.90 47.59 78.69 52.41 60.4
1967 63.36 64.70 98.74 154.41 1.26 37.4
1968 63.27 56.20 79.14 117.66 20.86 32.6
1969 56.96 48.69 66.00 93.25 34.00 36.8
1970 55.34 46.46 63.52 98.12 36.48 37.5
1971 53.99 51.96 69.78 108.30 30.22 44.3
1972 59.19 56.05 79.24 123.90 20.76 38.6
Average %  
1950-1959 55.44 57.01 68.78 93.19 31.22
Average 7 .  
1960-1966 47.35 47.02 58.57 91.36 41.43
Average X  
1967-1972 58.69 54.01 76.07 115.9 23.93
Average % 
1960-1972
Source: ( i
52.58 
Table No
50.25
1 A
66.65 102.70 33.35
Appendix II,
TABLE 10
THE CONNEXION BETWEEN FOREIGN AID AND COMPONENTS 0? INTERNATIONAL TRADE
1950-1972
VALUES ARE IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Values of Traded 
Goods (Merchan­
dise)
Balance of xovern-
aent
Receipts 
)f Fore­
ign Aid
Governm 
Aid as
ent Rece 
percents
Lpts of Foreign 
ge of:
Aggregate 
Aid Flow
Aggregate Aid Flow to Jordan 
As Percentage of
Inports
Hinus
Aggregate
Aid
Imports 
of Mer- 
chand— 
ise
Exports 
of Mer- 
chand*- 
ise
Balance
of
Goods
Balance 
of Goods 
and
Services
to Jordan Imports
of
Merchand­
ise
Balance 
of Goods 
and
Services
Foreign
Exchange
Reserves
Period Inports Export Goods Goods 
and
Service!
1950 13.48 1.95 -11.53-10.70 4.799 35.6 246.1 41.6 44.9 9.099 67.5 85.0 4.381
1951 16.18 2.00 -14.18-13.35 6.625 40.9 331.2 46.7 49.6 12.310 76.1 92.2 - 3.870
1952 17.15 2.11 -15.04-13.81 8.411 49.0 400.5 55.9 60.9 15.458 90.1 111.9 118.8 1.692
1953 18.21 2.66 -15.55-13.99 10.516 57.7 395.3 67.6 75.2 17.857 98.1 127.6 120.2 0.353
1954 18.59 3.05 -15.54-12.88 11.637 62.5 381.5 74.9 90.3 18.993 102.1 147.5 109.0 -0.403
1955 25.26 3.54 -21.72-18.55 9.921 39.2 280.2 45.7 53.5 13.864 54.9 74.7 64.6 11.396
1956 24.61 5.11 -19.50-16.4^ 10.540 42.8 206.2 54.1 64.1 18.815 76.5 114.4 74.7 5.795
1957 29.76 5.48 -24.28-23.22 7.229 24.2 131.9 28.8 31.1 17.009 57.2 73.3 63.4 12.751
1958 33.92 3.43 -30.49-24.81 16.182 47.7 471.7 53.1 65.2 22.009 64.9 88.7 71.5 11.911
1959 39.26 3.35 -35.91-33.25 18.699 47.6 558.1 52.1 56.2 25.000 63.7 75.2 82.5 14.260
1960 41.43 3.95 -37.48-28.8 18.895 45.6 478.3 50.4 65.6 25.813 62.3 89.6 83.7 15.617
1961 40.93 5.2 7 -35.66-25.5 18.938 46.2 359.3 53.1 74.3 26.092 63.7 102.3 75.9 14.838
1962 43.51 5.92 -37.59-26.9 17.395 39.9 293.8 46.3 64.7 24.523 56.4 91.2 59.8 18.987
1963 53.63 6.56 -47.07-36.1 17.420 32.4 265.5 37.0 48.3 24.646 46.0 68.3 70.3 28.984
1964 49.40 8.73 -40.60-24.4 21.234 42.9 243.2 52.3 87.0 28.665 58.0 117.5 54.2 20.735
1965 55.80 9.91 -45.90-26.9 19.027 34.0 191.9 41.5 70.7 27.780 49.8 . 103.3 45.6 28.02
1966 67.30 10.40 -56.90-35.5 17.945 26.6 172.5 31.5 50.5 ¡26.264 39.0 74.0 38.5 41.036
1967 54.20 11.33 -42.90-27.8 44.097 81.3 389.2 102.8 158.6 ¡54.301 100.2 195.3 58.0 -0.101
1968 57.30 14.26 -43.0 -44.4 45.258 78.9 317.3 105.3 101.9 ¡52.177 91.1 117.5 4 17 5.123
1969 67.54 14.75 -52.79-63.07 43.053 63.7 291.8 81.6 68.3 ¡48.078 71.2 76.2 48.3 19.462
1970 65.53 12.17 -53.36-46.58 37.497 57.2 308.1 70.3 80.5 *44.229 67.5 95.0 45.1 21.301
1971 76.19 11.44 -64.75-58.17 42.372 55.6 370.3 65.4 72.8 53.144 69.8 . 91.4 5 7.2 23.046
1972 94.88 17.01 -77.87-68.99 55.845 58.8 328.3 71.7 80.9 65. 710 69.3 95.2 65.3 29.17
Average 3
1950-59 44.7 340.3 52.2 59.1 75.1 99.1 88.1
Average 3
1960-66 38.2 286.4 44.6 65.9 53.6 92.3 61.1
Average Z
1967-72 65.9 334.2 82.9 93.8 78.2 111.8 53.6
Average Z
1960-72 51.0 308.4 62.2 78.8 64.9 101.3 57.7
Average Zj
1950-72 48.3 322.3 57.9 70.2 69.4 100.3 69.3
Source: (1) Appendix I, Tables 10 and 11.
(ii) Appendix I, Table 1.
(iii) Data on foreign exchange were collected froa: (a) I.M.F., I.F.S.. (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., n.d.), supplement to 1963-1964, 
p. 138. This covers data pertaining to the years 1952 until 1962; I.M.F., I.F.S., (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., n.d.),
Vol. 23, So. 3. It covers data pertaining to the period 1963- 1968; (b) Central Bank of Jordan,
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 8, August 1973. It covers data pertaining to the period 1968-1972.
Note: * Average for 1952-1959; * Average for 1952-1972.
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TABLE 11
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON DOMESTIC SAVINGS
Formula Foreign Aid Flow Definition of Inter- Regression Co-efficients 2 T.Values "ime Years
^Definitions) Domestic Savings cept of Explanatory Variables R D.W. W i e s
(a) V 1 V 2 V 3 jr Cross Section 
ountry1 .
DSt - a+bYt+cAt+dXt 
l . U ) :
Actual Aid Dis­
bursements
Current Expend­
itures Minus 
Current Revenues 
af both Public 
and Private
Sectors(E -R ) c c
- 5 .1 2 0 .0 2 8( 0 .1 1 ) - 0 .3 1 8( 0 .2 6 ) 0 .3 2( 0 .4 8 ) 0 .2 0 2 .6 5 0 .2 5 0.32 0 .6 7 r . s . 1 9 5 4 -1972
3S - a+bY +cA +dX
C C U b >
Actual Aid Dis­
bursements
Set Investment 
Minus Deficit on 
Current Account
-1 0 .6 9 0 .0 2( 0 .1 3 ) - 0 .3 9( 0 .3 0 0 .1 1( 0 .5 5 ) 0 .164 1.78S 0 .6 3 1 .2 ^ 0.21 r . s . 1954-19722 .
Bst - a+bYt+cA£+dXt
Imports of Goods 
and Services 
Minus Exports of 
Goods and Services 
(M-X)
Net Investment 
Minus Deficit on 
Current Account
8 .7 3 0 .1 4 8( 0 .0 8 ) - 0 .6 0 8( 0 .1 7 ) - 0 .0 5( 0 .3 9 ) 0 .4 9 1 .7 6 1 .8 5 3 .5 5 0 .1 3 : r . s . 1 9 5 4 -1972
3 .
)st- a+bYtîcAt 3 (a)s
Deficit on Curr­
ent Account 
(M-X)
Set Investment . 
Minus Deficit on 
Current Account
- 1 1 .5 7 0 .0 9( 0 .0 3 ) - 0 .3 0 7( 0 .1 6 ) 0 .3 9 2 .3 2 .7 1.86 r . s . 1 9 5 4 -1972
Dst - a+bYt_1+cAt3 .  (b) : Actual Disburse­ments Net Investment Minus Deficit on Current Account -4.8 0 .0 4( 0 .0 5 ) - 0 .1 9( 0 .2 6 ) 0 .0 4 2 .3 0.7 0 .8 r . s . 1954-1972
^•DSt - a+bAt Deficit on Curr­ent Account 
(M-X)
Net Investment 
iiinus Deficit on 
Current Account
1 7 .3 2 - 1 .0 8( 0 .1 3 ) 0 .7 7 1 .3 2 7 .7 r . s . 1954-1972
4(b):x c  Yt Actual Disburse­ments E - R c c 6 .2 - 0 .4 6( 0 .2 5 ) 0 .1 6 2 .3 1 1 .8 r . s . 1 9 5 4 -1972
DSt a+bA. m r \ — L  ££. 4.Cc);
*t___________
Actual Disburse­
ments
Net Investment 
Minus (M-X )
8.87 - 0 .7 7( 0 .3 1 ) 0 .2 6 1 .8 2.47 r . s . 19 5 4 -1972
Key to notations;
DS “ Domestic Savings.
A  ”  F o r e i g n  A i d .
T  »  G r o s s  N a t i o n a l  I n c o m e .
X  -  E x p o r t s .
N o t e s :  F i g u r e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s
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THE IMPACT OF FORE I C N AID  FLOW OH C FOWTH
1954-1972
—
FORMULA Definition 
of Foreign 
Aid Flow
Definition 
if Domestic 
Savings
Inter
cepe
| Regression Co-efficients of Explanatory 
Variahte* D.W
T. Values rr me
cries
Cross
Years
l _ h vi vi V5 V6 V7 $
1. X A  CDP-a+b D.S. b Grant 
CDP GDP
d Loan«
CDP
Actual Dis­
bursements
Current Exp­
enditures 
Minus Currei 
Revenues 
(Public and 
Private)
-0.41 1.02
(0.46)
0.76
(0.55)
-1.34
(1.41)
0.26 1.J7 2.19 .37 3.94 rime 
1er ies
(T.S.)
•.a.
19 34 
to 
1972
1954
to
1972
l.â.X A  CDP-a*b D.S. b 
GDP
Cranta fd Loans 
CDP CDP
Actual Dis­
bursements
Net Invest­
ment Minus 
(M-X)
0.82 -O.f ’ 0.81 -1.64 5.15 2.41 1.49 3.21 1.03
2. X Æ CDP-a*b D.S. C 
CDP
Aggregate Aid Flow 
CDP
Actual Dis­
bursements
E -R c c •0.54 0.815(0.44)
0.53
(0.54)
3.17 2.1 1.8 .98 r.R. 1954
to
1972
2.«.X ACDP-a+b D.S. C 
CDP
Agg. Aid Flow 
CDP
Actual Dis­
bursements
Net invest­
ment Minus 
(M-X)
2.5 -0.32
(0.38)
0.38
(0.61)
3.04 2.37 0.85 .62 r.s. 1954
to
1972
3. X ACDP-a*b D.S. C 
CDP 4
Aid to the Public Sector 
CDP
Actual Dis­
bursements
10.3 0.65
(0.45)
0.0B
(0.66)
D. 13 2.2 1.4 3.128
— —
r.s. 1934
to
1972
1934
to
1972
3.1.2 A  CDP«a*b D.S. C 
CDP *
Aid to the Public Sector 
CDP
Actual Dis­
bursements
Net Invest­
ment Minus 
(M-X)
14.4 -0.18
(0.34)
0.22
(0.65)
D.03 2.6 0.54 Ï.32 T.S.
4, X AC0P«a*D.S. |bCrant«| 
CDP CDP 
Loans«Expand.on Educ. 
CDP CDP * 
ExportSfV.A.Manufact.
CDP CUP 
V.A.Agriculture 
CDP
Actual Dis­
bursements
E -F c c 55.3 0.150.54)
0.72
(0.67)
-3.3
(1.48)
-7.1
(7.6ÿ
3.4
1.48)
1.18
(1.85)
1.85
(0.9)
13.68 1.95 0.24 .0 2.2 0.94 7.3
2.27
0.6
0.64
2.0 r.s.
T.S.
1954
to
1972
1954
to
1972
4.1.X A  CDP-atD.S.^bGrants^ 
CDP CDP 
Loans«Expend.on Educ. 
CDP ’ GDP 
Exports«V.A. Manufact, 
CDP CD?
V.A. Agriculture 
CDP
Actual Dis­
bursements
Net Invest­
ment Minus 
(M-X)
£1.59 -o.io
(0.37)
0.73
0.65)
3.4
1.48)
6.8
7.47)
.4
.49)
1.18
(1.84)
1.9-
(0.6)
3.68
)
1.9 0.25 .11 z . (7.91
5. Y “ a*b At 
< »,
Actual Dis­
bursements
8.18 0.05
(0.79)
1.001 2.8 0.11 T.S. 1954
to
J , V * * b ^ Deficit onCurrent
Account
12.7 0.13
(0.40)
>.oo< 2.7 0.32
—
T.S. 1954 
to
6> TPr- a»b At Actual Dis­
bursements
9.7 -0.12
(0.17)
>.03 2.9 0.679 T.S. 1954 
to
6a. Yp - a*b Ae )cficit on
Current
Account
10.12*0.12
(0.17)
3.03 7.9 0.679 T.S. 1954 
to
’• v " > 4 > Actual Dis­bursements
18.8 0.37
(0.18)
>.21 2.6 2.0 T.S. 1954 
to
7a. Ypf- a«b A< Deficit on
Current
Account
16.11 -0.27
(0.20)
3.11 2.5 1.35 T.S. 1954 
to
8. Ï - a*b A, 
» Kt
Actual Dis- 
>ursemcnts
49.5 0.15
(0.17)
3.05 0.87 0.916 T.S. 1934 
to
8a. Y - a*b A 
£ \
Isficit on
Current
Account
1.2! 0.14
(0.25)
0.02 2.89 0.55 T.S. 1954 
to
9. Yt • a«b Ax  
POP M
Actual Dis- 
>urscmcnts
02.5 -0.49
(0.36)
[>.09 0.36 1.3 T.S. 1954 
to
9.«.Yl " tt.
pop M
Deficit on
Current
Account
55.2 -1.38
(0.43)
0.37 0.45 3.17 T.S. 1954 
to 
1972
Key to dotation»:
D.S. Do most ic savings.
Annual rate of growth in C.N.P.C u r re n t C .N .P .
Annual current disbursements of foreign aid. 
Anneal rate of growth of percapita income. 
Annual current imports of good* and services. 
Annual total of population-
• Figure« in parentheses ■ «tandard error«.
TABLE 13
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION
1954-1972
Definition of [intercept Regression Coefficient Time Series Years
Formula Foreign Aid Flow of Explanatory Variables 9 T. Values or Cross-
V1 V2 V3 R2 D.W » Country
1. GDCFfc= a+bYt+cAt Deficit on Current -9.18 0.13 0.428 3.89 1.76 3.6 2.7 T.S. 1954-
account (0.03) (0.15) 1972
2. GDCFt= a+Yf._.+cA1. Deficit on Current-12.1 0.09 0.72 3.88 2.3 2.6 4.19 T.S. 1954-
account (0.03) (0.17) 1972
2a.GDCFt= a+Yt-j+cA,- Actual Disburse- -6.4 0.16 0.31 3.75 2.3 2.0 0.99 T.S. 1954-
ments (0.06) (0.30) 1972
3. GDCF = a+bA.+CÄGDP Deficit on current -3.75 0.83 0.17 0.69 1.7 5.5 0.88 T.S. 1954-L t account (0.15) (0.19) 1972
4. GDCF = a+bA +cM+d A  GDP Actual Disburse- -12.4 0.02 0.59 0.23 0.93 1.2 0.11 7.4 l. 5 T.S. 1954-c t ments (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) 1972
4a• GDCF =a+bA„+cM+d 4 GDP Deficit on current -9.76 -0.05 0.58 0.20 0.94 1.45 0.37 7.4 1 . 2 T.S. 1954-c t account (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) 1972
5. GDCF = a+bA+cM+d AGDP Actual Disburse- -13.8 0.47 0.37 0.31 0.95 1.65 2.0 3.19 3.5 T.S. 1954-Z C ments (0.22) (0.11) (0.08) 1972
6. GDCFt= a+bA,_ ,+d ¿ÆDP Actual Disburse- -13.5 1.16 0.42 0.92 1.96 L2.0 4.0 T.S. 1954-
ments (0.09) (0.09) 1972
Key to notations
G.D.C.F
Y
ÛG.D.P.
M
= Gross domestic capital formation 
= G r o s s  domestic income (G.D.P.).
= Absolute change in G.D.P.
= Total Annual Importa.
= Current annual foreign aid.
Figures in parentheses equal standard errors.
u sV£>
Note
TABLE 14
AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION AND FOREIGN AID 
1954-1972
Formula Definition of 
Foreign Aid Flow
tercept Regression Co-efficient 
of Explanatory Variables R2' D.W.
T. Values fears Time Series 
or Cross- 
CountryV1 V2 V3
33.37 0.04 11.3 0.99 2.26 0.7 18.1 L954- T.S.
(0.05) (0.62) L972
39.8 0.18 10.02 0.98 CO• 0.78 3.6 L954- T.S.
(0.24) (2.77) L972
32.8 3.8 0.83 l.ll 9.0 L954- T.S.
(0.42) 1972
29.6 . 4.19 0.78 1.2 7.56 L954- T.S.
(0.55) L972
31.7 -0.003 0.41 10.8 0.996 2.7 0.16 2.3 L7.91954- T.S.
(0.05) (0.17) (0.60) ^972
32.3 0.034 11.0 0.18 0.99 2.47 0.63 15.3 0.9:1954- T.S.
(0.05) (0.19) (0.72) :972
38.8 0.06 0.42 10.5 0.987 1.88 0.2 1.3 3.8 .954- T.S.
(0.26) (0.31) (2.7) L972
19.5 1.03 0.24 0.97 2.87 10.2 0.55 :954- T.S.
(0.10) (0.34) .972
20.7 1.078 0.972 2.79 23.4 .954- T.S.
(0.04) .972
44.3 12.12 0.98 1.56 31.6 .954- T.S.
(0. 34) .972
1. C - a+b (GNP-T)+ct 
2 m  C * a+b (GNP T)+ct
t-1
o C ■ a+b A.j* t
4* C ■ a+b A^ ._^  
5 . C » a+b (GNP-•T)+cAt+
dt
6. C » a+b (GNP-T)+cA(
+dt
7. C « a+b (GNP-T)+cA
t-:
8. C = a+b (gI
9. C = a+b (GNP 
10-C = a+bt
t-1 «  
'T)+cAt-l
-T)t-1
Acutal
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Disbursements
Disbursements
Disbursements
Disbursements
Disbursements
Disbursements
Disbursements
Disbursements
Key to Notations;
T » Total annual tax revenues, 
t * Time
At«= Current annual foreign aid flow.
C * Aggregate consumption expenditures (private and public) 
Note? Figures in parentheses = standard errors.
3
9
8
TABLE 15
IMPORTS AND THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF IMPORTED FOOD PRODUCTS
1959-1972
VALUES IN MILLIONS OF JORDANIAN DINARS
Time
Item3"~--~^_ 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Average 1959-1972
1. Aggregate 
Imports 39.3 41.4 40.9 43.5 53.6 49.4 55.8 67.3 54.2 57.3 67.5 65.5 76.2 94.9 57.6
2. Imports of 
Food 
Products 12.0 13f 4 10.5 9.3 12.4 14.2 15.0 18.2 14.1 16.2 18.1 18.9 21.5 27.6 17.2
3. Imports of 
Consumer 
Goods 27.3 28.6 27.6 27.9 32.9 34.8 34.6 42.2 29.6 29.4 34.7 38.4 44.4 60.8 35.2
4. Ratio of 2 
to 1 30.6 26,0 26.0 21.4 25.3 28.0 27.0 27.0 26.0 28.0 26.7 28.7 28.1 29.0 27.03
5. Ratio of 2 to 3 44.0 46.9 38.0 33.3 37.7 40.8 43.4 43.1 47.6 55.1 52.2 49.2 48.4 45.4 44.7
Source: (i) With regard to aggregate imports,see Appendix I, Table 10.
(ii) With regard to food imports,see (a) Appendix I, Table 11. (b) U. Nations. United Nations Yearbook 
• of International Trade Statistics, (New York: U.N., 1963). (For data relevant to the period 
1961-1963 only.)
(iii) Jordan Department of Statistics, Flow of Goods in the Jordanian Economy (Imports),(Amman: Department 
of Statistics Press, April 1970); For data relevant to the period 1971-1972, data were collected from 
the Jordan Department of Statistics, unpublished report. (In Arabic).
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